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The	  focus	  of	  this	  study	  is	  the	  formation	  of	  legal	  professional	  identity	  and	  the	  manner	  and	  extent	  
to	  which	  representations	  of	  legal	  professionals	  in	  classroom	  talk	  could	  feature	  in	  and	  be	  studied	  
as	  part	  of	  this	  process.	  Eclipsed	  for	  many	  years	  by	  the	  need	  to	  teach	  students	  to	  ‘think	  like	  
lawyers’,	  professional	  identify	  formation	  is	  increasingly	  acknowledged	  as	  a	  legitimate	  concern	  
of	  legal	  educationalists.	  This	  entails	  expanding	  the	  sphere	  of	  legal	  education	  beyond	  the	  
cognitive	  aspects	  of	  the	  discipline	  of	  law	  to	  encompass	  inculcation	  of	  the	  purposes	  and	  values	  
of	  the	  profession	  but	  also,	  more	  broadly,	  an	  appreciation	  of	  the	  forms	  of	  power	  legal	  
professionals	  exercise,	  the	  forms	  of	  work	  they	  undertake,	  the	  relationships	  they	  establish	  and	  
maintain,	  and	  the	  social	  profile	  of	  the	  profession	  they	  advocate	  for	  or	  accept.	  The	  study	  
assumes	  an	  understanding	  of	  legal	  professional	  identity	  formation	  as	  a	  pervasive	  and	  implicit	  
process	  of	  socialization	  that	  occurs	  irrespective	  of	  whether	  professional	  identity	  has	  been	  
posited	  as	  a	  particular	  pedagogical	  object	  or	  not.	  It	  puts	  forward	  the	  thesis	  that	  representations	  
of	  legal	  professionals	  in	  classroom	  talk	  constitute	  part	  of	  the	  socialization	  process.	  It	  presents	  a	  
theoretical	  model	  for	  understanding	  the	  significance	  of	  such	  representations	  in	  processes	  of	  
identity	  formation,	  linking	  them	  to	  an	  understanding	  of	  ‘identity	  regulation’	  that	  revolves	  
around	  the	  concepts	  ‘role’	  and	  ‘discourse’.	  It	  further	  invokes	  the	  resources	  of	  critical	  discourse	  
analysis	  and,	  in	  particular,	  the	  work	  of	  Van	  Leeuwen,	  to	  develop	  a	  set	  of	  appropriate	  analytical	  
codes	  modeled	  on	  key	  elements	  of	  social	  practice	  for	  analyzing	  representational	  meanings	  
relating	  to	  legal	  professionals	  in	  classroom	  talk.	  The	  development	  of	  the	  codes	  is	  undertaken	  
through	  an	  iterative	  process	  that	  engages	  with	  a	  complete,	  verbatim	  transcription	  of	  classroom	  
talk	  in	  an	  introductory	  six-­‐month	  course	  on	  law	  at	  a	  tertiary	  institution.	  The	  study	  concludes	  
that	  a	  discursive,	  analytical	  approach	  to	  studying	  representational	  meanings	  relating	  to	  legal	  
professionals	  in	  classroom	  talk	  and,	  in	  particular,	  a	  micro-­‐discursive	  point	  of	  entry	  modeled	  on	  
key	  elements	  of	  social	  practice,	  is	  useful	  and	  appropriate	  for	  apprehending	  the	  richness	  of	  the	  
representational	  meanings.	  Such	  an	  approach	  allows	  for	  a	  grounded	  identification	  of	  themes	  
that	  can	  then	  be	  compared	  to	  claims	  made	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  legal	  professionalism	  and	  the	  
teaching	  of	  legal	  ethics.	  It	  also	  concludes	  that	  because	  the	  representation	  of	  legal	  professionals	  
in	  classroom	  talk	  overlaps	  with	  the	  power	  relations	  of	  the	  classroom,	  they	  should	  be	  regarded	  
as	  a	  significant	  source	  of	  identity	  regulation	  and	  thus	  used	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  is	  both	  reflective	  
and	  constructive.	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INTRODUCTION	  TO	  THE	  STUDY	  
	  
1.	   THE	  ORIGIN	  OF	  THE	  RESEARCH	  JOURNEY	  	  
This	  study	  is	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  formation	  of	  legal	  professional	  identity	  and	  
the	  representation	  of	  legal	  professionals	  and	  their	  social	  practices	  in	  classroom	  talk.	  When	  I	  
first	  started	  teaching	  law	  at	  a	  tertiary	  institution	  in	  South	  Africa	  nine	  years	  ago	  I	  was	  
passionately	  energized	  by	  the	  thought	  of	  equipping	  young	  people	  with	  the	  tools	  they	  would	  
require	  to	  secure	  justice,	  to	  right	  the	  wrongs	  of	  society,	  to	  defend	  the	  downtrodden.	  The	  simple	  
imperatives	  from	  the	  text	  of	  my	  faith	  captured	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  lawyer-­‐ideal1	  that	  gripped	  my	  
imagination:	  ‘Seek	  justice,	  encourage	  the	  oppressed.	  Defend	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  fatherless,	  plead	  
the	  case	  of	  the	  widow’2	  so	  that	  justice	  might	  ‘roll	  on	  like	  a	  river,	  righteousness	  like	  a	  never-­‐
failing	  stream’.3	  In	  the	  classroom,	  however,	  though	  this	  was	  the	  ethos	  I	  wanted	  to	  impart,	  I	  felt	  
curiously	  constrained	  to	  do	  so	  by	  what	  I	  had	  to	  teach	  –	  the	  kinds	  of	  questions	  deemed	  
appropriate	  for	  lawyers	  to	  ask	  and	  the	  way	  lawyers	  reason	  about	  them	  –	  as	  well	  as	  strongly-­‐
embedded	  cultural	  assumptions	  about	  the	  type	  of	  people	  lawyers	  are	  and	  the	  opportunities	  
that	  existed	  for	  them	  to	  make	  a	  living.	  As	  someone	  who	  had	  never	  practiced	  as	  a	  lawyer	  in	  the	  
conventional	  sense,4	  I	  began	  to	  worry	  that	  the	  lawyer-­‐ideal	  which	  inspired	  me	  as	  a	  teacher	  was	  
both	  naïve	  and	  academic.	  It	  was	  a	  discouragement	  for	  me	  to	  think	  that	  my	  teaching	  was	  in	  
some	  way	  contributing	  to	  students	  becoming	  kinds	  of	  people	  quite	  different	  to	  my	  ideal:	  People	  
who	  seek	  not	  so	  much	  justice	  as	  the	  best	  technical,	  winning	  argument;	  who	  are	  not	  concerned	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  use	  the	  term	  ‘lawyer’	  (a	  generic	  term	  in	  South	  Africa	  that	  encompasses	  different	  types	  of	  legal	  
professional)	  and	  ‘legal	  professional’	  interchangeably.	  In	  my	  study	  of	  talk	  about	  legal	  professionals	  in	  the	  
classroom,	  however,	  I	  distinguish	  between	  the	  various	  types	  of	  legal	  professional	  in	  addition	  to	  studying	  the	  use	  of	  
‘lawyer’	  as	  a	  generic	  term.	  	  
2	  Isaiah	  1:17	  Life	  Application	  Study	  Bible	  NIV	  (1988)	  Tyndale	  House	  Publishers.	  	  
3	  Ibid,	  Amos	  5:24.	  	  
4	  As	  outlined	  in	  greater	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  Three,	  I	  have	  not	  completed	  articles	  to	  become	  an	  attorney	  nor	  pupilage	  
to	  become	  an	  advocate,	  I	  have	  not	  served	  as	  a	  public	  prosecutor	  or	  state	  attorney,	  I	  have	  never	  formally	  counseled	  




with	  questions	  of	  right	  and	  wrong	  but	  with	  the	  correct	  legal	  authority;	  and	  who	  would	  only	  be	  
prepared	  to	  take	  up	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  ‘fatherless’	  and	  the	  ‘widow’	  insofar	  as	  they	  were	  able	  to	  
pay	  for	  the	  service.	  But	  it	  did	  set	  me	  off	  to	  wondering	  about	  the	  professional	  identities	  of	  
lawyers	  and	  how	  they	  are	  formed:	  Whether	  they	  were	  in	  some	  way	  given	  by	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  
discipline	  or	  whether	  they	  were	  socially	  constituted	  and,	  if	  the	  latter,	  what	  I	  could	  do	  as	  a	  
teacher	  to	  shift	  or	  at	  least	  diversify	  the	  stereotypes	  that	  always	  seemed	  to	  be	  lurking	  in	  the	  
wings	  of	  my	  classroom	  performance.	  	  
Also,	  from	  a	  personal	  perspective,	  from	  a	  young	  age	  I	  have	  been	  aware	  of	  the	  potential	  for	  
language	  to	  shape	  identity.	  As	  a	  young	  girl	  and	  then	  woman,	  I	  would	  tend	  to	  adopt	  the	  manner	  
of	  speaking,	  the	  naming	  and	  allocation,	  the	  forms	  of	  interaction	  and	  the	  turns	  of	  phrase	  of	  the	  
individuals	  and	  groups	  with	  whom	  I	  entered	  into	  relationship.	  For	  instance,	  when	  I	  accepted	  the	  
Christian	  faith	  at	  the	  age	  of	  twenty-­‐six,	  I	  very	  quickly	  learned	  how	  to	  be	  a	  ‘good’	  Christian	  
according	  to	  the	  group	  with	  whom	  I	  worshiped.	  I	  learned	  how	  things	  and	  people	  were	  
appropriately	  named	  and	  how	  qualities	  were	  allocated	  among	  them.	  I	  learned	  how	  to	  pepper	  
my	  expressions	  of	  hope	  with	  the	  tag	  ‘God	  willing’	  or	  to	  preface	  my	  sharing	  of	  a	  good	  event	  with	  
a	  ‘Praise	  the	  Lord!’.	  I	  learnt	  the	  intricacies	  of	  the	  ritual	  of	  group	  prayer:	  When	  it	  was	  
appropriate	  to	  pray,	  what	  to	  say,	  how	  to	  say	  it,	  and	  the	  linguistic	  modalities	  of	  many	  other	  
interactions.	  In	  all	  these	  linguistic	  performances	  I	  was	  not	  only	  demonstrating	  a	  desire	  to	  
belong,	  but	  also	  bidding	  to	  be	  recognized	  and	  affirmed	  by	  key	  insiders.	  And	  this	  was	  all	  
premised	  on	  those	  who	  had	  modeled,	  who	  had	  represented	  to	  me,	  the	  kind	  of	  language	  used	  
by	  a	  ‘good’	  Christian	  in	  that	  group	  and	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  world	  was	  discursively	  
constructed	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  Christian	  frame	  of	  reference.	  Many	  years	  ago	  George	  Herbert	  Mead	  
wrote:	  ‘We	  divide	  ourselves	  up	  in	  all	  sorts	  of	  different	  selves	  with	  reference	  to	  our	  
acquaintances.	  We	  discuss	  politics	  with	  one	  and	  religion	  with	  another.	  There	  are	  all	  sorts	  of	  
different	  selves	  answering	  to	  all	  sorts	  of	  different	  social	  reactions’	  (1934:	  142).	  Suffice	  to	  say	  
that	  I	  have	  probably	  felt	  this	  division	  of	  self,	  and	  the	  change	  in	  the	  patterning	  of	  language	  it	  
entailed,	  more	  acutely	  than	  most.	  This	  not	  only	  led	  to	  an	  enhanced	  sensitivity	  to	  how	  language	  




rich	  and	  complex	  ways	  in	  which	  language	  functions	  to	  constitute	  identity	  and,	  in	  particular,	  the	  
ways	  in	  which	  classroom	  talk	  constitutes	  legal	  professional	  identity.	  
2.	   OUTLINING	  THE	  PROBLEM	  SPACE	  	  
2.1	   Legal	  professional	  identity	  as	  a	  research	  focus	  	  
Until	  very	  recently,	  the	  literature	  on	  legal	  education	  in	  leading	  Anglophone	  countries	  (the	  
United	  States	  of	  America,	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  Canada	  and	  Australia)	  bears	  no	  mention	  of	  
professional	  identity	  as	  a	  concept.	  There	  has	  been	  much	  written	  about	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘identity	  
crisis’	  (Rule,	  1987:	  249)	  of	  law	  schools,5	  but	  this	  invokes	  the	  (still	  debated)	  issue	  of	  how	  legal	  
academic	  training	  at	  tertiary	  institutions	  relates	  to	  and	  is	  integrated	  with	  the	  subsequent	  
practical	  training	  provided	  by	  the	  legal	  profession:	  Whether	  legal	  education	  is	  a	  ‘liberal	  
education’	  akin	  to	  a	  degree	  in	  the	  humanities,	  or	  a	  specialized	  technical	  education	  specifically	  
geared	  to	  preparing	  students	  for	  practice.6	  The	  poles	  in	  this	  debate	  were	  famously	  defined	  by	  
Twining	  (1967)	  who	  introduced	  the	  enduring	  metaphors	  of	  ‘Pericles’	  and	  ‘the	  Plumber’.	  The	  
image	  of	  the	  lawyer	  as	  ‘plumber’	  was	  essentially	  of	  ‘someone	  who	  is	  master	  of	  certain	  
specialized	  knowledge,	  ‘the	  law’,	  and	  certain	  technical	  skills.	  What	  she	  needs	  is	  a	  no-­‐nonsense	  
specialized	  training	  to	  make	  her	  a	  competent	  technician.	  A	  ‘liberal’	  education	  in	  law	  for	  such	  a	  
person	  is	  at	  best	  wasteful,	  at	  worst	  ‘dangerous’	  (ibid:	  397).	  Contrasted	  with	  this,	  is	  the	  image	  of	  
the	  lawyer	  as	  Pericles	  –	  ‘the	  law-­‐giver,	  the	  enlightened	  policy-­‐maker,	  the	  wise	  judge’	  (ibid:	  398)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  For	  research	  outlining	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘identity	  crisis’	  of	  legal	  education,	  see	  Arthurs	  (1997);	  Bates	  (1981),	  (1984);	  
Blake	  (1987);	  Bridge	  (1975);	  Cownie	  (2004),	  75;	  Duncan	  (1991);	  Fitzgerald	  (1993);	  Lawton	  (1980);	  Leighton	  &	  
Sheinman	  (1986);	  MacFarlane,	  Jeeves	  &	  Boon	  (1987);	  and	  Rule	  (1987)	  in	  addition	  to	  all	  the	  articles	  in	  Birks	  (1996).	  
Articles	  on	  the	  South	  African	  perspective	  include	  Maharaj	  (1994);	  Motala	  (1996);	  and	  Woolman,	  Watson	  &	  Smith	  
(1997).	  
6	  In	  many	  of	  these	  countries,	  as	  in	  South	  Africa,	  the	  education	  of	  a	  legal	  professional	  is	  a	  responsibility	  shared	  
between	  tertiary	  educational	  institutions	  and	  the	  legal	  profession.	  In	  South	  Africa,	  In	  order	  to	  become	  an	  advocate	  
or	  an	  attorney	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  obtain	  a	  Bachelor	  of	  Laws	  (LL.B)	  degree	  –	  most	  commonly	  at	  a	  university	  law	  
school	  –	  before	  undertaking	  one	  of	  the	  various	  forms	  of	  practical	  legal	  training	  prescribed	  by	  the	  General	  Council	  
of	  the	  Bar	  or	  the	  Law	  Society	  of	  South	  Africa.	  An	  LL.B	  degree	  is	  also	  the	  minimum	  entry	  requirement	  for	  various	  
positions	  in	  the	  public	  service,	  such	  as	  the	  position	  of	  public	  prosecutor.	  	  Today,	  a	  compulsory	  period	  of	  academic	  
study	  is	  an	  essential	  step	  toward	  becoming	  a	  lawyer	  in	  most	  countries	  of	  the	  world.	  The	  LL.B	  degree	  is	  the	  principal	  
academic	  degree	  in	  law	  in	  most	  common-­‐law	  countries	  (i.e.	  England,	  Australia,	  Scotland	  and	  Turkey)	  (Sonsteng,	  
2008:	  14	  n	  63)	  and	  is	  an	  undergraduate	  degree.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  Juris	  Doctorate	  (J.D.)	  in	  the	  United	  States	  of	  
America	  is	  a	  3-­‐year	  postgraduate	  degree.	  Some	  countries	  are	  similar	  to	  South	  Africa	  in	  requiring	  a	  subsequent	  
period	  of	  vocational	  training	  under	  the	  organized	  profession	  after	  completion	  of	  the	  LL.B	  (for	  instance,	  the	  United	  
Kingdom	  –	  see	  Fitzgerald,	  1993:	  5	  –	  6).	  In	  others,	  most	  notably	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America	  students	  are	  not	  




–	  an	  image	  associated	  with	  the	  attributes	  of	  intellectual	  discipline,	  detachment,	  breadth	  of	  
perspective,	  an	  interest	  in	  human	  nature	  and	  a	  capacity	  for	  independent	  and	  critical	  thought	  
(ibid:	  398,	  425).7	  The	  most	  frequent	  response	  to	  this	  debate	  –	  and	  one	  which	  still	  leaves	  the	  
positioning	  between	  Pericles	  and	  the	  Plumber	  open	  –	  is	  that	  law	  schools	  exist	  ‘to	  teach	  
students	  to	  think	  like	  lawyers’	  (see	  Boon,	  2002:	  34;	  Mertz,	  2007:	  97	  –	  8;	  Willging	  &	  Dunn,	  1981–
2:	  307).	  A	  great	  deal	  of	  thought	  has	  thus	  been	  channeled	  into	  understanding	  the	  cognitive,	  
intellectual	  dimensions	  of	  being	  a	  lawyer;	  i.e.	  the	  skills	  of	  classification,	  analysis,	  and	  reasoning	  
that	  constitute	  legal	  epistemology.8	  This	  has	  largely	  been	  conceptualized	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  project	  
of	  developing	  legal	  reasoning,	  not	  of	  developing	  professional	  identity.	   
A	  year	  after	  I	  commenced	  this	  research	  the	  Carnegie	  Foundation	  for	  the	  Advancement	  of	  
Teaching	  and	  Learning	  published	  a	  report	  on	  legal	  education	  in	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America9	  
(henceforth	  the	  ‘Carnegie	  Study’)	  in	  which	  the	  concept	  of	  professional	  identity	  emerged	  as	  a	  
prominent	  focus.	  To	  my	  knowledge,	  it	  was	  the	  first	  time	  in	  which	  the	  concept	  as	  such	  had	  
played	  such	  a	  central	  role	  in	  a	  high-­‐level	  report	  on	  the	  legal	  profession	  and	  legal	  education	  in	  an	  
Anglophone	  jurisdiction.	  Essentially,	  the	  Carnegie	  Study	  calls	  for	  a	  reconceptualization	  of	  the	  
nature	  and	  scope	  of	  learning	  that	  takes	  place	  in	  professional	  schools	  in	  the	  United	  States	  of	  
America,	  including	  law	  schools.	  The	  common	  problem	  of	  professional	  education,	  the	  Study	  
maintains,	  is	  ‘to	  teach	  the	  complex	  ensemble	  of	  analytic	  thinking,	  skillful	  practice,	  and	  wise	  
judgment	  on	  which	  each	  profession	  rests’	  and	  not	  to	  focus	  exclusively	  on	  the	  cognitive	  
dimension	  (Sullivan	  et	  al.,	  2007:	  27).	  	  In	  order	  to	  tease	  out	  the	  implications	  of	  this	  changed	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  These	  tensions	  are	  also	  evident	  in	  a	  South	  African	  context.	  As	  noted	  by	  Pickett	  in	  the	  recent	  LLB	  Curriculum	  
Research	  Report	  (2010),	  law	  graduates	  may	  subsequently	  pursue	  a	  career	  as	  a	  legal	  practitioner,	  whether	  as	  
attorney,	  advocate,	  legal	  advisers	  in	  the	  public	  or	  private	  sectors,	  legal	  financial	  advisers,	  and	  so	  on.	  But	  they	  may	  
often	  move	  into	  fields	  in	  which	  they	  do	  not	  practice	  law	  at	  all,	  becoming	  politicians,	  or	  diplomats	  or	  working	  in	  
completely	  unrelated	  fields.	  For	  these	  students,	  the	  Report	  notes,	  the	  study	  of	  law	  serves	  as	  a	  ‘good	  liberal	  arts	  
education’	  (Pickett,	  2010:	  10).	  The	  LL.B	  degree	  thus	  has	  a	  ‘dual	  nature’,	  serving	  both	  as	  an	  academic	  discipline	  in	  
itself,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  ‘academic	  component’	  for	  entry	  into	  a	  variety	  of	  specialized	  legal	  professions	  (ibid).	  	  	  
8	  Mertz	  (2007)	  provides	  the	  most	  extensive	  recent	  account	  of	  the	  distinctive	  features	  of	  a	  legal	  epistemology,	  
though	  her	  research	  is	  limited	  to	  the	  context	  of	  legal	  training	  in	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America.	  We	  may	  therefore	  
admit	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  ‘legal	  epistemologies’	  rather	  than	  the	  singular	  form.	  
9	  The	  Carnegie	  Foundation’s	  study	  on	  the	  legal	  profession	  (Sullivan,	  et	  al	  Educating	  Lawyers:	  Preparation	  for	  the	  
Profession	  of	  Law,	  2007)	  was	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  comparative	  study	  of	  education	  in	  five	  professional	  fields	  (law,	  
engineering,	  the	  clergy,	  nursing	  and	  medicine).	  The	  series	  commenced	  with	  an	  essay	  on	  the	  nature	  and	  value	  of	  
the	  professions	  in	  American	  life	  (Sullivan,	  W.M.	  Work	  and	  Integrity:	  The	  Crisis	  and	  Promise	  of	  Professionalism	  in	  




perspective	  for	  professional	  education,	  the	  authors	  re-­‐appropriate	  the	  metaphor	  of	  
apprenticeship,10	  but	  extend	  it	  to	  the	  whole	  range	  of	  ‘imperatives’	  (ibid)	  confronting	  
professional	  education.	  To	  this	  end	  they	  identify	  three	  forms	  of	  apprenticeship	  which	  they	  
propose	  as	  a	  framework	  to	  structure	  legal	  education:	  The	  cognitive,	  the	  practical	  and	  the	  
apprenticeship	  of	  identity	  and	  purpose	  (which	  they	  also	  dub	  the	  ethical-­‐social)	  (ibid:	  13	  –	  14,	  27	  
–	  28,	  147).	  	  
The	  focus	  of	  the	  cognitive	  apprenticeship	  is	  on	  both	  the	  forms	  of	  analytical	  thinking	  
characteristic	  of	  lawyers	  and	  the	  formal	  knowledge	  base	  of	  the	  law	  (the	  particular	  legal	  
doctrines,	  principles	  and	  rules	  applicable	  within	  a	  particular	  country),	  on	  knowing	  how	  lawyers	  
‘think’	  (ibid:	  27).	  The	  content	  of	  this	  apprenticeship	  thus	  entails	  learning	  about	  legal	  doctrines,	  
principles	  and	  rules	  in	  order	  to	  grasp	  particular	  matters	  in	  terms	  of	  general	  principles.	  It	  
involves	  developing	  a	  legal	  lens	  to	  recontextualize	  the	  social	  world	  (ibid:	  13).	  In	  the	  United	  
States	  of	  America	  the	  cognitive	  apprenticeship	  most	  frequently	  occurs	  in	  a	  classroom	  setting	  
involving	  a	  large	  number	  of	  students	  and	  the	  use	  of	  the	  ‘case	  method’11	  and	  ‘Socratic	  
dialogue’12	  (ibid:	  28).	  This	  is	  dubbed	  the	  ‘case-­‐dialogue	  approach’	  and	  is	  elevated	  by	  the	  
Carnegie	  Study	  to	  the	  status	  of	  legal	  education’s	  ‘signature	  pedagogy’	  (ibid:	  50	  –	  84).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  The	  Carnegie	  Study	  defines	  ‘apprenticeship’	  as	  learning	  that	  happens	  when	  an	  expert	  is	  able	  to	  model	  
performance	  in	  such	  as	  way	  that	  the	  learner	  can	  imitate	  the	  performance,	  while	  the	  expert	  provides	  feedback	  to	  
guide	  the	  learner	  in	  making	  the	  activity	  his	  or	  her	  own	  (Sullivan	  et	  al,	  2007:	  26).	  The	  Carnegie	  Study’s	  use	  of	  the	  
concept	  ‘apprenticeship’	  of	  course,	  signifies	  a	  alignment	  with	  particular	  theories	  of	  teaching	  and	  learning,	  more	  
specifically,	  the	  situative	  or	  socio-­‐cultural	  approach	  advocated	  by	  Jean	  Lave,	  Etienne	  Wenger	  and	  others.	  	  
11	  According	  to	  traditional	  accounts,	  the	  ‘case	  method’	  of	  instruction	  at	  American	  law	  schools	  was	  introduced	  by	  
Harvard	  professor	  Christopher	  Columbus	  Langdell	  during	  the	  1870s.	  The	  method	  entails	  extracting	  core	  legal	  
principles	  from	  a	  reading	  of	  cases	  issued	  by	  appellate	  courts.	  It	  was	  intended	  as	  a	  method	  to	  establish	  law	  as	  a	  
science	  (Sonsteng,	  2008:	  16).	  Sonsteng	  goes	  on	  to	  note	  that	  the	  case	  method	  is	  the	  predominant	  method	  of	  
teaching	  most	  courses	  at	  nearly	  all	  law	  schools	  in	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America	  (ibid:	  16	  n	  84).	  While	  a	  
comprehensive	  study	  of	  the	  use	  of	  the	  case	  method	  in	  South	  African	  law	  schools	  has	  not	  been	  conducted,	  in	  the	  
experience	  of	  the	  researcher	  the	  case	  method	  is	  also	  used	  pervasively	  in	  South	  Africa.	  	  
12	  The	  introduction	  of	  ‘Socratic	  dialogue’	  into	  the	  law	  school	  classroom	  in	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America	  is	  attributed	  
to	  Theodore	  Dwight	  who	  worked	  at	  the	  Columbia	  School	  of	  Law	  (Sonsteng,	  2008:	  12).	  Sonsteng	  describes	  Socratic	  
dialogue	  as	  follows:	  ‘The	  Socratic	  method	  of	  instruction	  engaged	  students	  in	  continual	  conversation	  and	  required	  
them	  to	  distill	  the	  applicable	  rule	  of	  law	  from	  the	  superfluous	  facts	  of	  a	  case.	  The	  method	  motivated	  students	  to	  
reason	  rather	  than	  recite.’	  (ibid:	  16).	  Mertz	  identifies	  the	  following	  features	  as	  being	  distinctive	  of	  Socratic	  dialogue	  
(2007:	  44):	  (i)	  Extended	  questioning	  of	  a	  single	  student	  about	  a	  case	  assigned	  for	  that	  day	  (question/answer	  or	  
‘dialogic’	  form);	  (ii)	  Frequent	  interruption;	  (iii)	  Few	  (if	  any)	  answers	  provided;	  (iv)	  An	  insistence	  on	  close	  attention	  
to	  the	  language	  of	  cases;	  and	  (v)	  A	  challenging	  (if	  not	  hostile)	  tone.	  She	  further	  maintains	  that	  the	  dialogic	  form	  is	  
key	  to	  legal	  discourse	  (106).	  The	  ‘tacit	  epistemological	  lesson’	  that	  emerges	  from	  the	  dialogic	  form	  is	  that	  legal	  
truth	  emerges	  through	  argumentative	  dialogue	  (108).	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  this	  method	  is	  employed	  in	  South	  




The	  focus	  of	  the	  practical	  apprenticeship,	  in	  turn,	  is	  on	  practical	  skill	  or	  how	  lawyers	  ‘perform’	  
(ibid:	  27),	  knowing	  the	  forms	  of	  ‘expert	  practice	  shared	  by	  competent	  practitioners’	  (ibid:	  28).	  
This	  would	  include,	  for	  instance,	  knowing	  how	  to	  work	  with	  clients	  and	  how	  to	  practically	  
function	  in	  particular	  legal	  contexts.	  Learning	  in	  this	  second	  apprenticeship	  occurs	  
predominantly	  through	  simulating	  practice,	  which	  may	  range	  from	  simulated	  practice	  situations	  
or	  case	  studies	  in	  small	  groups,	  to	  standard	  ‘legal	  writing	  courses’,	  to	  ‘actual	  clinical	  experience	  
with	  real	  clients’	  (ibid:	  28,	  104	  –	  124).	  	  
The	  focus	  of	  the	  ethical-­‐social	  apprenticeship,	  finally,	  is	  ‘professional	  identity’	  which	  the	  
Carnegie	  Report	  notes	  is	  sometimes	  described	  as	  ‘professionalism’,	  ‘social	  responsibility’	  or	  
‘ethics’	  (ibid:	  14);	  i.e.	  on	  how	  lawyers	  ‘behave’	  (ibid:	  27).	  This	  apprenticeship	  ‘introduces	  
students	  to	  the	  purposes	  and	  attitudes	  that	  are	  guided	  by	  the	  values	  for	  which	  the	  professional	  
community	  is	  responsible’	  (ibid:	  28).	  It	  shares	  with	  the	  goals	  of	  a	  liberal	  education	  in	  law	  an	  
attempt	  ‘to	  provide	  a	  wide,	  ethically	  sensitive	  perspective	  on	  the	  technical	  knowledge	  and	  skill	  
that	  the	  practice	  of	  law	  requires’	  (ibid).	  Elsewhere	  the	  Carnegie	  Study	  describes	  the	  content	  of	  
this	  apprenticeship	  as	  involving	  the	  areas	  of	  ‘professional	  ethics’	  (the	  professional	  rules	  of	  
conduct	  prescribed	  in	  particular	  jurisdictions)	  and	  ‘wider	  matters	  of	  morality	  and	  character’	  
(ibid:	  129).	  It	  is	  typically	  taught	  by	  a	  ‘continuum’	  of	  pedagogies	  (ibid:147):	  From	  discussion	  of	  
the	  ethical	  aspects	  of	  cases	  in	  class,	  to	  simulations	  of	  practice	  situations	  which	  raise	  ethical	  
issues,	  to	  work	  in	  legal	  clinics	  and	  internships	  that	  incorporate	  reflection	  on	  ethical	  aspects,	  to	  
dedicated	  courses	  on	  professional	  ethics	  (ibid:	  147	  –	  160).	  The	  ethical-­‐social	  apprenticeship	  
‘joins’	  the	  first	  two	  apprenticeships	  and	  serves	  as	  ‘the	  catalyst	  for	  an	  integrated	  legal	  education’	  
by	  elucidating	  the	  significance	  of	  learning	  legal	  analysis	  and	  acquiring	  practical	  skills	  (ibid:	  14).	  It	  
both	  legitimates	  the	  work	  of	  lawyers	  and	  serves	  as	  a	  source	  of	  inspiration.	  The	  Carnegie	  Study	  
found,	  however,	  that	  most	  aspects	  of	  the	  ethical-­‐social	  apprenticeship	  were	  subordinated	  ‘to	  
academic	  training	  in	  case-­‐dialogue	  method	  and	  contested	  as	  to	  their	  value	  and	  
appropriateness’	  (ibid:	  132).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
My	  own	  attempts	  to	  use	  this	  method	  over	  the	  years	  have	  been	  met	  with	  a	  mass	  resistance	  by	  students	  who	  simply	  
refuse	  to	  answer	  the	  questions	  posed.	  Colleagues	  from	  the	  same	  and	  different	  universities	  report	  similar	  
experiences.	  There	  may	  be	  various	  reasons	  for	  this	  phenomenon:	  The	  different	  levels	  of	  academic	  socialization	  of	  
South	  African	  students	  as	  compared	  to	  	  the	  American	  counterparts	  as	  well	  as	  different	  levels	  of	  cultural	  comfort	  




The	  Carnegie	  Report’s	  positioning	  of	  professional	  identity	  within	  the	  overall	  design	  of	  a	  legal	  
education	  can	  thus	  be	  graphically	  represented	  as	  follows:	  	  
	  
Figure	  1:	  Carnegie	  Report’s	  positioning	  of	  professional	  identity	  in	  legal	  education.13	  	  
The	  Carnegie	  Study	  is	  not	  alone	  in	  highlighting	  the	  importance	  of	  identity	  as	  a	  constituent	  
element	  of	  a	  framework	  for	  thinking	  about	  the	  teaching	  of	  practice	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  
university.	  Grossman’s	  et	  al	  (2009)	  cross-­‐professional	  study	  of	  methods	  courses	  aimed	  at	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 In	  South	  Africa,	  although	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘professional	  identity’	  has	  yet	  to	  enter	  the	  discourse	  of	  legal	  education,	  
there	  is	  a	  similar	  move	  towards	  seeing	  the	  LL.B	  less	  as	  a	  qualification	  based	  on	  knowledge	  of	  the	  law	  per	  se,	  and	  
more	  as	  one	  in	  which	  there	  should	  be	  a	  focus	  on	  a	  mix	  of	  knowledge,	  skills	  and	  attitudes.	  The	  recent	  LL.B	  
Curriculum	  Research	  Report	  	  found	  that	  there	  was	  ‘a	  great	  deal	  of	  commonality	  in	  the	  competencies	  which	  are	  
highly	  valued	  by	  law	  faculty	  and	  all	  types	  of	  legal	  practitioners’	  (Pickett,	  2010:	  161).	  The	  six	  competencies	  that	  
were	  highly	  valued	  by	  all	  respondents	  in	  the	  surveys	  were:	  (i)	  the	  ability	  to	  understand,	  analyze,	  investigate	  and	  
solve	  problems;	  (ii)	  proficiency	  in	  reading,	  writing	  and	  speaking	  English;	  (iii)	  ability	  to	  read	  and	  interpret	  statutes	  
and	  legal	  documents;	  (iv)	  ability	  to	  construct	  and	  communicate	  an	  argument;	  (v)	  understanding	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  
South	  African	  law	  and	  how	  they	  apply	  in	  practice;	  and	  (vi)	  research	  skills,	  both	  in	  general	  and	  specific	  to	  the	  
profession’	  (ibid).	  A	  second	  group	  of	  competencies	  –	  namely,	  ability	  to	  draft	  legal	  documents,	  skills	  in	  the	  practical	  
application	  of	  law,	  and	  understanding	  of	  legal	  ethics	  –	  although	  not	  listed	  in	  the	  top	  ten,	  were	  indicated	  as	  ‘very	  
important’	  by	  the	  overwhelming	  majority	  of	  respondents	  (ibid).	  With	  the	  emphasis	  thus	  falling	  on	  ‘high-­‐level	  or	  
generic	  skills’	  (ibid:	  162)	  (such	  as	  proficiency	  in	  reading,	  writing	  and	  speaking	  English	  or	  research	  skills),	  legal	  
knowledge,	  some	  more	  specific	  legal	  skills,	  and	  legal	  ethics	  (although	  this	  aspect	  was	  clearly	  overshadowed	  by	  the	  
greater	  emphasis	  on	  generic	  skills),	  this	  Report	  clearly	  shows	  that	  while	  there	  are	  significant	  differences	  arising	  
from	  the	  unique	  features	  of	  a	  South	  African	  context,	  there	  is	  widespread	  support	  in	  South	  Africa	  for	  moving	  away	  
from	  a	  ‘knowledge-­‐based	  curriculum’	  (ibid),	  to	  one	  that	  also	  focuses	  on	  other	  dimensions	  of	  legal	  education.	  There	  
is	  also	  evidence	  for	  this	  move	  in	  the	  limited	  South	  African	  literature	  on	  legal	  education	  (De	  Klerk,	  2006;	  De	  Klerk	  &	  




preparation	  of	  preachers,	  clinical	  psychologists	  and	  teachers,	  for	  instance,	  is	  undergirded	  by	  a	  
conviction	  that	  ‘[p]art	  of	  professional	  preparation	  involves	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  professional	  
identity’	  (2009:	  2059).	  This	  stems	  from	  their	  understanding	  of	  practice	  in	  complex	  domains	  as	  
involving	  ‘the	  orchestration	  of	  understanding,	  skill,	  relationship	  and	  identity	  to	  accomplish	  
particular	  activities	  with	  others	  in	  specific	  environments’	  (ibid).	  The	  three	  concepts	  they	  offer	  
for	  understanding	  the	  pedagogies	  of	  practice	  in	  professional	  education	  	  -­‐	  a	  schemata	  that	  might	  
serve	  to	  categorize	  the	  Carnegie	  Study’s	  ‘continuum	  of	  pedagogies’	  –	  are	  representations,	  
decompositions	  and	  approximations	  of	  practice,	  respectively	  (ibid:	  2058).	  Representations	  
comprise	  different	  ways	  of	  representing	  the	  practice	  in	  a	  professional	  education	  setting	  and	  
what	  these	  various	  representations	  make	  visible	  to	  novices.	  Decompositions	  involve	  breaking	  a	  
practice	  down	  into	  its	  constituent	  parts	  for	  teaching	  and	  learning	  purposes.	  Approximations	  
refer	  to	  opportunities	  for	  learners	  to	  engage	  in	  activities	  that	  are	  more	  or	  less	  proximal	  to	  the	  
practice	  being	  learned	  (ibid).	  By	  implication,	  pedagogies	  of	  representation,	  decomposition	  and	  
approximation	  of	  practice	  are	  potentially	  all	  useful	  for	  instigating	  the	  formation	  of	  professional	  
identity.	  	  
However,	  whereas	  both	  the	  Carnegie	  and	  the	  Grossman	  studies	  focus	  on	  identifying	  and	  
delineating	  the	  pedagogies	  by	  which	  professional	  identity	  is	  taught	  as	  a	  constituent	  element	  of	  
practice,	  I	  was	  more	  interested	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  professional	  identity	  as	  a	  process	  of	  
socialization.	  Instead	  of	  positioning	  professional	  identity	  as	  an	  ‘object’	  of	  particular	  pedagogies,	  
and	  evaluating	  these	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  varying	  degrees	  of	  effectiveness,	  I	  regarded	  
professional	  identity	  formation	  as	  a	  process	  that	  is	  both	  more	  pervasive	  and	  more	  implicit,	  
potentially	  linked	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  social	  phenomena.	  This	  is	  implied	  in	  the	  Carnegie	  Study	  when	  it	  
is	  claimed	  that	  the	  law	  school	  experience	  entails	  an	  ‘inevitable	  apprenticeship’	  (ibid:	  139)	  into	  
professional	  identity	  through,	  firstly,	  the	  tendency	  in	  the	  cognitive	  apprenticeship	  to	  massively	  
over-­‐emphasize	  the	  conceptual	  and	  procedural	  or	  ‘formal’	  aspects	  of	  legal	  reasoning	  while	  
marginalizing	  the	  ethical,	  moral	  or	  social	  implications	  of	  the	  disputes	  with	  which	  the	  law	  deals	  
(ibid:	  141),	  and	  secondly,	  by	  the	  moral	  culture	  or	  atmosphere	  of	  classrooms	  and	  the	  law	  school	  
campus	  more	  broadly	  (ibid:	  140).	  Students	  learn	  from	  ‘their	  relationships	  with	  particular	  faculty	  




in	  clinics,	  their	  pro	  bono	  work,	  externships,	  summer	  jobs,	  and	  other	  extracurricular	  activities’	  
(ibid).	  	  
Whilst	  not	  disputing	  that	  professional	  identity	  is	  also	  formed	  by	  such	  broad	  experiences	  and	  the	  
presences	  and	  absences	  of	  the	  cognitive	  apprenticeship,	  my	  initial	  intuition	  pointed	  to	  another	  
source	  of	  learning,	  a	  source	  situated	  in	  the	  legal	  classroom,	  but	  distinct	  from	  teaching	  about	  
law	  and	  legal	  reasoning,	  namely	  representations	  of	  legal	  professionals	  made	  by	  university	  law	  
lecturers	  in	  the	  classroom	  context.	  In	  the	  Grossman	  study,	  ‘representations’	  comprise	  
classroom	  experiences	  that	  provide	  novices	  with	  ‘opportunities	  to	  develop	  ways	  of	  seeing	  and	  
understanding	  professional	  practice’	  (2009:	  2065).	  These	  include	  direct	  observations	  of	  
professionals	  in	  the	  field,	  videos	  of	  practice	  situations	  or	  explications	  of	  technique,	  written	  
cases	  of	  practice	  such	  as	  the	  court	  cases	  used	  in	  law	  schools,	  and	  examples	  of	  ‘embodied	  
representations’	  (ibid:	  2066),	  being	  instances	  where	  the	  teacher	  speaks	  of	  experience	  as	  a	  
practitioner.	  My	  own	  idea	  of	  representations	  extended	  beyond	  these	  examples	  to	  include	  all	  
instances	  where	  the	  law	  lecturer	  talked	  about	  legal	  professionals	  and	  their	  social	  practices,	  
whether	  such	  talk	  was	  the	  focus	  of	  a	  particular	  pedagogy	  or	  not.	  	  Like	  the	  Grossman	  study,	  
however,	  I	  regarded	  such	  representations	  to	  be	  of	  consequence	  for	  determining	  the	  ‘horizon	  of	  
observation’	  of	  the	  practice	  (Little,	  J.W.	  (2003)	  ‘Inside	  teacher	  community:	  Representations	  of	  
classroom	  practice’	  105	  Teacher’s	  College	  Record	  913	  at	  917,	  cited	  in	  Grossman	  (2009)	  2065);	  
i.e.	  the	  aspects	  of	  the	  practice	  (its	  activities,	  resources,	  actors,	  and	  values)	  which	  are	  rendered	  
visible	  versus	  those	  which	  are	  obscured	  from	  view	  (Grossman,	  2009:	  2066).	  The	  
visibility/invisibility	  of	  the	  practice	  in	  different	  representations	  impacts	  on	  novices’	  opportunity	  
to	  engage	  meaningfully	  with	  the	  practice	  because	  such	  representations	  can	  vary	  in	  terms	  of	  
their	  comprehensiveness	  and	  authenticity	  (ibid:	  2065,	  2068).	  A	  focus	  on	  this	  aspect	  of	  
classroom	  talk	  also	  offered	  a	  way	  out	  of	  the	  predominant	  association	  of	  professional	  identity	  
with	  the	  teaching	  of	  ‘legal	  ethics’	  and	  ‘moral	  reasoning’	  –	  an	  association	  reaffirmed	  by	  the	  
Carnegie	  Study	  (see,	  for	  instance,	  Sullivan	  et	  al.,	  2007:	  133)	  but	  also	  established	  by	  the	  





2.2	   Searching	  for	  clues	  about	  the	  formation	  of	  legal	  professional	  identity	  in	  literature	  on	  
legal	  professionalism	  and	  the	  teaching	  of	  legal	  ethics	  	  
In	  seeking	  to	  determine	  whether	  classroom	  representations	  of	  legal	  professionals	  had	  been	  
associated	  with	  the	  formation	  of	  professional	  identity,	  and	  how	  the	  relationship	  had	  been	  
conceptualized,	  I	  was	  drawn	  to	  two	  somewhat	  different	  bodies	  of	  literature:	  The	  first	  
constituted	  by	  official	  reports	  and	  policy	  statements	  on	  legal	  professionalism,	  the	  second	  by	  the	  
extensive	  (non-­‐South-­‐African14)	  work	  on	  the	  teaching	  of	  legal	  ethics.	  These	  bodies	  of	  literature	  
were	  relevant	  because	  they	  accommodated	  the	  possibility	  that	  legal	  education	  is	  about	  
teaching	  students	  ‘to	  be’	  lawyers,	  rather	  than	  simply	  to	  ‘think	  like’	  lawyers.	  
2.2.1	   Legal	  Professionalism	  	  
Over	  the	  past	  20	  years	  many	  reports	  and	  policy	  statements	  from	  different	  jurisdictions	  have	  
attempted	  to	  take	  stock	  of	  legal	  education	  as	  part	  of	  the	  legal	  profession	  and	  to	  determine	  the	  
norms	  that	  should	  guide	  its	  future	  development.15	  These	  reports	  typically	  focus	  on	  what	  legal	  
education	  should	  achieve	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  knowledge	  and	  skills	  in	  which	  students	  should	  be	  
proficient	  and	  the	  values	  they	  should	  hold	  by	  the	  time	  they	  leave	  law	  school.	  In	  South	  Africa,	  
the	  statement	  on	  the	  generic	  LL.B	  qualification	  published	  by	  the	  Standards	  Generating	  Body	  for	  
Legal	  Education	  and	  Training	  (2002)16	  (henceforth,	  generic	  LL.B.	  statement)	  and	  the	  recent	  LL.B	  
Curriculum	  Research	  Report	  (2010)17	  serve	  as	  reports	  of	  this	  nature.18	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  The	  study	  of	  legal	  ethics	  in	  South	  Africa	  is	  virtually	  non-­‐existent.	  Davis	  (1978);	  Dlamini	  (1992);	  Mokgoro	  (1998);	  
and	  Woolman	  (1997)	  refer	  to	  values	  tangentially,	  but	  there	  is	  otherwise	  not	  a	  single	  reference	  to	  cite.	  	  
15	  They	  include	  the	  famous	  ‘MacCrate	  Report’	  (R.	  MacCrate	  An	  Educational	  Continuum:	  Report	  on	  the	  Task	  Force	  
on	  Law	  Schools	  and	  the	  Profession	  –	  Narrowing	  the	  Gap,	  1992)	  commissioned	  by	  the	  American	  Bar	  Association	  in	  
the	  United	  States	  of	  America	  (for	  other	  reports	  commissioned	  by	  the	  ABA	  during	  the	  20th	  century	  see	  Sonsteng,	  
2008:	  42	  –	  45);	  the	  ‘Cotter	  Report’	  (W.B.	  Cotter	  Professional	  responsibility	  instruction	  in	  Canada:	  A	  co-­‐ordinated	  
curriculum	  for	  legal	  education	  (1992)	  in	  Canada	  (for	  an	  account	  of	  the	  teaching	  of	  legal	  ethics	  in	  Canadian	  Law	  
Schools	  post	  1992	  see	  Cotter,	  2009);	  the	  ‘ACLEC	  Report’	  (First	  Report	  on	  Legal	  Education	  and	  Training,	  prepared	  by	  
a	  statutory	  body,	  the	  Lord	  Chancellor’s	  Advisory	  Committee	  on	  Legal	  Education	  in	  1996	  (ACLEC))	  in	  the	  United	  
Kingdom	  (for	  the	  three	  other	  major	  reports	  on	  legal	  education	  preceding	  the	  ACLEC	  Report	  see	  Boon,	  2002:	  36	  –	  
38);	  and	  the	  Australian	  Law	  Reform	  Commission’s	  final	  report	  on	  Managing	  Justice:	  A	  Review	  of	  the	  Federal	  Civil	  
Justice	  System	  (2000)	  on	  the	  situation	  in	  Australia.	  
16	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  policy-­‐legal	  framework	  established	  since	  1996	  (the	  key	  documents	  being:	  National	  Commission	  
on	  Higher	  Education	  Report:	  A	  Framework	  for	  Higher	  Education	  (1996);	  White	  Paper	  on	  Education	  (1997);	  Higher	  
Education	  Act	  101	  of	  1997;	  National	  Plan	  for	  Higher	  Education	  (2001);	  New	  Academic	  Policy	  for	  Programmes	  and	  




As	  a	  general	  observation,	  these	  reports	  are	  focused	  on	  what	  should	  be	  achieved	  in	  legal	  
education	  and	  not	  on	  how	  this	  should	  be	  done.	  In	  none	  of	  the	  reports	  or	  statements,	  therefore,	  
is	  an	  explicit	  connection	  made	  between	  the	  attainment	  of	  the	  recommended	  knowledge,	  skills	  
and	  values,	  as	  elements	  of	  a	  professional	  identity,	  and	  the	  representation	  of	  legal	  professionals	  
in	  classroom	  talk.	  As	  intimated	  above	  these	  reports	  do	  not	  even	  recognize	  professional	  identity	  
as	  a	  coherent	  object	  of	  legal	  education.	  	  
They	  are,	  however,	  relevant	  to	  a	  project	  investigating	  professional	  identity	  formation	  in	  that	  
they	  set	  forth	  the	  ideal,	  they	  define	  the	  contours	  and	  features	  of	  the	  practitioner	  role	  to	  which	  
novices,	  and	  those	  teaching	  them,	  should	  aspire.	  This	  occurs	  most	  obviously	  through	  
statements	  of	  the	  values	  which	  lawyers	  should	  uphold.	  The	  MacCrate	  Report’s	  four	  
‘fundamental	  values’	  for	  instance,	  envisage	  a	  practitioner	  who	  is	  committed	  to	  (1)	  attaining	  and	  
maintaining	  a	  level	  of	  competence	  in	  a	  chosen	  field	  of	  practice	  and	  representing	  clients	  in	  a	  
competent	  manner;	  (2)	  promoting	  justice,	  fairness	  and	  morality	  in	  his	  or	  her	  practice,	  
contributing	  to	  the	  profession’s	  fulfillment	  of	  its	  responsibility	  to	  ensure	  that	  adequate	  legal	  
services	  are	  provided	  to	  those	  who	  cannot	  afford	  to	  pay	  for	  them,	  and	  enhancing	  the	  capacity	  
of	  law	  and	  legal	  institutions	  to	  do	  justice;	  (3)	  participating	  in	  activities	  designed	  to	  improve	  the	  
profession,	  assisting	  in	  the	  training	  and	  preparation	  of	  new	  lawyers,	  striving	  to	  rid	  the	  
profession	  of	  bias	  based	  on	  race,	  religion,	  ethnic	  origin,	  gender,	  sexual	  orientation	  or	  disability	  
and	  rectifying	  the	  effects	  of	  these	  biases;	  and	  (4)	  seeking	  out	  and	  taking	  advantage	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
qualifications	  in	  South	  Africa	  must	  be	  registered	  on	  the	  National	  Qualifications	  Framework	  (NQF).	  Once	  a	  
qualification	  is	  registered,	  the	  institution	  concerned	  (e.g.	  a	  university)	  will	  be	  accredited	  as	  a	  service	  provider.	  	  In	  
order	  to	  obtain	  registration,	  the	  qualification	  must	  comply	  with	  the	  general	  and	  specific	  standards	  established	  
from	  time	  to	  time	  by	  so-­‐called	  ‘Standards	  Generating	  Bodies’	  (SGBs).	  The	  generic	  LL.B	  statement,	  which	  was	  
published	  in	  Government	  Gazette	  23845	  of	  20	  September	  2002	  was	  registered	  on	  the	  NQF,	  obviating	  the	  need	  for	  
universities	  and	  technikons	  to	  register	  their	  individual	  LLBs.	  However,	  this	  registration	  was	  only	  valid	  until	  2009	  
and	  a	  new	  generic	  LLB	  framework	  is	  currently	  being	  negotiated.	  
17	  See	  notes	  7	  and	  13	  above.	  	  
18	  A	  thorough	  analysis	  of	  these	  reports	  and	  policy	  statements,	  and	  the	  commentary	  thereon,	  would	  constitute	  a	  
comprehensive	  study	  on	  its	  own.	  It	  would	  also	  need	  to	  include	  the	  work	  of	  professional	  bodies	  (such	  as	  societies	  of	  
advocates	  or	  attorneys)	  on	  legal	  professionalism	  as	  well	  as	  studies	  on	  legal	  professionalism	  in	  different	  states.	  As	  
my	  purpose	  is	  merely	  to	  provide	  a	  sense	  of	  some	  common	  themes	  in	  formal	  statements	  on	  legal	  professionalism	  
that	  are	  associated	  with	  educational	  contexts,	  and	  to	  determine	  the	  modalities	  by	  which	  such	  formal	  statements	  
envisage	  the	  desired	  aspects	  of	  legal	  professionalism	  emerging	  in	  young	  professionals,	  I	  focus	  on	  two	  very	  well-­‐
known	  reports	  in	  the	  English-­‐speaking	  world	  –	  the	  MacCrate	  and	  ACLEC	  reports	  respectively	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  





opportunities	  to	  increase	  knowledge	  and	  improve	  skills,	  and	  selecting	  and	  maintaining	  
employment	  that	  would	  allow	  for	  development	  as	  a	  professional	  and	  the	  pursuit	  of	  professional	  
and	  personal	  goals’	  (American	  Bar	  Association,	  1992:	  Chapter	  5).	  The	  ACLEC	  Report	  envisages	  
lawyers	  committed	  to	  similar	  ideals.19	  The	  South	  African	  generic	  LL.B	  statement,	  on	  the	  other	  
hand,	  articulates	  values	  relevant	  to	  a	  newly-­‐democratized	  state	  and	  a	  society	  needing	  to	  
transform	  itself	  away	  from,	  in	  particular,	  racial	  and	  gendered	  forms	  of	  power.20	  Thus	  lawyers	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  The	  legal	  values	  which	  the	  ACLEC	  Report	  advocates	  that	  legal	  education	  should	  achieve	  are	  commitment	  to	  the	  
rule	  of	  law;	  justice,	  fairness	  and	  high	  ethical	  standards;	  acquiring	  and	  improving	  professional	  skills;	  representing	  
clients	  without	  fear	  or	  favour;	  promoting	  equality	  of	  opportunity;	  and	  ensuring	  that	  legal	  services	  are	  provided	  
even	  to	  those	  who	  cannot	  pay	  for	  them	  (ACLEC,	  1996:	  17).	  
20	  The	  stubborn	  persistence	  of	  such	  forms	  of	  power	  in	  the	  South	  African	  legal	  profession	  is	  illustrated	  by	  statistics	  
of:	  The	  gender	  and	  race	  profile	  of	  university	  law	  entrants	  in	  2011;	  the	  number	  of	  law	  graduates	  in	  2010;	  the	  
number	  of	  articles	  registered	  in	  2011;	  and	  the	  2011	  statistics	  of	  practicing	  professionals	  in	  the	  attorneys	  and	  
advocates’	  profession	  and	  the	  permanent	  members	  of	  the	  judiciary.	  Statistics	  for	  race	  and	  gender	  are	  not	  available	  
for	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  public	  prosecutor,	  state	  advocate	  or	  magistrate.	  Table	  1.1	  sets	  out	  statistics	  for	  the	  afore-­‐
mentioned	  categories	  per	  the	  standard	  racial	  categories	  in	  South	  Africa	  (Black,	  Coloured,	  Asian	  and	  White),	  while	  
table	  1.2	  presents	  gender	  representation	  across	  the	  categories.	  The	  data	  in	  these	  tables	  was	  compiled	  from	  two	  
sources:	  The	  Law	  Society	  of	  South	  Africa’s	  2010/2011	  Statistics,	  which	  were	  in	  turn	  based	  on	  data	  submitted	  
directly	  by	  all	  tertiary	  institutions	  in	  South	  Africa	  and	  the	  four	  provincial	  law	  societies;	  and	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  report	  
submitted	  by	  the	  Chair	  of	  the	  General	  Council	  of	  the	  Bar	  at	  its	  66th	  annual	  general	  meeting	  which	  appeared	  in	  The	  
Advocate	  (August	  2011),	  7.	  The	  statistics	  for	  the	  advocates’	  profession	  were	  submitted	  by	  the	  various	  bar	  councils	  
in	  South	  Africa.	  The	  data	  can	  thus	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  reliable.	  	  	  
	  
Racial	  Group	   Entered	  Law	  













members	  of	  the	  
Judiciary	  	  
Black	  	   4570	  (64%)	  	   1611	  (43%)	   570	  (32%)	   4006	  (20%)	   327	  (14%)	   91	  (40%)	  
Coloured	   596	  (8%)	  	   285	  (7%)	   56	  (3%)	   270	  (1%)	   78	  (4%)	   21	  (10%)	  
Asian	  	   471	  (7%)	   666	  (18%)	   386	  (21%)	   2424	  (12%)	   179	  (8%)	   23	  (10%)	  
White	  	   1545	  (21%)	   1192	  (32%)	   781	  (44%)	   13219	  (67%)	   1684	  (74%)	   91	  (40%)	  

















members	  of	  the	  
Judiciary	  	  
Male	  	  	   3302	  (46%)	   1533	  (41%)	   789	  (44%)	   13433	  (67%)	   1754	  (77%)	   167	  (74%)	  
Female	  	   3944	  (54%)	   2218	  (59%)	   1004	  (56%)	   6644	  (33%)	   514	  (23%)	   59	  (26%)	  
Table	  1.3:	  Gender	  representation	  in	  tertiary	  education,	  practicing	  attorneys	  and	  advocates	  and	  the	  judiciary.	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  both	  tables,	  the	  statistics	  represent	  a	  snapshot	  and	  not	  the	  progression	  of	  a	  cohort	  over	  time.	  As	  
such	  the	  fall-­‐off	  in	  the	  number	  of	  graduates	  compared	  to	  the	  number	  of	  students	  entering	  law	  school	  cannot	  be	  
calculated	  with	  complete	  accuracy.	  The	  only	  categories	  that	  allow	  for	  continuity	  would	  be	  the	  number	  of	  students	  
graduating	  and	  the	  number	  of	  articles	  registered,	  as	  the	  registration	  of	  articles	  follow	  the	  year	  of	  graduation.	  
The	  data	  indicates	  that	  people	  of	  colour	  (Black,	  Coloured	  and	  Asian)	  and	  women	  comprise	  the	  majority	  of	  
university	  law	  entrants.	  While	  there	  is	  a	  significant	  fall-­‐off	  in	  the	  number	  of	  students	  enrolling	  for	  law	  and	  the	  
number	  that	  graduate	  (only	  about	  50%	  eventually	  graduate),	  they	  continue	  to	  comprise	  the	  majority	  in	  the	  
number	  of	  law	  graduates.	  The	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  White	  and	  Asian	  graduates	  compared	  to	  the	  number	  
enrolling	  indicates	  that	  these	  two	  population	  groups	  experience	  greater	  success	  in	  their	  studies,	  whilst	  the	  greatest	  




South	  Africa	  are	  expected	  to	  sustain	  the	  development	  of	  a	  just	  and	  democratic	  society	  based	  on	  
the	  rule	  of	  law;	  promote	  constitutional	  principles	  and	  values;	  address	  past	  and	  current	  
injustices;	  and	  participate	  in	  promoting	  the	  administration	  of	  justice	  and	  the	  development	  of	  
legal	  institutions	  in	  South	  African	  society.21	  By	  articulating	  the	  values	  to	  which	  legal	  
professionals	  should	  be	  committed,	  these	  reports	  and	  statements	  contribute	  to	  defining	  the	  
purposes	  of	  law	  and	  the	  legal	  profession.	  	  
They	  also	  define	  the	  contours	  and	  features	  of	  the	  ideal	  practitioner,	  however,	  by	  specifying	  the	  
types	  of	  tasks	  they	  should	  be	  able	  to	  undertake,	  the	  resources	  they	  should	  be	  able	  to	  use,	  and	  
the	  relationships	  they	  should	  be	  able	  to	  sustain.	  Thus	  many	  of	  the	  reports	  emphasize	  the	  need	  
for	  lawyers	  to	  undertake	  legal	  analysis	  and	  reasoning,	  or	  to	  be	  problem-­‐solvers.	  They	  point	  to	  
the	  need	  for	  lawyers	  to	  not	  only	  know	  the	  core	  principles	  and	  rules	  of	  the	  law,	  but	  also	  to	  
understand	  the	  law	  in	  its	  social,	  economic,	  political,	  philosophical,	  moral	  and	  cultural	  contexts.	  
They	  point	  to	  the	  need	  for	  lawyers	  to	  sustain	  a	  diverse	  range	  of	  relationships	  both	  within	  the	  
legal	  profession	  and	  with	  members	  of	  other	  professions	  or	  disciplines.	  In	  all	  of	  this	  they	  are	  this	  
contributing	  to	  defining,	  within	  the	  context	  of	  a	  particular	  jurisdiction,	  the	  professional	  identity	  
of	  the	  lawyer,	  albeit	  in	  very	  general,	  abstract	  terms.	  As	  in	  this	  project,	  they	  can	  therefore	  be	  
used	  as	  points	  of	  reference	  for	  evaluating	  the	  comprehensiveness	  and	  authenticity	  of	  any	  
particular	  representation	  of	  legal	  professionals.	  Their	  content	  in	  this	  regard	  is	  therefore	  
considered	  in	  greater	  detail	  in	  chapter	  six.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
graduates	  who	  are	  successfully	  entering	  the	  attorney’s	  profession.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  race,	  the	  data	  indicate	  that	  White	  
and	  Asian	  students	  are	  more	  successful	  in	  finding	  articles	  than	  their	  Black	  and	  Coloured	  counterparts.	  Females,	  
however,	  continue	  to	  constitute	  the	  majority	  of	  articled	  clerks.	  Racial	  and	  gender	  representation	  becomes	  more	  
disproportionate	  in	  the	  number	  of	  practicing	  members	  of	  the	  attorneys’	  and	  advocates’	  profession,	  with	  the	  White	  
and	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent	  the	  Asian	  groups	  representing	  a	  significantly	  greater	  percentage	  of	  the	  practicing	  members	  
than	  their	  representation	  in	  the	  total	  population.	  White	  dominance	  and	  Black	  under-­‐representation	  is	  particularly	  
marked	  in	  the	  advocates’	  profession.	  Male	  representation	  increases	  disproportionately	  in	  the	  number	  of	  practicing	  
attorneys	  and	  even	  more	  so	  amongst	  practicing	  advocates.	  The	  effect	  of	  transformational	  policies	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  
the	  racial	  composition	  of	  the	  judiciary	  but	  the	  gender	  transformation	  of	  the	  bench	  has	  been	  decidedly	  less	  marked.	  
Given	  these	  statistics,	  it	  is	  interesting	  that	  the	  generic	  LL.B	  statement	  only	  references	  the	  need	  to	  transform	  racial	  
and	  gendered	  forms	  of	  power	  tangentially	  –	  through	  its	  reference	  to	  ‘constitutional	  principles’	  (the	  South	  African	  
Bill	  of	  Rights	  includes	  a	  clause	  prohibiting	  discrimination	  on	  a	  wide-­‐ranging	  set	  of	  grounds,	  including	  gender	  and	  
race).	  	  
21	  An	  analysis	  of	  the	  	  manner	  in	  which	  these	  values	  are	  enfolded	  in	  the	  generic	  LL.B	  statement	  is	  provided	  in	  
Appendix	  1.	  While	  noting	  that	  ‘legal	  ethics’	  is	  a	  competency	  which	  practitioners	  and	  academics	  agree	  is	  important,	  




2.2.2	   The	  teaching	  of	  legal	  ethics	  	  	  	  
There	  is	  an	  extensive	  literature	  on	  the	  teaching	  of	  ‘professional	  ethics’,	  ‘legal	  ethics’,	  
‘professional	  responsibility’	  and	  so	  on	  that	  reports	  predominantly	  on	  teaching	  and	  research	  in	  
the	  United	  States	  of	  America,22	  England,23	  Australia24	  and	  Canada.25	  26	  As	  noted	  above,	  the	  
literature	  on	  this	  topic	  in	  South	  Africa	  is	  virtually	  non-­‐existent.	  	  
It	  is	  interesting,	  that	  this	  literature	  almost	  never	  claims	  that	  law	  schools	  produce	  ethical	  legal	  
professionals	  who	  display	  a	  commitment	  to	  the	  kinds	  of	  values	  articulated	  in	  the	  previous	  
section.	  ‘The	  view	  apparent	  from	  the	  literature,’	  Chapman	  writes,	  ‘is	  of	  a	  widespread	  belief	  that	  
law	  school	  causes	  moral	  and	  ethical	  insensitivity	  and	  induces	  a	  regression	  in	  personal	  and	  social	  
values’	  (2002:	  73).27	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  The	  literature	  on	  ethics	  teaching	  is	  probably	  the	  most	  extensive	  in	  this	  jurisdiction	  where	  a	  concern	  for	  legal	  
ethics	  has	  a	  long	  history	  (see	  Rhode,	  1992:	  33	  –	  38).	  Following	  the	  Watergate	  scandal,	  which	  cast	  highly-­‐placed	  
lawyers	  in	  the	  Nixon	  government	  –	  and	  by	  extension	  the	  whole	  legal	  profession	  –	  in	  an	  unfavourable	  light,	  the	  
American	  Bar	  Association	  (ABA)	  introduced	  a	  requirement	  that	  accredited	  law	  schools	  offer	  training	  in	  professional	  
ethics	  (Morawetz,	  1998:	  216).	  The	  current	  Standards	  for	  Approval	  of	  Law	  Schools	  (2008	  –	  9)	  require,	  as	  regards	  the	  
program	  of	  education	  offered	  by	  accredited	  schools,	  that	  each	  student	  receive	  substantial	  instruction	  in	  ‘the	  
history,	  goals,	  structure,	  values,	  rules	  and	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  legal	  profession	  and	  its	  members’	  (American	  Bar	  
Association,	  2008:	  Standard	  302(a)(5)).	  The	  interpretive	  guidelines	  on	  the	  standards	  point	  out	  that	  the	  substantial	  
instruction	  in	  this	  regard	  includes	  ‘instruction	  in	  matters	  such	  as	  the	  law	  of	  lawyering	  and	  the	  Model	  Rules	  of	  
Professional	  Conduct	  of	  the	  American	  Bar	  Association’	  (ibid:	  Interpretation	  302-­‐9).	  For	  research	  on	  the	  teaching	  of	  
legal	  ethics	  in	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America	  see	  Bartlett	  (1987);	  Cramton	  (1977	  –	  8),	  (1987);	  Elkins	  (1985),	  (1987),	  
(1988);	  Erlanger	  (1996);	  Erlanger	  &	  Klegon	  (1978	  –	  9);	  Halpin	  &	  Palmer	  (1996);	  Kennedy	  (1971),	  (1982);	  Luban	  
(1983);	  Meltsner	  (1983);	  Menkel-­‐Meadow	  (1991),	  (1994),	  (1999),	  (2000);	  Morawetz	  (1998);	  Rathjen	  (1976	  –	  77);	  
Schechter	  (1996);	  and	  Stone	  (1971).	  In	  1995	  the	  journal	  Law	  and	  Contemporary	  Problems	  devoted	  an	  entire	  issue	  
to	  innovations	  in	  teaching	  the	  professional	  responsibility	  course	  in	  American	  law	  schools	  (see	  Vol.	  58	  Nos.	  3	  &	  4.	  
23	  See	  for	  instance	  Boon	  (2002);	  Chapman	  (2002);	  Economides	  &	  Webb	  (2000);	  Giddings	  (2001);	  Hutchinson	  
(1999);	  Johnson	  (2006);	  Nicolson	  (2008);	  O’Dair	  (1998);	  Sherr	  &	  Webb	  (1989);	  and	  Webb	  (1996),	  (1998),	  (1999).	  
24	  See	  for	  instance	  Evans	  (1998),	  (2002),	  (2005);	  Goldsmith	  &	  Powles	  (1998);	  Noone	  &	  Dickson	  (2001);	  Powles	  
(1999);	  Sonsteng	  (2008);	  Sonsteng	  &	  Camarotto	  (2000);	  Willging	  &	  Dunn	  (1981	  –	  2).	  
25See	  for	  instance	  Arthurs	  (1998);	  Cotter	  (2009)	  and	  Jewell	  (1984).	  
26	  The	  literature	  is	  part	  of	  a	  recent	  interest	  in	  the	  ethics	  of	  the	  legal	  profession	  more	  broadly	  –	  see,	  for	  instance,	  
the	  sources	  cited	  in	  Nicolson,	  2008:	  145	  n	  1.	  This	  interest,	  in	  turn,	  is	  commonly	  justified	  by	  claims	  that	  the	  legal	  
profession	  is	  ‘in	  crisis’:	  The	  levels	  of	  depression	  and	  addiction	  amongst	  legal	  professionals,	  it	  is	  claimed,	  are	  very	  
high,	  while	  the	  public	  confidence	  in	  the	  legal	  profession	  is	  at	  an	  all	  time	  low	  –	  see	  Chapman,	  2002:	  70	  n	  10	  in	  which	  
she	  cites	  a	  media	  report	  indicating	  that	  40%	  of	  practicing	  lawyers	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  were	  keen	  to	  leave	  their	  
jobs	  and	  at	  70	  in	  which	  she	  cites	  empirical	  evidence	  for	  the	  public’s	  dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  profession’s	  self-­‐
regulation.	  See	  also	  Evans,	  1998:	  276,	  278;	  Giddings,	  2001:	  166	  (reporting	  on	  lawyers	  misbehaving	  in	  Australia);	  
Jewell,	  1984:	  474	  –	  5;	  Mixon	  &	  Schuwerk,	  1995:	  94	  n	  19	  –	  21;	  Schechter,	  1996:	  367	  –	  8;	  Sulllivan	  et	  al,	  2007:	  29;	  
Webb,	  1998:	  134	  –	  5;	  Webb,	  1999:	  284.	  
27	  Many	  of	  these	  types	  of	  claim	  are	  supported	  by	  a	  literary	  genre	  devoted	  to	  recounting	  the	  horrors	  of	  studying	  law	  





The	  literature	  details	  both	  the	  nature	  of	  such	  regression	  and	  the	  ostensible	  causes	  thereof.	  For	  
purposes	  of	  this	  study	  it	  is	  significant	  that	  the	  representation	  of	  lawyers,	  including	  their	  values	  
and	  the	  social	  practices	  in	  which	  they	  are	  engaged	  featured	  as	  one	  of	  three	  broad	  categories	  of	  
causes	  linked	  to	  student	  moral	  and	  ethical	  regression;	  the	  other	  two	  being	  the	  forced	  
separation	  of	  legal	  reasoning	  from	  ethical	  or	  moral	  concerns,	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  
relationships	  established	  between	  the	  lecturer	  and	  students	  in	  the	  classroom.	  Although	  	  the	  
first	  category	  is	  most	  important	  for	  purposes	  of	  this	  research	  I	  provide	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  all	  
three.	  	  
As	  regards	  the	  representation	  of	  legal	  professionals	  in	  the	  classroom,	  it	  is	  claimed	  that	  law	  
schools,	  encourage	  litigiousness	  on	  the	  part	  of	  students	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  social	  practice	  of	  
litigation	  rather	  than,	  for	  instance,	  counseling	  and	  mediation	  (Schechter,	  1996:	  373).	  This	  
apparently	  encourages	  an	  adversarial	  approach	  to	  human	  conflict	  and	  produces	  lawyers	  who	  
are	  arrogant,	  confrontational,	  controlling,	  unfeeling	  and	  rude	  (Menkel-­‐Meadow,	  1991:	  7;	  
Schechter,	  1996:	  374,	  379;	  Webb:	  1996:	  274)	  as	  well	  as	  ruthless	  and	  over-­‐competitive	  
(Nicolson,	  2008:	  149;	  Schechter,	  1996:	  389).	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  it	  is	  said	  that	  law	  schools	  
discourage	  students	  from	  the	  social	  practices	  of	  providing	  access	  to	  justice	  for	  the	  poor,	  from	  
providing	  pro	  bono	  legal	  services	  and	  pursuing	  career	  options	  in	  the	  public	  service	  as	  opposed	  
to	  private	  practice	  (Erlanger	  &	  Klegon,	  1978	  –	  9,	  1996;	  Granfield,	  1992;	  Schechter,	  1996:	  384).	  
This	  is	  linked	  to	  an	  abandonment	  of	  activism	  and	  idealism	  on	  the	  part	  of	  individual	  students	  
(Chapman,	  2002:	  68;	  Nicolson,	  2008:	  149).	  Many	  commentators	  have	  also	  claimed	  that	  the	  law	  
school	  experience	  engenders	  cynicism	  in	  students	  (Chapman,	  2002:	  68;	  Menkel-­‐Meadow,	  1991:	  
7	  –	  8;	  Parker,	  2001:	  182,	  186;	  Webb,	  1996:	  274;	  Webb,	  1999:	  286)	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  
representation	  of	  lawyers	  as	  ‘mindless	  form-­‐fillers	  and	  grubby	  money	  seekers’	  (Nicolson,	  2008:	  
149).	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  representation	  of	  lawyers,	  there	  are	  many	  claims	  in	  this	  body	  of	  literature	  
that	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  legal	  reasoning	  is	  separated	  from	  moral	  or	  ethical	  reasoning	  (Cownie,	  
2003:	  159;	  Elkins,	  n.d.;	  Kennedy,	  1982:	  598;	  Nicolson,	  2008;	  148)	  impacts	  negatively	  on	  
students’	  moral	  and	  ethical	  development.	  These	  claims	  are	  not	  directly	  linked	  to	  claims	  




thinking	  in	  this	  way.	  Instead	  the	  focus	  is	  on	  legal	  reasoning	  more	  generally.	  The	  forced	  
separation	  between	  legal	  and	  moral/ethical	  issues	  is	  said	  to	  foster	  a	  legalistic	  approach	  to	  
moral	  issues	  –	  a	  ‘morality	  of	  rule	  veneration’	  (Elkins,	  n.d.:	  16;	  Webb,	  1998:	  137)	  in	  terms	  of	  
which	  moral	  conduct	  is	  equated	  with	  rule-­‐following	  and	  ‘creative	  compliance’	  through	  rule	  
manipulation	  is	  encouraged	  (Webb,	  1998:	  137).	  It	  is	  also	  said	  to	  instill	  a	  sense	  of	  moral	  
relativism	  (Cramton,	  1977:	  253),28	  which	  is	  closely	  identified	  with	  the	  fostering	  of	  an	  
instrumentalist	  approach	  to	  law	  (Chapman,	  2002:	  68;	  Cramton,	  1977:	  257;	  Nicolson,	  2008:	  
148):	  What	  is	  ‘right’	  is	  whatever	  works	  for	  a	  particular	  client	  or	  a	  particular	  case	  (Menkel-­‐
Meadow,	  1991:	  7).	  Along	  with	  this,	  it	  is	  said	  that	  law	  schools	  teach	  that	  legal	  reasoning	  requires	  
‘habitual	  deference	  to	  certain	  formally	  legitimate	  kinds	  of	  authority’	  (Webb,	  1998:	  140)	  –	  
institutions	  of	  juristic	  speech	  and	  writing	  organized	  dogmatically	  and	  hierarchically	  as	  sites	  of	  
truth	  (Goodrich,	  1996:	  60).	  This,	  it	  is	  claimed,	  fosters	  a	  deferential	  attitude	  to	  authority.	  The	  
habitual	  reference	  to	  legal	  authority,	  as	  the	  essence	  of	  legal	  reasoning,	  encourages	  passivity	  
(Chapman,	  2002:	  68;	  Kennedy,	  1982:	  594;	  Nicolson,	  2008:	  149;	  Webb,	  1998:	  137).	  Law	  schools	  
also	  teach	  that	  legal	  reasoning	  requires	  the	  exclusion	  of	  an	  emotional	  response	  to	  legal	  
disputes	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  this	  is	  irrelevant	  (Kennedy,	  1982:	  595).	  This	  tends	  to	  introduce	  within	  
students	  a	  sense	  of	  estrangement	  from	  themselves	  (Goodrich,	  1996:	  62)	  in	  addition	  to	  
undermining	  all	  recourse	  to	  contexts	  that	  are	  contingent,	  partial,	  fallible	  or	  subjective	  
(Cramton,	  1977:	  260;	  Goodrich,	  1996:	  60;	  Webb,	  1998:	  140).	  
Finally,	  there	  are	  claims	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  relationship	  a	  lecturer	  establishes	  with	  students	  
in	  the	  classroom	  models	  tends	  to	  be	  hierarchical	  (Kennedy,	  1982:	  593,	  604;	  Nicolson,	  2008:	  
149)	  and	  models	  the	  subsequent	  hierarchical	  relations	  between	  senior	  and	  junior	  associates	  in	  
law	  firms,	  and	  between	  lawyers	  and	  judges	  in	  court	  (Kennedy,	  1982:	  604).	  In	  line	  with	  this	  it	  is	  
claimed	  that	  lecturers	  frequently	  humiliate	  students.	  The	  humiliation	  arises	  from	  the	  ‘pseudo-­‐
participation’	  that	  arises	  from	  being	  called	  upon,	  before	  a	  large	  class,	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  
teacher’s	  questioning	  in	  relation	  to	  knowledge	  about	  which	  one	  is	  not	  yet	  sure	  (Kennedy,	  1982:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  Cramton	  describes	  moral	  relativism	  as	  encompassing	  beliefs	  –	  also	  widely-­‐held	  outside	  the	  law	  school	  context	  –	  
that	  value	  judgments	  are	  ultimately	  indefensible,	  that	  one	  person’s	  values	  are	  equal	  to	  the	  values	  of	  another,	  that	  
since	  values	  are	  different	  all	  over	  the	  world	  no	  values	  are	  ultimately	  the	  ‘best’	  or	  have	  any	  special	  claim,	  that	  
values	  are	  the	  result	  of	  hard-­‐wired	  social	  conditioning	  and	  it	  is	  thus	  futile	  to	  attempt	  to	  change	  them	  or	  that	  values	  




593).	  Students	  also	  learn	  to	  defer	  to	  their	  ‘betters’	  through	  a	  range	  of	  practices	  on	  the	  part	  of	  
the	  law	  teacher:	  Interrupting	  students	  in	  mid-­‐sentence,	  mocking	  them,	  initiating	  ad	  hominem	  
assaults,	  almost	  never	  praising	  students	  or	  only	  very	  seldom	  (Kennedy,	  1982:	  604)	  or	  laughing	  
at	  students’	  expressions	  of	  common	  sense	  of	  morality	  (Menkel-­‐Meadow,	  1991:	  8).	  As	  an	  
authority	  figure	  in	  the	  classroom,	  the	  lecturer	  also	  exercises	  a	  power	  over	  how	  to	  position	  
students	  in	  relation	  to	  legal	  practices.	  Cramton	  argues	  that	  students	  are	  invariably	  positioned	  as	  
legal	  advocates.29	  The	  underlying,	  unarticulated	  assumption	  is	  that	  the	  advocate	  must	  work	  
with	  goals	  and	  values	  that	  have	  already	  been	  determined	  by	  the	  party	  for	  whom	  the	  advocate	  
is	  acting.	  Critical	  reflection	  upon	  the	  goals	  underlying	  competing	  rules	  is	  rarely	  undertaken	  and	  
students	  are	  inculcated	  in	  the	  belief	  that	  the	  proper	  role	  of	  the	  lawyer	  is	  always	  to	  assume	  the	  
goals	  and	  values	  of	  others	  (1977:	  256).	  	  
From	  the	  literature,	  therefore,	  certain	  key	  claims	  emerge	  regarding	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  legal	  
professionals	  are	  represented	  in	  the	  classroom;	  i.e.	  there	  is	  a	  focus	  on	  litigiousness;	  
discouragement	  of	  social	  practices	  related	  to	  providing	  access	  to	  justice	  for	  the	  poor,	  providing	  
pro	  bono	  legal	  services	  and	  pursuing	  a	  career	  in	  the	  public	  services;	  and	  a	  representation	  of	  
lawyers	  themselves	  as	  ‘mindless	  form	  fillers	  and	  grubby	  money	  seekers’.	  Claims	  regarding	  the	  
nature	  of	  legal	  reasoning	  (its	  separation	  from	  moral,	  ethical	  and	  emotional	  responses;	  its	  
deference	  to	  forms	  of	  legal	  authority)	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  moral	  thinking	  (relativistic,	  
instrumentalist)	  are	  not	  specifically	  linked	  to	  the	  representation	  of	  legal	  professionals.	  Similarly,	  
the	  nature	  of	  relations	  in	  the	  classroom	  between	  lecturer	  and	  students	  (hierarchical	  
relationship;	  actions	  aimed	  at	  belittling	  students;	  the	  positioning	  of	  students)	  are	  said	  to	  model	  
relations	  in	  the	  legal	  profession,	  and	  are	  not	  linked	  to	  representations	  of	  the	  legal	  profession	  
per	  se.	  
Whilst	  they	  are	  not	  all	  linked	  to	  the	  representation	  of	  legal	  professionals,	  what	  does	  unite	  these	  
claims	  is	  a	  pattern	  in	  which	  either	  the	  representation	  of	  legal	  professionals,	  or	  legal	  reasoning,	  
or	  the	  nature	  of	  relationships	  in	  the	  classroom	  is	  claimed	  to	  have	  certain	  effects	  in	  students	  
which	  defines	  their	  professional	  identity	  in	  a	  negative	  way:	  They	  ‘become’	  confrontational,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  The	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘advocate’	  in	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America	  would	  not	  be	  the	  same	  as	  the	  term	  in	  South	  




unfeeling,	  rude,	  cynical,	  passive,	  competitive,	  and	  so	  on.	  In	  this	  way	  the	  representations	  are	  
thus	  clearly	  linked	  –	  even	  if	  anecdotally	  and	  intuitively	  –	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  professional	  
identity.	  	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  I	  do	  not	  intend	  to	  set	  up	  claims	  made	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  
teaching	  of	  legal	  ethics	  as	  the	  ‘bad	  straw	  man’,	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  ‘good	  straw	  man’	  
constituted	  by	  the	  statements	  on	  legal	  professionalism	  found	  in	  official	  reports	  and	  policy	  
statements.	  In	  line	  with	  the	  discourse-­‐oriented	  approach	  of	  this	  study,	  these	  two	  bodies	  of	  
literature	  comprise	  texts	  that	  are	  produced	  by	  different	  social	  actors,	  under	  different	  social	  
conditions	  and	  invoking	  different	  agendas	  and	  power	  relations.	  In	  themselves	  they	  are	  both	  
also	  representations	  that	  make	  different	  aspects	  of	  the	  practice	  visible	  and	  invisible.	  The	  scope	  
of	  the	  study	  does	  not	  admit	  for	  exploring	  these	  differences.	  How	  reference	  to	  these	  contrasting	  
discourses30	  on	  legal	  professionalism	  serves	  the	  present	  study,	  however,	  is	  that	  they	  stand	  as	  
contrasting	  points	  of	  reference	  for	  comparing	  the	  representations	  of	  legal	  professionals	  made	  
by	  the	  lecturer	  in	  the	  particular	  classroom	  I	  studied.	  They	  thus	  enable	  my	  analysis	  to	  move	  
beyond	  mere	  description	  to	  some	  sort	  of	  evaluation	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  my	  research	  subject’s	  
representations.	  
2.3	   Basis	  for	  claims	  regarding	  the	  formation	  of	  legal	  professional	  identity	  –	  A	  need	  to	  focus	  
on	  the	  language	  of	  the	  classroom	  (‘classroom	  talk’)	  
2.3.1	   Questioning	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  negative	  effects	  of	  law	  school	  
Much	  more	  than	  reports	  and	  statements	  on	  legal	  professionalism,	  therefore,	  the	  literature	  on	  
the	  teaching	  of	  legal	  ethics	  attempts	  to	  account	  for	  how	  professional	  identity	  is	  formed	  in	  the	  
classroom.	  The	  prevailing	  argument	  in	  this	  literature	  –	  that	  law	  school	  tends	  to	  induce	  a	  
regression	  in	  social	  and	  personal	  values	  and	  possibly	  even	  produces	  unethical	  practitioners	  –	  is	  
based	  on	  two	  separate	  claims:	  (1)	  Teaching	  in	  law	  schools	  represents	  legal	  professionals,	  the	  
nature	  of	  legal	  reasoning,	  and	  the	  relations	  in	  the	  classroom	  in	  a	  certain	  (typically	  negative)	  
light;	  and	  (2)	  this	  triggers	  the	  development	  of	  (typically	  negative)	  approaches,	  attitudes/traits	  of	  
character	  and	  values	  in	  students.	  The	  two	  claims,	  however,	  did	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  equally	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




grounded	  on	  rigorous	  empirical	  research	  (i.e.	  research	  in	  which	  there	  is	  significant,	  
comprehensive	  and	  systematic	  empirical	  data	  to	  support	  the	  findings).	  	  
The	  first	  claim	  seemed	  to	  be	  predominantly	  grounded	  upon	  authors’	  personal	  impressions	  of	  
broad-­‐ranging	  features	  of	  legal	  education.	  Schechter’s	  argument	  regarding	  the	  over-­‐emphasis	  
on	  litigation	  as	  a	  means	  of	  conflict	  resolution,	  for	  instance,	  is	  based	  upon	  his	  observations	  
regarding	  the	  prominence	  and	  timing	  of	  certain	  courses	  in	  the	  curriculum	  (for	  example,	  courses	  
such	  as	  civil	  procedure	  and	  evidence	  which	  are	  both	  offered,	  in	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America,	  in	  
the	  first	  and	  second	  years	  of	  the	  J.D.);	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  courses	  tend	  to	  be	  taught	  by	  
prominent,	  tenured	  members	  of	  the	  faculty;	  and	  the	  observation	  that	  courses	  dealing	  with	  
procedures	  and	  institutions	  for	  diverting	  disputes	  from	  the	  courts	  are	  considerably	  less	  
common	  (Schechter,	  1996:	  373–4).	  For	  me,	  what	  was	  significant	  about	  Schechter	  and	  others’	  
claims	  was	  that	  while	  broad-­‐ranging	  features	  of	  legal	  education	  (curriculum,	  forms	  of	  pedagogy,	  
forms	  of	  assessment)	  may	  well	  carry	  tacit	  messages	  about	  being	  a	  lawyer,	  no	  one	  had	  paid	  
systematic	  attention	  to	  how	  legal	  professionals	  were	  actually	  being	  represented	  in	  legal	  
classroom	  talk	  or	  proposed	  a	  ‘way	  of	  seeing’	  or	  making	  sense	  of	  such	  representations.	  	  
For	  the	  second	  claim,	  there	  have	  been	  a	  small	  group	  of	  studies	  that	  have	  utilized	  more	  rigorous	  
and	  systematic	  methods	  of	  empirical	  research.	  These	  include	  Elkins’	  series	  of	  articles	  (1985,	  
1987,	  1988)	  relating	  to	  the	  ‘felt	  experience’	  of	  law	  school	  of	  his	  students	  at	  West	  Virginia	  
University;31	  Willging	  and	  Dunn’s	  study	  of	  the	  moral	  development	  of	  law	  students	  (which	  
utilized	  a	  measuring	  instrument	  developed	  by	  Rest	  that	  tested	  students’	  moral	  development	  in	  
terms	  of	  the	  Kohlbergian	  stages)	  (1981–82:	  345–6,	  351	  –	  2);32	  and	  Sherr	  and	  Webb’s	  research	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  Although	  Elkins	  did	  not	  explicitly	  identify	  the	  methodology	  he	  employed,	  it	  appears	  that	  he	  instructed	  students	  
to	  keep	  a	  journal	  of	  their	  experiences.	  Their	  journal	  entries	  affirmed	  that	  law	  school,	  especially	  the	  first	  year,	  was	  a	  
time	  of	  tremendous	  psychological,	  behavioural	  and	  affective	  change.	  While	  a	  few	  students	  found	  the	  experience	  
exhilarating	  and	  stimulating,	  most	  described	  themselves	  as	  being	  tired,	  exhausted,	  unable	  to	  sleep,	  depressed,	  
disappointed,	  feeling	  inadequate,	  responding	  mechanically	  to	  tasks,	  apprehensive,	  overwhelmed,	  indifferent	  and	  
plagued	  by	  fears	  of	  failure	  (Elkins,	  1985).	  Many	  affirmed	  a	  developing	  split	  between	  the	  personal	  and	  professional	  
self,	  a	  split	  which	  entailed	  compartmentalizing	  professional	  and	  personal	  values.	  One	  student,	  for	  instance,	  wrote;	  
‘Lawyers	  are	  not	  taught	  to	  be	  valueless.	  However,	  a	  lot	  of	  my	  classmates	  feel	  they	  are	  being	  told	  to	  forget	  their	  
values.	  I	  disagree.	  We	  are	  being	  taught	  to	  separate	  our	  private	  life	  from	  our	  business	  life.	  Lawyers	  must	  be	  able	  to	  
look	  at	  a	  problem	  from	  a	  strictly	  legal	  viewpoint.	  They	  can’t	  let	  their	  analysis	  be	  influenced	  by	  personal	  values.’	  
(ibid).	  Elkins’	  articles	  are	  a	  rich	  source	  of	  such	  student	  accounts.	  	   
32	  The	  aim	  of	  Willging	  &	  Dunn’s	  empirical	  research	  was	  to	  determine:	  (1)	  Whether	  the	  first	  year	  of	  law	  school	  had	  




on	  the	  socialization	  effects	  of	  undergraduate	  legal	  education	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Warwick;33	  
amongst	  others	  (Erlanger,	  1996;	  Erlanger	  &	  Klegon,	  1976;	  Evans	  &	  Palermo	  2002,	  2005;	  
Rathjen,	  1976	  –	  1977).	  However,	  the	  findings	  of	  these	  research	  projects	  relate	  mostly	  to	  very	  
general	  claims	  that	  law	  school	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  promote	  moral	  development,	  or	  that	  law	  
school	  does	  not	  tend	  to	  encourage	  an	  orientation	  toward	  ‘big	  firms’.	  They	  do	  not	  ground	  claims	  
regarding	  the	  acquisition	  of	  particular	  attributes	  or	  values	  on	  the	  part	  of	  students.	  Furthermore,	  
all	  the	  studies	  were	  focused	  exclusively	  on	  students,	  rather	  than	  focused	  on	  the	  law	  lecturer	  as	  
the	  site	  and	  source	  of	  representations	  of	  legal	  professionals.	  Cownie’s	  ground-­‐breaking	  study	  of	  
legal	  academics	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  notes	  that	  academic	  lawyers	  ‘have	  hitherto	  been	  subject	  
to	  remarkably	  little	  scrutiny’	  (2004:	  2),	  though	  even	  her	  study	  –	  focused	  as	  it	  was	  on	  the	  culture	  
and	  identity	  of	  legal	  academics	  in	  this	  part	  of	  the	  world	  –	  did	  not	  examine	  how	  academics	  
lawyers	  represent	  legal	  professionals	  to	  the	  students	  in	  their	  classrooms.	  	  
I	  therefore	  considered	  that	  my	  PhD	  research	  project	  could	  offer	  something	  novel	  in	  focusing	  on	  
what	  was	  actually	  being	  said	  about	  legal	  professionals	  in	  the	  classroom.	  I	  did	  not	  wish	  to	  
examine	  the	  causal	  effect	  of	  such	  representations	  upon	  the	  moral	  development	  of	  students	  as	  
this	  would	  have	  entailed	  a	  far	  more	  broad-­‐ranging	  study	  of	  students	  in	  different	  social	  contexts,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
compared	  with	  that	  of	  students	  with	  equivalent	  levels	  of	  education;	  (3)	  How	  the	  moral	  development	  of	  law	  
students	  related	  to	  other	  law	  student	  characteristics;	  and	  (4)	  Whether	  a	  comprehensive	  ethics	  course	  emphasizing	  
classroom	  discussion	  of	  professional	  ethical	  dilemmas	  had	  any	  measurable	  influence	  on	  the	  moral	  development	  of	  
law	  students.	  The	  measuring	  instrument	  relied	  upon	  was	  the	  Defining	  Issues	  Test	  (DIT)	  –	  see	  Rest	  ‘Longitudinal	  
study	  of	  the	  DIT	  of	  moral	  judgment	  –	  A	  strategy	  for	  analyzing	  developmental	  change’	  (1975)	  11	  Developmental	  
Psychology	  738.	  The	  DIT	  was	  administered	  to	  a	  limited	  student	  population	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Toledo	  during	  1976	  
and	  1978	  (1981	  –	  82:	  345–6,	  351	  –	  2)	  together	  with	  gathering	  of	  information	  on	  students’	  academic	  results	  and	  
parental	  educational	  backgrounds.	  Contrary	  to	  the	  anecdotal	  accounts	  outlined	  above	  and	  Elkins’	  work,	  the	  
researchers	  found	  that	  neither	  the	  first	  year	  of	  law	  school,	  nor	  the	  completion	  of	  a	  professional	  responsibility	  
course	  resulted	  in	  a	  statistically	  significant	  change	  in	  moral	  reasoning	  (ibid:	  355).	  	  
33	  Sherr	  and	  Webb	  sought	  to	  determine	  whether	  students	  possess	  or	  develop	  a	  set	  of	  values	  and	  expectations	  that	  
cause	  them	  to	  prioritize	  ‘big	  city’	  commercial	  work	  over	  other	  forms	  of	  legal	  work	  (1989:	  225).	  The	  researchers	  
developed	  a	  questionnaire	  eliciting	  information	  on	  the	  following	  categories	  of	  information:	  Parental	  education	  and	  
occupations;	  political	  orientation;	  reasons	  for	  studying	  law;	  reasons	  for	  choosing	  Warwick	  University;	  student	  
preferences	  for	  specified	  elements	  of	  their	  legal	  education	  (e,.g.	  ‘thinking	  like	  a	  lawyer’,	  using	  legal	  techniques	  to	  
achieve	  policy	  goals,	  legal	  ethics);	  reasons	  for	  selecting	  course	  options;	  and	  students’	  career	  intentions.	  The	  
questionnaire	  was	  administered	  on	  a	  longitudinal	  basis,	  starting	  with	  students	  entering	  in	  1981	  and	  then	  
administered	  at	  the	  end	  of	  their	  first	  to	  fourth	  years	  (ibid:	  229).	  The	  researchers	  concluded	  that	  the	  answer	  to	  their	  
overarching	  question	  –	  does	  law	  school	  make	  students	  ‘turn	  to	  the	  city	  –	  was	  equivocal:	  Students	  entered	  
university	  with	  a	  practical	  bias,	  and	  evaluated	  the	  ‘relevance’	  of	  course	  offerings	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  relation	  to	  
practice,	  but	  there	  were	  few	  signs	  that	  students	  consistently	  rated	  the	  image	  of	  ‘city	  firms’	  (those	  prioritizing	  a	  
highly	  commercial	  ethos)	  higher	  over	  others	  and	  the	  students’	  desired	  specializations	  offered	  no	  evidence	  of	  




thus	  considerably	  diluting	  my	  study	  of	  the	  lecturer.	  The	  research	  thus	  focuses	  on	  the	  first	  claim	  
outlined	  above,	  and	  on	  the	  law	  lecturer	  rather	  than	  the	  students.	  Further,	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  
chose	  and	  develop	  an	  appropriate	  conceptual	  framework	  for	  theorizing	  the	  relationship	  
between	  representations	  in	  classroom	  talk	  and	  the	  formation	  of	  professional	  identity	  and	  
working	  out	  a	  methodological	  approach	  for	  systematically	  analyzing	  and	  synthesizing	  ‘talk’	  
about	  legal	  professionals	  in	  the	  classroom.	  In	  line	  with	  my	  original	  interest	  in	  language	  and	  the	  
constitution	  of	  identity,	  I	  wanted	  my	  approach	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  fine	  linguistic	  details	  of	  
classroom	  talk:	  Not	  only	  to	  present	  what	  was	  being	  said,	  but	  to	  uncover	  and	  explain	  the	  rich	  
and	  complex	  ways	  in	  which	  language	  was	  functioning	  to	  constitute	  legal	  professionals	  in	  a	  
particular	  manner.	  As	  explained	  in	  chapter	  two,	  the	  use	  of	  critical	  discourse	  analysis,	  a	  textually	  
oriented	  form	  of	  discourse	  analysis,	  came	  to	  serve	  this	  purpose	  well.	  	  
2.3.2	   Inspiration:	  Mertz’	  study	  on	  legal	  epistemology	  in	  classroom	  talk	  	  
After	  I	  had	  already	  done	  a	  substantial	  amount	  of	  work	  on	  this	  project,	  I	  was	  inspired	  by	  
Elizabeth	  Mertz’	  work	  on	  The	  Language	  of	  Law	  School:	  Learning	  to	  ‘Think	  like	  a	  Lawyer’	  (2007,	  
Oxford	  University	  Press),	  a	  study	  of	  the	  constitution	  of	  legal	  epistemology	  in	  classroom	  talk.	  
Mertz	  sought	  to	  determine	  whether	  there	  was	  a	  common	  content	  to	  ‘learning	  to	  think	  like	  a	  
lawyer’	  in	  law	  schools	  in	  the	  U.S.A.	  Her	  point	  of	  departure	  was	  that	  the	  transformation	  in	  
thought	  patterns	  which	  students	  reputedly	  undergo	  was	  accomplished	  through	  spoken	  and	  
written	  language	  in	  classroom	  exchanges	  and	  examinations	  (Mertz,	  2007:	  vii).	  This	  insight	  
prompted	  Mertz	  (supported	  by	  a	  number	  of	  research	  assistants)	  to	  record,	  transcribe,	  code	  and	  
analyze	  the	  law	  of	  contracts	  classes	  in	  eight	  law	  schools	  in	  the	  United	  States	  over	  a	  period	  of	  a	  
semester.	  Through	  her	  examination	  of	  classroom	  talk,	  Mertz	  found	  that	  there	  was	  in	  fact	  a	  
common	  content	  to	  the	  distinctively	  legal	  ways	  of	  knowing	  taught	  in	  the	  law	  schools	  of	  her	  
study.	  This	  included,	  for	  instance,	  the	  precepts	  that	  justice	  is	  served	  by	  an	  adversarial	  system	  
involving	  combative	  verbal	  dueling,	  and	  that	  social	  conflicts	  of	  any	  kind	  can	  be	  fitted	  to	  this	  
form	  of	  conflict	  resolution.	  In	  dealing	  with	  human	  conflict,	  a	  lawyer	  must	  therefore	  always	  




of	  adversarial	  reasoning,34	  identifying	  and	  understanding	  the	  applicable	  legal	  authorities,35	  and	  
using	  legal	  language	  (the	  language	  derived	  from	  legal	  authorities)	  to	  formulate	  the	  dispute.	  It	  
also	  entails	  ignoring	  details	  of	  the	  context	  to	  which	  people	  would	  attach	  significance	  on	  social	  
or	  moral	  grounds	  	  (Mertz,	  2007:	  4).	  Interestingly,	  although	  the	  classrooms	  in	  Mertz’	  study	  
differed	  in	  terms	  of	  teaching	  style	  –	  in	  one	  classroom	  the	  professor	  lectured	  95%	  of	  the	  time,	  in	  
others	  lecturers	  spent	  45–60%	  of	  the	  time	  in	  focused	  dialogue	  with	  individual	  students,	  whilst	  
in	  others	  focused	  Socratic-­‐dialogue	  occupied	  only	  21	  –	  29%	  of	  the	  time	  with	  a	  higher	  incidence	  
of	  shorter	  and	  non-­‐focused	  professor-­‐student	  exchanges	  –	  she	  found	  that	  the	  epistemological	  
content	  was	  similar,	  that	  there	  was	  a	  ‘shared	  message’	  about	  legal	  reading	  ‘conveyed	  across	  
diverse	  classrooms,	  professors	  and	  teaching	  methods’	  (ibid:	  94).	  	  
In	  distinguishing	  the	  common	  legal	  epistemology	  of	  U.S.	  Law	  Schools	  however	  Mertz	  also	  
provided	  a	  lens	  for	  others	  to	  see	  how	  language	  is	  patterned	  to	  constitute	  distinctively	  legal	  
ways	  of	  knowing.	  The	  patterns	  were	  both	  semantic	  (‘content’	  categories)	  and	  linguistic	  
(involving	  the	  ‘form’	  of	  the	  language)	  in	  nature.	  She	  found,	  for	  instance,	  that	  in	  discussing	  case	  
law	  most	  of	  the	  professors’	  linguistic	  turns	  fell	  into	  one	  of	  several	  semantic	  categories:	  (1)	  
clarifying	  facts;	  (2)	  applying	  legal	  principles	  to	  facts;	  (3)	  clarifying	  law,	  from	  doctrine	  to	  technical	  
terms;	  (4)	  resolving	  the	  implications	  of	  procedural	  factors	  and	  clarifying	  their	  impact;	  and	  (5)	  
discussing	  social	  or	  policy	  implications	  of	  decisions,	  including	  the	  possible	  motivation	  of	  actors	  
(ibid:	  65).	  She	  found	  lecturers	  (or	  ‘professors’	  in	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America)	  policed	  the	  first	  
four	  semantic	  categories	  strongly	  through	  a	  variety	  of	  linguistic	  patterns.	  For	  instance,	  by	  
relying	  on	  the	  Socratic	  method	  the	  law	  teacher	  could	  maintain	  tight	  control	  over	  the	  discourse	  
and	  prevent	  the	  student	  from	  giving	  up	  on	  adopting	  the	  new	  style	  of	  language	  (ibid:	  51).	  This	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  This	  would	  also	  entail	  positioning	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  dispute	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  roles	  in	  the	  adversarial	  process	  (e.g.	  
plaintiff,	  defendant,	  respondent,	  appellant,	  witness;	  etc).	  
35	  The	  concept	  of	  ‘legal	  authority’	  is	  a	  legal-­‐technical	  term	  that	  might	  not	  be	  easily	  understood	  by	  a	  person	  who	  has	  
not	  undergone	  legal	  training.	  Essentially,	  it	  refers	  to	  the	  sources	  of	  law	  recognized	  in	  a	  particular	  country.	  These	  
are	  textual	  sources	  upon	  which	  the	  State	  confers	  the	  status	  of	  ‘legal	  authority’,	  i.e.	  the	  sources	  of	  the	  principles	  
which	  the	  State	  will	  use	  force	  to	  ensure	  their	  observation.	  Recognition	  of	  these	  sources	  would	  include	  recognition	  
of	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  sources	  would	  be	  allowed	  to	  change	  over	  time;	  i.e.	  an	  authoritative	  process	  for	  
changing	  the	  sources	  of	  law	  (such	  as	  procedures	  for	  amending	  legislation	  or	  overruling	  an	  existing	  court	  
precedent).	  In	  South	  Africa	  the	  binding	  sources	  of	  law	  are	  (in	  order	  of	  priority):	  The	  Constitution,	  legislation,	  court	  
precedent	  (case-­‐law	  or	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  courts),	  the	  common	  law	  and	  custom.	  The	  process	  of	  identifying	  
applicable	  legal	  authorities	  would	  also	  entail	  categorizing	  the	  dispute	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  recognized	  categories	  of	  law	  




was	  achieved	  through	  the	  formal	  device	  of	  	  ‘non-­‐uptake’:	  A	  failure	  to	  affirm	  what	  the	  student	  
has	  just	  said.	  This	  functioned	  as	  an	  effective	  mechanism	  to	  teach	  the	  student	  that	  certain	  ways	  
of	  using	  language,	  and	  thereby	  certain	  avenues	  of	  thought	  –	  for	  example,	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  social	  
and	  moral	  overtones	  of	  a	  legal	  reading	  before	  it	  had	  been	  correctly	  parsed	  in	  terms	  of	  layers	  of	  
legal	  authority	  and	  procedure	  –	  were	  inappropriate	  (ibid:	  56).	  	  
Mertz	  not	  only	  focused	  on	  the	  semantic	  and	  linguistic	  features	  of	  classroom	  talk	  that	  
constituted	  a	  distinctive	  legal	  epistemology,	  she	  went	  further	  to	  examine	  the	  implications	  of	  
this	  way	  of	  thinking	  for	  professional	  identity.	  In	  other	  words	  she	  suggested	  that	  the	  semantic	  
categories	  associated	  with	  learning	  to	  think	  like	  a	  lawyer	  (clarifying	  facts,	  applying	  legal	  
principles	  to	  facts,	  and	  so	  on)	  had	  subtle	  implications	  for	  becoming	  a	  legal	  person.	  For	  example,	  
she	  argued	  that	  the	  process	  of	  learning	  to	  read	  like	  a	  lawyer	  tended	  to	  socialize	  students	  into	  
the	  balance	  of	  power	  encoded	  in	  the	  law	  and	  the	  practices	  of	  the	  legal	  profession.	  In	  certain	  
circumstances,	  the	  need	  to	  strip	  conflicts	  of	  their	  social	  and	  moral	  context	  operates	  to	  ensure	  
that	  bias	  against	  persons	  based	  on	  their	  inherent	  features	  (such	  as	  race	  or	  gender)	  are	  set	  aside	  
for	  purposes	  of	  legal	  judgment.	  This	  presents	  the	  law	  as	  a	  liberating	  and	  leveling	  force.	  But	  the	  
use	  of	  layered	  linguistic	  frames	  of	  reference;	  i.e.	  the	  application	  of	  the	  various	  layers	  of	  legal	  
authority,	  also	  disguises	  the	  prejudice	  and	  power	  that	  inheres	  in	  the	  laws	  themselves	  (ibid:	  
101).	  In	  this	  way	  it	  is	  easier	  ‘for	  the	  cultural	  assumptions	  of	  the	  dominant	  group	  to	  make	  their	  
way	  into	  a	  legal	  calculus	  than	  it	  will	  be	  for	  other	  viewpoints’	  (ibid).	  This	  positions	  the	  student	  as	  
a	  subject	  of	  ideology	  rather	  than	  merely	  a	  rational	  being	  who	  is	  being	  taught	  to	  separate	  a	  legal	  
from	  a	  personal	  view	  of	  the	  case.	  
She	  also	  argued	  that	  certain	  linguistic	  features	  associated	  with	  inculcating	  the	  appropriate	  
manner	  of	  legal	  reading	  and	  writing	  had	  subtle	  implications	  for	  becoming	  a	  legal	  person.	  She	  
pointed,	  for	  instance,	  to	  the	  pervasive	  use	  of	  direct	  quotation	  in	  the	  legal	  classrooms	  of	  her	  
study	  (ibid:	  102),	  particularly	  in	  so-­‐called	  stretches	  of	  ‘Socratic	  dialogue’.	  The	  use	  of	  direct	  
speech	  creates	  a	  more	  vivid,	  dramatic	  and	  immediate	  rendition	  of	  a	  conflict,	  imaginatively	  
bringing	  the	  hearer	  into	  the	  very	  heart	  of	  the	  reported	  context.	  It	  also	  creates	  the	  impression	  
that	  the	  reported	  speech	  is	  being	  produced	  precisely	  as	  it	  was	  spoken	  (ibid:	  103),	  which	  in	  the	  




said	  or	  thought	  would	  almost	  always	  be	  an	  imagined	  reconstruction	  of	  what	  actually	  took	  place.	  
This,	  Mertz	  argued,	  has	  two	  profound	  implications	  for	  identity.	  Firstly,	  it	  defines	  a	  person’s	  
central	  identity	  in	  terms	  of	  his	  or	  her	  role	  as	  a	  source	  of	  legal	  argument	  or	  strategy	  (ibid:	  101).	  
When	  students,	  as	  part	  of	  the	  process	  of	  socialization	  into	  this	  way	  of	  thinking,	  are	  invited	  to	  
role-­‐play	  the	  various	  parties	  to	  a	  dispute,	  it	  is	  this	  identity	  –	  the	  strategist	  –	  that	  they	  assume.	  
The	  allegiances	  or	  values	  that	  may	  otherwise	  motivate	  a	  party	  to	  a	  legal	  dispute	  are	  subsumed	  
by	  the	  overarching	  objective	  of	  formulating	  the	  better	  legal	  argument.	  Secondly,	  the	  use	  of	  
direct	  quotation	  elided	  the	  role	  of	  ‘animator’	  and	  ‘author’	  of	  the	  text.36	  When	  a	  law	  teacher	  
used	  direct	  speech	  to	  characterize	  the	  position	  of	  the	  people	  encountered	  in	  case-­‐law,	  he	  gave	  
the	  impression	  of	  being	  merely	  the	  animator,	  whereas	  in	  fact	  he	  was	  being	  both	  animator	  and	  
author	  of	  the	  text	  emerging	  in	  the	  classroom.	  This	  allowed	  him	  to	  present	  a	  case	  in	  other	  
people’s	  voices,	  just	  as	  attorneys	  do	  in	  court	  through	  the	  use	  of	  witnesses	  –	  in	  this	  way	  
constructing	  a	  version	  of	  the	  ‘truth’	  that	  is	  authoritative	  for	  being	  based	  on	  what	  ‘actually’	  took	  
place	  between	  the	  parties,	  but	  in	  reality	  was	  not	  necessarily	  so	  (ibid:	  105).	  For	  the	  student	  who	  
takes	  on	  this	  technique,	  it	  stresses	  the	  essential	  contestability	  of	  any	  account	  of	  events	  (ibid:	  
112).	  The	  frequent	  shifting	  that	  takes	  place	  through	  the	  elision	  of	  animator	  and	  author	  also	  
elevates	  fluency	  in	  speech	  participant	  roles	  over	  the	  anchoring	  of	  self	  in	  any	  particular	  position	  
(ibid).	  The	  ability	  to	  shift	  position	  or	  ‘sides’	  is	  presented	  as	  of	  higher	  value	  than	  the	  steadfast	  
commitment	  to	  a	  position	  based	  on	  a	  particular	  set	  of	  values	  or	  principles.	  	  
The	  subtlety	  of	  Mertz’	  work	  inspired	  me	  to	  continue	  my	  focus	  on	  classroom	  talk	  that	  
represented	  legal	  professionals.	  Her	  work	  also	  served	  to	  point	  me	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  focusing	  
on	  both	  the	  semantic	  (content)	  categories	  in	  terms	  of	  which	  legal	  professionals	  were	  
represented,	  and	  their	  typical	  linguistic	  (form)	  realizations.	  The	  representation	  of	  legal	  
professionals	  as	  an	  aspect	  of	  classroom	  talk	  did	  not,	  however,	  feature	  at	  all	  in	  Mertz’	  study	  and	  
so	  the	  gap	  I	  had	  identified	  in	  the	  research	  literature	  remained	  open.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  These	  are	  terms	  introduced	  by	  Erving	  Goffman	  to	  explain	  his	  concept	  of	  ‘footing’.	  Footing	  describes	  the	  standing	  
or	  relationship	  a	  speaker	  holds	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  text:	  The	  ‘animator’	  is	  the	  person	  doing	  the	  actual	  speaking,	  the	  
‘author’	  is	  the	  person	  who	  composed	  the	  words,	  and	  the	  ‘principal’	  is	  the	  person	  ultimately	  responsible	  for	  the	  




3.	   STATEMENT	  OF	  THE	  PROBLEM	  	  	  
While	  the	  formation	  of	  professional	  identity	  has	  been	  identified	  as	  a	  legitimate	  focus	  of	  legal	  
education,	  it	  has	  tended	  to	  be	  construed	  as	  a	  pedagogical	  object	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  process	  of	  
socialization.	  While	  various	  processes	  of	  socialization	  –	  both	  within	  and	  outside	  the	  legal	  
classroom	  –	  have	  been	  linked	  to	  professional	  identity	  formation,	  no-­‐one	  to	  date	  seems	  to	  have	  
paid	  extensive	  attention	  to	  the	  detailed	  representation	  of	  legal	  professionals	  in	  classroom	  talk.	  
The	  extensive	  literature	  on	  the	  teaching	  of	  legal	  ethics	  affirms	  that	  law	  lecturers	  inevitably	  
construct	  images	  of	  law,	  lawyering	  and	  lawyers	  through	  the	  stories	  they	  tell	  and	  the	  remarks	  
they	  make	  in	  the	  classroom,	  yet	  an	  extensive	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  such	  representations	  has	  not	  
been	  conducted.	  As	  such,	  a	  method	  for	  determining	  how	  such	  representations	  can	  be	  ordered	  
and	  made	  meaningful	  has	  also	  not	  been	  developed,	  nor	  have	  the	  conceptual	  associations	  
between	  such	  representations	  and	  processes	  of	  identity	  formation	  been	  made.	  	  
4.	   AIM	  OF	  THE	  STUDY	  AND	  KEY	  RESEARCH	  QUESTIONS	  	  	  
The	  study	  assumes	  the	  form	  of	  a	  detailed	  case	  study	  of	  a	  university	  law	  lecturer’s	  talk	  about	  
legal	  professionals	  in	  a	  six-­‐month,	  first-­‐year	  course	  of	  study	  entitled	  ‘Introduction	  to	  Law’	  
presented	  in	  2008	  at	  a	  tertiary	  educational	  institution	  in	  South	  Africa.	  The	  case	  study	  was	  
undertaken	  with	  a	  view	  to	  answering	  the	  following	  research	  questions:	  	  
(a)	  	   What	  conceptual	  resources	  exist	  for	  theorizing	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  
representation	  of	  legal	  professionals	  in	  classroom	  talk	  and	  the	  formation	  of	  legal	  
professional	  identity?	  	  
(b)	   Which	  methodological	  approach	  would	  best	  elucidate	  the	  content	  and	  form	  of	  
representations	  about	  legal	  professionals	  in	  classroom	  talk?	  	  
(c)	  	   How	  were	  legal	  professionals	  actually	  represented	  in	  the	  classroom	  of	  the	  study?	  How	  
did	  language	  function	  to	  constitute	  these	  representations?	  	  
(d)	   How	  did	  the	  lecturer’s	  representations	  relate	  to	  broader	  discourses	  on	  legal	  
professionalism	  and	  the	  teaching	  of	  legal	  ethics?	  i.e.	  what	  ‘horizon	  of	  observation’	  did	  




5.	  	   STRUCTURE	  OF	  THE	  REPORT	  	  	  
The	  remaining	  chapters	  of	  this	  report	  are	  structured	  as	  follows:	  
In	  chapter	  two	  I	  answer	  the	  first	  of	  the	  questions	  outlined	  above	  by	  providing	  an	  overview	  of	  
social	  constructivist	  understandings	  of	  professional	  identity	  formation.	  This	  is	  linked	  to	  the	  
distinctive	  processes	  of	  ‘identity	  regulation’	  and	  ‘identity	  work’	  with	  the	  focus	  in	  this	  study	  
falling	  on	  the	  former.	  I	  posit	  ‘role’	  and	  ‘discourse’	  as	  the	  two	  concepts	  most	  central	  to	  
understanding	  processes	  of	  identity	  regulation	  and	  outline	  how	  the	  resources	  of	  critical	  
discourse	  analysis	  may	  be	  used	  to	  elucidate	  the	  discourses	  associated	  with	  particular	  
professionals	  roles	  in	  the	  data.	  The	  chapter	  concludes	  with	  the	  identification	  of	  three	  
conceptual	  claims	  that	  frame	  the	  study	  and	  that	  relate	  to	  the	  use	  of	  the	  model	  of	  social	  practice	  
to	  structure	  representations.	  
Chapter	  three	  situates	  myself	  as	  the	  researcher	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  research	  topic,	  outlines	  and	  
justifies	  the	  research	  paradigm	  and	  research	  design,	  introduces	  the	  research	  subject	  (the	  
lecturer	  whose	  talk	  over	  a	  course	  of	  a	  semester	  I	  dissected),	  and	  deals	  with	  a	  number	  of	  key	  
methodological	  issues.	  	  
In	  chapter	  four	  I	  respond	  to	  the	  second	  of	  the	  key	  questions	  identified	  above	  by	  explaining	  how	  
I	  developed	  the	  internal	  language	  of	  description;	  i.e.	  the	  codes	  used	  to	  analyze	  the	  data	  which	  
were	  drawn	  primarily	  from	  Van	  Leeuwen’s	  work	  (2008)	  on	  the	  representational	  function	  of	  
language.	  The	  codes	  centre	  on	  four	  critical	  elements	  of	  social	  practice,	  namely	  social	  action,	  the	  
circumstances	  of	  social	  action,	  social	  actors	  and	  values.	  
Chapters	  five	  and	  six	  respond	  to	  the	  final	  two	  research	  questions	  by	  outlining	  and	  then	  
discussing	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  analysis.	  Chapter	  five	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  most	  prominent	  
legal	  professional	  roles	  present	  in	  the	  lecturer’s	  classroom	  talk	  according	  to	  the	  key	  semantic	  
categories	  and	  their	  linguistic	  realizations	  outlined	  in	  chapter	  four.	  Chapter	  six	  synthesizes	  the	  




The	  thesis	  concludes	  in	  chapter	  seven	  with	  an	  overview	  of	  conclusions	  in	  response	  to	  the	  four	  
key	  research	  questions	  and	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  teaching	  and	  learning,	  policy	  and	  research	  








DEFINING	  A	  CONCEPTUAL	  FRAMEWORK	  FOR	  THE	  STUDY	  	  
Based	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  representations	  of	  legal	  professionals	  in	  classroom	  talk	  are	  of	  
consequence	  for	  the	  formation	  of	  students’	  legal	  professional	  identity,	  this	  study	  seeks	  to	  
determine	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  legal	  professionals	  were	  actually	  represented	  in	  one	  particular	  
case	  of	  legal	  classroom	  talk	  and	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  such	  representations	  were	  constituted	  by	  
language.	  This	  calls	  for	  the	  development	  of	  conceptual	  resources	  to	  understand	  the	  linkages	  
between	  representations	  and	  identity	  formation,	  and	  a	  methodological	  approach	  for	  studying	  
them.	  
In	  developing	  a	  conceptual	  frame	  for	  the	  study	  it	  was	  therefore	  necessary	  to	  gain	  a	  better	  
understanding	  of	  ‘identity’	  and	  the	  processes	  implicated	  in	  its	  formation,	  namely	  ‘identity	  work’	  
and	  ‘identity	  regulation’.	  In	  further	  developing	  the	  notion	  of	  identity	  regulation,	  it	  was	  
necessary	  to	  outline	  the	  concepts	  of	  ‘role’	  and	  ‘discourse’	  and	  the	  choices	  involved	  in	  studying	  
these.	  For	  purposes	  of	  studying	  the	  constitution	  of	  various	  legal	  professional	  roles	  and	  their	  
associated	  discourse	  in	  classroom	  talk	  I	  focused	  on	  the	  representational	  meaning	  of	  texts.	  
Critical	  discourse	  analysis,	  and	  the	  work	  of	  Van	  Leeuwen	  in	  particular,	  was	  further	  identified	  as	  
an	  appropriate	  analytical	  approach	  for	  studying	  these	  representational	  meanings.	  	  
1.	   IDENTITY	  	  
The	  literature	  on	  ‘identity’	  (and	  closely-­‐associated	  terms	  such	  as	  ‘self’,	  ‘self-­‐identity’,	  ‘personal	  
identity’,	  ‘social	  identity’)	  is	  huge	  (Sveningsson	  &	  Alvesson,	  2003:	  1166)	  as	  the	  concept	  is	  a	  
popular	  frame	  of	  analysis	  in	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  fields.	  These	  include	  philosophy	  (Hirsch,	  1982;	  
Vesey,	  1974),	  	  social	  psychology	  (Burke	  &	  Reitzes,	  1981;	  Callero,	  1985;	  Calleo,	  Howard	  &	  
Piliavin,	  1987;	  Chang,	  Piliavin	  &	  Callero,	  1988;	  Swann,	  1987;	  Yost	  et	  al,	  1992),	  different	  types	  of	  
sociology	  (Giddens,	  1991;	  Goffman,	  1959,	  1961,	  1963;	  Stryker,	  1968,	  1980,	  1992),	  cultural	  
studies	  (Du	  Guy,	  2000;	  Hall,	  2000),	  education	  (Carrim,	  2006;	  Perumal,	  2005)	  and	  studies	  of	  




virtually	  all	  of	  these	  fields,	  but	  the	  body	  of	  literature	  that	  I	  ultimately	  found	  to	  be	  most	  relevant	  
and	  appropriate	  was	  the	  treatment	  of	  identity	  in	  organization	  studies,	  primarily	  because	  the	  
concept	  of	  ‘professional	  identity’	  features	  most	  directly	  in	  this	  field	  as	  one	  of	  various	  types	  of	  
identity.	  	  
Writing	  from	  this	  perspective,	  Alvesson	  	  et	  al	  point	  out	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  identity	  has	  
appealed	  to	  scholars	  working	  from	  ‘strikingly	  different	  philosophical	  frameworks’	  (2008:	  8).	  
Scholars	  working	  from	  a	  functionalist,	  interpretivist	  and	  critical	  orientation	  have	  all	  been	  drawn	  
to	  the	  ‘theoretical	  promise’	  of	  the	  concept	  (ibid).	  The	  functionalist	  approach	  to	  identity	  is	  
technical,	  aimed	  at	  ‘developing	  knowledge	  of	  cause-­‐and-­‐effect	  relations	  through	  which	  control	  
over	  natural	  and	  social	  conditions	  can	  be	  achieved’	  (ibid).	  In	  organization	  studies,	  for	  instance,	  
it	  has	  been	  maintained	  that	  commitment,	  group	  cohesion,	  decision-­‐making	  and	  behavior,	  
amongst	  others,	  are	  all	  affected	  by	  patterns	  of	  identification	  (ibid).	  The	  focus	  on	  identity	  is	  
accordingly	  instrumental	  –	  as	  a	  means	  to	  improve	  these	  aspects	  of	  organizational	  life.	  The	  focus	  
of	  an	  interpretivist	  approach	  to	  identity	  falls	  more	  on	  an	  understanding	  (for	  its	  own	  sake)	  of	  
how	  humans	  generate	  and	  transform	  meaning,	  on	  ‘how	  people	  craft	  their	  identities	  through	  
interaction,	  or	  how	  they	  weave	  “narratives	  of	  self”	  in	  concert	  with	  others	  and	  out	  of	  the	  diverse	  
contextual	  resources	  within	  their	  reach’	  (ibid).	  A	  critical	  approach,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  has	  an	  
emancipatory	  interest,	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  unmasking	  the	  intricacies	  of	  power	  relations	  and	  the	  
‘various	  repressive	  relations	  that	  tend	  to	  constrain	  agency’	  (ibid:	  9).	  While	  the	  approach	  to	  
identity	  in	  this	  research	  is	  more	  aligned	  with	  interpretivist	  and	  critical	  traditions	  this	  does	  not	  
exclude	  the	  possibility	  that	  insights	  gained	  cannot	  be	  used	  to	  effect	  improvements	  in	  South	  
African	  legal	  education	  and	  elsewhere.	  	  
Definitions	  of	  identity	  are	  multi-­‐faceted.	  Most	  commonly,	  identity	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  self-­‐
definitions	  or	  self-­‐understandings	  people	  attach	  to	  themselves	  (Alvesson	  et	  al,	  2008:	  10;	  Ibarra,	  
1999:	  765;	  Sveningsson	  &	  Alvesson,	  2003:	  1184).	  Identity	  answers	  to	  the	  twin	  questions	  that	  go	  
to	  the	  heart	  of	  personhood:	  Who	  am	  I?	  and	  How	  should	  I	  be?	  (Cerulo,	  1997).	  Identity	  may	  also,	  
however,	  be	  used	  in	  the	  context	  of	  defining	  group	  or	  collective	  identity,	  and	  thus	  the	  
‘experience	  of	  coherence,	  consistency	  over	  time	  and	  distinctiveness	  of	  a	  person	  or	  a	  group’	  




encompasses	  the	  meanings	  others	  attach	  to	  self	  (Beech,	  2008:	  52;	  Ibarra,	  1999:	  766).	  This	  
insight	  undergirds	  Sfard	  and	  Prusak’s	  conception	  of	  identity	  as	  narratives	  about	  individuals	  that	  
may	  either	  be	  told	  by	  the	  identified	  person	  to	  him	  or	  herself,	  that	  may	  be	  told	  to	  the	  identified	  
person	  by	  another,	  or	  that	  may	  be	  told	  about	  an	  identified	  person	  by	  one	  third	  party	  to	  another	  
2005:	  16–17).	  The	  concept	  of	  identity	  thus	  invokes	  a	  pervasive	  process	  of	  meaning-­‐making	  in	  
relation	  to	  persons	  that	  may	  be	  focused	  on	  self	  or	  others.	  	  	  
Definitions	  of	  professional	  identity	  reflect	  this	  understanding.	  Goodrick	  and	  Reay	  define	  
‘professional	  role	  identity’	  as	  ‘a	  sense	  of	  self	  that	  is	  associated	  with	  enactment	  of	  a	  professional	  
role’	  (2010:	  58),	  while	  Ibarra	  associates	  it	  with	  the	  ‘relatively	  stable	  and	  enduring	  constellation	  
of	  attributes,	  beliefs,	  values,	  motives	  and	  experiences	  in	  terms	  of	  which	  people	  define	  
themselves	  in	  a	  professional	  role’	  (1999:	  764	  –	  5).	  	  
The	  self-­‐definitions	  and	  categorizations	  around	  which	  identity	  revolves	  ‘have	  long	  been	  seen	  as	  
constructed	  and	  negotiated	  in	  social	  interaction’	  (Ibarra,	  1999:	  766,	  referencing	  Mead,	  1934	  
and	  Goffman,	  1959).	  Already	  in	  the	  1930s	  George	  Herbert	  Mead	  concluded	  that	  the	  self	  can	  
only	  arise	  through	  a	  process	  of	  social	  experience	  and	  activity	  (Mead,	  1934:	  135)	  –	  it	  is	  not	  
something	  that	  is	  naturally	  given	  or	  biologically	  determined.	  Mead’s	  insights	  were	  taken	  up	  by	  
symbolic	  interactionists37	  such	  as	  Blumer	  who	  proposed	  that	  the	  self,	  rather	  than	  being	  a	  fixed	  
structure,	  is	  a	  process	  that	  unfolds	  through	  social	  interaction	  (Blumer,	  1969:	  63),	  while	  Goffman	  
did	  much	  to	  advance	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  self	  as	  a	  social	  product	  over	  the	  course	  of	  his	  lengthy	  
writing	  career.38	  This	  ‘constructivist’	  perspective	  contrasts	  with	  one	  that	  associates	  identity	  
with	  a	  fixed	  and	  abiding	  essence.	  In	  much	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  postmodernism	  this	  ‘essentialist’	  
view	  is	  attributed	  to	  pre-­‐modern	  societies	  in	  which	  identity	  was	  ‘fixed,	  solid	  and	  stable’,	  ‘a	  
function	  of	  predefined	  social	  roles	  and	  a	  traditional	  system	  of	  myths	  …’	  (Kellner,	  1992:	  141).	  
Identity	  was	  not	  open	  to	  being	  made	  and	  was	  thus	  not	  subject	  to	  reflection	  or	  discussion.	  In	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  Symbolic	  interactionism	  –	  a	  term	  coined	  by	  Herbert	  Blumer	  in	  1937	  –	  was	  the	  most	  significant	  theoretical	  
product	  of	  the	  Chicago	  school	  of	  sociology,	  the	  dominant	  force	  in	  American	  sociology	  until	  the	  1930s	  (Ritzer,	  1996:	  
194).	  
38	  Goffman’s	  output	  included	  eight	  books,	  three	  collections	  of	  essays	  and	  twenty-­‐eight	  essays,	  published	  between	  




modernity,	  the	  problem	  of	  identity	  opened	  up	  as	  individuals	  became	  more	  aware	  that	  one’s	  
identity	  could	  be	  the	  subject	  of	  innovation	  and	  change	  (ibid:	  143).	  	  
The	  trend	  away	  from	  essentialist	  and	  fixed	  views	  on	  identity	  toward	  constructive	  approaches	  
has	  gone	  hand	  in	  glove	  with	  a	  trend	  away	  from	  viewing	  an	  individual’s	  identity	  as	  ‘monolithic’	  
and	  toward	  seeing	  the	  individual	  as	  the	  point	  at	  which	  multiple	  identities	  intersect	  (Sveningsson	  
&	  Alvesson,	  2003;	  1164).	  The	  former	  trend	  has	  opened	  up	  an	  extensive	  area	  of	  inquiry	  into	  the	  
manner	  in	  which	  discursive,	  political	  and	  cultural	  influences	  interface	  with	  a	  person	  or	  group’s	  
identifications,	  and	  the	  issues	  of	  control	  and	  contestation	  (Simpson	  &	  Carroll,	  2008:	  31)	  that	  are	  
implicated	  in	  the	  ongoing	  ‘struggle’	  to	  define	  a	  sense	  of	  self	  (Svenigsson	  &	  Alvesson,	  2003:	  
1164).	  The	  metaphor	  of	  a	  ‘struggle’	  reflects	  the	  multiple,	  fluid,	  shifting,	  intersecting,	  possibly	  
competing	  identifications	  that	  an	  individual	  may	  hold	  at	  any	  one	  time	  (Avelsson	  et	  al,	  2008:	  6;	  
Simpson	  &	  Caroll,	  2008:	  31).	  The	  self-­‐definitions	  involved	  in	  processes	  of	  identification	  never	  
involve	  ‘simply	  stepping	  into	  pre-­‐packaged	  selves	  but	  always	  involve	  negotiating	  intersections	  
with	  other	  simultaneously	  held	  identities’	  (Alvesson	  et	  al,	  2008:	  10).	  More	  than	  saying	  that	  
identity	  is	  socially	  constructed,	  contemporary	  narratives	  of	  identity	  are	  	  characterized	  by	  a	  ‘flux	  
ontology’	  (Simpson	  &	  Carroll,	  2008:	  31)	  which	  associates	  the	  meaning-­‐making	  of	  identity	  
processes	  with	  ‘negotiation’	  at	  multiple	  levels.	  	  
It	  is	  common,	  particularly	  in	  functionalist	  approaches	  to	  identity	  (cf.	  Ibarra,	  1999:	  766),	  to	  group	  
meaning-­‐making	  processes	  in	  relation	  to	  identity	  at	  a	  ‘personal’	  or	  ‘social’	  level,	  indeed	  
Alvesson	  et	  al	  suggest	  that	  there	  is	  an	  ‘inevitable	  personal-­‐social	  relation’	  (2008:	  10)	  in	  
processes	  of	  identity	  formation.	  They	  define	  personal	  identity	  as	  the	  personal	  traits	  and	  
attributes	  assumed	  ‘as	  not	  being	  shared	  by	  other	  people,	  or	  not	  seen	  as	  a	  mark	  of	  group	  
belonging’,	  and	  social	  identity	  as	  ‘an	  individual’s	  perception	  of	  him	  or	  herself	  as	  a	  member	  of	  a	  
group,	  particularly	  in	  terms	  of	  value	  and	  emotional	  attachment’	  (ibid).	  Within	  the	  literature,	  
however,	  there	  are	  differing	  conceptions	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  personal	  identity	  and	  its	  intersection	  
with	  social	  identities.	  Some	  theorists	  advocate	  a	  very	  ‘sparse’	  understanding	  of	  personal	  
identity.	  In	  positioning	  theory,	  a	  body	  of	  work	  in	  the	  field	  of	  social	  psychology	  that	  draws	  
heavily	  on	  the	  work	  of	  Goffman,	  personal	  identity	  refers	  to	  the	  ‘single	  self’	  or	  ‘self1’,	  i.e.	  the	  self	  




Langenhove,	  1999a:	  ibid).	  In	  this	  sense	  personal	  identity	  is	  merely	  a	  structural	  or	  organizational	  
feature	  of	  an	  individual’s	  mentality:	  It	  can	  only	  be	  presented	  ‘formally’	  and	  has	  no	  content	  (ibid:	  
7).	  Discursively	  we	  display	  personal	  identity	  –	  the	  singularity	  of	  our	  selfhood	  –	  in	  the	  use	  of	  first	  
person	  indexicals	  (‘I’,	  ‘me’,	  ‘myself’,	  ‘mine’)	  and	  through	  the	  continuing	  narratives	  we	  construct	  
of	  our	  lives	  –	  to	  index	  one’s	  discourse	  in	  this	  way	  is	  to	  have	  personal	  identity	  (ibid:	  8)	  –	  the	  ‘I’	  
does	  not	  represent	  some	  sort	  of	  structure	  or	  mental	  state	  inside	  the	  individual.	  The	  ability	  to	  
use	  the	  discursive	  resources	  of	  personal	  identity	  is	  a	  learned	  behavior	  that	  the	  individual	  
acquires	  as	  a	  child	  in	  various	  social	  settings	  and	  it	  is	  this	  which	  bestows	  a	  unified	  sense	  of	  self.	  
Others	  however	  suggest	  that	  the	  unifying	  and	  integrating	  functions	  which	  seem	  to	  be	  
associated	  with	  personal	  identity	  involve	  more	  than	  the	  capacity	  to	  have	  a	  single,	  continuing	  
‘point	  of	  view	  in	  the	  world	  of	  objects	  in	  space	  and	  time’	  (Harré	  &	  Langenhove,	  1999:	  7).	  
Sveningsson	  and	  Alvesson	  appropriate	  the	  term	  ‘narrative	  self-­‐identity’	  to	  refer	  to	  
identifications	  associated	  with	  personal	  history	  and	  orientations	  that	  function	  to	  stabilize	  and	  
integrate	  the	  diversity	  of	  role	  expectations	  common	  in	  modern	  life	  (2003:	  1185).	  In	  their	  study	  
of	  a	  manager	  experiencing	  conflicting	  expectations	  related	  to	  her	  roles	  at	  a	  research	  and	  
development	  company	  as	  manager	  of	  operations,	  ‘ambassador’	  to	  external	  parties,	  and	  self-­‐
appointed	  leader	  of	  the	  organizational	  culture,	  they	  note	  how	  she	  ‘grounds’	  herself	  by	  going	  
back	  to	  her	  interests	  in	  farming,	  walking	  in	  the	  woods,	  caring	  for	  her	  cats	  and	  watching	  sports	  
(ibid:	  1185	  –	  6).	  In	  this	  view	  personal	  identity,	  while	  still	  discursively	  marked	  by	  first-­‐person	  
indexicals	  and	  personal	  narratives,	  refers	  to	  a	  sense	  of	  self	  that	  permeates	  or	  possibly	  
transcends	  identifications	  with	  diverse	  social	  identities	  and	  that	  is	  closely	  connected	  to	  fantasy	  
and	  personal	  myth,	  enduring	  predilections	  and	  traits.	  Alvesson	  et	  al	  thus	  invite	  identity	  
theorists	  to	  develop	  a	  ‘sharper	  eye’	  for	  the	  ‘diverse	  and	  fine-­‐tuned’	  ways	  in	  which	  personal	  and	  
social	  identities	  are	  intertwined:	  Personal	  meanings	  may	  be	  invoked	  in	  identifications	  with	  
social	  groups	  (as	  in	  being	  a	  White,	  female	  professor),	  and	  ‘social	  forces	  may	  be	  at	  work	  in	  the	  
most	  personalized	  of	  identity	  moves’	  (2008:	  10).	  	  
What	  matters	  for	  purposes	  of	  this	  thesis,	  however,	  is	  that	  both	  personal	  and	  social	  
identifications	  form	  part	  of	  what	  has	  been	  dubbed	  ‘identity	  work’	  –	  the	  ongoing	  activities	  




coherent,	  distinctive	  and	  positively	  valued	  (Alvesson	  et	  al,	  2008:	  15;	  Beech,	  2008:	  52;	  Pratt	  et	  
al,	  2006:	  237;	  Sveningsson	  &	  Alvesson,	  2003:	  1165).	  Although	  identity	  work	  is	  triggered	  and	  
lived	  out	  in	  social	  interaction,	  it	  is	  a	  process	  primarily	  located	  within	  the	  individual,	  and	  hence	  
for	  many	  scholars	  the	  individual	  subject	  is	  the	  central	  concern	  (Alvesson	  et	  al,	  2008:	  18).	  
Identity	  work,	  however,	  never	  takes	  place	  in	  a	  vacuum	  but	  is	  shaped	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  
‘extra-­‐individual	  forces’,	  grouped	  under	  the	  rubric	  of	  ‘identity	  regulation’	  (ibid;	  Beech,	  2008:	  
52).	  It	  is	  to	  a	  more	  detailed	  consideration	  of	  these	  two	  concepts,	  but	  particularly	  the	  latter,	  that	  
I	  must	  now	  turn.	  	  
2.	   IDENTITY	  REGULATION	  AND	  IDENTITY	  WORK	  	  
Studies	  examining	  processes	  of	  identity	  formation	  from	  across	  the	  functionalist,	  interpretivist	  
and	  critical	  traditions	  utilize	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  terms	  to	  describe	  forms	  of	  identity	  regulation.	  
There	  is	  mention,	  for	  instance,	  of	  ‘contextual’	  or	  ‘cultural	  resources	  (Alvesson	  et	  al,	  2008:	  8,	  
15),	  ‘cultural	  templates’	  or	  ‘scripts’	  (ibid:	  9,	  18),	  ‘social	  discourses	  or	  narratives’	  (ibid:	  11),	  
‘identity	  sets’	  (Pratt	  et	  al,	  2006:	  246);	  and	  ‘role	  models’	  (Ibarra,	  1999:	  773).	  The	  most	  common	  
meaning	  attached	  to	  all	  these	  terms	  is	  that	  they	  stand	  as	  types	  of	  resource	  out	  of	  which	  an	  
individual	  constructs	  a	  repertoire	  of	  ‘possible	  selves’	  (ibid:	  785),	  or	  ‘weaves’	  a	  narrative	  of	  self	  
(Alvesson	  et	  al,	  2008:	  8).	  They	  are	  resources	  to	  be	  ‘drawn’	  upon	  in	  a	  dynamic	  and	  reciprocal	  
way	  (ibid:	  11,	  15),	  the	  ‘raw	  materials’	  used	  to	  ‘customize’	  personal	  and	  social	  identifications	  
(Pratt	  et	  al,	  2006;	  246).	  Within	  the	  critical	  tradition,	  they	  are	  also	  seen	  as	  forces	  that	  pressurize	  
or	  determine	  how	  one	  ought	  to	  be	  (Alvesson	  et	  al,	  2008:	  9).	  	  
For	  both	  form	  and	  substance,	  identity	  work	  –	  the	  negotiation	  of	  personal	  and	  social	  
identifications	  –	  thus	  draws	  upon	  diverse	  forms	  of	  identity	  regulation.	  The	  manner	  in	  which	  this	  
occurs	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  a	  ‘loosely	  affiliated’	  body	  of	  research	  that	  has	  ‘yet	  to	  systematically	  
tackle	  issues	  of	  identity	  construction’	  (Pratt	  et	  al,	  2006:	  238).	  Within	  the	  available	  literature	  
there	  is	  less	  focus	  on	  when	  and	  where	  identity	  work	  occurs	  than	  on	  proposing	  models	  for	  how	  it	  
takes	  place.	  Pratt	  et	  al,	  in	  their	  six-­‐year	  qualitative	  study	  of	  medical	  residents,	  for	  instance,	  
propose	  an	  integrated	  model	  of	  work	  and	  identity	  learning	  cycles	  in	  which	  learning	  about	  the	  




linked.	  Work	  triggers	  ‘work	  identity	  integrity	  assessments’	  which	  occur	  when	  what	  one	  is	  doing	  
does	  not	  match	  self-­‐conceptions	  about	  who	  one	  is	  or	  thinks	  one	  should	  be	  (ibid:	  253).	  Thus	  in	  
their	  study,	  medical	  residents	  who	  were	  studying	  to	  become	  general	  practitioners	  (‘primary	  
care	  residents’)	  experienced	  the	  least	  amount	  of	  work-­‐identity	  integrity	  assessments:	  What	  
they	  found	  themselves	  doing	  in	  medical	  residence	  largely	  conformed	  with	  what	  they	  expected	  
to	  be	  doing	  and	  what	  they	  had	  done	  during	  medical	  school	  (ibid:	  246).	  The	  ‘identity	  
customization	  process’	  which	  these	  students	  undertook	  –	  changes	  in	  the	  form	  and	  content	  of	  
identifications	  with	  a	  particular	  social	  role	  that	  are	  aimed	  at	  making	  identity	  fit	  to	  work	  
demands	  –	  was	  akin	  to	  ‘identity	  enriching’.	  The	  main	  ‘identity	  sets’	  that	  students	  drew	  upon	  
were	  the	  ones	  they	  had	  acquired	  during	  medical	  school,	  but	  during	  the	  period	  of	  medical	  
residence	  these	  understandings	  became	  deeper	  and	  more	  nuanced	  (ibid).	  Medical	  residents	  
who	  were	  studying	  to	  become	  surgeons,	  however,	  experienced	  work-­‐identity	  integrity	  
assessments	  that	  were	  much	  more	  severe.	  Coming	  into	  the	  programme	  they	  saw	  themselves	  as	  
highly	  action-­‐oriented	  professionals	  who	  effected	  dramatic	  change	  in	  disease,	  and	  were	  
surprised	  to	  discover	  that	  their	  role	  included	  paperwork	  and	  ‘scut’	  work	  such	  as	  lowering	  a	  
patient’s	  toilet	  seat	  or	  deciding	  which	  vitamin	  shake	  the	  patient	  should	  be	  given	  (ibid:	  245).	  
These	  violations	  of	  their	  social	  identifications	  with	  the	  role	  of	  ‘surgeon’	  triggered	  the	  identity	  
customization	  process	  of	  ‘identity	  patching’	  whereby	  they	  added	  their	  pre-­‐existing	  (acquired	  
during	  medical	  school)	  understandings	  of	  being	  a	  general	  practitioner	  to	  their	  sense	  of	  being	  a	  
surgeon,	  with	  a	  resultant	  identification	  in	  being	  the	  ‘most	  complete	  doctors’	  (ibid:	  247).	  In	  
defining	  themselves	  as	  the	  ‘most	  complete	  doctors’,	  and	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  identity	  sets	  they	  
had	  acquired	  during	  medical	  school,	  the	  surgical	  residents	  tended	  to	  draw	  much	  more	  upon	  the	  
organizational	  discourses	  of	  the	  institution	  in	  which	  they	  were	  studying	  than	  other	  types	  of	  
residents	  (ibid:	  248).	  Students	  who	  were	  studying	  to	  become	  radiologists	  experienced	  even	  
more	  severe	  work-­‐identity	  integrity	  assessments	  because	  the	  work	  they	  found	  themselves	  
doing	  bore	  little	  relation	  to	  the	  conceptions	  of	  radiologists	  they	  had	  acquired	  during	  medical	  
school.	  While	  radiologists	  read	  films	  and	  other	  images	  for	  real	  patients,	  during	  their	  first	  year	  
students	  did	  little	  of	  such	  work,	  having	  instead	  to	  read,	  study	  and	  attend	  daily	  teaching	  
conferences	  (ibid:	  248).	  In	  these	  circumstances	  the	  identity	  customization	  process	  they	  




undertake	  the	  work	  of	  radiologists	  in	  later	  years	  and	  their	  radiologist	  identifications	  became	  
stronger	  (ibid).	  Ibarra,	  in	  her	  study	  of	  the	  acquisition	  of	  professional	  identity	  on	  the	  part	  of	  
junior	  investment	  bankers,	  developed	  a	  model	  for	  the	  adaptation	  process	  which	  identity	  work	  
entails	  that	  is	  regulated	  by	  both	  ‘situational	  influences’	  (job	  requirements,	  socialization	  
practices	  and	  role	  models)	  and	  ‘individual	  influences’	  (traits,	  abilities,	  motives,	  self-­‐conceptions	  
and	  past	  experiences)	  (1999:	  787).	  This	  leads	  to	  the	  conception,	  within	  an	  individual,	  of	  an	  
‘adaptation	  repertoire’	  comprising	  of	  ‘possible’	  or	  ‘provisional	  selves’.	  The	  ‘adaptation	  tasks’	  
involved	  in	  developing	  and	  refining	  the	  repertoire	  of	  ‘possible	  selves’	  involved	  three	  basic	  tasks:	  
(a)	  observing	  role	  models	  to	  identify	  potential	  identities;	  (b)	  experimenting	  with	  provisional	  
selves;	  and	  (c)	  evaluating	  experiments	  against	  internal	  standards	  and	  external	  feedback	  (ibid:	  
764,	  787).39	  Beech,	  in	  turn	  offers	  a	  complex	  dialogic	  model	  for	  identity	  work	  that	  draws	  upon	  
the	  theoretical	  insights	  of	  Bakhtin	  and	  Wittgenstein	  where	  identity	  work	  is	  typically	  triggered	  by	  
the	  utterances	  of	  others	  or	  from	  a	  ‘contextual	  discourse’	  (2008:	  55)	  
For	  purposes	  of	  this	  research	  it	  is	  not	  necessary	  for	  me	  to	  elaborate	  further	  on	  these	  or	  other	  
models	  of	  identity	  work,	  or	  to	  choose	  among	  them,	  because	  the	  focus	  of	  my	  work	  is	  not	  upon	  
law	  students’	  identity	  work	  as	  such,	  but	  rather	  on	  a	  law	  lecturer’s	  representation	  of	  legal	  
professionals	  in	  classroom	  talk	  as	  a	  form	  of	  identity	  regulation.	  All	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  emphasized	  
is	  that	  all	  of	  the	  models	  are	  premised	  on	  an	  understanding	  of	  identity	  work	  being	  inextricably	  
intertwined	  with	  identity	  regulation	  and	  of	  personal	  and	  social	  identifications	  emerging	  from	  
the	  interaction	  of	  these	  two	  complex	  processes.	  	  
With	  the	  spotlight	  accordingly	  turned	  toward	  identity	  regulation,	  in	  the	  following	  section	  I	  
propose	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  contextualized	  and	  decontextualized	  practices	  enrich	  an	  
understanding	  of	  where	  and	  when	  identity	  regulation	  occurs,	  while	  the	  concepts	  of	  role	  and	  
discourse	  are	  central	  to	  understanding	  how	  it	  operates.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  Ibarra’s	  concept	  of	  an	  ‘adaptation	  repertoire’	  possibly	  goes	  too	  far	  in	  suggesting	  that	  the	  choice	  of	  identity	  is	  
necessarily	  a	  conscious	  decision,	  whereas	  an	  assumption	  linked	  to	  the	  study	  of	  the	  discoursal	  representation	  of	  
legal	  professionals	  in	  classroom	  talk	  is	  that	  the	  individual’s	  engagement	  with	  possible	  identities	  is	  a	  far	  more	  
insidious	  process.	  This	  is	  discussed	  further	  in	  section	  4.2.1	  below	  dealing	  with	  discourse	  determination	  versus	  





3.	   IDENTITY	  REGULATION	  IN	  CONTEXTUALISED	  AND	  DECONTEXTUALIZED	  PRACTICES	  	  
In	  considering	  where	  and	  when	  identity	  regulation	  takes	  place,	  Alvesson	  et	  al	  distinguish	  
between	  the	  study	  of	  ‘situated	  practice’	  and	  ‘cultural	  formation’	  (2008:	  20).	  The	  former	  
involves	  the	  study	  of	  identity	  construction	  processes	  from	  a	  contextualized	  context;	  i.e.	  from	  
within	  the	  concrete	  activity	  concerned.	  Thus,	  a	  contextualized	  study	  of	  legal	  professional	  
identity	  would	  entail	  studying	  legal	  professionals	  or	  various	  types	  of	  legal	  professional	  in	  the	  
carrying	  out	  of	  their	  work,	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  their	  practice,	  through	  such	  methods	  as	  research	  
interviews,	  focus	  groups,	  participant	  observations	  and	  the	  like.	  	  
A	  focus	  on	  identity	  regulation	  as	  ‘cultural	  formation’,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  recognizes	  that	  
‘available	  working	  subjectivities’	  may	  be	  created	  or	  produced	  in	  sites	  other	  than	  situated,	  
contextualized	  practices,	  including	  the	  media	  (popular	  news	  and	  televisions	  shows,	  news	  
coverage,	  advertising,	  ‘best-­‐selling’	  books	  on	  the	  practice),	  occupational	  associations,	  industry	  
or	  trade	  forums,	  academic	  writing	  (see	  for	  instance	  Goodrick	  and	  Reay’s	  (2010)	  study	  of	  the	  
legitimation	  and	  institutionalization	  of	  professional	  identities	  for	  nurses	  in	  nursing	  textbooks)	  
and	  most	  importantly	  for	  purposes	  of	  this	  study,	  educational	  settings	  (Alvesson,	  2008:	  21).	  	  All	  
these	  sites	  involve	  identity	  formation	  in	  decontextualized	  social	  practices.	  The	  critical	  
implication	  of	  studying	  identity	  regulation	  in	  such	  contexts	  is	  that	  it	  will	  involve	  a	  study	  of	  
representations	  of	  the	  practice,	  rather	  than	  the	  practice	  itself	  (ibid).	  This	  legitimates	  the	  study	  
of	  representations	  of	  legal	  professionals	  in	  classroom	  talk	  as	  a	  form	  of	  identity	  regulation	  taking	  
place	  within	  the	  decontextualized	  social	  practice	  of	  education.	  	  
The	  extent	  to	  which	  educational	  settings	  might	  influence	  novice	  professionals’	  perception	  of	  
their	  future	  roles	  is	  illustrated	  by	  Pratt	  et	  al’s	  study	  of	  the	  professional	  identity	  formation	  of	  
medical	  interns	  discussed	  above.	  For	  all	  three	  groups	  included	  in	  the	  study	  (interns	  studying	  to	  
become	  general	  practitioners,	  surgeons	  and	  radiologists	  respectively),	  the	  ‘identity	  beliefs’	  
(Pratt	  et	  al,	  2010:	  246)	  that	  students	  had	  acquired	  during	  medical	  school	  about	  being	  a	  doctor	  
influenced	  the	  customization	  of	  their	  identifications	  with	  the	  target	  roles,	  although	  the	  manner	  





4.	  	  	   IDENTITY	  REGULATION:	  ROLE	  AND	  DISCOURSE	  	  	  
In	  their	  paper	  on	  the	  management	  of	  managerial	  identities	  Sveningsson	  and	  Alvesson	  argue	  
that	  the	  identity	  work	  which	  lies	  at	  the	  ‘struggle’	  of	  identity	  is	  both	  fueled	  and	  constrained	  by	  
(1)	  roles,	  (2)	  discourses	  and	  (3)	  narrative	  self-­‐identity’	  (ibid).	  In	  this	  model,	  narrative	  identity	  –	  
identifications	  associated	  with	  personal	  history	  and	  orientations	  that	  function	  to	  stabilize	  and	  
integrate	  the	  diversity	  of	  role	  expectations	  common	  in	  modern	  life	  (ibid:	  1185)	  –	  can	  be	  
regarded	  as	  the	  intra-­‐individual	  force	  whereas	  ‘roles’	  and	  ‘discourses’	  are	  extra-­‐individual,	  and	  
thus	  associated	  with	  identity	  regulation.	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  concepts	  of	  ‘role’	  and	  ‘discourse’	  
can	  be	  used	  to	  understand	  how	  identity	  regulation	  takes	  place.	  Rather	  than	  assuming	  the	  
meaning	  of	  each	  of	  these	  concepts,	  the	  following	  section	  explores	  their	  dimensions	  and	  
associations.	  	  
4.1	   Role	  	  
The	  notion	  of	  role	  has	  a	  number	  of	  problematic	  associations.	  It	  has	  been	  used	  in	  both	  symbolic	  
interactionist	  and	  systems	  approaches	  with	  strongly	  functionalist	  overtones.	  Theorists	  working	  
in	  these	  traditions	  assume	  a	  named	  and	  classified	  world,	  where	  classification	  includes	  symbols	  
designating	  ‘social	  positions’	  as	  the	  relatively	  stable,	  formal	  components	  of	  social	  structure.	  
‘Roles’	  are	  the	  shared	  social	  expectations	  attached	  to	  social	  positions	  (Ritzer,	  1996:	  367).	  When	  
interacting,	  people	  name	  one	  another	  and	  thus	  evoke	  reciprocal	  expectations	  of	  what	  each	  is	  
expected	  to	  do	  (ibid).	  People	  also	  apply	  role	  designations	  to	  themselves	  and,	  in	  so	  doing,	  
construct	  a	  set	  of	  self-­‐definitions	  which	  function	  as	  internalized	  expectations	  for	  their	  own	  
behaviour	  (ibid:	  368).	  In	  terms	  of	  this	  view,	  roles	  are	  socially	  determined	  and	  stable,	  a	  
‘relatively	  fixed	  social	  construction	  that	  prescribes	  the	  expected	  and	  acceptable	  behaviours	  in	  a	  
given	  social	  context’	  (Simpson	  &	  Carroll,	  2008:	  31,	  44).	  This	  resonates	  with	  naïve	  
understandings	  of	  identity	  as	  singular,	  integral,	  harmonious	  and	  unproblematic	  (ibid:	  31).	  There	  
is	  a	  failure	  in	  this	  body	  of	  literature	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  ‘discursive,	  cultural	  and	  political	  
construction	  of	  roles	  [or]	  with	  issues	  of	  control	  and	  contestation’	  (ibid:	  31,	  44).	  The	  focus	  falls	  




accurate	  predictors	  of	  	  behavior	  in	  different	  contexts	  (see	  Burke,	  1977;	  Burke	  &	  Reitzes,	  1981;	  
Callero,	  1985;	  Callero,	  Howard	  &	  Piliavin,	  1987;	  Chang,	  Piliavin	  &	  Callero,	  1988;	  Stryker,	  1968,	  
1980).	  Simpson	  and	  Carroll	  argue	  however	  that	  unless	  the	  concept	  of	  role	  can	  be	  wrested	  from	  
the	  remains	  of	  its	  functionalist	  bonds,	  unless	  it	  can	  be	  re-­‐theorized	  as	  a	  fixed	  social	  construction	  
that	  determines	  member	  behavior,	  ‘then	  its	  irrelevance	  and	  redundancy	  in	  the	  context	  of	  
contemporary	  theory	  is	  inevitable’	  (2008:	  33).	  	  
In	  their	  paper	  Simpson	  and	  Carroll	  argue	  for	  a	  reformulation	  of	  ‘role’	  as	  a	  ‘boundary	  object’	  –	  as	  
something	  that	  sits	  externally	  to	  actors	  and	  mediates	  identity	  work	  (ibid:	  45);	  as	  an	  
‘intermediary	  translation	  device	  that	  sits	  between	  the	  relational	  processes	  of	  identity	  
construction’	  (ibid:	  33).	  Roles	  sit	  in-­‐between	  constructing	  selves	  as	  a	  ‘relational	  vehicle’	  for	  both	  
the	  reinforcement	  of	  existing	  meanings	  and	  the	  construction	  of	  new	  ones	  (ibid:	  43).	  This	  allows	  
for	  the	  concept	  of	  role	  to	  be	  reconceived	  as	  ‘inherently	  unstable	  and	  perpetually	  “becoming”’	  
(ibid:	  44)	  and	  subject	  to	  power	  and	  control	  (ibid:	  44	  –	  45).	  It	  is	  not	  only	  the	  individual	  whose	  
personal	  and	  social	  identifications	  are	  constantly	  being	  re-­‐negotiated	  through	  identity	  work,	  
but	  in	  the	  process,	  in	  the	  interaction	  that	  occurs	  between	  constructing	  selves,	  the	  meanings	  of	  
roles	  as	  in-­‐between	  objects	  are	  also	  transient	  and	  incomplete,	  subject	  to	  possible	  disruption	  
and	  change	  (ibid:	  44).	  However	  their	  meanings	  are	  not	  so	  unstable	  as	  to	  fail	  to	  provide	  anchors	  
or	  nodes	  for	  identity	  construction	  that	  sustain	  a	  sense	  of	  continuity	  over	  time	  (ibid:	  44).	  	  
The	  reformulated	  concept	  of	  role	  put	  forward	  by	  Simpson	  and	  Carroll	  has	  much	  in	  common	  
with	  ‘subject	  position’	  –	  a	  concept	  used	  often	  in	  the	  Foucauldian-­‐inspired	  literature	  on	  identity	  
(see,	  for	  instance,	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  Kuhn	  (1999)	  uses	  the	  concept).	  Like	  role,	  a	  subject	  
position	  is	  ‘something	  that	  sits	  externally	  to	  actors	  and	  serves	  to	  facilitate	  the	  identity	  
construction	  process’	  (Simpson	  &	  Carroll,	  2008:	  45),	  and	  similarly	  to	  the	  reconceived	  version	  of	  
role	  it	  is	  situated	  in	  a	  ‘flux	  ontology’	  (ibid:	  31),	  perpetually	  becoming	  rather	  than	  fixed,	  stable	  or	  
determined.	  The	  notion	  of	  subject	  position,	  however,	  is	  frequently	  associated	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  
agency	  that	  is	  posited	  as	  incoherent,	  marked	  by	  Jameson’s	  ‘constitutive	  features	  of	  the	  
postmodern’	  (1991:	  6):	  A	  new	  ‘depthlessness’	  present,	  in	  particular	  in	  a	  preoccupation	  with	  the	  
postmodern	  ‘culture	  of	  the	  image’;	  a	  consequent	  weakening	  of	  historicity	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  




of	  self	  that	  extends	  back	  in	  time);	  and	  a	  new	  type	  of	  ‘emotional	  ground	  tone’	  (ibid),	  
characterized	  by	  a	  flux	  of	  euphoric	  but	  disintegrated,	  fragmented	  and	  disconnected	  emotional	  
intensities	  (Kellner,	  1992:	  144).	  The	  abandonment	  of	  agency	  that	  such	  a	  view	  implies,	  goes	  
together	  with	  a	  determination-­‐oriented	  or	  extremely	  ‘muscular’	  view	  of	  discourse	  (as	  outlined	  
below).	  Subject	  positions	  are	  the	  externally	  constituted	  personifications	  of	  the	  contingent	  and	  
historically	  specific	  discourses	  that	  are	  connected	  to	  particular	  bodies	  of	  knowledge	  at	  a	  
particular	  time.	  The	  use	  of	  the	  concept	  as	  Simpson	  and	  Carroll	  point	  out,	  is	  that	  it	  gives	  greater	  
emphasis	  to	  the	  process	  of	  subjectification	  than	  it	  does	  to	  the	  ‘substance	  of	  identity	  or	  self’;	  
one	  is	  ‘constituted	  as	  a	  subject	  more	  than	  one	  constitutes	  a	  position’	  (2008:	  32).	  The	  actor	  is	  
presented	  as	  a	  ‘docile	  body	  …	  in	  the	  servitude	  of	  far	  more	  powerful	  and	  pervasive	  discourses’	  
(ibid).	  	  
However,	  recent	  research	  in	  this	  paradigm	  has	  railed	  against	  this	  ‘occlusion’	  of	  agency	  (Kuhn,	  
2009:	  682).	  The	  notion	  of	  subject	  position	  certainly	  does	  imply	  that	  individuals	  are	  ‘sites’	  for	  the	  
confluence	  of	  multiple	  discourses	  prescribing	  thought	  and	  action,	  but	  it	  can	  also	  imply	  
reflection,	  resourcefulness	  and	  resistance	  (ibid).	  While	  early	  identity	  studies	  in	  this	  mould	  
‘asserted	  the	  deterministic	  power	  of	  discourse,	  recent	  studies	  suggest	  that	  creative	  self-­‐
construction	  (i.e.	  agency)	  is	  possible	  because	  the	  circulation	  of	  multiple	  discourses	  provides	  a	  
capacity	  for	  ongoing	  reinvention	  through	  variations	  in	  identifications’	  (ibid:	  683).	  Subject	  
positions	  exhibit	  a	  ‘discursive	  surplus’	  –	  because	  each	  subject	  position	  is	  supported	  and	  
inscribed	  by	  a	  variety	  of	  other	  discourses	  –	  which	  thus	  facilitates,	  rather	  than	  erases	  agency	  
(ibid:	  684).	  	  
This	  points	  to	  the	  unique	  contribution	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘subject	  position’	  and	  in	  its	  
reformulated	  version	  ‘role’	  can	  add	  to	  the	  conceptual	  frame:	  The	  concept	  refers	  to	  the	  ‘nub’	  or	  
the	  ‘site’	  around	  which	  diverse	  discourses	  can	  converge,	  as	  the	  temporary	  points	  of	  ‘suture’	  
(Hall,	  1996)	  which	  not	  only	  connect	  concrete	  individuals	  to	  particular	  discourses	  but	  which	  
function	  as	  points	  of	  attraction	  for	  different	  discourses	  as	  well.40	  As	  regards	  the	  choice	  between	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  Kuhn’s	  notion	  of	  a	  ‘discursive	  surplus’	  (2009:	  684)	  captures	  the	  concept	  well	  but	  the	  insight	  is	  not	  frequently	  
emphasized	  in	  the	  literature.	  The	  focus,	  instead,	  seems	  to	  fall	  on	  characterizing	  the	  multiple	  discourses	  that	  can	  
shape	  personal	  and	  social	  identifications	  at	  any	  one	  level	  (such	  as	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  organization).	  Each	  discourse	  




them	  the	  distinguishing	  feature	  between	  the	  two,	  according	  to	  Simpson	  and	  Carroll,	  is	  that	  the	  
concept	  of	  role	  invokes	  a	  stronger	  sense	  of	  agency	  (2008:	  45).	  Because	  the	  approach	  to	  
discourse	  which	  I	  will	  proceed	  to	  outline	  opts	  for	  a	  tight	  coupling	  between	  discourse,	  meaning	  
and	  other	  social	  elements,	  and	  not	  a	  relationship	  that	  is	  determined	  or	  collapsed,	  I	  preferred	  to	  
work	  with	  the	  reformulated	  version	  of	  role	  put	  forward	  by	  Simpson	  and	  Carroll.	  	  
4.2	   Discourse	  	  
In	  their	  article	  on	  varieties	  of	  discourse,	  Alvesson	  and	  Karreman	  note	  that	  while	  the	  term	  
‘discourse’	  is	  widely	  used	  in	  social	  science	  and	  organization	  studies,	  in	  many	  texts	  there	  are	  no	  
definitions	  or	  discussions	  of	  what	  discourse	  means	  (2000:	  1126).	  It	  is	  used	  as	  if	  it	  had	  a	  clear,	  
broadly	  agreed-­‐upon	  meaning	  (ibid:	  2006)	  but	  the	  confusingly	  varied	  use	  of	  the	  term	  points	  to	  
the	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  no	  agreed-­‐upon	  definition	  (ibid:	  1127).	  Although	  use	  of	  the	  term	  discourse	  
signals	  an	  interest	  in	  language,	  quite	  often	  it	  is	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  ‘conceptions,	  a	  line	  of	  
reasoning,	  a	  theoretical	  position	  or	  something	  similar’	  (ibid:	  1129).	  	  
However,	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  view	  that	  discourse	  is	  integrally	  connected	  to	  language,	  it	  is	  
important	  to	  remember	  that	  the	  first	  attempts	  to	  study	  language,	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  
twentieth	  century,	  aimed	  to	  disconnect	  language	  from	  its	  social	  context	  –	  to	  produce	  a	  pure,	  
uniform	  and	  stable	  ‘science	  of	  language’	  by	  dividing	  it	  up	  into	  various	  domains	  and	  studying	  
these	  separately	  (Beaugrande,	  1997:	  36).	  While	  linguists	  were	  successful	  in	  identifying	  and	  
classifying	  the	  most	  basic	  units	  of	  language,	  they	  found	  that	  as	  they	  ascended	  the	  levels	  of	  
analysis,	  it	  became	  increasingly	  difficult	  to	  identify	  underlying	  patterns	  and	  rules	  explaining	  how	  
the	  language	  worked	  (Beaugrande,	  1997:	  39).	  After	  decades	  of	  research	  into	  language	  as	  a	  
disconnected	  system,	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1960s	  to	  early	  70s	  a	  number	  of	  new,	  closely-­‐related	  disciplines	  
emerged	  in	  the	  humanities	  and	  social	  sciences	  that	  were	  focused	  on	  reconnecting	  language	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
identified	  four	  analytically	  distinct	  discourses	  operating	  at	  the	  organizational	  level	  (specifically,	  discourses	  on	  ‘the	  
global	  company’,	  ‘facilitating	  creativity’,	  ‘exploiting	  networks’,	  and	  ensuring	  proper	  ‘management	  control’	  of	  
technical	  operations)	  (2003:	  1172	  –	  1176)	  each	  of	  which	  is	  associated	  with	  a	  particular	  role.	  The	  subject	  of	  their	  
study,	  for	  instance,	  identified	  with	  the	  role	  of	  ‘generator	  of	  institutional	  culture’,	  which	  had	  its	  roots	  in	  the	  
‘facilitating	  creativity’	  discourse	  that	  emerged	  at	  an	  organizational	  level	  but	  eschewed	  the	  role	  she	  associated	  with	  
the	  ‘management	  control’	  discourse	  –	  one	  which	  she	  pejoratively	  described	  as	  being	  the	  ‘janitor’	  (ibid:	  1177	  –	  
1178).	  However	  each	  one	  of	  these	  roles	  could	  be	  studied	  as	  layered	  discursive	  constructions	  in	  	  themselves.	  One	  of	  
the	  most	  obvious	  ways	  in	  which	  this	  can	  be	  seen,	  for	  instance,	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  particular	  roles	  are	  frequently	  




its	  social	  contexts	  (Beaugrande,	  1997:	  39	  –	  40,	  45	  –	  58;	  Van	  Dijk,	  1997a:	  25	  –	  27;	  Wodak	  &	  
Meyer,	  2009:	  2).	  Theories	  of	  discourse	  –	  the	  study	  of	  language	  in	  use	  (Jaworski	  &	  Coupland,	  
1999;	  Taylor,	  2001:	  5)	  –	  emerged	  out	  of	  this	  reconnection	  project.	  Over	  the	  years	  a	  staggering	  
number	  of	  different	  theoretical	  orientations	  to	  the	  study	  of	  discourse	  have	  emerged	  (Jaworski	  
&	  Coupland,	  1999:	  14	  –	  35;	  Rogers	  et	  al,	  2005:	  369).	  These	  include	  speech	  act	  theory	  (Austin,	  
1962;	  Grice,	  1975);	  genre	  theory	  (Bakhtin,	  1981;	  Eggins	  &	  Martin,	  1997;	  Martin,	  1985;	  Hasan	  &	  
Fries,	  1995);	  the	  study	  of	  intertextuality	  (Bakhtin,	  1981;	  Kristeva,	  1989);	  conversation	  analysis	  
(Collins,	  1986;	  Gumperz,	  1982);	  narrative	  analysis	  (Bruner,	  1991;	  Ricoeur,	  (1988));	  discursive	  
psychology	  (Edwards	  &	  Potter,	  1992;	  Edley,	  2001:	  190);	  ethnography	  of	  communication	  
(Hymes,	  1972);	  and	  critical	  discourse	  analysis	  (Fairclough,	  1992,	  2003;	  Van	  Leeuwen,	  2008,	  
2009;	  Wodak	  &	  Meyer,	  2009).	  	  
It	  was	  initially	  difficult	  to	  choose	  amongst	  this	  smorgasbord	  of	  options	  for	  discourse	  analysis.	  
Alvesson	  and	  Karreman,	  however,	  point	  out	  that	  the	  different	  versions	  of	  discourse	  analysis	  can	  
be	  ‘fruitfully	  analyzed	  along	  two	  key	  dimensions’	  (2000:	  1129):	  The	  first	  concerns	  the	  
relationship	  between	  discourse	  and	  meaning	  and,	  related	  to	  this,	  the	  relationship	  between	  
discourse	  and	  other	  elements	  of	  social	  life	  –	  with	  the	  poles	  defining	  the	  spectrum	  of	  
possibilities	  being	  ‘discourse	  determination’	  (a	  ‘muscular’	  view	  of	  discourse	  whereby	  discourse	  
and	  meaning	  are	  inseparable)	  and	  ‘discourse	  autonomy’	  (whereby	  the	  meanings	  that	  arise	  in	  
discourse	  are	  transient	  and	  not	  durable)	  (ibid:	  1133).	  The	  second	  concerns	  the	  scope	  and	  scale	  
of	  the	  study	  of	  discourse	  –	  whether	  it	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  study	  of	  highly-­‐local,	  context-­‐
dependent	  phenomena,	  or	  the	  broader	  and	  more	  generalized	  vocabularies	  structuring	  social	  
life	  (ibid:	  1129).	  The	  diagram	  below	  illustrates	  the	  matrix	  that	  emerges	  from	  these	  four	  





Figure	  2:	  Alevesson	  and	  Karreman’s	  four-­‐dimensional	  representation	  of	  discourse	  studies.	  
The	  version	  of	  discourse	  analysis	  I	  decided	  would	  be	  best	  fitted	  to	  elucidating	  the	  
representation	  of	  legal	  professionals	  in	  classroom	  talk	  as	  a	  form	  of	  identity	  regulation,	  was	  
critical	  discourse	  analysis	  (CDA).41	  This	  was	  because	  (referencing	  the	  two	  dimensions	  outlined	  
above),	  it	  was	  an	  approach	  that	  allowed	  me	  to	  adopt	  a	  moderately	  strong,	  but	  not	  extreme,	  
position	  on	  the	  determinative	  effects	  of	  discourse	  and	  to	  undertake	  a	  sufficiently	  close-­‐range,	  
textually-­‐oriented	  analysis	  of	  the	  data	  that	  nevertheless	  allowed	  me	  to	  look	  toward	  the	  longer-­‐	  
range	  meaning	  of	  the	  text.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  The	  term	  ‘critical	  discourse	  analysis	  has	  been	  attributed	  to	  the	  use	  of	  the	  term	  in	  Fairclough’s	  Language	  and	  
Power	  (1989)	  (Rogers	  et	  al,	  2005:	  365).	  A	  network	  of	  ‘CDA	  scholars’	  is	  said	  to	  have	  emerged	  following	  a	  small	  
symposium	  held	  in	  Amsterdam	  in	  January	  1991.	  Besides	  Norman	  Fairclough	  and	  Theo	  van	  Leeuwen,	  Teun	  van	  Dijk,	  
Gunther	  Kress	  and	  Ruth	  Wodak	  –	  all	  well-­‐known	  and	  respected	  CDA	  scholars	  –	  attended	  the	  symposium	  (Wodak	  &	  
Meyer,	  2009:	  3).	  Critical	  Discourse	  Analysis	  has	  never	  been	  and	  has	  never	  attempted	  to	  provide	  one	  single	  or	  
specific	  theory.	  Studies	  in	  CDA	  are	  multifarious	  and	  derived	  from	  quite	  different	  theoretical	  backgrounds	  (ibid).	  
There	  is	  no	  specific	  methodology	  that	  is	  characteristic	  of	  research	  in	  CDA	  (ibid:	  5),	  nor	  is	  there	  one	  specific	  CDA	  
way	  of	  gathering	  data	  –	  most	  of	  the	  approaches	  to	  CDA	  do	  not	  explicitly	  recommend	  sampling	  procedures	  and	  
theoretical	  sampling	  is	  often	  employed	  (ibid:	  27).	  It	  is	  therefore	  best	  characterized	  as	  a	  ‘school’	  or	  a	  ‘programme’,	  




4.2.1	   Discourse	  determination	  versus	  discourse	  autonomy	  
Approaches	  to	  discourse	  that	  lie	  at	  the	  pole	  of	  discourse	  autonomy	  are	  interested	  in	  studying	  
linguistic	  patterns	  for	  their	  own	  sake.	  Discourse	  autonomy	  assumes	  that	  the	  ‘language	  in	  use’	  in	  
a	  particular	  social	  context	  is	  and	  should	  not	  be	  connected	  to	  any	  other	  kind	  of	  social	  
phenomenon	  (Alvesson	  &	  Karreman,	  2000:	  1132).	  The	  meanings	  associated	  with	  the	  language	  
are	  temporal	  and	  specific,	  not	  extending	  beyond	  the	  specific	  linguistic	  interaction	  (ibid:	  1130).	  
Nunan’s	  introductory	  text	  on	  discourse	  analysis	  (1993),	  for	  instance,	  follows	  this	  approach.	  The	  
focus	  of	  his	  book	  is	  on	  discourse	  as	  a	  linguistic	  performance:	  Discourse	  is	  associated	  with	  units	  
of	  language	  use	  greater	  than	  the	  sentence	  and	  the	  linguistic	  techniques	  for	  ensuring	  coherence	  
between	  such	  units.	  	  
Discourse	  determination,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  assumes	  that	  discourse	  is	  integrally	  related	  to,	  and	  
in	  varying	  degrees	  determinative	  and	  thus	  encompassing	  of,	  other	  social	  phenomena.	  Thinking	  
within	  the	  context	  of	  identity	  (or	  ‘subjectivity’	  as	  it	  is	  also	  termed	  in	  this	  body	  of	  literature),	  the	  
most	  extreme	  proponents	  of	  discourse	  determination	  would	  maintain	  that	  discourses	  ‘produce’	  
or	  ‘create’	  identities.	  This	  approach	  –	  inspired	  in	  particular	  by	  Foucault’s	  radical	  historicization	  
of	  the	  subject	  –	  would	  hold	  that	  ‘rather	  than	  autonomous	  subjects	  using	  discourse	  to	  construct	  
identities,	  it	  is	  discourse	  that	  produces	  power-­‐knowledge	  relations	  within	  which	  subjects	  are	  
positioned,	  identities	  are	  constructed	  and	  bodies	  are	  disciplined’	  (Ainsworth	  &	  Hardy,	  2004:	  
238).	  An	  oft-­‐cited	  example	  is	  Foucault’s	  account	  of	  the	  ‘hysterical	  woman’,	  a	  subjectivity	  
intimately	  associated	  with	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  emergence	  of	  psychoanalysis	  and,	  similarly,	  
the	  socially	  recognizable	  identity	  of	  the	  homosexual	  which	  only	  came	  about	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  
intersection	  between	  discourses	  of	  sexuality,	  medicine	  and	  law	  during	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  
(ibid).	  	  
The	  notion	  of	  discourse	  ‘producing’	  or	  ‘creating’	  identities	  is	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  concepts	  of	  
identity,	  identity	  work	  and	  identity	  regulation	  which	  I	  have	  thus	  far	  been	  developing	  in	  this	  
chapter.	  Persons,	  and	  their	  personal	  and	  social	  identifications,	  exist	  independently	  of	  the	  




exercise	  a	  powerful	  framing	  effect	  on	  such	  identifications.	  If	  it	  were	  otherwise	  there	  would	  be	  
no	  need	  to	  recognize	  identity	  work.	  	  
I	  therefore	  needed	  to	  work	  with	  an	  approach	  to	  discourse	  analysis	  that	  conceived	  of	  discourse	  
as	  part	  of	  social	  practices	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  is	  tightly-­‐coupled	  to	  but	  nevertheless	  distinct	  from	  
other	  social	  elements.	  Critical	  discourse	  analysis	  responded	  to	  this	  need.	  Fairclough	  recognizes	  
that	  discourse	  exists	  alongside	  other	  social	  elements	  when	  he	  holds	  that	  through	  social	  
practices	  discourses	  are	  ‘articulated’	  with	  non-­‐discursive	  elements	  of	  social	  life	  such	  as	  action	  
and	  interaction,	  social	  relations,	  the	  material	  world	  and	  persons	  (and	  their	  identifications).	  Thus	  
discourse	  is	  but	  one	  type	  of	  social	  element	  that	  is	  articulated	  with	  others	  in	  social	  practices.	  The	  
relationship	  between	  these	  different	  elements	  is	  dialectical	  rather	  than	  determinative	  (2003:	  
25).	  This	  captures	  the	  ‘apparently	  paradoxical	  fact	  that	  although	  the	  discourse	  element	  of	  a	  
social	  practice	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  for	  example	  its	  social	  relations,	  each	  in	  a	  sense	  contains	  or	  
internalizes	  the	  other	  –	  social	  relations	  are	  partly	  discursive	  in	  nature,	  discourse	  is	  partly	  social	  
relations	  (ibid,	  emphasis	  in	  original).	  In	  his	  earlier	  work	  on	  language	  and	  power	  he	  put	  it	  as	  
follows:	  Linguistic	  phenomena	  are	  social	  phenomena	  of	  a	  special	  sort	  and	  social	  phenomena	  
are	  in	  part	  linguistic	  phenomena	  (1989:	  23).	  This	  underlines	  the	  point	  that	  discourse	  it	  not	  
merely	  an	  expression	  or	  reflection	  of	  social	  practices,	  it	  is	  part	  of	  those	  practices	  (ibid).	  This	  
view	  on	  the	  dialectical	  relationship	  between	  discourse	  and	  other	  elements	  of	  social	  life	  is	  one	  of	  
the	  ‘shared	  perspectives’	  of	  critical	  discourse	  scholars	  (Fairclough	  &	  Wodak,	  1997:	  258.	  See	  also	  
Rogers	  et	  al.,	  2005:	  369	  –	  70).	  In	  the	  context	  of	  processes	  of	  identity	  construction,	  therefore,	  
discourse	  shapes	  the	  personal	  and	  social	  identifications	  of	  individuals	  and	  groups,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  
conditioned	  by	  the	  choices	  of	  such	  individuals	  and	  groups	  (as	  manifest	  in	  their	  identity	  work)	  as	  
well	  as	  the	  constitutive	  possibilities	  of	  other	  discourses.	  	  
Scholars	  of	  CDA,	  however,	  take	  the	  conditioning	  or	  shaping	  effects	  of	  discourse	  very	  seriously,	  
placing	  a	  special	  emphasis	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  discourse	  and	  power.	  Through	  the	  ways	  
in	  which	  they	  represent	  things	  and	  position	  people,	  discourses	  may	  have	  major	  ideological	  
effects;42	  i.e.	  they	  can	  help	  produce	  and	  reproduce	  unequal	  power	  relations	  between	  (for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  Ideologies	  in	  this	  sense	  should	  not	  be	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  Marxian	  economic	  base/superstructure	  




instance)	  social	  classes,	  women	  and	  men,	  and	  ethnic/cultural	  majorities	  and	  minorities	  
(Fairclough	  &	  Wodak,	  1997:	  258).	  A	  defining	  feature	  of	  CDA	  is	  a	  concern	  to	  develop	  a	  theory	  of	  
language	  that	  acknowledges	  the	  centrality	  of	  power	  in	  social	  life	  and	  that	  analyzes	  the	  
multifarious	  ways	  in	  which	  language	  is	  entwined	  with	  power	  (ibid:	  10).	  Legal	  professionals	  have	  
traditionally	  been	  regarded	  as	  quite	  powerful	  social	  players,	  and	  this	  aspect	  of	  CDA	  allowed	  me	  
to	  point	  out	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  classroom	  talk	  constituted	  lawyers	  as	  powerful.	  It	  also	  allowed	  
me	  to	  explain	  how	  unequal	  relations	  –	  not	  only	  traditional	  categories	  such	  as	  the	  relationship	  
between	  genders	  but	  also	  lesser-­‐known	  relationships	  such	  as	  between	  lawyers	  and	  their	  
clients,	  or	  the	  hierarchies	  that	  pertain	  amongst	  different	  types	  of	  legal	  professional	  –	  were	  
coded	  in	  classroom	  talk.	  This	  points	  to	  the	  orientation	  of	  CDA	  analyses	  as	  being	  both	  
interpretive	  and	  critical.	  The	  critical	  orientation	  reflects	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  Frankfurt	  School	  
and	  Jürgen	  Habermas	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  the	  school	  of	  Critical	  Linguistics	  (associated	  with	  the	  
work	  of	  Fowler	  and	  Kress	  and	  Hodge)	  on	  the	  other	  (Wodak	  &	  Meyer,	  2009:	  6	  –	  7;	  Rogers	  et	  al,	  
2005:	  367–9).	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  analysis	  is	  thus	  to	  produce	  and	  convey	  critical	  knowledge	  that	  
will	  enable	  human	  beings,	  through	  self-­‐reflection,	  to	  emancipate	  themselves	  from	  forms	  of	  
domination	  (Wodak	  &	  Meyer,	  2009:	  6	  –	  7).	  A	  critical	  approach	  also	  implies	  the	  ethical	  duty	  to	  
make	  one’s	  own	  position,	  research	  interests	  and	  values	  explicit	  and	  one’s	  criteria	  as	  
transparent	  as	  possible,	  for	  labeling	  one’s	  work	  as	  ‘critical’	  does	  not	  place	  it	  outside	  of	  the	  
social	  forms	  of	  power	  which	  are	  the	  object	  of	  the	  critique	  (ibid).	  	  
The	  approach	  to	  discourse	  in	  CDA	  studies	  therefore	  fitted	  well	  with	  the	  understanding	  of	  
identity	  regulation	  within	  a	  broader	  conceptual	  model	  of	  identity	  formation.	  This	  choice	  of	  
analytical	  approach,	  however,	  then	  enabled	  the	  understanding	  that	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  multi-­‐
functionality	  of	  language,	  discourse	  –	  and	  thus	  also	  identity	  regulation	  –	  intersects	  with	  other	  
elements	  of	  social	  life	  in	  different	  ways.	  The	  multi-­‐functionality	  of	  language	  refers	  to	  the	  
phenomenon	  of	  language	  achieving	  different	  things	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  Drawing	  on	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
beliefs	  or	  values’.	  The	  ideologies	  which	  are	  of	  interest	  to	  critical	  discourse	  analysts	  are	  the	  more	  hidden	  and	  latent	  
types	  of	  everyday	  beliefs	  which	  often	  appear	  disguised	  as	  conceptual	  metaphors	  and	  analogies	  (Wodak	  &	  Meyer,	  
2009:	  8)	  or	  simply	  by	  the	  way	  in	  which	  people,	  actions	  and	  things	  are	  named	  or	  circumstances	  are	  described.	  By	  




pioneering	  work	  of	  Halliday43	  in	  the	  field	  of	  Systemic	  Functional	  Linguistics,	  Fairclough	  points	  
out	  that	  when	  people	  use	  language	  they	  simultaneously	  represent	  aspects	  of	  the	  world	  
(physical,	  mental,	  relational),	  enact	  social	  relations	  between	  themselves,	  and	  manifest	  
attitudes,	  desires	  and	  values	  (2003:	  27).44	  On	  this	  basis	  he	  distinguishes	  between	  three	  major	  
types	  of	  meaning	  in	  language	  (ibid):	  
• The	  first	  type	  of	  meaning	  is	  representation.	  Through	  language	  people	  construe	  human	  
experience.	  They	  name	  and	  categorize	  every	  aspect	  of	  a	  social	  practice	  (sometimes	  in	  
language	  which	  is	  unique	  to	  a	  particular	  social	  practice,	  sometimes	  in	  language	  which	  is	  
more	  general),	  and	  establish	  relationships	  among	  things.	  Language	  always	  represents	  
some	  doing	  or	  happening,	  saying	  or	  sensing,	  being	  or	  having	  –	  along	  with	  its	  various	  
participants	  and	  circumstances	  (Halliday,	  2004:	  29).	  Fairclough	  refers	  to	  this	  type	  of	  
meaning	  (rather	  confusingly,	  see	  below)	  as	  ‘discourse’	  (2003:	  26).	  	  
• The	  second	  meaning-­‐type	  is	  action/interaction.	  Through	  language	  people	  are	  always	  
enacting	  some	  social	  function	  –	  they	  are	  informing	  or	  questioning,	  demanding,	  offering,	  
promising,	  threatening,	  and	  so	  on	  through	  a	  potentially	  very	  long	  list.	  Such	  action	  and	  
interaction	  is	  in	  part	  guided	  by	  patterned	  ways	  of	  speaking	  and	  writing,	  as	  in	  an	  
interview	  or	  in	  a	  classroom	  lecture	  	  (Fairclough,	  2003:	  27).	  Fairclough	  refers	  to	  this	  type	  
of	  meaning	  as	  ‘genre’	  (ibid:	  26).	  	  
• The	  third	  type	  of	  meaning,	  according	  to	  Fairclough	  is	  identification,	  through	  which	  
individuals	  identify	  themselves	  and	  are	  identified	  by	  others	  (ibid:	  159).	  Language	  
features	  alongside	  bodily	  behavior	  ‘in	  constituting	  particular	  ways	  of	  being,	  particular	  
personal	  and	  social	  identities	  (ibid:	  26).	  Fairclough	  refers	  to	  this	  type	  of	  meaning	  as	  
‘style’	  (ibid:	  26).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  See	  Halliday,	  2004:	  29,	  58.	  Halliday	  refers	  to	  ‘metafunctions’	  of	  language	  and	  distinguishes	  an	  ideational	  
metafunction	  (which	  relates	  to	  Fairclough’s	  representational	  meaning),	  an	  interpersonal	  function	  (which	  
Fairclough	  divides	  into	  the	  meaning	  types	  of	  action/interaction	  and	  identification	  respectively)	  and	  a	  textual	  
function	  (which	  Fairclough	  includes	  in	  the	  meaning	  type	  of	  action/interaction).	  	  
44	  All	  three	  aspects	  of	  language	  use	  are	  of	  course	  grounded	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  language	  is	  constitutive,	  and	  
not	  merely	  reflective	  of	  a	  pre-­‐given	  reality.	  In	  saying	  that	  attitudes,	  values	  and	  so	  on	  are	  manifest	  in	  language	  is	  




What	  the	  identification	  of	  three	  major	  meaning	  types	  in	  language	  shows	  is	  that	  discourse	  is	  in	  
itself	  differentiated:	  It	  is	  associated	  with	  patterned	  ways	  of	  representing,	  acting	  and	  interacting,	  
and	  identifying.	  The	  one	  confusing	  aspect	  of	  this	  model	  is	  Fairclough’s	  use	  of	  the	  term	  
‘discourse’	  to	  refer	  to	  both	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  the	  use	  of	  language	  in	  social	  practice	  (as	  a	  
whole)	  as	  well	  as	  to	  refer	  to	  ways	  of	  representing	  in	  a	  social	  practice	  (and	  thus	  to	  only	  an	  
element	  of	  ‘discourse’	  more	  broadly	  understood).	  Fairclough	  acknowledges	  this	  and	  explains	  it	  
as	  follows:	  ‘Notice	  that	  “discourse”	  is	  	  being	  used	  here	  in	  two	  senses:	  abstractly,	  as	  an	  abstract	  
noun,	  meaning	  language	  and	  other	  types	  of	  semiosis	  as	  elements	  of	  social	  life;	  more	  concretely,	  
as	  a	  count	  noun,	  meaning	  particular	  ways	  of	  representing	  the	  world.	  An	  example	  of	  “discourse”	  
in	  the	  latter	  sense	  would	  be	  the	  political	  discourse	  of	  New	  Labour	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  political	  
discourse	  of	  “old”	  labour	  or	  the	  political	  discourse	  of	  “Thatcherism”’	  (ibid:	  26).	  	  
Fairclough	  is	  at	  pains	  to	  emphasize	  that	  although	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  three	  meaning	  
types	  is	  a	  necessary	  one	  analytically,	  it	  does	  not	  prevent	  the	  meanings	  from	  ‘flowing	  into’	  each	  
other	  in	  various	  ways	  (ibid:	  29)	  –	  they	  are	  ‘dialectically	  interrelated’	  (ibid).	  Thus	  ‘particular	  
Representations	  (discourses)	  may	  be	  enacted	  in	  particular	  ways	  of	  Acting	  and	  Relating	  (genres),	  
and	  inculcated	  in	  particular	  ways	  of	  Identifying	  (styles)’	  (ibid).	  Conversely	  –	  and	  importantly	  for	  
purposes	  of	  this	  research	  –	  particular	  ways	  of	  identifying,	  acting	  and	  relating	  may	  be	  inculcated	  
in	  particular	  ways	  of	  representing.	  	  	  
There	  are	  two	  important	  points	  to	  underline	  regarding	  the	  use	  of	  Fairclough’s	  meaning	  types	  in	  
this	  research:	  Firstly,	  because	  this	  is	  a	  study	  of	  identity	  regulation	  in	  a	  decontextualized	  context	  
–	  which	  as	  I	  noted	  in	  section	  3	  of	  this	  chapter	  involves	  a	  study	  of	  representations	  of	  the	  social	  
practices	  –	  the	  meaning	  type	  with	  which	  I	  am	  most	  concerned	  is	  representational	  meaning;	  i.e.	  
the	  study	  of	  ‘discourse’	  as	  a	  count	  noun,	  as	  a	  particular	  way	  of	  representing	  the	  world	  (and	  
unless	  specifically	  mentioned,	  this	  is	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  this	  term	  will	  henceforth	  be	  used	  
throughout	  this	  thesis).	  Specifically,	  this	  will	  involve	  studying	  how	  particular	  roles	  and	  
associated	  meanings	  are	  constructed	  in	  the	  lecturer’s	  classroom	  talk.	  However,	  one	  could	  also	  
study	  identity	  regulation	  through	  interactional	  meanings,	  for	  instance,	  through	  dialogue	  




Secondly,	  although	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  Fairclough’s	  third	  meaning	  type	  (identificational	  
meanings)	  would	  be	  relevant	  for	  this	  research,	  in	  my	  view	  what	  Fairclough	  has	  in	  mind	  here	  is	  
the	  manner	  in	  which	  language	  features	  in	  identity	  work,	  rather	  than	  identity	  regulation.	  In	  
Analyzing	  Discourse	  Fairclough	  did	  not	  intend	  to	  provide	  a	  detailed	  theoretical	  framework	  for	  
identity	  construction	  processes	  and	  so	  his	  model	  for	  this	  is	  not	  as	  differentiated	  or	  detailed	  as	  
developed	  in	  other	  studies	  or	  in	  this	  chapter.	  	  
In	  order	  to	  clarify	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  different	  meaning	  types,	  and	  their	  dialectical	  
interconnectedness,	  chapter	  4	  of	  this	  thesis	  commences	  with	  an	  illustration	  differentiating	  
between	  the	  different	  meanings	  types	  with	  reference	  to	  an	  extract	  from	  the	  data	  and	  showing	  
how	  they	  constitute	  different	  identities,	  before	  moving	  on	  to	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  codes	  
related	  to	  representational	  meanings	  were	  developed.	  	  	  
4.2.2	   Textually	  oriented	  analysis	  of	  the	  data	  	  
In	  discussing	  textually	  oriented	  analysis,	  Alvesson	  and	  Karreman	  identify	  four	  versions	  of	  
discourse	  analysis	  as	  follows	  (2000:	  1134):	  
(a)	   Micro-­‐discourse	  approach,	  involving	  the	  detailed	  study	  of	  language	  use	  in	  a	  
specific	  micro-­‐context;	  	  
(b)	   Meso-­‐discourse	  approach,	  involving	  sensitivity	  to	  the	  use	  of	  language	  in	  context	  
but	  with	  an	  interest	  in	  identifying	  broader	  patterns	  and/or	  going	  beyond	  the	  
details	  of	  the	  text	  to	  generalize	  to	  similar	  local	  contexts;	  	  
(c)	   Grand-­‐discourse	  approach,	  involving	  how	  discourses	  are	  assembled,	  ordered	  and	  
presented	  as	  an	  integrated	  frame.	  This	  will	  involve	  paying	  less	  attention	  to	  the	  
specificities	  of	  language	  use	  in	  a	  particular	  local	  context	  and	  greater	  
generalization	  as	  regards	  the	  themes	  evident	  in	  such	  language	  use;	  and	  	  
(d)	   Mega-­‐discourse	  approach,	  referring	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  more	  or	  less	  universal	  
connection	  of	  discourse	  material,	  such	  as	  a	  discourse	  on	  masculinity,	  




Using	  CDA	  as	  a	  method	  to	  elucidate	  representations	  of	  legal	  professionals	  in	  classroom	  talk	  as	  a	  
form	  of	  identity	  regulation	  allowed	  me	  to	  undertake	  a	  textually-­‐oriented,	  micro-­‐discursive	  
analysis	  of	  the	  classroom	  representations.	  Critical	  discourse	  analysis	  is	  textually-­‐oriented	  as	  an	  
approach	  in	  that	  it	  generally	  pays	  attention	  to	  the	  linguistic	  details	  of	  the	  text	  (Fairclough,	  1992:	  
37),	  although	  it	  is	  not	  a	  common	  feature	  of	  CDA	  studies	  that	  a	  detailed	  study	  of	  the	  text	  is	  
integrated	  into	  the	  research	  in	  the	  same	  way	  or	  with	  the	  same	  intensity	  (Wodak	  &	  Meyer,	  
2009:	  21).	  The	  nature	  of	  this	  study	  called	  for	  the	  use	  of	  a	  fairly	  comprehensive	  range	  of	  
semantic	  and	  linguistic	  categories	  in	  order	  to	  conduct	  the	  micro-­‐discursive	  analysis	  and	  a	  
wealth	  of	  such	  categories	  were	  found	  in	  two	  key	  works:	  Fairclough’s	  Analyzing	  Discourse	  (2003)	  
and	  Van	  Leeuwen’s	  Discourse	  and	  Practice:	  New	  Tools	  for	  Critical	  Discourse	  Analysis	  (2008).	  A	  
detailed	  discussion	  of	  the	  categories	  I	  derived	  from	  these	  two	  works	  for	  purposes	  of	  the	  study	  –	  
which	  are	  both	  semantic	  (content)	  and	  linguistic	  (form)	  in	  nature	  –	  is	  provided	  in	  chapter	  4	  of	  
the	  thesis.	  	  
Critical	  Discourse	  Analysis,	  however,	  also	  provided	  models	  for	  shifting	  from	  a	  micro-­‐	  to	  a	  meso-­‐	  
or	  even	  macro-­‐level	  analysis,	  this	  being	  one	  of	  the	  particular	  values	  of	  CDA	  which	  Ainsworth	  
and	  Hardy	  identified	  in	  their	  study	  of	  the	  ‘older	  worker’	  identity	  (2004:	  225).	  After	  examining	  
what	  the	  disciplines	  of	  economics,	  labour	  market	  research,	  gerontology,	  and	  cultural	  studies	  
contributed	  to	  a	  study	  of	  the	  older	  worker,	  they	  concluded	  that	  a	  CDA	  approach	  is	  especially	  
suited	  to	  understanding	  the	  processes	  of	  construction	  whereby	  the	  category	  (or	  role)	  of	  the	  
older	  worker	  identity	  and	  the	  meanings	  associated	  with	  it	  come	  into	  being	  in	  the	  first	  place	  
(ibid:	  241).	  None	  of	  the	  other	  disciplines	  dealt	  adequately	  with	  these	  processes	  (ibid).	  CDA,	  
further,	  provided	  tools	  of	  analysis	  for	  studying	  these	  processes	  of	  construction	  at	  both	  a	  macro-­‐	  
and	  a	  micro-­‐level:	  The	  former,	  by	  showing	  how	  ‘an	  assembly	  of	  discourses	  is	  ordered	  and	  
presented	  as	  an	  integrated	  frame’,	  the	  latter	  through	  the	  detailed	  study	  of	  language	  in	  specific	  
micro-­‐contexts	  (ibid).	  In	  particular,	  the	  use	  of	  CDA	  to	  study	  processes	  of	  construction	  at	  the	  
micro-­‐level	  facilitated	  identification	  of	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  constructions	  of	  identity	  could	  
function	  to	  constrain	  individuals,	  as	  well	  as	  offer	  resources	  for	  resistance	  (ibid:	  243).	  	  
The	  movement	  from	  micro-­‐	  to	  a	  meso-­‐	  or	  larger-­‐scale	  analysis	  involves	  a	  movement	  from	  




generality	  in	  capturing	  the	  ideas	  of	  a	  particular	  period	  (Alvesson	  and	  Karreman,	  2000:	  1126).45	  
The	  problem	  of	  climbing	  the	  ‘discursive	  ladder’	  (Alvesson	  &	  Karreman,	  2000:	  1147)	  –	  of	  moving	  
beyond	  the	  very	  specific	  empirical	  data	  which	  ordinarily	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  a	  text	  (whether	  
derived	  from	  interviews,	  questionnaires,	  observed	  talk	  or	  written	  documents)	  to	  address	  
Discourses,	  as	  a	  ‘powerful	  ordering	  force’	  (Alvesson	  &	  Karreman,	  2000:	  1127)	  is	  a	  common	  
problem	  in	  organizational	  (and	  broader	  social)	  research.	  Alvesson	  and	  Karreman	  counsel	  that	  
there	  is	  no	  final	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  of	  the	  extent,	  timing	  and	  modalities	  of	  moving	  from	  
discourse	  to	  Discourse	  (ibid:	  1146	  –	  7).	  They	  note	  that	  this	  movement	  involves	  a	  shift	  both	  of	  
aggregation	  and	  perspective,	  and	  frequently	  the	  decision	  to	  ignore	  local	  context	  and	  variation	  is	  
made	  a	  priori	  (ibid:	  1147).	  There	  is	  also	  pressure,	  at	  least	  in	  studies	  of	  organization,	  to	  ascend	  
the	  discursive	  ladder	  very	  quickly	  so	  as	  to	  be	  able	  to	  claim	  that	  discourse	  determines	  important	  
extra-­‐discursive	  social	  phenomena	  (ibid).	  They	  therefore	  express	  some	  ‘sympathy’	  for	  reducing	  
the	  range	  in	  studies	  of	  discourse	  and	  focusing	  more	  on	  the	  specificities	  of	  language	  use	  in	  local	  
social	  contexts	  (2000:	  1145).	  ‘[T]here	  are	  good	  reasons	  to	  sometimes	  resist	  the	  temptation	  and	  
engage	  in	  further	  contemplation	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  text	  and	  perhaps	  make	  more	  of	  it	  …	  
Grandiosation	  and	  muscularization	  of	  discourse	  should	  be	  grounded	  and	  shown	  –	  rather	  than,	  
as	  in	  some	  Foucauldian	  and	  poststructuralist	  writings,	  be	  postulated’	  (ibid).	  	  	  
Given	  my	  interest	  in	  the	  specificities	  of	  language	  use	  in	  the	  lecturer’s	  constitution	  of	  legal	  
professionals	  in	  classroom	  talk,	  a	  micro-­‐discursive	  point	  of	  entry	  was	  mandated.	  However,	  
because	  I	  also	  wished	  to	  theorize	  the	  relationship	  between	  representations	  of	  legal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  Gee	  (1996)	  uses	  the	  distinction	  between	  ‘discourses’	  and	  ‘Discourses’	  in	  a	  somewhat	  different	  way.	  He	  
associates	  ‘discourses’	  with	  the	  different	  ‘social	  languages’	  that	  make	  different	  social	  identities	  visible	  and	  
recognizable.	  A	  study	  of	  ‘discourse’	  thus	  involves	  paying	  attention	  to	  how	  people	  enact	  different	  social	  identities	  
by	  subtle	  variations	  in	  their	  use	  of	  language	  (see	  his	  example	  relating	  to	  ‘Jane’	  and	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  she	  relates	  
a	  story	  first	  to	  her	  parents	  and	  then	  to	  her	  boyfriend,	  1996:	  66	  –	  8).	  He	  views	  ‘Discourses’,	  in	  turn,	  as	  ways	  of	  
behaving,	  interacting,	  valuing,	  thinking,	  believing,	  and	  often	  reading	  and	  writing	  that	  are	  accepted	  as	  instantiations	  
of	  particular	  roles	  (or	  types	  of	  people)	  by	  specific	  groups	  of	  people,	  whether	  families	  of	  a	  certain	  sort,	  lawyers	  of	  a	  
certain	  sort	  …and	  so	  on	  through	  a	  very	  long	  list’	  (ibid:	  viii,	  emphasis	  in	  original).	  Each	  Discourse	  represents	  one	  of	  
our	  social	  identities	  (ibid:	  ix).	  Through	  the	  concept	  of	  Discourse	  Gee	  thus	  provides	  an	  indication	  of	  the	  range	  of	  
elements	  that	  constitute	  a	  particular	  social	  identity:	  Forms	  of	  action	  and	  interaction;	  particular	  beliefs	  and	  values;	  
particular	  ways	  of	  thinking;	  and	  particular	  forms	  of	  reading	  and	  writing,	  or	  particular	  literacies.	  His	  concept	  of	  
‘Discourse’	  is	  thus	  closer	  to	  Fairclough’s	  understanding	  of	  ‘social	  practice’	  as	  patterned	  ways	  of	  being	  that	  
articulate	  together	  action	  and	  interaction,	  social	  actors,	  social	  relations,	  the	  material	  world	  and	  discourse	  (as	  
patterned	  ways	  of	  communicating).	  What	  Gee’s	  concept	  of	  ‘discourse’	  does	  not	  allow	  for	  is	  for	  a	  recognition	  of	  
differing	  levels	  of	  generality	  and	  prevalence	  in	  the	  patterning	  of	  language,	  which	  Alvesson	  and	  Karreman’s	  scheme	  




professionals	  in	  classroom	  talk	  and	  the	  process	  of	  identity	  formation,	  and	  because	  I	  wished	  to	  
evaluate	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  lecturer’s	  representations	  contributed	  to	  sustaining	  or	  
transforming	  existing	  discourses	  on	  legal	  professionalism	  and	  the	  teaching	  of	  legal	  ethics,	  it	  was	  
clear	  that	  my	  analysis	  could	  not	  remain	  at	  that	  level.	  	  
Fairclough’s	  three-­‐tiered	  framework	  for	  analyzing	  discourse	  is	  a	  well-­‐known	  model	  for	  moving	  
from	  a	  micro-­‐	  to	  a	  macro-­‐discursive	  level	  of	  analysis.	  The	  model	  is	  premised	  on	  the	  
understanding	  that	  language	  use	  is	  determined	  by	  social	  structures	  through	  ‘orders	  of	  
discourse’	  –	  sets	  of	  conventions	  associated	  with	  social	  institutions	  which	  are,	  in	  turn,	  shaped	  by	  
power	  relations	  within	  social	  institutions	  and	  society	  as	  a	  whole	  (1989:	  17).	  The	  use	  of	  language	  
in	  any	  particular	  context,	  however,	  always	  has	  effects	  upon	  social	  structures	  as	  well	  as	  being	  
determined	  by	  them,	  and	  this	  contributes	  to	  social	  continuity	  and	  change	  (ibid).	  The	  framework	  
itself	  incorporates	  a	  focus	  on:	  (1)	  The	  text;	  (2)	  the	  ‘discursive	  practice’,	  i.e.	  the	  processes	  by	  
which	  texts	  are	  produced	  and	  interpreted;	  and	  (3)	  	  the	  socio-­‐historical	  conditions	  that	  govern	  
(but	  are	  also	  potentially	  affected)	  by	  these	  processes	  (ibid:	  22	  –	  27).46	  In	  their	  review	  of	  the	  use	  
of	  critical	  discourse	  analysis	  in	  education,	  Rogers	  	  et	  al	  observed	  that	  while	  many	  authors	  used	  
aspects	  of	  this	  three-­‐tiered	  framework	  they	  frequently	  failed	  to	  specify	  which	  linguistic	  
resources	  accompanied	  each	  tier	  of	  analysis,	  or	  to	  explain	  how	  linguistic	  resources,	  discursive	  
practices	  and	  wider	  social	  formations	  are	  connected	  (2005:	  381).	  They	  held	  that	  there	  is	  often	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  Analysis	  of	  the	  text	  entails	  describing	  the	  language	  structures	  produced	  in	  a	  discursive	  event	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  an	  
extensive	  array	  of	  linguistic	  features	  which	  Fairclough	  groups	  into	  ten	  key	  questions	  for	  textual	  analysis	  (ibid:	  110	  –	  
111).	  These	  analytical	  prompts	  enable	  one	  to	  analyze	  such	  micro-­‐discursive	  features	  as	  lexicalization	  (or	  
vocabulary),	  patterns	  of	  transitivity,	  the	  use	  of	  active	  and	  passive	  voice,	  the	  use	  of	  nominalization,	  choices	  of	  
mood,	  choices	  of	  modality	  or	  polarity,	  the	  thematic	  structure	  of	  the	  text,	  the	  information	  focus,	  and	  cohesion	  
devices	  (Janks,	  1997:	  335	  and	  see	  Fairclough,	  1989:	  Chapter	  5).	  Analysis	  of	  the	  discursive	  practice	  entails	  
interpreting	  participants’	  processes	  of	  text	  production	  and	  interpretation	  through	  a	  variety	  of	  resources	  that	  
explicate	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  they	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  context,	  the	  discourse	  type,	  and	  difference	  and	  change	  
(Fairclough,	  1989:	  140	  –	  162).	  Essentially,	  this	  involves	  focusing	  on	  the	  ‘members’	  resources’	  –	  the	  ‘prototypes’	  
which	  individuals	  hold	  relating	  to	  ‘the	  shapes	  of	  words,	  the	  grammatical	  forms	  of	  sentences,	  the	  typical	  structure	  
of	  a	  narrative,	  the	  properties	  of	  types	  of	  object	  and	  person,	  the	  expected	  sequence	  of	  events’	  against	  which	  they	  
evaluate	  a	  text	  (ibid:	  11).	  Finally,	  analysis	  of	  the	  underlying	  socio-­‐historical	  conditions	  entails	  explaining	  the	  social	  
constitution	  and	  change	  of	  members’	  resources,	  including	  their	  reproduction	  in	  social	  practice	  (ibid:	  163,	  see	  162	  –	  
168).	  The	  usefulness	  of	  this	  framework	  is	  that	  it	  not	  only	  provides	  a	  disciplined	  model	  for	  ascending	  the	  discursive	  
ladder,	  it	  also	  provides	  multiple	  points	  of	  analytic	  entry	  (Janks,	  1997:	  329).	  ‘It	  does	  not	  matter	  which	  kind	  of	  
analysis	  one	  begins	  with,	  as	  long	  as	  they	  are	  all	  included	  and	  are	  shown	  to	  be	  mutually	  explanatory	  (ibid,	  and	  see	  




too	  much	  social	  theory	  in	  discourse	  analyses	  of	  language	  in	  educational	  contexts	  at	  the	  expense	  
of	  attention	  to	  the	  specificities	  of	  the	  language	  use	  (ibid:	  372).	  	  
While	  Fairclough’s	  three-­‐tiered	  framework	  for	  analysis	  served	  as	  a	  broad	  model	  for	  thinking	  
about	  this	  process,	  I	  decided	  against	  using	  it	  as	  a	  means	  to	  structure	  the	  analysis	  (e.g.	  to	  have	  
separate	  chapters	  dealing	  with	  the	  linguistic	  structures	  of	  the	  text,	  the	  processes	  of	  production	  
and	  interpretation,	  and	  the	  explanation	  of	  the	  discourse	  as	  a	  socio-­‐cultural	  practice).	  The	  main	  
reason	  for	  this	  was	  the	  availability	  of	  an	  alternative	  model	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Theo	  van	  Leeuwen,	  
whose	  notion	  of	  ordering	  representational	  meanings	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  various	  elements	  of	  social	  
practice	  was	  aligned	  with	  my	  understanding	  of	  discourse	  being	  dialectically	  articulated	  with	  
other	  elements	  of	  social	  life	  through	  social	  practices.	  Dissecting	  the	  elements	  of	  the	  social	  
practice	  in	  the	  discourse	  would	  therefore	  make	  these	  articulations	  explicit.	  The	  emphasis	  on	  
social	  practice,	  coupled	  with	  Van	  Leeuwen’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  recontextualization	  of	  social	  
practices	  (which	  is	  another	  way	  of	  looking	  at	  practices	  in	  decontextualized	  contexts),	  enabled	  
me	  to	  foreground	  the	  ‘contextual	  resources’	  relating	  to	  legal	  professionalism	  in	  the	  classroom	  
of	  my	  study	  in	  a	  more	  direct,	  accessible	  way	  than	  was	  possible	  using	  Fairclough’s	  method.	  It	  is	  
therefore	  to	  a	  more	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  Van	  Leeuwen’s	  method	  of	  CDA	  that	  I	  now	  turn.	  	  
4.2.3	   Reconstructing	  discourses	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  social	  practice	  
In	  Discourse	  and	  Practice:	  New	  Tools	  for	  Critical	  Discourse	  Analysis	  (2008),	  Van	  Leeuwen	  points	  
out	  that	  the	  study	  of	  genre	  in	  analyses	  of	  discourse	  has	  taken	  place	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  studies	  of	  
representation	  (ibid:	  4).	  His	  aim	  in	  this	  book	  is	  to	  turn	  things	  around	  by	  providing	  analytical	  
tools	  for	  reconstructing	  discourses	  from	  texts,	  even	  where	  these	  differ	  in	  terms	  of	  genre	  (ibid).	  
His	  fundamental	  point	  of	  departure	  is	  that	  representational	  meanings	  are	  ultimately	  based	  on	  
social	  practices	  on	  ‘what	  people	  do’	  (ibid).	  He	  notes	  that	  while	  sociologists	  sometimes	  derive	  
concrete	  actions	  from	  abstract	  concepts	  (as	  in	  Parson’s	  systems	  theory	  and	  Bourdieu’s	  
‘habitus’),	  ‘the	  primacy	  of	  practice	  keeps	  asserting	  itself	  also	  in	  the	  work	  of	  these	  writers,	  
sometimes	  against	  the	  grain	  of	  their	  general	  methodology’	  (ibid).	  The	  idea	  at	  the	  core	  of	  his	  




and	  what	  is	  going	  on	  in	  it,	  however	  abstract,	  should	  be	  interpreted	  as	  representations	  of	  social	  
practices’	  (ibid:	  5).	  	  
Van	  Leeuwen	  describes	  social	  practices	  as	  ‘socially	  regulated	  ways	  of	  doing	  things’,	  but	  with	  the	  
caveat	  that	  social	  practices	  are	  regulated	  to	  differing	  degrees	  and	  in	  different	  ways	  (ibid:	  6	  –	  7).	  
Although	  he	  does	  not	  identify	  the	  theoretical	  provenance	  of	  his	  concept	  of	  social	  practice,	  he	  
assumes	  that	  all	  actually	  performed	  social	  practices	  include	  at	  least	  ten	  elements	  which	  are	  (in	  
the	  order	  in	  which	  he	  provides	  them	  –	  ibid:	  7	  –	  12):	  (1)	  A	  set	  of	  participants	  (social	  actors)	  in	  
certain	  roles,	  for	  instance	  a	  lecture	  minimally	  needs	  a	  lecturer	  and	  students;	  (2)	  a	  set	  of	  actions	  
performed	  in	  a	  sequence	  (these	  constitute	  the	  ‘core’	  of	  any	  social	  practice	  –	  ibid:	  8);	  (3)	  
performance	  modes	  which	  are	  prescriptions	  relating	  to	  how	  an	  action	  must	  be	  undertaken,	  for	  
instance,	  actions	  may	  be	  required	  to	  be	  undertaken	  at	  a	  particular	  pace;	  (4)	  eligibility	  conditions	  
being	  the	  qualifications	  a	  participant	  must	  have	  in	  order	  to	  play	  a	  particular	  role	  in	  a	  particular	  
social	  practice;	  (5)	  the	  presentation	  styles	  involving	  dress	  or	  body	  grooming	  requirements	  of	  the	  
participants;	  (6)	  the	  times	  (being	  either	  specific	  times	  or	  durations)	  associated	  with	  the	  actions	  
of	  the	  social	  practice;	  (7)	  the	  locations	  in	  or	  at	  which	  social	  practices	  occur;	  (8)	  eligibility	  
conditions	  attaching	  to	  locations	  (for	  example,	  rooms	  must	  fulfill	  certain	  conditions	  if	  they	  are	  
to	  be	  eligible	  as	  courtrooms	  or	  classrooms);	  (9)	  resources	  being	  the	  material	  or	  semiotic	  tools	  
participants	  employ	  in	  the	  actions	  of	  a	  social	  practice;	  and	  (10)	  eligibility	  conditions	  attached	  to	  
resources.	  	  
This	  is	  a	  very	  sophisticated	  and	  detailed	  model	  which	  Van	  Leeuwen	  himself	  reduces	  in	  
developing	  analytical	  tools	  for	  studying	  the	  representation	  of	  social	  practice	  in	  texts.	  In	  
Discourse	  and	  Practice	  he	  focuses	  only	  on	  the	  representation	  of	  social	  actors,	  social	  actions,	  
time	  and	  space	  (the	  ‘performance	  modes’	  and	  ‘eligibility	  conditions’	  associated	  with	  these	  
elements	  are	  therefore	  folded	  into	  the	  discussion	  and	  the	  tools,	  rather	  than	  being	  given	  a	  
separate	  treatment).	  In	  relation	  to	  each	  of	  these	  four	  main	  categories,	  he	  proceeds	  to	  identify	  
the	  key	  sociosemantic	  categories	  by	  which	  actors,	  actions,	  and	  so	  on	  can	  be	  represented,	  and	  
their	  typical	  linguistic	  realizations,	  referring	  to	  these	  as	  ‘sociological’	  and	  ‘linguistic’	  categories	  
respectively	  (ibid:	  24).	  For	  example,	  in	  representing	  social	  actors	  there	  is	  always	  a	  fundamental	  




represent	  the	  sociological	  categories.	  Exclusion,	  as	  the	  more	  contentious	  of	  the	  two,	  is	  achieved	  
through	  a	  variety	  of	  linguistic	  mechanisms,	  including	  radical	  exclusion	  (there	  is	  no	  trace	  of	  the	  
actor	  in	  the	  action),	  or	  suppression	  through	  the	  use	  of	  passive	  agent	  deletion	  (as	  in	  ‘concerns	  
are	  being	  expressed’	  –	  here	  the	  people	  who	  are	  expressing	  the	  concern	  are	  not	  mentioned)	  or	  
nonfinite	  clauses	  (as	  in	  ‘to	  pass	  law	  school	  is	  hard’,	  in	  which	  the	  agents	  are	  similarly	  not	  
present)	  (ibid:	  28	  –	  9).	  Van	  Leeuwen’s	  emphasis	  falls	  more	  on	  developing	  a	  ‘sociosemantic’	  
inventory	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  representations	  can	  occur	  than	  on	  exhaustively	  compiling	  a	  
correlating	  inventory	  of	  linguistic	  categories	  –	  the	  reason	  being	  that	  language	  lacks	  ‘bi-­‐
uniqueness’,	  in	  other	  words,	  there	  is	  no	  one	  or	  exactly	  corresponding	  linguistic	  means	  for	  
representing	  a	  particular	  sociological	  category	  (ibid:	  23),	  or	  no	  ‘neat	  fit’	  between	  sociological	  
and	  linguistic	  categories	  (ibid:	  24).	  Nevertheless,	  knowing	  the	  typical	  linguistic	  realizations	  of	  
the	  various	  sociological	  categories	  enables	  one	  to	  identify	  the	  latter	  in	  the	  text	  and	  determine	  
the	  patterns	  that	  may	  be	  evident.	  	  
Van	  Leeuwen	  highlights	  a	  further	  and	  critically	  important	  aspect	  of	  the	  study	  of	  
representational	  meanings	  in	  texts,	  which	  is	  that	  any	  one	  social	  practice	  may	  be	  differently	  
represented	  in	  different	  contexts.	  What	  Van	  Leeuwen	  recognizes	  is	  that	  ‘talking	  about’	  a	  social	  
practice	  necessarily	  involves	  insertion	  into	  another	  social	  practice.	  He	  appropriates	  the	  
Bernsteinian	  notion	  of	  ‘recontextualization’47	  to	  describe	  this	  phenomenon.	  The	  ‘talked	  about’	  
practice	  (recontextualized	  practice)	  is	  recontextualized	  by	  the	  practice	  in	  which	  the	  ‘talking	  
about’	  occurs	  (recontextualizing	  practice).	  For	  example,	  research	  on	  the	  social	  practice	  of	  
lawyering	  per	  se	  could	  be	  inserted	  into	  the	  social	  practice	  of	  research	  which	  may	  involve	  
interviewing,	  focus	  groups,	  participant	  observation	  and	  so	  on	  and	  the	  meanings	  and	  limitations	  
associated	  with	  the	  latter.	  As	  the	  vast	  literature	  on	  research	  methodology	  itself	  recognizes	  
‘[r]econtextualization	  not	  only	  makes	  the	  recontextualized	  social	  practices	  explicit	  to	  a	  greater	  
or	  lesser	  degree,	  it	  also	  makes	  them	  pass	  through	  the	  practices	  in	  which	  they	  are	  inserted’	  (ibid:	  
12).	  However,	  	  ‘chains	  of	  recontextualization’	  (ibid:	  13)	  may	  be	  involved:	  Recontextualization	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  Bernstein	  developed	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘recontextualization’	  in	  ‘Codes,	  modalities	  and	  the	  process	  of	  cultural	  
reproduction:	  A	  model’	  (1981)	  19	  Language	  and	  Society	  327	  and	  ‘On	  pedagogic	  discouse’	  In:	  Richardson	  (ed.)	  
Handbook	  for	  Theory	  and	  Research	  in	  the	  Sociology	  of	  Education	  (1986)),	  205).	  He	  held	  that	  knowledge	  is	  produced	  
in	  certain	  social	  practices	  and	  then	  recontextualized	  in	  pedagogic	  contexts.	  Van	  Leeuwen	  uses	  the	  term	  




may	  be	  recursive	  removing	  one	  further	  and	  further	  from	  the	  starting	  point	  of	  the	  chain	  (ibid).	  
This	  is	  applicable	  to	  any	  study	  of	  social	  practices	  in	  a	  decontextualized	  context	  as	  is	  the	  case	  in	  
the	  present	  study:	  The	  social	  practice	  of	  lawyering	  has	  in	  the	  first	  instance	  been	  
recontextualized	  by	  the	  practice	  of	  tertiary	  education	  and,	  as	  the	  object	  of	  this	  study,	  has	  been	  
further	  recontextualized	  by	  the	  practices	  associated	  with	  doing	  PhD	  research.	  The	  rigours	  of	  the	  
latter	  however,	  would	  hopefully	  go	  some	  way	  to	  ensuring	  that	  the	  filters	  which	  might	  reshape	  
or	  distort	  the	  object	  of	  study	  -­‐	  the	  practice	  of	  talking	  about	  legal	  professionals	  in	  the	  classroom	  
as	  a	  recontextualizing	  practice	  in	  itself	  –	  would	  at	  least	  be	  made	  explicit.	  	  
Various	  kinds	  of	  transformation	  of	  the	  recontextualized	  practice	  take	  place	  in	  the	  process	  of	  
recontextualization.	  Elements	  of	  the	  initial	  social	  practice	  may	  be	  substituted,	  deleted	  or	  
rearranged.	  Most	  importantly	  for	  purposes	  of	  this	  thesis,	  the	  recontextualizing	  practice	  –	  in	  this	  
instance	  the	  ‘talk	  about’	  legal	  professionals	  in	  the	  classroom	  –	  may	  add	  certain	  elements.	  These	  
include	  a	  host	  of	  elements	  relating	  to	  the	  value	  framework	  supporting	  the	  practice	  –	  
constructions	  of	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  practice	  and	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  it	  is	  evaluated,	  both	  of	  
which	  link	  up	  to	  legitimation	  –	  why	  the	  practice	  must	  take	  place	  or	  must	  take	  place	  in	  the	  way	  
that	  it	  does	  (ibid:	  20	  –	  21).	  Van	  Leeuwen	  also	  provides	  analytical	  tools	  for	  studying	  these	  
aspects	  in	  texts	  and	  I	  drew	  upon	  these	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  how	  the	  law	  lecturer	  of	  my	  study	  
framed	  the	  values	  associated	  with	  the	  social	  practice	  of	  lawyering	  and,	  thereby,	  being	  a	  legal	  
professional.	  	  
Van	  Leewen’s	  work	  served	  as	  an	  important	  source	  of	  inspiration	  in	  developing	  a	  framework	  for	  
systematizing	  representational	  meanings	  relating	  to	  the	  social	  practice	  of	  lawyering	  and,	  
thereby,	  showing	  how	  legal	  professional	  roles	  and	  their	  associated	  meanings	  are	  constructed	  in	  
classroom	  talk.	  In	  two	  instances,	  however	  –	  the	  identification	  of	  ‘internal’	  and	  ‘external’	  goods	  
in	  the	  practice	  and	  the	  representation	  of	  emotion	  –	  I	  found	  that	  Van	  Leeuwen’s	  work	  was	  
lacking.	  For	  the	  first	  I	  drew	  upon	  the	  work	  of	  McIntyre	  (described	  further	  in	  chapter	  four),	  while	  
for	  the	  second	  I	  was	  fortunate	  to	  have	  been	  referred48	  to	  Martin	  &	  Rose’s	  Working	  with	  
Discourse:	  Meaning	  Beyond	  the	  Clause	  (2004)	  whose	  chapter	  on	  appraisal	  (ibid:	  22ff)	  contains	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  My	  thanks	  in	  this	  regard	  are	  due	  to	  Yvonne	  Reid	  (PhD),	  head	  of	  the	  Applied	  English	  Language	  Studies	  




an	  account	  of	  the	  representation	  of	  emotion	  in	  texts.	  The	  manner	  in	  which	  this	  study	  drew	  
upon	  and	  developed	  the	  sociological	  and	  linguistic	  categories	  developed	  by	  Van	  Leeuwen	  (and	  
to	  a	  lesser	  extent	  McIntyre	  and	  Martin	  &	  Rose)	  is	  outlined	  in	  chapter	  four.	  	  
5.	   A	  CONCEPTUAL	  FRAMEWORK	  FOR	  THE	  STUDY	  	  	  
The	  literature	  review	  presented	  in	  this	  chapter	  has	  established	  that	  representations	  about	  legal	  
professionals	  in	  classroom	  talk	  are	  relevant	  to	  processes	  of	  professional	  identity	  formation	  as	  a	  
form	  of	  identity	  regulation	  in	  which	  professional	  roles	  and	  their	  attendant	  discourse(s)	  emerge.	  
In	  this	  study	  I	  investigate	  how	  legal	  professionals	  were	  actually	  represented	  in	  the	  talk	  of	  one	  
particular	  classroom	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  what	  the	  process	  entails	  –	  how	  the	  representations	  
themselves	  may	  be	  studied,	  and	  what	  such	  study	  reveals	  in	  order	  to	  further	  understanding	  of	  
the	  processes	  of	  legal	  professional	  identity	  formation.	  The	  concepts	  of	  identity,	  identity	  work,	  
identity	  regulation,	  role	  and	  discourse	  have	  been	  explored	  and	  the	  resources	  of	  CDA	  have	  been	  
invoked	  in	  order	  to	  study	  representational	  meanings.	  From	  the	  foregoing,	  I	  therefore	  identify	  
the	  following	  three	  conceptual	  claims	  that	  provide	  the	  framework	  for	  this	  research	  study:	  	  
• At	  a	  micro-­‐level	  of	  discourse	  analysis,	  the	  basic	  elements	  of	  social	  practice	  (Van	  
Leeuwen’s	  ‘reduced’	  model)	  and	  their	  associated	  sociosemantic	  categories	  and	  linguistic	  
realizations,	  provide	  a	  useful	  schemata	  for	  understanding	  how	  representations	  function	  
as	  a	  form	  of	  identity	  regulation.	  	  
• A	  micro-­‐discursive	  study	  of	  representations	  of	  legal	  professionals	  in	  classroom	  talk	  
allows	  one	  to	  situate	  the	  representations	  in	  a	  particular	  classroom	  in	  relation	  to	  broader	  
discourses	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  legal	  professionalism	  and	  the	  teaching	  of	  legal	  ethics.	  
• The	  recontextualization	  of	  the	  legal	  profession	  within	  the	  social	  context	  of	  the	  
classroom	  overlays	  representational	  meanings	  with	  the	  power	  that	  derives	  from	  that	  
context.	  	  
6.	   SUMMARY	  
In	  this	  chapter	  I	  firstly	  provided	  a	  theoretical	  account	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  identity	  and	  processes	  




study	  of	  identity	  and	  identified	  the	  present	  study	  as	  having	  interpretivist	  and	  critical	  leanings.	  I	  
then	  defined	  identity	  as	  the	  self-­‐definitions	  attached	  to	  an	  individual	  by	  him	  or	  herself	  and	  
others.	  I	  distinguished	  constructivist	  (which	  sees	  the	  self	  as	  negotiated	  in	  interaction	  with	  
others)	  from	  essentialist	  (which	  sees	  the	  self	  as	  an	  abiding	  essence)	  approaches	  to	  identity,	  and	  
described	  how	  a	  shift	  from	  the	  latter	  to	  the	  former	  has	  been	  accompanied	  by	  recognition	  of	  the	  
multiple,	  fluid,	  shifting,	  intersecting,	  possibly	  competing	  identifications	  that	  an	  individual	  may	  
hold	  at	  any	  one	  time.	  I	  noted	  that	  theorists	  commonly	  distinguish	  between	  ‘personal	  identity’	  
(self-­‐definitions	  not	  associated	  with	  forms	  of	  group	  belonging)	  and	  ‘social	  identity’	  (self-­‐
definitions	  linked	  to	  forms	  of	  group	  belonging),	  but	  associated	  both	  of	  these	  with	  processes	  
that	  inhere	  in	  the	  individual,	  with	  what	  is	  referred	  to	  in	  the	  literature	  as	  ‘identity	  work’.	  I	  
emphasized	  that	  identity	  work	  always	  takes	  place	  in	  relation	  to	  ‘extra-­‐individual	  forces’	  which	  
are	  variously	  described	  as	  ‘cultural	  resources’,	  ‘identity	  sets’,	  ‘discourses’	  and	  so	  on,	  but	  
commonly	  grouped	  under	  the	  rubric	  of	  ‘identity	  regulation’;	  and	  that	  personal	  and	  social	  
identifications	  emerge	  from	  the	  interaction	  of	  these	  two	  complex	  processes.	  I	  associated	  the	  
present	  research	  with	  the	  study	  of	  identity	  regulation	  rather	  than	  identity	  work.	  	  
I	  then	  proceeded	  to	  elaborate	  the	  concept	  of	  identity	  regulation	  by	  noting,	  firstly,	  that	  the	  
literature	  recognizes	  the	  possibility	  of	  studying	  identity	  formation	  processes	  (and	  thus	  also	  
identity	  regulation)	  in	  both	  contextualized	  and	  decontextualized	  practices.	  I	  emphasized	  that	  
the	  study	  of	  identity	  regulation	  in	  the	  latter	  involves	  a	  study	  of	  representations	  of	  the	  practice,	  
rather	  than	  the	  practice	  per	  se.	  Following	  Sveningsson	  and	  Alvesson	  (2003),	  I	  identified	  the	  
concepts	  of	  ‘role’	  and	  ‘discourse’	  as	  integral	  to	  understanding	  how	  identity	  regulation	  operates.	  
I	  discussed	  the	  problematic	  functionalist	  associations	  attached	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  role	  but	  noted	  
that	  in	  the	  reformulation	  of	  the	  concept	  undertaken	  by	  Simpson	  and	  Carroll	  (2008)	  it	  has	  much	  
in	  common	  with	  the	  Foucauldian	  concept	  of	  subject	  position	  (but	  without	  the	  ‘muscular’	  
discourse-­‐determination	  associations	  of	  the	  latter),	  and	  is	  in	  line	  with	  the	  ‘flux	  ontology’	  
characteristic	  of	  constructivist	  understandings	  of	  identity.	  I	  also	  explained	  that	  it	  was	  necessary	  
to	  invoke	  the	  concept	  of	  role	  in	  the	  conceptual	  framework	  as	  the	  ‘nub’	  or	  ‘site’	  at	  which	  
discourses	  could	  intersect.	  I	  noted	  that	  the	  term	  ‘discourse’	  has	  been	  used	  in	  a	  great	  variety	  of	  




disconnected	  social	  phenomenon.	  While	  acknowledging	  the	  wide	  range	  of	  analytical	  
approaches	  to	  the	  study	  of	  discourse,	  I	  identified	  CDA	  as	  the	  approach	  best	  fitted	  to	  the	  aims	  of	  
the	  study	  in	  that	  it	  allowed	  for	  a	  position	  on	  discourse	  as	  tightly-­‐coupled	  to,	  but	  not	  
determinative	  of	  or	  collapsed	  with	  other	  social	  elements,	  and	  afforded	  a	  micro-­‐discursive	  point	  
of	  entry	  with	  various	  models	  for	  nevertheless	  ascending	  the	  discursive	  ladder.	  What	  reliance	  on	  
CDA	  added	  to	  the	  conceptual	  frame	  was	  an	  awareness	  of	  the	  nature	  in	  which	  power	  relations	  
are	  coded	  into	  the	  finest	  details	  of	  the	  text,	  and	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  multi-­‐functionality	  of	  
language.	  As	  regards	  the	  latter,	  Fairclough’s	  identification	  of	  representational	  meanings	  with	  
particular	  ‘discourses’	  affirmed	  the	  theoretical	  choice	  to	  utilize	  ‘discourse’	  as	  one	  of	  the	  major	  
conceptual	  categories	  constituting	  identity	  regulation.	  The	  multi-­‐functionality	  of	  language,	  
however,	  also	  pointed	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  representational	  meanings	  (discourses)	  sit	  alongside	  
interactional	  (genres)	  and	  identificational	  (styles)	  meanings	  in	  constituting	  ‘discourse’	  more	  
broadly	  and	  abstractly	  as	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  language	  in	  social	  practice.	  	  
I	  concluded	  this	  section	  with	  an	  overview	  of	  Van	  Leeuwen’s	  insight	  that	  the	  study	  of	  
representational	  meanings	  should	  centre	  around	  the	  various	  elements	  of	  social	  practice.	  For	  
each	  of	  the	  major	  elements	  of	  social	  practice	  an	  inventory	  of	  sociosemantic	  categories	  and	  
associated	  typical	  forms	  of	  linguistic	  realization	  can	  be	  identified.	  These	  categories	  assist	  in	  
fleshing	  out	  and	  systematizing	  representational	  meanings.	  The	  phenomenon	  of	  
recontextualization	  chains	  was	  recognized	  as	  well	  as	  the	  transformations	  –	  the	  most	  important	  
among	  them	  relating	  to	  additions	  of	  purpose,	  legitimation	  and	  evaluation	  –	  that	  may	  take	  place	  
with	  every	  recontextualization.	  The	  chapter	  concluded	  by	  identifying	  the	  conceptual	  claims	  for	  
the	  study.	  	  
The	  following	  chapter	  turns	  to	  the	  question	  of	  the	  research	  paradigm,	  research	  design	  and	  key	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  AND	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1.	   RESTATEMENT	  OF	  PURPOSE	  AND	  AIM	  OF	  STUDY	  	  
This	  research	  aims	  to	  fill	  the	  knowledge	  gap	  I	  identified	  in	  chapter	  one:	  While	  the	  literature	  
suggests	  that	  talk	  about	  legal	  professionals	  impacts	  upon	  students’	  formation	  of	  legal	  
professional	  identity,	  little	  systematic	  conceptual	  or	  empirical	  research	  has	  been	  conducted	  on	  
what	  law	  lecturers	  say	  about	  legal	  professionals	  in	  the	  classroom.	  The	  problem	  –	  the	  possibility	  
that	  law	  lecturers	  are	  socializing	  law	  students	  into	  models	  of	  legal	  professional	  identity	  that	  
could	  be	  positive	  or	  negative	  –	  is	  both	  under-­‐conceptualized	  and	  under-­‐examined.	  My	  purpose	  
is	  to	  propose	  a	  way	  of	  making	  sense	  of	  this	  aspect	  of	  classroom	  talk,	  to	  propose	  a	  possible	  
conceptual	  and	  methodological	  frame	  for	  beginning	  to	  understand	  the	  lecturer’s	  potential	  
contribution	  to	  professional	  identity	  formation	  processes.	  My	  specific	  interest	  is	  to	  determine	  
which	  models	  of	  legal	  professional	  identity	  are	  present	  and,	  if	  so,	  how	  these	  are	  linked	  to	  
particular	  semantic	  and	  linguistic	  themes	  or	  patterns.	  My	  argument	  is	  that	  such	  a	  conceptual	  
and	  methodological	  frame	  should	  be	  based	  upon	  constructivist	  theories	  of	  identity	  formation	  
and	  theories	  of	  the	  functioning	  of	  language	  in	  social	  practice	  with	  particular	  regard	  to	  the	  
representational	  function	  of	  language.	  These	  theories,	  however,	  needed	  to	  be	  brought	  into	  
relation	  with	  an	  in-­‐depth	  empirical	  case	  study	  to	  produce	  results	  that	  will	  resonate	  with	  legal	  
educationalists.	  	  
Some	  of	  the	  primary	  conceptual	  and	  methodological	  choices	  I	  made	  have	  already	  been	  
discussed	  in	  chapter	  two.	  This	  includes,	  for	  instance,	  the	  key	  methodological	  choices	  to	  use	  the	  
resources	  of	  critical	  discourse	  analysis,	  and	  Van	  Leeuwen’s	  work	  on	  the	  representational	  
function	  of	  language	  in	  particular,	  and	  I	  will	  not	  repeat	  my	  reasons	  for	  these	  choices	  here.	  This	  
chapter	  discusses	  the	  research	  paradigm;	  considerations	  and	  observations	  relating	  to	  the	  
development	  of	  the	  research	  design;	  the	  choices	  that	  were	  made	  regarding	  the	  selection	  of	  the	  




credibility	  of	  the	  study.	  I	  have	  not	  devoted	  a	  separate	  section	  to	  the	  ethics	  of	  the	  research	  but	  
have	  integrated	  discussion	  of	  ethical	  issues	  into	  the	  various	  sub-­‐sections.	  In	  line	  with	  ethical	  
norms	  relating	  to	  qualitatively-­‐oriented	  research,	  however,	  I	  commence	  this	  chapter	  with	  a	  
statement	  of	  my	  own	  position	  as	  researcher.	  	  
2.	   POSITIONING	  THE	  RESEARCHER	  	  	  
In	  this	  section	  I	  would	  like	  to	  position	  myself	  in	  terms	  of	  both	  the	  resources	  I	  brought	  to	  the	  
study	  and	  the	  subjective	  biases	  I	  hold	  which	  could	  have	  influenced	  my	  interpretation	  of	  the	  
data.	  	  
Prior	  to	  undertaking	  this	  research,	  my	  academic	  training	  had	  been	  overwhelmingly	  based	  in	  the	  
discipline	  of	  law	  with	  only	  a	  little	  training	  in	  and	  virtually	  no	  experience	  of	  methods	  in	  the	  social	  
sciences.49	  I	  had	  never	  conducted	  an	  empirical	  study,	  nor	  had	  I	  used	  discourse	  analytic	  
techniques.	  In	  undertaking	  this	  research,	  therefore,	  I	  have	  been	  stretched	  and	  forced	  to	  grow	  in	  
many	  ways.	  Chief	  among	  them	  has	  been	  a	  deepened	  understanding	  of	  different	  forms	  of	  
knowledge.	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  typology	  presented	  by	  Merriam	  and	  Simpson	  –	  wherein	  the	  
different	  paths	  to	  knowledge	  encompass	  the	  processes	  of	  believing	  (authoritative	  knowledge),	  
thinking	  (rational	  knowledge),	  sensing	  (empirical	  knowledge)	  and	  feeling	  (intuitive	  knowledge)	  
(Merriam	  &	  Simpson,	  1995:	  2	  –	  3)	  –	  law	  is	  for	  the	  most	  part	  firmly	  situated	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  
authoritative	  knowledge.	  The	  belief	  or	  ideology	  that	  lies	  at	  the	  essence	  of	  legal	  thinking	  is	  that	  
social	  order	  is	  attained	  and	  social	  disputes	  appropriately	  addressed	  through	  the	  development	  
and	  application	  of	  principles	  and	  rules	  which	  derive	  from	  various	  sources	  of	  legal	  authority.	  The	  
documents	  that	  emanate	  from	  particular	  sources	  –	  such	  as	  Parliament	  or	  the	  courts	  –	  are	  in	  
themselves	  regarded	  as	  authoritative	  (ibid:	  4).	  It	  is	  these	  sources	  which	  constitute	  the	  raw	  
materials	  of	  the	  lawyer’s	  path	  to	  knowledge	  as	  she	  learns	  to	  identify	  and	  subtly	  to	  parse	  or	  
synthesize	  the	  legal	  texts.	  In	  so	  doing	  she	  develops	  an	  ever-­‐increasing	  understanding	  of	  a	  vast	  
legal	  semantic	  field	  which	  recontextualizes	  the	  social	  world	  in	  terms	  of	  legal	  categories.	  The	  
overwhelming	  emphasis	  in	  texts	  on	  legal	  research,	  therefore,	  is	  on	  finding	  and	  using	  the	  various	  
sources	  of	  legal	  authority:	  ‘All	  legal	  research	  has	  as	  its	  objective	  the	  collection	  of	  authoritative	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  I	  completed	  a	  course	  in	  Research	  Design	  for	  purposes	  of	  completing	  my	  Postgraduate	  Diploma	  in	  Tertiary	  




materials	  relevant	  to	  the	  problem’	  (Campbell	  et	  al,	  1979:	  225.	  See	  also	  Cohen	  &	  Berring	  (1983);	  
Cohen	  &	  Olson	  (1992);	  and	  Jacobstein	  et	  al	  (1994)).	  By	  contrast	  the	  conceptual	  and	  empirical	  
questions	  with	  which	  I	  sought	  to	  engage	  for	  purposes	  of	  this	  research	  led	  me	  down	  the	  tangled	  
and	  knotty	  avenues	  of	  rational	  and	  empirical	  processes	  of	  inquiry	  which	  entailed	  engaging	  with	  
the	  rigours	  of	  developing	  a	  research	  design,	  managing	  and	  analyzing	  data,	  thinking	  about	  
validity,	  and	  so	  forth.	  Whilst	  daunting,	  the	  process	  has	  been	  immensely	  enriching,	  providing	  me	  
with	  a	  new	  sense	  of	  confidence	  to	  undertake	  social	  research,	  and,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  solidifying	  
and	  clarifying	  my	  understanding	  of	  what	  makes	  research	  in	  my	  home	  discipline	  of	  law	  
distinctive.	  	  
In	  legal	  research	  it	  is	  not	  customary	  for	  researchers	  to	  lay	  their	  subjective	  biases	  open	  for	  
scrutiny.	  	  In	  the	  social	  sciences	  and	  research	  on	  education,	  this	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  
strategies	  to	  enhance	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  research	  (Maxwell,	  1996:	  5).	  Following	  the	  lead	  
provided	  by	  Peshkin	  (1988),	  therefore,	  I	  have	  attained	  an	  awareness	  of	  at	  least	  two	  ‘subjective	  
I’s’	  	  (ibid:	  18)	  that	  potentially	  exerted	  their	  influence	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  research	  and	  its	  
outcomes.	  Firstly,	  as	  noted	  in	  the	  very	  first	  few	  pages	  of	  this	  thesis,	  the	  element	  of	  law	  that	  
excites	  my	  imagination,	  fantasies	  and	  emotions	  is	  the	  potential	  for	  law	  to	  deliver	  justice.	  This	  
‘Justice-­‐Seeking	  I’	  orientates	  me	  to	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  good	  associated	  with	  law	  and	  possibly	  
blinds	  me	  to	  others,	  such	  as	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  law	  ensures	  an	  orderly	  society.50	  There	  is	  
within	  me	  a	  ‘ranking’	  of	  the	  goods	  provided	  by	  law	  that	  affords	  justice	  pre-­‐eminence	  and	  I	  
therefore	  needed	  to	  take	  care	  in	  both	  seeing	  other	  goods	  associated	  with	  law	  in	  my	  subject’s	  
classroom	  talk	  and	  according	  them	  appropriate	  weight.	  Secondly,	  there	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  my	  own	  
particular	  career	  path	  in	  the	  law,	  which	  has	  led	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  subjectivity	  I	  describe	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  This	  is	  not	  to	  suggest,	  however,	  that	  justice	  and	  order	  necessarily	  stand	  in	  an	  antithetical	  relationship	  to	  each	  
other.	  However,	  when	  the	  maintenance	  of	  order	  appears	  to	  prevail	  over	  my	  intuitive	  sense	  of	  justice,	  I	  regard	  this	  
as	  a	  negative	  outcome.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  field	  of	  environmental	  law,	  the	  judge	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Bareki	  v	  Gencor	  
2006	  (1)	  SA	  432	  (T)	  refused	  to	  uphold	  a	  community’s	  attempt	  to	  hold	  a	  mining	  company	  liable	  for	  cleaning	  the	  
environment	  from	  pollution	  by	  asbestos	  caused	  by	  the	  company’s	  operations	  over	  many	  years.	  The	  basis	  for	  the	  
judge’s	  decision	  was	  that	  the	  legal	  authority	  relied	  upon	  by	  the	  community	  could	  not	  be	  applied	  retrospectively;	  
i.e.	  to	  acts	  completed	  before	  the	  legislation	  came	  into	  operation.	  The	  alternative	  source	  of	  legal	  authority	  applied	  
by	  the	  judge	  was	  the	  common	  law	  presumption	  that	  the	  legislature	  does	  not	  intend	  to	  legislate	  retrospectively.	  
This	  is	  a	  broad-­‐ranging	  principle	  derived	  from	  our	  legal	  tradition	  which	  is	  aimed	  at	  regulating	  the	  power	  exercised	  
by	  the	  institution	  of	  State	  entrusted	  with	  making	  laws.	  However,	  there	  were	  clear	  indications	  in	  the	  law	  relied	  
upon	  by	  the	  community	  that	  this	  was	  in	  fact	  the	  legislature’s	  intention,	  and	  the	  law	  was	  in	  fact	  changed	  by	  




the	  ‘Outsider-­‐I’.	  After	  obtaining	  a	  first	  degree	  in	  music,	  I	  proceeded	  to	  undertake	  legal	  studies	  
through	  South	  Africa’s	  primary	  distance	  learning	  institution,	  the	  University	  of	  South	  Africa.	  
Upon	  finishing	  my	  B.Proc	  and	  LL.B	  degrees	  I	  moved	  to	  another	  city.	  I	  had	  sent	  out	  more	  than	  50	  
letters	  of	  application	  to	  various	  attorneys’	  firms	  from	  which	  I	  secured	  two	  interviews	  and	  no	  
offers	  for	  articles	  of	  clerkship	  notwithstanding	  an	  outstanding	  academic	  record.	  As	  I	  needed	  to	  
support	  myself	  I	  could	  not	  undertake	  training	  to	  become	  an	  advocate,	  which	  (at	  that	  time)	  
required	  that	  one	  work	  without	  remuneration	  for	  six	  months	  (now	  it	  is	  a	  year).	  I	  was	  similarly	  
unsuccessful	  in	  securing	  a	  post	  as	  a	  public	  prosecutor	  at	  the	  Department	  of	  Justice.	  I	  eventually	  
found	  work	  at	  a	  legal	  consultancy	  that	  held	  various	  tenders	  from	  national	  and	  regional	  
institutions	  to	  draft	  legislation.	  After	  three	  years	  I	  entered	  legal	  academia	  where	  I	  have	  been	  
based	  ever	  since.	  Notwithstanding	  that	  I	  therefore	  have	  other	  and	  different	  forms	  of	  
experience	  in	  the	  law,	  there	  is	  still	  a	  sense	  that	  I	  have	  not	  passed	  through	  the	  rites	  of	  
professional	  passage	  that	  would	  assure	  me	  of	  insider	  status.	  It	  is	  this	  Outsider-­‐I	  that	  was	  so	  
interested	  in	  the	  topic	  of	  research	  as	  well	  as	  the	  subject	  whose	  classroom	  talk	  I	  chose	  to	  
analyze	  because,	  as	  outlined	  further	  below,	  he	  has	  a	  rich	  and	  varied	  career	  history	  that	  
encompassed	  a	  variety	  of	  mainstream	  legal	  professional	  roles.	  The	  influence	  therefore	  exerted	  
by	  this	  particular	  subjective	  I	  is	  that	  it	  could	  easily	  have	  led	  to	  too-­‐great	  a	  fascination	  with	  my	  
subject’s	  representations,	  a	  starry-­‐eyed	  awe	  that	  could	  not	  draw	  on	  the	  benefits	  of	  experience	  
to	  offer	  alternative	  models.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  however,	  this	  is	  same	  position	  occupied	  by	  the	  
first-­‐year	  student.	  The	  Outsider-­‐I	  was	  thus	  a	  double-­‐edged	  subjectivity:	  It	  triggered	  my	  
professional	  naivety	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  potentially	  positioned	  me	  in	  a	  manner	  similar	  to	  the	  
students	  soaking	  up	  my	  research	  subject’s	  representations	  of	  the	  legal	  professional	  world.	  	  
Having	  outlined	  my	  own	  position,	  the	  following	  sections	  address	  the	  research	  paradigm,	  
research	  design	  and	  methodological	  issues.	  	  
3.	   RESEARCH	  PARADIGM	  
Schwandt	  (2000)	  commences	  his	  essay	  on	  epistemological	  stances	  for	  qualitative	  enquiry	  with	  




‘Labels	  in	  philosophy	  and	  cultural	  discourse	  have	  the	  character	  that	  Derrida	  ascribes	  to	  Plato’s	  
pharmakon:	  they	  can	  poison	  and	  kill,	  and	  they	  can	  remedy	  and	  cure.	  We	  need	  them	  to	  help	  
identify	  a	  style,	  a	  temperament,	  a	  set	  of	  common	  concerns	  and	  emphases,	  or	  a	  vision	  that	  has	  
determinate	  shape.	  But	  we	  must	  also	  be	  wary	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  they	  can	  blind	  us	  or	  can	  reify	  
what	  is	  fluid	  and	  changing’	  (Richard	  J.	  Bernstein	  ‘What	  is	  the	  difference	  that	  difference	  makes?’	  
(1986)	  quoted	  in	  Schwandt,	  2000:	  189).	  	  
This	  statement	  is,	  perhaps	  somewhat	  uncomfortably,	  true	  of	  the	  use	  of	  the	  concept	  ‘paradigm’	  
in	  literature	  on	  research	  methodologies.	  Popularized	  by	  Thomas	  Kuhn	  in	  his	  The	  Structure	  of	  
Scientific	  Revolutions	  (1962),	  a	  ‘paradigm’	  has	  been	  defined	  as:	  
‘An	  organizing	  framework	  that	  contains	  the	  concepts,	  theories,	  assumptions,	  beliefs,	  values	  and	  
principles	  that	  inform	  a	  discipline	  on	  how	  to	  interpret	  subject	  matter	  of	  concern.	  The	  paradigm	  
also	  contains	  the	  research	  methods	  considered	  best	  to	  generate	  knowledge	  and	  suggests	  that	  
which	  is	  open	  and	  not	  open	  to	  inquiry	  at	  the	  time	  (B.A.	  Powers	  &	  T.	  R.	  Knapp	  (1990)	  A	  Dictionary	  
of	  Nursing	  Theory	  and	  Research,	  103	  quoted	  in	  Bergman,	  2010:	  172	  –	  3).	  
Babbie,	  more	  succinctly,	  describes	  a	  paradigm	  as	  ‘[a]	  model	  or	  framework	  for	  observation	  and	  
understanding,	  which	  shapes	  both	  what	  we	  see	  and	  how	  we	  understand	  it’	  (2004:	  33).	  In	  the	  
research	  methods	  literature	  different	  labels	  for	  research	  paradigms	  abound.	  Denzin	  and	  Lincoln	  
recognize	  the	  ‘received’	  and	  dominating	  paradigm	  of	  ‘positivism’	  (the	  view	  toward	  research	  
that	  has	  dominated	  formal	  discourse	  in	  the	  physical	  and	  social	  sciences	  for	  400	  years)	  and	  the	  
‘alternative’	  inquiry	  paradigms	  of	  ‘postpositivism’,	  ‘critical	  theory’	  and	  ‘constructivism’	  (1998:	  
202–3).	  In	  a	  later	  work,	  Lincoln	  and	  Guba	  revise	  this	  basic	  framework	  to	  incorporate	  Heron’s	  
(1981)	  notion	  of	  a	  ‘participatory’	  paradigm	  as	  an	  alternative	  method	  of	  inquiry	  (2000:	  168).	  
Cohen	  and	  Manion	  (1994)	  associate	  positivism	  with	  the	  ‘scientific	  method’	  and	  distinguish	  it	  
from	  the	  ‘alternatives’	  of	  phenomenology,	  ethnomethodology	  and	  symbolic	  interactionism.	  
Maykut	  and	  Morehouse,	  in	  turn,	  distinguish	  the	  ‘positivist	  approach’	  as	  the	  ‘dominant	  
paradigm’	  and	  the	  ‘phenomenological	  approach’	  as	  an	  ‘alternate	  paradigm’	  (1994:	  12).	  Babbie’s	  
typology	  of	  paradigms	  is	  more	  diverse	  and	  incorporates	  early	  positivism,	  social	  Darwinism,	  the	  
conflict	  paradigm,	  symbolic	  interactionism,	  ethnomethodology,	  structural	  functionalism	  and	  
feminist	  paradigms	  (2004:	  32).	  	  	  
Bergman	  notes	  that	  in	  the	  literature	  (at	  least	  on	  mixed	  methods	  research)	  the	  term	  paradigm	  is	  




competing	  and	  incommensurable	  and	  in	  a	  ‘weak’	  sense	  where	  it	  is	  roughly	  synonymous	  with	  
‘worldview’,	  ‘approach’	  or	  ‘framework’	  (2010:	  173).	  Bergman	  critiques	  the	  first	  use	  on	  the	  basis	  
that	  the	  claimed	  differences	  between	  qualitative	  and	  quantitative	  methods	  on	  ontological,	  
epistemological	  and	  axiological	  grounds	  cannot	  be	  sustained,	  that	  qualitative	  and	  quantitative	  
analytical	  techniques	  do	  not	  necessitate	  or	  predetermine	  a	  particular	  view	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  
reality,	  a	  specific	  research	  theme	  or	  how	  to	  research	  it,	  the	  relationship	  between	  researcher	  
and	  research	  subject	  or	  the	  truth	  value	  of	  the	  data	  (ibid).	  As	  regards	  the	  second	  use,	  he	  argues	  
that	  if	  ‘paradigm’	  simply	  signifies	  an	  approach	  or	  framework	  ‘there	  are	  as	  many	  paradigms	  as	  
there	  are	  authors	  who	  feel	  the	  need	  to	  distinguish	  a	  meta,	  grand,	  and	  middle-­‐range	  theoretical	  
approach	  from	  alternatives’	  (ibid).	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  as	  Bernstein	  suggests,	  the	  situation	  of	  one’s	  work	  within	  a	  particular	  
paradigm	  can	  ‘remedy	  and	  cure’,	  orientating	  both	  writer	  and	  reader	  to	  a	  common	  set	  of	  
concerns	  and	  emphases,	  helping	  to	  shape	  an	  internally	  consistent	  orientation	  and	  style.	  The	  
paradigmatic	  labels	  –	  both	  in	  the	  strong	  sense	  of	  the	  qualitative/quantitative	  divide	  and	  the	  
weaker	  sense	  of	  more	  diverse	  ‘worldviews’	  –	  would	  only	  seem	  capable	  of	  ‘poisoning	  and	  killing’	  
when	  they	  are	  applied	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  necessitates	  or	  predetermines,	  the	  research	  project,	  
without	  the	  researcher	  applying	  her	  mind	  to	  the	  true	  fit	  between	  her	  project	  and	  the	  available	  
paradigmatic	  labels.	  Further,	  as	  Guba	  and	  Lincoln	  emphasize,	  it	  is	  helpful	  to	  remember	  that	  all	  
paradigms	  are	  human	  constructs.	  They	  are	  not	  open	  to	  proof	  in	  the	  conventional	  sense	  and	  
there	  is	  no	  way	  to	  elevate	  one	  over	  another	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  ultimate,	  foundational	  criteria	  
(1998:	  201	  –	  2).	  	  
Instead	  of	  positioning	  my	  research	  in	  terms	  of	  one	  of	  the	  available	  paradigmatic	  labels	  at	  the	  
outset,	  I	  found	  that	  the	  questions	  various	  authors	  identify	  in	  order	  to	  frame	  and	  distinguish	  the	  
various	  paradigms	  from	  each	  other	  constituted	  a	  more	  generative	  starting	  point.	  These	  
questions	  can	  be	  grouped	  around	  the	  key	  pillars	  of	  ontology,	  epistemology	  and	  methodology	  







Ontological	  Questions:	  	   What	  is	  the	  form	  and	  nature	  of	  reality?	  What	  can	  be	  known	  about	  
reality?	  
Epistemological	  Questions:	  	   What	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  knowledge?	  What	  does	  research	  contribute	  
to	  knowledge	  or	  how	  does	  knowledge	  accumulate?	  What	  is	  the	  
role	  of	  values	  in	  inquiry?	  
Methodological	  Questions:	  	   How	  should	  the	  inquirer	  go	  about	  finding	  out	  whatever	  he	  or	  she	  
believes	  can	  be	  known?	  	  
Figure	  3:	  Questions	  that	  constitute	  the	  basis	  for	  a	  particular	  paradigmatic	  position.	  
There	  is	  no	  need	  in	  this	  research	  for	  me	  to	  take	  a	  position	  on	  the	  ultimate	  nature	  and	  form	  of	  
all	  reality,	  only	  that	  small	  aspect	  of	  reality	  with	  which	  I	  have	  been	  concerned,	  namely	  the	  
formation	  of	  legal	  professional	  identity.	  To	  a	  certain	  extent	  I	  have	  already	  nailed	  my	  colours	  to	  
the	  mast	  in	  chapter	  two	  for	  I	  have	  made	  a	  variety	  of	  claims	  that	  are	  consistent	  with	  the	  view	  
that	  identities,	  including	  professional	  identities,	  are	  constructed	  in	  social	  interaction.	  This	  basic	  
claim,	  I	  in	  fact	  regard	  to	  be	  a	  ‘true’	  state	  of	  affairs,	  as	  accurately	  reflecting	  what	  happens	  in	  the	  
world.	  This	  seems	  akin	  to	  what	  Guba	  and	  Lincoln	  describe	  as	  a	  ‘positivist’	  ontological	  position:	  
an	  ‘apprehendable	  reality	  is	  assumed	  to	  exist,	  driven	  by	  immutable	  natural	  laws	  and	  
mechanisms’	  (1998:	  204),	  the	  claim	  for	  the	  social	  construction	  of	  identities	  being	  a	  ‘time-­‐	  and	  
context-­‐free	  generalization’	  (ibid).	  My	  basis	  for	  this	  position	  is	  that	  this	  claim	  has	  been	  
espoused	  and	  found	  to	  be	  workable	  by	  a	  great	  variety	  of	  authors	  in	  many	  different	  disciplines.	  
It	  also	  resonates	  very	  deeply	  with	  my	  own	  subjective	  experience	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  identity	  
formation.	  The	  same	  can	  possibly	  be	  said	  of	  the	  claims	  that	  language	  is	  both	  constitutive	  and	  
reflective	  of	  social	  reality	  and	  that	  it	  plays	  a	  critical	  role	  in	  the	  socialization	  process.	  As	  the	  
claims	  in	  chapter	  two	  branch	  out	  from	  these	  fundamental	  ‘root’	  claims,	  however,	  my	  
ontological	  position	  shifts	  more	  clearly	  to	  that	  of	  a	  constructivist	  one	  for	  I	  consider	  that	  the	  
‘reality’	  of	  the	  process	  of	  the	  outworking	  of	  the	  social	  construction	  of	  identities	  can	  be	  
apprehended	  through	  a	  variety	  of	  intangible	  mental	  constructions	  that	  are	  ‘socially	  and	  




many	  individuals	  and	  across	  cultures]	  and	  dependent	  for	  their	  form	  and	  content	  on	  the	  
individual	  persons	  or	  groups	  holding	  the	  constructions’	  (ibid:	  206).	  Thus	  the	  conceptual	  choices	  
I	  have	  made,	  for	  instance,	  to	  distinguish	  ‘identity	  regulation’	  and	  ‘identity	  work’	  as	  the	  two	  
most	  fundamental	  processes	  of	  identity	  formation,	  or	  my	  choice	  to	  then	  associate	  identity	  
regulation	  with	  the	  key	  concepts	  of	  ‘role’	  and	  ‘discourse’	  are	  not	  more	  or	  less	  ‘true’	  in	  an	  
absolute	  sense,	  though	  they	  may	  come	  to	  be	  considered	  as	  more	  or	  less	  informed,	  elegant	  and	  
sophisticated	  than	  other	  propositions.	  The	  same	  is	  even	  truer	  of	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  I	  have	  
applied	  and	  developed	  Van	  Leeuwen’s	  categories	  for	  the	  representational	  meanings	  of	  
language.	  	  
The	  nature	  of	  the	  knowledge	  I	  thus	  present	  in	  this	  thesis	  is	  that	  it	  is	  one	  possible	  version	  of	  the	  
truth	  that	  may	  coexist	  alongside	  many	  others.	  Later	  research	  on	  this	  topic	  might	  affirm	  or	  
negate	  what	  I	  have	  put	  forward,	  both	  as	  regards	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  the	  semantic	  and	  
linguistic	  categories	  by	  which	  I	  have	  proposed	  to	  make	  the	  representational	  meanings	  relating	  
to	  legal	  professional	  identity	  more	  accessible	  and	  understandable,	  and	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  I	  
have	  commented	  upon	  the	  utility	  of	  Van	  Leeuwen’s	  scheme	  for	  the	  project	  of	  understanding	  
legal	  professional	  identity.	  Ultimately,	  ‘knowledge’	  on	  this	  topic	  will	  consist	  of	  the	  relative	  
consensus	  among	  those	  competent	  and	  trusted	  to	  interpret	  the	  substance	  of	  the	  constructions	  
(Guba	  and	  Lincoln,	  1998:	  212).	  My	  stance	  on	  the	  epistemological	  nature	  of	  this	  work	  is,	  
furthermore,	  ‘transactional	  and	  subjectivist’	  (ibid)	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  I	  do	  not	  claim	  to	  have	  stood	  
apart	  from	  my	  inquiry	  into	  this	  topic	  in	  a	  manner	  akin	  to	  the	  objectivist,	  ‘one-­‐way	  mirror’	  model	  
characteristic	  of	  positivist	  and	  postpositivist	  paradigms	  (ibid:	  204–5).	  	  
There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  methodological	  implications	  flowing	  from	  the	  foregoing	  ontological	  and	  
epistemological	  positions.	  The	  aim	  of	  the	  inquiry	  would	  seem	  to	  tend	  more	  towards	  
understanding	  and	  constructing	  the	  positions	  people	  hold	  on	  the	  formation	  of	  legal	  
professional	  identity	  (a	  constructivist	  form	  of	  inquiry	  –	  ibid:	  211)	  –	  as	  I	  intimated	  in	  chapter	  one	  
where	  I	  noted	  that	  the	  Carnegie	  Report	  tends	  to	  present	  the	  formation	  of	  legal	  professional	  
identity	  as	  an	  object	  of	  pedagogy	  without	  at	  the	  same	  time	  considering	  the	  socializing	  effects	  of	  
talk	  about	  legal	  professionals	  in	  the	  classroom.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  I	  do	  not	  withhold	  the	  




semantic	  and	  linguistic	  categories	  which	  I	  have	  held	  generate	  particular	  kinds	  of	  meaning,	  a	  
possible	  critique	  and	  transformation	  of	  talk	  in	  the	  classroom	  about	  legal	  professionals	  could	  
take	  place	  (a	  ‘critical’	  position	  –	  ibid).	  The	  manner	  of	  going	  about	  the	  inquiry	  would	  also	  seem	  
to	  call	  for	  a	  focus	  on	  a	  natural	  and	  localized	  setting,	  which	  is	  true	  of	  this	  study	  in	  that	  I	  focused	  
on	  the	  talk	  actually	  occurring	  in	  one	  particular	  legal	  classroom	  and	  did	  not	  attempt	  to	  devise	  an	  
‘experiment’	  in	  which	  I	  carefully	  controlled	  various	  confounding	  variables	  (ibid:	  204).	  In	  one	  
sense,	  however,	  the	  research	  was	  ‘experimental’	  in	  that	  I	  took	  the	  a	  priori	  (albeit	  justified)	  
position	  that	  Van	  Leeuwen’s	  representational	  categories	  could	  be	  applied	  and	  tested	  against	  
the	  data	  generated	  on	  the	  representation	  of	  legal	  professionals	  in	  the	  classroom,	  which	  
categories	  I	  then	  modified	  and	  developed	  as	  I	  worked	  with	  the	  data	  and	  according	  to	  what	  I	  
perceived	  and	  felt	  to	  be	  most	  generative	  and	  appropriate.	  The	  research	  is	  thus	  not	  wholly	  
‘grounded’	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  I	  developed	  these	  categories	  from	  scratch.	  The	  transactional	  and	  
subjective	  nature	  of	  the	  knowledge	  generated	  by	  the	  research	  also	  required	  that	  I	  sought	  to	  
engage	  in	  a	  dialogue	  with	  the	  subject	  of	  my	  research,	  seeking	  his	  emic	  perspective	  on	  the	  
categories	  and	  findings	  I	  generated	  (ibid:	  207).	  I	  have	  also	  attempted	  to	  enhance	  the	  
transactional	  nature	  of	  my	  research	  by	  opening	  up	  my	  analytical	  choices	  to	  scrutiny	  through	  the	  
use	  of	  the	  analytical	  tables	  contained	  on	  the	  accompanying	  CD-­‐ROM	  (see	  section	  5.4	  below	  for	  
an	  explanation	  of	  the	  tables).	  	  
My	  responses	  to	  the	  ontological,	  epistemological	  and	  methodological	  questions	  therefore,	  
leads	  me	  to	  conclude	  that	  my	  research	  is	  indeed	  ‘qualitative’	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  a	  
‘nonnumerical	  examination	  and	  interpretation	  of	  observations,	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  discovering	  
underlying	  meanings	  and	  patterns	  of	  relationships’	  (Babbie,	  2004:	  G8).	  	  
4.	   RESEARCH	  DESIGN	  	  	  
The	  literature	  on	  research	  methodology	  similarly	  abounds	  with	  metaphors	  that	  attempt	  to	  
capture	  what	  a	  research	  design	  entails.	  Babbie	  and	  Mouton	  resort	  to	  architectural	  or	  
engineering	  contexts,	  describing	  the	  research	  design	  as	  ‘a	  plan	  or	  blueprint’	  of	  how	  one	  intends	  
conducting	  the	  research	  (2001:	  74).	  This	  is	  suggestive	  of	  a	  pre-­‐determined,	  clear-­‐cut,	  linear	  
process	  that	  resonates	  with	  Merriam	  and	  Simpson’s	  definition	  of	  research	  design	  as	  ‘organizing	  




identifying	  a	  concern	  or	  problem,	  (2)	  establishing	  a	  conceptual	  framework,	  (3)	  delineating	  the	  
research	  phenomenon,	  (4)	  determining	  research	  methodology	  and	  using	  appropriate	  data-­‐
gathering	  procedures	  and	  techniques,	  and	  (5)	  analyzing	  and	  reporting	  data’	  (1995:	  9,	  although	  
in	  fairness	  they	  do	  note	  that	  the	  process	  ‘is	  not	  always’	  sequential).	  Maxwell	  is	  critical	  of	  works	  
that	  present	  research	  design	  as	  ‘a	  series	  of	  stages	  or	  tasks’	  that	  are	  both	  linear	  and	  one-­‐
directional	  drawing	  inspiration,	  instead,	  from	  the	  realm	  of	  artistic	  production:	  A	  research	  design	  
is	  ‘an	  underlying	  scheme	  that	  governs	  functioning,	  developing,	  or	  unfolding’	  and	  ‘the	  
arrangement	  of	  elements	  or	  details	  in	  a	  product	  or	  work	  of	  art’	  (1996:	  1–2).	  	  He	  emphasizes	  the	  
mutually	  constitutive	  nature	  of	  the	  elements	  of	  the	  design,	  presenting	  an	  ‘interactive	  model’	  
that	  comprises	  of	  purposes,	  conceptual	  context,	  research	  questions,	  methods	  and	  validity.	  
These	  elements	  form	  an	  integrated	  and	  interacting	  whole	  with	  each	  element	  closely	  tied	  to	  
several	  others	  (ibid:	  4	  –	  5).	  Janesick	  turns	  to	  the	  world	  of	  dance,	  comparing	  the	  research	  design	  
process	  with	  stages	  of	  completion	  of	  a	  choreographic	  piece	  (warm-­‐up,	  exploration	  and	  total	  
work-­‐out	  stage,	  and	  illumination	  and	  formulation)	  which	  involves	  both	  set	  routines	  (such	  as	  
those	  found	  in	  the	  dancing	  of	  a	  minuet)	  and	  free-­‐er	  movements	  (such	  as	  those	  used	  in	  the	  
dance	  approach	  known	  as	  improvisation)	  (2000:	  383).	  	  
While	  all	  these	  definitions	  and	  metaphors	  seem	  to	  capture	  an	  element	  of	  truth	  about	  the	  
research	  design	  process,	  based	  on	  my	  experience	  the	  various	  models	  are	  better	  at	  identifying	  
and	  describing	  the	  constituent	  elements	  of	  the	  design	  and	  the	  role	  that	  such	  elements	  play	  in	  
the	  project	  than	  they	  are	  at	  capturing	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  process.	  With	  the	  vantage	  that	  
hindsight	  affords,	  Maxwell	  and	  Janesick’s	  models	  seem	  intrinsically	  more	  authentic	  in	  their	  
emphasis	  upon	  the	  mutually	  constitutive,	  holistic	  and	  open-­‐ended	  nature	  of	  the	  elements	  and	  
the	  process	  of	  bringing	  them	  together.	  The	  metaphor	  that	  best	  captures	  my	  own	  process	  of	  
consolidating	  a	  research	  design	  is	  the	  somewhat	  prosaic,	  domestic	  art	  of	  making	  white	  sauce	  –	  
a	  process	  that	  entails	  melting	  a	  fat,	  adding	  flour	  to	  make	  a	  paste,	  mixing	  this	  together	  with	  milk	  
or	  water	  and	  then	  stirring	  the	  mixture	  over	  heat	  until	  the	  ingredients	  gradually	  thicken	  into	  a	  
smooth,	  creamy	  sauce.	  If	  the	  ingredients	  are	  not	  in	  proportion,	  or	  if	  care	  is	  not	  taken	  in	  the	  
manner	  in	  which	  they	  are	  combined	  however,	  the	  cook	  is	  likely	  to	  produce	  a	  stodgy	  or	  lumpy	  




followed:	  The	  fat	  represents	  the	  research	  idea	  or	  interest	  which	  I	  outlined	  at	  the	  very	  start	  of	  
this	  thesis,	  which	  melted	  in	  the	  initial	  passion	  with	  which	  it	  was	  infused.	  The	  flour	  represents	  
the	  literature,	  and	  here	  I	  was	  in	  grave	  danger	  of	  adding	  too	  great	  a	  quantity.	  This	  danger	  arose	  
from	  the	  nature	  of	  my	  topic	  which	  necessitated	  having	  regard	  to	  at	  least	  three	  different	  bodies	  
of	  literature:	  Research	  on	  the	  teaching	  of	  legal	  ethics	  and	  models	  of	  legal	  professionalism	  in	  the	  
literature	  on	  legal	  education;	  research	  on	  identity	  and	  identity	  formation	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  
disciplines;	  and	  research	  on	  discourse	  analysis,	  the	  different	  meaning	  potentials	  of	  language	  
and	  the	  function	  of	  representational	  meanings	  in	  particular.	  It	  also	  arose	  from	  the	  fact	  –	  already	  
intimated	  in	  chapter	  two	  above	  –	  that	  the	  literature,	  particularly	  in	  the	  case	  of	  identity	  and	  
identity	  formation	  was	  vast.	  Although	  I	  followed	  various	  strategies	  to	  try	  and	  delimit	  the	  
literature,	  it	  was	  only	  after	  I	  started	  engaging	  with	  the	  final	  element	  of	  the	  recipe	  –	  the	  milk	  or	  
water	  added	  to	  the	  floury	  paste	  which	  represents	  my	  empirical	  data	  –	  that	  the	  choices	  I	  needed	  
to	  make	  regarding	  the	  literature	  came	  more	  easily	  into	  focus.	  The	  research	  design	  process	  I	  
followed	  was	  not	  predetermined	  or	  executed.	  While	  I	  was	  never	  without	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  
phenomenon	  I	  wished	  to	  investigate,	  my	  purpose,	  conceptual	  framework,	  research	  questions	  
and	  methodology	  emerged	  and	  coalesced	  over	  time,	  in	  relation	  to	  each	  other	  and	  most	  
importantly,	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  empirical	  data.	  	  
As	  noted	  in	  the	  restatement	  of	  the	  purpose	  and	  aim	  of	  the	  research	  above,	  my	  reasons	  for	  
deciding	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  resources	  of	  critical	  discourse	  analysis,	  and	  the	  work	  of	  Van	  Leeuwen	  in	  
particular,	  will	  not	  be	  restated	  here.	  It	  is	  important,	  however,	  to	  explain	  why	  I	  decided	  to	  link	  
critical	  discourse	  analysis	  to	  a	  case	  study	  of	  one	  particular	  lecturer	  in	  one	  particular	  legal	  
classroom.	  Janks,	  in	  describing	  her	  research	  method	  for	  critical	  discourse	  analysis,	  says	  that	  she	  
usually	  starts	  with	  a	  particular	  text	  and	  then,	  depending	  on	  the	  unanswered	  questions	  and	  
hypotheses	  raised	  by	  the	  somewhat	  arbitrary	  entry	  point	  of	  that	  particular	  text,	  seeks	  out	  other	  
related	  texts	  (1997:	  331).	  In	  this	  way	  she	  is	  able	  to	  move	  from	  the	  text	  to	  the	  discourse(s)	  (ibid).	  
The	  choice	  to	  rely	  on	  a	  case	  study,	  as	  Stake	  points	  out,	  is	  not	  so	  much	  a	  methodological	  choice	  
but	  a	  choice	  of	  what	  to	  study	  (2000:	  435).	  If	  I	  had	  decided	  to	  move	  from	  text	  to	  text	  in	  this	  way	  
a	  variety	  of	  options	  were	  available	  to	  me.	  I	  could	  have	  obtained	  extracts	  from	  the	  classroom	  




the	  study	  (‘Introduction	  to	  Law’),	  or	  lecturers	  teaching	  different	  courses	  in	  the	  same	  law	  school,	  
or	  lecturers	  teaching	  the	  same	  or	  different	  courses	  in	  different	  law	  schools	  across	  South	  Africa.	  
Apart	  from	  certain	  practical	  considerations,51	  my	  primary	  reason	  for	  eschewing	  these	  options	  in	  
favour	  of	  an	  approach	  on	  a	  single	  lecturer	  was	  that	  I	  wanted	  to	  be	  able	  to	  make	  a	  clear	  
empirical	  claim	  about	  the	  extent	  of	  classroom	  talk	  about	  legal	  professionals	  –	  a	  claim	  which	  
would	  not	  have	  been	  possible	  if	  I	  relied	  on	  snippets	  of	  the	  classroom	  talk	  of	  a	  number	  of	  
lecturers.	  A	  focus	  on	  one	  lecturer,	  moreover,	  was	  in	  line	  with	  the	  conceptually	  and	  
methodologically	  exploratory	  nature	  of	  my	  research:	  I	  did	  not	  seek,	  for	  instance,	  to	  stake	  a	  
claim	  on	  the	  content	  of	  the	  representations	  of	  legal	  professionals	  in	  South	  African	  law	  schools,	  
or	  even	  within	  the	  particular	  law	  school	  where	  I	  work,	  but	  rather	  sought	  to	  determine	  the	  ways	  
in	  which	  such	  representations	  are	  constituted	  by	  the	  language	  in	  use.	  I	  also	  considered	  that	  an	  
expansion	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  research	  to	  include	  more	  lecturers	  would	  entail	  a	  sacrifice	  in	  the	  
depth	  of	  the	  semantic	  and	  linguistic	  analysis,	  and	  thus	  one	  of	  my	  chief	  interests	  in	  the	  research	  
project.	  	  
A	  case	  may	  be	  simple	  or	  complex	  but	  it	  is	  always	  a	  bounded	  system	  that	  exhibits	  patterned	  
behavior	  (Stake,	  2000:	  436).	  The	  first	  responsibility	  of	  the	  researcher	  undertaking	  a	  case	  study	  
is	  to	  ‘bound’	  the	  case,	  to	  conceptualize	  the	  object	  of	  study	  (ibid:	  448).	  In	  this	  study	  the	  object	  is	  
not	  merely	  the	  lecturer,	  but	  the	  lecturer	  within	  the	  context	  of	  a	  specific	  classroom	  and	  then,	  
even	  more	  specifically,	  the	  classroom	  talk	  relating	  to	  legal	  professionals	  within	  such	  classroom.	  
This	  includes,	  where	  relevant,	  exchanges	  between	  the	  lecturer	  and	  students.	  The	  purpose	  of	  
the	  case	  study	  ‘is	  not	  to	  represent	  the	  world,	  but	  to	  represent	  the	  case’	  (ibid).	  	  As	  opposed	  to	  
an	  intrinsic	  case	  study,	  however,	  which	  is	  squarely	  focused	  on	  the	  particularities	  of	  a	  case	  
because	  of	  a	  primary	  interest	  in	  those	  particularities	  and	  not	  because	  the	  case	  represents	  other	  
cases	  or	  illustrates	  a	  particular	  trait	  or	  problem,	  an	  instrumental	  case	  study	  –	  being	  the	  form	  in	  
which	  the	  present	  study	  is	  better	  classified	  –	  facilitates	  our	  understanding	  of	  something	  else	  
(ibid:	  437).	  This	  still	  entails	  scrutinizing	  a	  case	  in	  all	  its	  depth	  (Mason,	  1996:	  92),	  but	  rather	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  If	  I	  had	  wanted	  to	  tape	  all	  the	  lectures	  of	  the	  lecturers	  in	  the	  same	  course	  in	  the	  same	  year,	  for	  instance,	  I	  would	  
have	  required	  six	  research	  assistants,	  as	  the	  lectures	  all	  took	  place	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  If	  I	  was	  going	  to	  compare	  
lecturers	  I	  felt	  it	  was	  important	  to	  compare	  them	  teaching	  the	  same	  content.	  As	  regards	  comparing	  lecturers	  at	  
different	  universities,	  I	  had	  no	  funding	  for	  the	  research	  so	  arranging	  for	  transport	  to	  and	  time	  spent	  on	  the	  campus	  




because	  this	  helps	  the	  researcher	  pursue	  a	  broader,	  external	  interest	  which,	  in	  this	  case,	  is	  the	  
development	  of	  a	  conceptual	  and	  methodological	  frame	  for	  understanding	  legal	  classroom	  talk	  
relating	  to	  legal	  professionals.	  Even	  an	  instrumental	  case	  study,	  however,	  will	  only	  weakly	  
represent	  the	  larger	  group	  of	  interest	  (ibid:	  446).	  The	  further	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  case	  study	  
researcher	  include	  selecting	  the	  ‘thematic	  lines’	  or	  issues	  (ibid:	  440)	  around	  which	  the	  case	  can	  
be	  organized	  and	  selecting	  patterns	  of	  data	  to	  develop	  these	  issues	  (ibid:	  448).	  The	  thematic	  
lines	  for	  purposes	  of	  this	  research	  are	  contained	  in	  the	  research	  questions	  articulated	  in	  
chapter	  one,	  whilst	  the	  selection	  of	  data	  is	  patterned	  on,	  firstly,	  the	  primary	  roles	  constituted	  
by	  the	  lecturer’s	  classroom	  talk,	  and	  secondly	  on	  the	  primary	  elements	  of	  the	  social	  practice	  of	  
lawyering	  as	  described	  in	  chapter	  four.	  Methodologically,	  triangulating	  key	  observations	  and	  
bases	  for	  interpretation	  in	  a	  case	  study	  is	  important	  (ibid;	  Cohen	  &	  Manion,	  1994:	  241)	  as	  is	  
seeking	  emic	  meanings	  held	  by	  the	  subjects	  of	  the	  case	  (Stake,	  2000:	  441).	  It	  is	  to	  such,	  and	  
other,	  methodological	  issues	  that	  I	  now	  turn.	  	  
5.	   METHODOLOGICAL	  ISSUES	  
In	  this	  final	  section	  of	  the	  chapter	  I	  consider	  selection	  of	  the	  case,	  access	  to	  the	  site	  of	  
the	  research	  and	  informed	  consent,	  collection	  of	  the	  data,	  steps	  in	  data	  analysis	  and	  
criteria	  for	  evaluating	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  research.	  	  
5.1	   Selection	  of	  the	  case	  	  
Instrumental	  case	  studies	  require	  the	  researcher	  to	  choose	  the	  case;	  i.e.	  to	  undertake	  
purposive	  sampling	  (Stake,	  2000:	  446).	  This	  is	  a	  type	  of	  non-­‐probability	  sampling	  in	  which	  the	  
researcher	  selects	  the	  objects	  of	  observation	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  his	  or	  her	  own	  judgment	  about	  
which	  ones	  will	  be	  the	  most	  useful	  or	  representative	  (Babbie,	  2004:	  183).	  As	  noted	  above	  
instrumental	  case	  studies	  are	  only	  weakly	  representative	  of	  a	  broader	  population.	  The	  
‘epistemological	  opportunity’	  obtained	  from	  selecting	  a	  case	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  representativeness	  
alone	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  quite	  small	  (Stake,	  2000:	  446).	  For	  this	  reason,	  Stake	  suggests	  that	  
‘potential	  for	  learning’	  is	  sometimes	  a	  superior	  criterion	  to	  representativeness	  –	  to	  select	  that	  
case	  from	  which	  we	  feel	  we	  can	  learn	  the	  most	  (ibid).	  This	  was	  indeed	  an	  important	  




The	  first	  decision	  involved	  selection	  of	  the	  course	  ‘Introduction	  to	  Law’	  as	  the	  unit	  of	  study	  in	  
which	  to	  conduct	  the	  research.	  This	  is	  a	  semester-­‐long	  compulsory	  course	  in	  both	  the	  
undergraduate	  and	  post-­‐graduate	  LL.B	  programmes	  at	  the	  tertiary	  institution	  where	  the	  study	  
was	  conducted.52	  In	  both	  cases	  it	  is	  offered	  in	  the	  students’	  first	  year	  of	  studying	  law.	  From	  my	  
own	  experience	  of	  teaching	  the	  course	  (three	  or	  four	  times	  before	  I	  started	  the	  research),	  I	  
knew	  that	  students	  come	  to	  it	  with	  an	  enthusiasm	  and	  interest	  in	  all	  things	  relating	  to	  law	  
which	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  dampened	  by	  the	  grind	  of	  parsing	  and	  assimilating	  endless	  legal	  
authorities.	  The	  content	  of	  this	  course,	  more	  so	  than	  any	  other	  one,	  arguably	  created	  a	  space	  
for	  talk	  about	  legal	  professionals,	  not	  least	  because	  a	  section	  of	  the	  curriculum	  was	  devoted	  to	  
‘The	  Legal	  Profession’	  (the	  lecturer	  devoted	  about	  2	  lectures	  to	  this	  particular	  topic	  at	  the	  end	  
of	  the	  lecture	  series).	  Although	  the	  students	  may	  already	  have	  preconceived	  ideas	  as	  to	  the	  
kinds	  of	  people	  lawyers	  are	  (gained,	  for	  instance,	  from	  the	  media	  or	  through	  family/friends	  they	  
know	  who	  are	  lawyers),	  they	  are	  ‘fresh’	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  determining	  the	  socializing	  
effect	  of	  law	  school.	  The	  semester	  length	  of	  the	  course	  also	  enabled	  me	  to	  work	  with	  a	  
reasonably	  (and	  not	  impossibly)	  large	  set	  of	  transcriptions.	  Three	  lectures	  of	  45	  minutes	  each	  
(one	  ‘single’	  lecture	  on	  a	  Tuesday	  and	  one	  ‘double’	  on	  a	  Thursday)	  were	  presented	  each	  week	  
(although	  the	  lecturer	  sometimes	  shortened	  the	  double	  lecture	  from	  an	  hour	  and	  a	  half	  to	  an	  
hour,	  in	  which	  case	  I	  worked	  with	  the	  session	  as	  a	  single	  lecture	  –	  see	  lecture	  22	  for	  instance).	  I	  
considered	  it	  necessary,	  for	  purposes	  of	  making	  a	  claim	  regarding	  the	  extent	  of	  talk	  about	  legal	  
professionals	  within	  the	  classroom,	  to	  observe	  and	  video-­‐record	  all	  22	  lectures	  constituting	  the	  
series.	  	  
The	  second	  decision	  involved	  the	  selection	  of	  the	  lecturer	  teaching	  the	  course.	  Every	  year,	  the	  
‘Introduction	  to	  Law’	  class	  comprises	  about	  600	  students	  who	  are	  then	  divided	  into	  smaller	  
classes.	  In	  2008	  there	  were	  six	  undergraduate	  classes	  (of	  approximately	  100	  students	  each)	  and	  
one	  postgraduate	  class	  (of	  approximately	  15	  –	  20	  students).	  The	  allocation	  of	  lecturers	  to	  these	  
courses	  is	  an	  administrative	  task	  undertaken	  by	  the	  Timetabling	  and	  Workload	  Committee	  –	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52	  The	  undergraduate	  LL.B	  programme	  at	  the	  institution	  where	  the	  study	  was	  conducted	  is	  a	  four-­‐year	  degree	  
ordinarily	  taken	  by	  students	  straight	  out	  of	  secondary	  education.	  The	  post-­‐graduate	  LL.B	  is	  a	  two-­‐	  or	  three-­‐year	  
degree	  (depending	  if	  there	  has	  been	  a	  law	  major),	  taken	  by	  students	  who	  already	  have	  a	  3-­‐year	  university	  degree.	  





one	  in	  which	  I	  have	  no	  involvement	  in	  or	  power	  over	  whatsoever.	  I	  was	  thus	  required	  to	  make	  
my	  selection	  from	  those	  lecturers	  who	  had	  been	  allocated	  to,	  and	  were	  willing	  to	  teach	  the	  
course.	  My	  primary	  criterion	  in	  making	  the	  selection	  was	  that	  the	  subject	  had	  to	  have	  had	  some	  
practical	  experience	  in	  the	  legal	  professional	  world,	  to	  have	  known	  that	  world,	  as	  it	  were,	  from	  
the	  inside.	  This	  answered	  to	  my	  feelings	  of	  incompleteness	  as	  a	  lecturer	  in	  having	  never	  
functioned	  within	  the	  ordinary	  realms	  of	  the	  legal	  professional	  world	  myself	  and	  hence	  my	  
curiosity	  to	  see	  how	  a	  person	  who	  had	  been	  an	  insider	  taught	  the	  course	  differently.	  It	  also,	  I	  
believe,	  afforded	  some	  authenticity	  to	  the	  representations	  made	  by	  the	  lecturer.53	  Given	  this	  
criterion	  there	  was	  really	  only	  one	  candidate	  for	  the	  research	  from	  the	  group	  of	  allocated	  
lecturers	  –	  a	  middle-­‐aged	  white	  male	  who	  has	  taught	  at	  the	  institution	  for	  a	  number	  of	  years	  
but	  who,	  prior	  to	  that,	  had	  done	  his	  articles	  of	  clerkship	  as	  an	  attorney,	  worked	  as	  a	  public	  
prosecutor	  and	  then	  a	  magistrate	  for	  a	  number	  of	  years,	  and	  then	  on	  a	  Justice-­‐College54	  project	  
raising	  awareness	  of	  the	  new	  Constitution	  amongst	  magistrates	  and	  judges	  (though	  he	  noted	  
that	  there	  were	  ‘many	  other	  little	  detours	  and	  intermezzos	  and	  dramas	  and	  the	  other	  things’	  
inbetween	  (I1:60:271	  –	  2)55).	  He	  is,	  moreover,	  married	  to	  a	  very	  successful	  currently	  practicing	  
attorney	  (identified	  in	  the	  transcripts	  as	  ‘Isobel’),	  and	  regularly	  socializes	  with	  other	  attorneys,	  
advocates	  and	  judges.	  He	  therefore	  not	  only	  had	  a	  background	  in	  legal	  practice,	  but	  a	  rich	  and	  
diverse	  background	  that	  spanned	  both	  the	  ‘private’	  and	  ‘public’56	  divides	  of	  the	  profession.	  It	  is	  
nevertheless	  a	  limitation	  of	  the	  study	  that	  his	  experience	  was	  limited	  to	  these	  particular	  forms	  
of	  practice	  (for	  instance,	  he	  has	  had	  no	  experience	  of	  legal	  consulting	  work	  or	  of	  work	  in	  
alternative	  forms	  of	  dispute	  resolution).	  
Notwithstanding	  his	  rich	  experience	  in	  the	  legal	  profession,	  my	  subject’s	  stance	  toward	  it	  and	  
to	  legal	  professionals	  more	  generally,	  as	  ascertained	  in	  the	  interviews	  I	  conducted	  with	  him,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  The	  question	  of	  authenticity	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  my	  subject	  having	  been	  a	  practising	  legal	  professional	  at	  some	  point	  
in	  his	  career	  seemed	  to	  be	  the	  most	  significant	  factor	  grounding	  the	  validity	  of	  my	  research	  when	  I	  presented	  to	  a	  
group	  of	  South	  African	  legal	  academics	  at	  the	  South	  African	  Law	  Teachers’	  Association	  held	  in	  January	  2011	  in	  
Stellenbosh.	  The	  very	  first	  question	  asked	  was	  whether	  my	  subject	  had	  been	  ‘in	  practice’.	  
54	  The	  Justice	  College	  is	  an	  institution	  attached	  to	  the	  national	  Department	  of	  Justice,	  which	  primarily	  undertakes	  
the	  training	  of	  public	  prosecutors	  and,	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent	  magistrates.	  It	  is	  located	  in	  Pretoria,	  South	  Africa.	  	  	  
55	  The	  referencing	  system	  which	  I	  utilized	  for	  both	  the	  transcribed	  lectures	  and	  for	  the	  interviews	  conducted	  with	  
the	  subject	  is	  explained	  in	  section	  3.5.3	  below.	  	  
56	  The	  construction	  of	  the	  legal	  profession	  in	  terms	  of	  public	  and	  private	  spheres	  is	  discussed	  more	  extensively	  in	  




could	  best	  be	  described	  as	  ambiguous,	  if	  not	  cynical.	  In	  describing	  his	  decision	  to	  study	  law,	  for	  
instance,	  he	  stated:	  ‘I	  started	  off	  in	  law	  …	  I	  wouldn’t	  like	  to	  call	  it	  an	  accident	  because	  that	  
sounds	  terrible	  but	  because	  it	  was	  the	  natural	  continuation	  of	  what	  I	  had	  been	  doing.	  	  There	  
was	  nothing	  better	  to	  do’	  (I1:61:274-­‐77).	  Two	  factors	  appeared	  to	  push	  him	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  
legal	  studies.	  At	  school	  he	  had	  some	  success	  as	  an	  orator,	  though	  he	  had	  always	  been	  
overshadowed	  by	  a	  good	  friend	  who	  had	  won	  the	  National	  Orator’s	  competition	  and	  wanted	  to	  
study	  law.	  Because	  his	  friend	  ‘had	  this	  vision	  of	  becoming	  an	  orator	  and	  a	  lawyer	  …	  that	  was	  
peer	  pressure’	  (I1:64:312–3).	  	  His	  mother	  was	  a	  lawyer	  and	  urged	  him	  to	  ‘go	  do	  law	  …You’re	  a	  
good	  orator	  and	  you	  are	  good	  with	  words,	  do	  law’	  (I1:67:329	  –	  30).	  He	  admitted,	  however,	  that	  
he	  would	  have	  liked	  to	  study	  architecture	  in	  which	  he	  had	  a	  ‘keen	  interest’	  (I:66:325).57	  	  But	  his	  
businessman	  father	  was	  dead	  against	  the	  idea,	  telling	  his	  son	  ‘[p]lease,	  you	  know,	  there	  is	  no	  
work	  for	  architects.	  	  You	  are	  not	  going	  to	  make	  a	  living.	  	  Just	  forget	  about	  it.	  	  I	  am	  not	  going	  to	  
pay	  for	  you	  to	  waste	  your	  money	  and	  not	  be	  able	  to	  make	  money’	  (I1:66:320–3).	  All	  of	  these	  
factors	  therefore,	  together	  with	  a	  certain	  lack	  of	  career	  guidance	  (see	  I1:62),	  prompted	  the	  
lecturer	  to	  pursue	  his	  career	  in	  law.	  There	  were	  no	  ‘lofty	  ideals’	  at	  the	  beginning,	  more	  of	  an	  
‘absence	  of	  something	  else’	  that	  he	  could	  study	  (I1:68:331,	  337).	  	  
His	  ambiguity	  extended	  to	  his	  current	  role	  as	  an	  academic	  lawyer.	  ‘I	  am	  not	  a	  very	  good	  
academic	  lawyer	  …	  I	  am	  not	  a	  good	  true	  blue	  lawyer’,	  he	  declared	  (I1:69:340–2).	  This	  dis-­‐
identification	  with	  the	  role	  seemed	  to	  stem	  both	  from	  a	  sense	  of	  ennui	  in	  legal	  matters,	  as	  well	  
as	  his	  perception	  of	  lacking	  the	  ‘legal	  killing	  instinct’.	  He	  said,	  for	  example:	  ‘You	  know,	  I	  sit	  in	  
the	  tearoom	  and	  I	  listen	  to	  my	  colleagues	  argue	  a	  point	  and	  if	  I	  don’t	  fall	  asleep	  which	  often	  
happens	  because	  it’s	  so	  boring,	  you	  know	  …	  I	  don’t	  understand	  what	  they	  are	  arguing	  about.	  	  I	  
can’t	  see	  the	  point	  and	  I	  don’t,	  I	  haven’t	  got	  that	  legal	  killing	  instinct’	  (I1:70:343–6).	  He	  
maintained,	  instead,	  that	  he	  should	  have	  studied	  history	  which	  was	  his	  ‘passion’	  (I1:69:340).58	  
His	  characterization	  of	  the	  key	  personal	  characteristic	  required	  of	  being	  a	  lawyer	  as	  the	  ‘legal	  
killing	  instinct’,	  together	  with	  his	  characterization	  of	  the	  legal	  profession	  more	  generally	  as	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  This	  interest	  came	  through	  at	  various	  points	  in	  the	  series	  of	  lectures	  when,	  for	  instance,	  the	  lecturer	  would	  
describe	  the	  architecture	  and	  design	  of	  various	  court	  buildings	  to	  the	  students.	  	  
58	  This	  interest,	  and	  particularly	  the	  lecturer’s	  interest	  in	  Roman	  legal	  history,	  also	  came	  to	  the	  fore	  at	  numerous	  




‘cut-­‐throat	  business’,	  a	  ‘dog-­‐eats-­‐dog	  profession’	  (I1:75:375)	  pointed	  to	  him	  being	  an	  
illustrative	  case	  for	  purposes	  of	  the	  research	  (Stake,	  2000:	  436),	  i.e.	  one	  who	  was	  likely	  to	  
exemplify	  the	  kinds	  of	  claims	  made	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  teaching	  of	  legal	  ethics	  in	  classroom	  
talk.	  I	  regarded	  this	  as	  a	  positive	  attribute	  as	  it	  would	  assist	  me	  in	  identifying	  the	  semantic	  and	  
linguistic	  patterns	  that	  constituted	  such	  talk.	  It	  is,	  however,	  also	  a	  limitation	  of	  the	  study	  in	  that	  
the	  discursive	  basis	  of	  a	  non-­‐cynical	  attitude	  towards	  the	  lega	  profession	  is	  not	  investigated	  
through	  the	  choice	  of	  this	  particular	  subject.	  
Rogers	  et	  al.,	  in	  their	  description	  of	  the	  CDA	  tradition,	  note	  that	  scholars	  working	  within	  this	  
fold	  often	  distinguish	  their	  work	  from	  other	  ‘non-­‐critical’	  forms	  of	  discourse	  analysis	  by	  arguing	  
that	  their	  analyses	  move	  beyond	  description	  and	  interpretation	  of	  the	  role	  of	  language	  in	  the	  
social	  world	  toward	  explaining	  why	  and	  how	  language	  does	  the	  work	  that	  it	  does	  (2005:	  368).	  
This	  corresponds	  with	  Fairclough’s	  third	  tier	  of	  analysis	  outlined	  in	  chapter	  two.	  	  
5.2	   Access	  to	  the	  site	  of	  research	  and	  informed	  consent	  	  
The	  ethics	  of	  social	  research	  necessitates	  obtaining	  the	  consent	  and	  co-­‐operation	  of	  the	  
subjects	  who	  are	  going	  to	  assist	  in	  the	  investigations	  and	  of	  significant	  others	  in	  the	  institutions	  
or	  organizations	  providing	  the	  research	  facilities	  (Cohen	  &	  Manion,	  1994:	  349).	  	  As	  Stake	  notes,	  
‘[q]ualitative	  researchers	  are	  guests	  in	  the	  private	  spaces	  of	  the	  world’	  (2000:	  447).	  Although	  it	  
was	  not	  problematic	  for	  me	  to	  obtain	  access	  to	  the	  research	  site	  as	  it	  was	  conducted	  at	  the	  
institution	  where	  I	  am	  employed	  (though	  unwise,	  as	  Cohen	  &	  Manion	  caution,	  to	  take	  consent	  
and	  co-­‐operation	  for	  granted,	  1994:	  355),	  it	  was	  necessary	  for	  me	  to	  firstly	  obtain	  consent	  
clearance	  from	  the	  university	  ethics	  committee	  for	  non-­‐medical	  research.	  To	  this	  end	  I	  
submitted	  a	  detailed	  proposal	  setting	  out	  the	  substance	  of	  the	  proposed	  research	  together	  with	  
annexures	  that	  included	  a	  participant	  information	  sheet,	  informed	  consent	  form,	  and	  
procedure	  for	  obtaining	  student	  consent.	  The	  ethics	  committee	  considered	  the	  proposal	  and	  
granted	  clearance	  on	  17	  July	  2006	  (see	  Appendix	  2A).	  The	  participant	  information	  sheet	  	  
describing	  the	  object	  and	  nature	  of	  the	  proposed	  research,	  the	  methodology	  and	  data	  
collection	  methods	  to	  be	  employed,	  and	  measures	  to	  ensure	  the	  confidentiality	  of	  the	  subject’s	  




collection	  methods	  included	  observing,	  video-­‐taping	  and	  transcribing	  the	  subject’s	  lectures	  in	  
the	  selected	  course	  as	  well	  as	  interviewing	  the	  subject	  and	  audio-­‐taping	  and	  subsequently	  
transcribing	  the	  interviews.	  Measures	  to	  ensure	  the	  confidentiality	  of	  the	  research	  and	  to	  
demonstrate	  respect	  for	  the	  subject	  included	  the	  opportunity	  for	  the	  research	  subject	  to	  check	  
the	  interview	  and	  lecture	  transcripts	  and	  to	  review	  drafts	  of	  the	  subsequent	  analysis	  and	  
discussion.	  I	  also	  guaranteed	  that	  the	  subject’s	  identity	  would	  not	  be	  disclosed	  in	  the	  interview	  
or	  lecture	  transcripts	  or	  at	  any	  place	  in	  the	  draft	  or	  final	  PhD	  reports,	  offered	  to	  return	  the	  audi-­‐	  
and	  video	  files	  generated	  during	  the	  course	  of	  the	  research	  and	  provided	  an	  assurance	  that	  
none	  of	  the	  data	  generated	  by	  the	  research	  would	  in	  any	  way	  be	  used	  to	  influence	  the	  subject’s	  
status	  at	  the	  institution	  concerned.	  After	  discussing	  the	  contents	  of	  the	  participant	  information	  
sheet	  and	  possible	  negative	  effects	  on	  the	  lecturer’s	  teaching,	  the	  selected	  lecturer	  signed	  the	  
informed	  consent	  form	  on	  15	  January	  2008,	  consenting	  to	  all	  the	  data	  collection	  methods	  
proposed	  without	  imposing	  any	  conditions	  (see	  Appendix	  2B).59	  	  
It	  was	  not	  only	  necessary	  to	  obtain	  the	  informed	  consent	  of	  the	  lecturer	  in	  the	  selected	  course,	  
but	  also	  of	  the	  students	  taking	  the	  course	  in	  the	  particular	  year	  in	  which	  I	  conducted	  the	  data	  
collection.	  Even	  though	  the	  focus	  of	  my	  research	  was	  the	  law	  lecturer	  and	  not	  the	  students,	  I	  
nevertheless	  considered	  asking	  the	  students	  to	  sign	  written	  consent	  forms	  as	  well.	  Students	  
have	  a	  right	  to	  a	  learning	  environment	  that	  is	  not	  disruptive	  and	  that	  respects	  their	  privacy	  as	  
individuals.	  The	  students	  concerned	  must	  therefore	  permit	  any	  unfamiliar	  intrusion	  into	  that	  
environment.	  Prior	  to	  obtaining	  ethical	  clearance,	  I	  sought	  the	  advice	  of	  the	  Head	  of	  School	  at	  
the	  time	  as	  well	  as	  a	  colleague	  who	  was	  a	  member	  of	  the	  university	  ethics	  committee	  for	  non-­‐
medical	  research	  who	  were	  both	  of	  the	  opinion	  that,	  given	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  research,	  it	  was	  not	  
necessary	  to	  obtain	  the	  students’	  written	  consent.	  	  The	  following	  course	  of	  action	  was	  
therefore	  approved	  as	  part	  of	  the	  ethical	  clearance	  and	  carried	  out	  by	  myself	  in	  February	  2008	  
when	  the	  lectures	  commenced:	  At	  the	  first	  lecture	  the	  lecturer	  introduced	  me	  to	  the	  class	  and	  
allowed	  me	  time	  to	  explain	  the	  nature	  and	  object	  of	  the	  research,	  the	  fact	  that	  I	  would	  be	  
sitting	  in	  the	  class	  for	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  semester	  as	  a	  non-­‐participant	  observer,	  and	  that	  I	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  copy	  of	  the	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would	  be	  video-­‐recording	  the	  class	  for	  transcription	  and	  analysis	  at	  a	  later	  stage.60	  Students	  
were	  assured	  that	  they	  would	  in	  no	  way	  be	  identified	  in	  the	  video	  transcripts	  and	  that	  nothing	  
that	  appeared	  in	  the	  video	  could	  or	  would	  be	  used	  against	  them	  in	  any	  decision	  taken	  by	  the	  
lecturer	  concerned	  or	  any	  other	  member	  of	  staff	  of	  the	  law	  school.	  They	  were	  also	  be	  assured	  
that	  the	  video	  files	  would	  not	  be	  made	  available	  to	  outsiders.	  Students	  were	  invited	  to	  
comment	  on	  whether	  they	  felt	  the	  research	  process	  would	  be	  intrusive	  and	  how	  this	  might	  be	  
minimized.	  Whilst	  arrangements	  could	  have	  been	  made	  to	  accommodate	  students	  who	  
objected	  to	  the	  research	  being	  conducted	  in	  their	  learning	  space,	  they	  made	  no	  comments	  or	  
objections	  in	  the	  first	  introductory	  lecture	  or	  at	  any	  time	  thereafter.	  	  
5.3	   Data	  collection	  and	  transcription	  	  
In	  case	  studies	  it	  is	  appropriate	  to	  use	  triangulation,	  which	  Cohen	  and	  Manion	  define	  as	  ‘the	  
use	  of	  two	  or	  more	  methods	  of	  data	  collection	  in	  a	  study	  of	  some	  aspect	  of	  human	  behavior’	  
(1994:	  233,	  241).	  Triangulation	  is	  commonly	  assumed	  to	  enhance	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  study	  
(Maxwell,	  1996:	  88,	  though	  see	  my	  reference	  in	  section	  5.5	  below	  to	  Janesick’s	  critique	  of	  the	  
use	  of	  validity,	  generalizability	  and	  reliability	  to	  evaluate	  qualitative	  research).	  A	  researcher	  
contemplating	  the	  use	  of	  triangulation	  is	  confronted	  with	  three	  broad	  questions:	  ‘Which	  
methods	  are	  to	  be	  selected?’	  ‘How	  are	  they	  to	  be	  combined?’	  And	  ‘How	  are	  the	  data	  to	  be	  
used?’	  (ibid:	  241–2).	  
In	  my	  initial	  research	  design	  I	  sought	  to	  rely	  on	  two	  methods	  of	  data	  collection:	  Observation	  
and	  video-­‐recording	  of	  the	  lectures	  in	  the	  selected	  course	  over	  a	  period	  of	  six	  months,	  and	  
interviewing	  of	  the	  lecturer.	  In	  both	  cases	  I	  envisaged	  producing	  detailed	  textual	  transcriptions	  
containing	  everything	  that	  had	  been	  said	  either	  in	  the	  lecture	  or	  the	  interview.	  These	  methods	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  Unfortunately,	  as	  events	  unfolded	  this	  only	  occurred	  at	  the	  end,	  and	  not	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  first	  lecture	  in	  
the	  course.	  I	  had	  planned	  to	  commence	  observing	  and	  recording	  the	  lectures	  in	  February	  2008	  but	  hit	  a	  snag	  when	  
my	  ten-­‐month	  old	  son	  required	  major	  reparative	  open-­‐heart	  surgery	  which	  took	  place	  on	  1	  February	  2008.	  The	  
lecture	  times	  clashed	  with	  the	  limited	  visiting	  times	  in	  the	  intensive	  care	  unit	  (ICU).	  Not	  wishing	  to	  delay	  my	  data	  
collection	  by	  a	  year	  I	  engaged	  the	  assistance	  of	  a	  postgraduate	  student	  who	  recorded	  the	  lectures	  for	  me	  during	  
the	  month	  of	  February.	  On	  the	  occasion	  of	  the	  first	  lecture,	  which	  took	  place	  on	  12	  February,	  very	  soon	  after	  the	  
operation,	  I	  rushed	  from	  	  the	  hospital	  to	  be	  able	  to	  present	  the	  object	  and	  nature	  of	  the	  research	  to	  the	  students	  
and	  to	  obtain	  their	  consent	  before	  the	  lecture	  ended.	  This	  was	  not	  ideal	  but	  the	  best	  I	  could	  achieve	  in	  what	  were	  
extremely	  trying	  circumstances.	  I	  took	  over	  the	  recording	  of	  the	  lectures	  in	  March,	  when	  my	  son	  was	  released	  




were	  selected	  because	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  research	  process	  I	  was	  also	  toying	  with	  the	  idea	  
of	  exploring	  how	  lecturers	  themselves	  –	  rather	  than	  their	  representations	  of	  the	  professional	  
world	  –	  constituted	  models	  for	  the	  identity	  formation	  of	  students.	  In	  addition	  to	  studying	  their	  
representations	  in	  the	  classroom,	  I	  had	  thought	  to	  explore	  the	  extent	  of	  their	  own	  professional	  
development	  in	  the	  interview	  in	  order	  to	  examine,	  in	  effect,	  how	  their	  own	  professional	  
identity	  formation	  structured	  their	  presentation	  of	  learning	  resources	  in	  the	  classroom.	  As	  I	  
proceeded	  with	  the	  study	  I	  realized	  this	  constituted	  a	  distinct	  research	  focus	  that	  could	  easily	  
ground	  another	  PhD	  and	  chose	  instead	  to	  focus	  only	  on	  the	  representation	  of	  legal	  
professionals	  in	  the	  lecturer’s	  classroom	  talk	  (which	  could	  and	  in	  fact	  did	  involve	  him	  referring	  
to	  himself	  in	  professional	  roles,	  but	  encompassed	  much	  more	  than	  that).	  	  
As	  a	  result,	  the	  primary	  form	  of	  data	  collection	  upon	  which	  I	  relied	  was	  the	  video-­‐recordings	  
and	  observations	  of	  the	  entire	  series	  of	  lectures	  in	  the	  selected	  course.	  Concern	  relating	  to	  the	  
relationship	  between	  reliance	  on	  this	  source	  of	  data	  alone	  and	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  data	  collection	  
may	  be	  alleviated	  by	  having	  regard	  to	  Ensor	  and	  Hoadley’s	  (2004)	  work	  on	  the	  relationship	  
between	  classroom	  observation	  and	  trustworthy	  claims	  in	  pedagogy.	  They	  distinguish	  between	  
inductive	  approaches	  (often	  described	  as	  classroom	  ethnography)	  that	  call	  for	  the	  fullest	  
possible	  records	  of	  classroom	  life	  from	  which	  theoretical	  frameworks	  can	  be	  deductively	  
derived.	  Such	  approaches	  are	  usually	  associated	  with	  exploratory,	  small-­‐scale	  studies	  and	  
involve	  the	  use	  of	  open	  instruments	  such	  as	  field	  notes,	  audio-­‐	  or	  video-­‐recordings	  or	  a	  
combination	  thereof	  (ibid:	  81–2).	  Deductive	  approaches	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  operate	  deductively	  
from	  theory	  to	  the	  development	  of	  categories	  and	  sub-­‐categories	  that	  then	  constitute	  a	  lens	  to	  
develop	  classroom	  observation	  instruments	  that	  sample	  particular	  aspects	  of	  classroom	  life.	  
The	  data	  set	  produced	  thus	  tends	  to	  be	  discrete	  rather	  than	  continuous	  (ibid:	  82–3).	  The	  
distinction	  between	  the	  two	  approaches	  is	  not	  watertight.	  For	  instance,	  theory	  also	  shapes	  the	  
collection	  of	  continuous	  data,	  guiding	  what	  the	  researcher	  foregrounds	  and	  backgrounds	  –	  as	  in	  
this	  research	  where	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  video-­‐recordings	  is	  most	  often	  on	  the	  lecturer	  and	  not	  on	  
the	  students.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  point	  to	  be	  underlined	  is	  that	  validity	  in	  data	  collection	  is	  more	  
of	  an	  issue	  in	  the	  deductive	  approach	  and	  the	  use	  of	  closed	  schedules	  because	  these	  involve	  a	  




instruments,	  sampling	  and	  the	  validity	  thereof	  arises	  in	  what	  one	  decides	  to	  focus	  upon	  but	  
emerges	  as	  more	  of	  an	  issue	  in	  the	  process	  of	  analysis	  where	  the	  trustworthiness	  of	  the	  
researcher’s	  claims	  are	  linked	  to	  how	  exhaustively	  she	  treats	  the	  collected	  data	  sets	  (ibid:	  83).	  
As	  such,	  reliance	  on	  the	  transcribed	  video-­‐recordings	  and	  related	  classroom	  observations	  as	  the	  
main	  source	  of	  data	  is	  not	  a	  fatal	  validity	  threat	  to	  the	  study,	  provided	  that	  I	  account	  for	  my	  
process	  of	  analysis	  of	  such	  texts	  in	  as	  rigorous	  a	  manner	  as	  possible.	  	  
Because	  I	  wished	  to	  reproduce	  an	  as	  accurate-­‐as-­‐possible	  textual	  account	  of	  the	  lectures	  and	  
the	  interviews	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  select	  a	  particular	  method	  of	  recording.	  For	  the	  lectures	  I	  
decided	  to	  obtain	  audio-­‐visual	  material	  by	  taping	  each	  lecture	  with	  a	  small	  camcorder.	  In	  this	  
way	  I	  hoped	  to	  capture	  as	  much	  detail	  of	  the	  lecture	  as	  possible	  –	  the	  lecturer’s	  positioning	  in	  
relation	  to	  the	  class,	  his	  body	  language,	  the	  students	  with	  whom	  he	  was	  interacting	  (but	  not	  the	  
reactions	  of	  the	  students	  when	  he	  was	  not	  interacting	  with	  them),	  and	  so	  on.	  	  I	  discussed	  the	  
use	  of	  this	  method	  with	  the	  research	  subject	  prior	  to	  commencing	  the	  research	  and	  he	  was	  of	  
the	  opinion	  that	  whilst	  he	  could	  be	  conscious	  of	  the	  fact	  of	  being	  video-­‐taped	  at	  first,	  after	  a	  
while	  he	  would	  forget	  about	  it.	  My	  presence	  in	  the	  lectures	  was	  of	  the	  non-­‐participant	  variety	  
(ibid:	  293)	  and	  I	  tried	  to	  position	  myself	  in	  the	  physical	  space	  of	  the	  classroom	  in	  the	  least	  
conspicuous	  manner	  possible.	  At	  times	  it	  was	  apparent	  that	  the	  lecturer	  remembered	  the	  
presence	  of	  the	  camcorder	  in	  the	  lecture.	  For	  example,	  in	  advising	  the	  students	  to	  take	  time	  in	  
reading	  their	  instructions	  from	  clients	  he	  states	  ‘[w]e	  are	  not	  working	  with	  the	  lives	  of	  other	  
people,	  you	  are	  not	  a	  paediatrician	  or	  a	  cardiac	  surgeon,	  nobody’s	  going	  to	  die,	  I’ve	  never	  seen	  
anybody	  die	  in	  a	  law	  office’	  L16:5:24–5.	  His	  references	  to	  ‘paediatrician’	  and	  ‘cardiac	  surgeon’	  
may	  have	  been	  included	  to	  index	  an	  awareness	  of	  my	  own	  engagement	  with	  these	  
professionals	  a	  few	  months	  prior	  (see	  note	  59	  above)	  and	  thus	  point	  to	  his	  awareness	  of	  my	  
presence	  in	  the	  class.	  Such	  instances,	  however,	  were	  very	  rare.	  For	  the	  interviews,	  I	  considered	  
it	  sufficient	  to	  use	  a	  digital	  dictaphone	  as	  this	  adequately	  captured	  the	  lecturer’s	  talk	  as	  well	  as	  
the	  tone	  and	  inflection	  with	  which	  he	  said	  particular	  things.	  	  
The	  data	  collection	  period	  for	  the	  lectures	  extended	  from	  12	  February	  till	  17	  April	  2008	  and	  
resulted	  in	  22	  transcripts	  totaling	  10	  618	  lines	  of	  text.	  The	  complete	  lecture	  transcripts	  are	  




is	  outlined	  in	  Appendix	  3.	  Miles	  and	  Huberman	  note	  that	  any	  transcription	  process	  is	  ‘fraught	  
with	  slippage’	  depending	  on	  the	  knowledgeability,	  skill	  and	  care	  of	  the	  transcribing	  person	  
(1994:	  51).	  Because	  I	  wanted	  the	  lecture	  transcripts	  to	  reflect	  as	  much	  detail	  as	  possible	  
(including	  all	  the	  ‘uhs’,	  ‘ers’,	  mispronounciations	  and	  so	  on,	  but	  also	  certain	  non-­‐textual	  data	  
such	  as	  tone,	  emphasis,	  body	  language,	  positioning)	  I	  undertook	  to	  transcribe	  the	  lecture	  
material	  myself.	  I	  was	  concerned	  that	  a	  professional	  transcriber	  would	  not	  take	  sufficient	  care	  
in	  recording	  these	  other	  aspects	  and,	  additionally,	  all	  of	  the	  service	  providers	  I	  contacted	  
worked	  only	  with	  audio	  and	  not	  audiovisual	  files.	  Initially	  my	  supervisors	  and	  I	  experimented	  
with	  transcribing	  extracts	  from	  the	  lectures.	  My	  modus	  operandi	  thus	  consisted	  in	  viewing	  the	  
audiovisual	  file	  of	  the	  lecturer	  as	  soon	  as	  possible	  after	  it	  had	  occurred,	  using	  a	  table	  to	  chunk	  
the	  video	  into	  themes	  which	  I	  was	  able	  to	  identify	  by	  their	  time	  and	  duration,	  and	  then	  
evaluating	  whether	  each	  chunk	  was	  worthy	  of	  transcribing	  as	  an	  extract.	  After	  proceeding	  in	  
this	  way	  for	  a	  few	  of	  the	  lectures	  I	  became	  concerned	  that	  this	  methodology	  would	  cause	  me	  to	  
lose	  some	  of	  the	  subtlety	  of	  talk	  about	  legal	  professionals	  in	  the	  classroom,	  which	  was	  often	  
interspersed	  among	  discussion	  on	  other	  topics.	  I	  therefore	  decided	  to	  transcribe	  the	  lectures	  in	  
their	  entirety,	  which	  thus	  also	  enabled	  me	  to	  gain	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  proportion	  of	  classroom	  talk	  
devoted	  to	  legal	  professionals.	  The	  transcription	  process	  took	  me	  a	  very	  long	  time,	  but	  I	  was	  
able	  to	  proceed	  with	  this	  task	  during	  the	  year	  in	  which	  I	  put	  the	  degree	  in	  abeyance	  (2009).	  The	  
great	  advantage	  derived	  from	  this	  labour	  was	  an	  intimate	  familiarity	  with	  the	  content	  of	  the	  
lecture	  data.	  	  	  
The	  interview	  took	  place	  over	  six	  sessions	  of	  an	  hour	  to	  an	  hour	  and	  a	  half	  each	  during	  June	  
2008	  and	  resulted	  in	  six	  transcripts	  totaling	  4	  110	  lines	  of	  text.	  The	  complete	  interview	  
transcripts	  are	  saved	  on	  the	  CD-­‐ROM	  accompanying	  this	  thesis.	  The	  interview	  that	  I	  conducted	  
with	  the	  subject	  was	  in-­‐depth	  and	  loosely-­‐structured	  in	  line	  with	  what	  Mason	  identifies	  as	  
features	  of	  ‘qualitative	  interviewing’;	  i.e.	  a	  relatively	  informal	  style;	  the	  assumption	  that	  data	  
are	  generated	  by	  the	  interaction;	  and	  a	  thematic,	  topic-­‐centered	  and	  narrative	  approach	  (1996:	  
38).	  	  For	  purposes	  of	  preparing	  for	  the	  interview,	  I	  drew	  up	  a	  semi-­‐structured	  interview	  
schedule	  (contained	  with	  the	  interviews	  on	  the	  accompanying	  CD-­‐ROM)	  that	  I	  provided	  to	  the	  




areas,	  namely	  the	  lecturer’s	  own	  conception	  of	  legal	  professional	  identity,	  his	  identification	  
with	  that	  model	  and	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  his	  own	  sense	  of	  professional	  identity	  had	  formed,	  
and	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  he	  sought	  to	  impart	  legal	  professional	  identity	  in	  the	  classroom.	  While	  
the	  schedule	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	  guided	  us	  as	  to	  the	  breadth,	  scope	  and	  sequence	  of	  the	  
questions,	  as	  with	  interviewing	  of	  this	  nature	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  think	  on	  the	  spot	  (ibid:	  44)	  
when	  the	  subject’s	  answer	  to	  a	  question	  suggested	  a	  different	  line	  of	  inquiry,	  when	  he	  seemed	  
to	  be	  digressing	  on	  a	  particular	  point	  or	  when	  the	  sequence	  of	  questions	  needed	  to	  change.	  For	  
the	  interviews,	  I	  was	  satisfied	  in	  using	  the	  services	  of	  a	  professional	  transcriber	  whose	  work	  I	  
checked	  against	  the	  content	  of	  the	  audio	  files	  and	  corrected,	  where	  necessary.	  The	  complete	  
transcripts	  of	  the	  lectures	  and	  interviews	  are	  saved	  in	  the	  relevant	  folders	  on	  the	  CD-­‐ROM	  
accompanying	  this	  thesis.	  
5.4	   Data	  analysis	  	  	  
For	  purposes	  of	  conducting	  the	  data	  analysis,	  I	  used	  the	  code-­‐based	  theory	  building	  software	  
package	  ATLAS.ti.	  The	  use	  of	  qualitative	  data	  analysis	  (QDA)	  software	  in	  research	  is	  dogged	  by	  a	  
variety	  of	  false	  hopes	  and	  fears.	  Chief	  among	  them	  is	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  software	  somehow	  
does	  the	  analysis	  –	  that	  one	  would	  be	  able	  to	  ‘dump’	  one’s	  text	  into	  a	  programme	  and	  see	  what	  
comes	  out	  (Weitzman,	  2000:	  806).	  This	  is	  a	  major	  misconception.	  As	  Weitzman	  notes,	  ‘using	  
software	  cannot	  be	  a	  substitute	  for	  learning	  data	  analysis	  methods.	  The	  researcher	  must	  know	  
what	  needs	  to	  be	  done	  and	  do	  it.	  The	  software	  provides	  tools	  to	  do	  it	  with’	  (ibid:	  805).	  The	  
software	  I	  employed	  served	  as	  an	  analytical	  tool	  in	  the	  following	  ways:	  Providing	  a	  place	  to	  
store	  the	  lecture	  transcripts	  and	  to	  search	  quickly,	  easily	  and	  effectively	  across	  the	  22	  
documents;	  in	  the	  coding	  of	  the	  data,	  by	  storing	  and	  keeping	  track	  of	  the	  codes	  I	  had	  used	  and	  
the	  modifications	  made	  to	  codes	  as	  the	  analysis	  proceeded;	  by	  enabling	  me	  to	  retrieve	  the	  data	  
segments	  attached	  to	  particular	  codes	  and	  produce	  code	  reports;	  and	  by	  helping	  me	  to	  produce	  
and	  keep	  track	  of	  memos	  attached	  to	  particular	  codes.	  For	  me,	  ATLAS.ti	  vastly	  reduced	  the	  
technical	  or	  administrative	  difficulties	  associated	  with	  analyzing	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  textual	  data	  
consistently	  and	  relatively	  quickly,	  thus	  opening	  up	  space	  to	  think	  coherently	  about	  the	  




My	  first	  step	  in	  the	  data	  analysis	  process	  was	  to	  devise	  a	  system	  for	  accurately	  referencing	  the	  
texts.	  I	  numbered	  the	  lecture	  transcripts	  sequentially	  and	  then	  read	  through	  each	  transcript	  in	  
order	  to	  distinguish	  and	  number	  each	  paragraph.	  Every	  change	  of	  speaker	  was	  accommodated	  
in	  a	  paragraph	  break,	  but	  the	  texts	  were	  also	  marked	  by	  very	  long	  stretches	  of	  the	  lecturer	  
speaking	  alone	  and	  I	  divided	  these	  sections	  into	  paragraphs	  as	  well.	  As	  a	  last	  step,	  I	  used	  the	  
‘line	  numbers’	  function	  in	  Microsoft	  Word	  to	  insert	  line	  numbers.	  I	  then	  adopted	  a	  citation	  
system	  that	  captured	  the	  largest	  to	  the	  smallest	  unit,	  thus	  L4:10	  refers	  the	  reader	  to	  Lecture	  4,	  
paragraph	  10;	  whilst	  L16:55:237–9	  refers	  the	  reader	  to	  Lecture	  16,	  paragraph	  55,	  lines	  237	  to	  9.	  
Where	  relevant	  in	  my	  overview	  of	  findings	  and	  discussion	  of	  findings	  I	  was	  therefore	  able	  to	  
refer	  to	  either	  a	  particular	  paragraph	  in	  a	  particular	  lecture,	  or	  to	  particular	  lines	  or	  a	  line	  in	  a	  
particular	  lecture.	  I	  followed	  a	  similar	  method	  for	  referencing	  the	  interviews	  (thus	  I3:40:357	  
refers	  to	  the	  third	  interview,	  paragraph	  40,	  line	  357).	  	  
As	  noted	  above,	  I	  transcribed	  each	  lecture	  verbatim	  and	  in	  its	  entirety.	  This	  included	  the	  
interaction	  between	  the	  lecturer	  and	  students.	  I	  identified	  the	  students	  numerically,	  allocating	  
a	  number	  to	  each	  one	  as	  they	  spoke	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	  lecture	  series.	  Thus	  ‘Student	  1’	  was	  the	  
first	  to	  speak	  in	  the	  lectures	  and	  was	  identified	  in	  this	  way	  throughout	  the	  series.	  I	  kept	  track	  of	  
descriptors	  of	  each	  student	  (principally	  their	  gender	  and	  race	  in	  addition	  to	  other	  signifying	  
features)	  in	  a	  separate	  excel	  sheet.	  This	  enabled	  me,	  for	  instance,	  to	  know	  that	  when	  the	  
lecturer	  was	  interacting	  with	  Student	  1,	  he	  was	  interacting	  with	  a	  white	  female.	  As	  my	  findings	  
will	  show,	  this	  was	  important	  at	  times,	  particularly	  as	  regards	  the	  representation	  of	  legal	  
professionals	  as	  social	  actors.	  	  	  
Having	  thus	  devised	  a	  referencing	  method,	  I	  proceeded	  with	  the	  coding	  of	  the	  data.	  As	  Miles	  
and	  Huberman	  so	  accurately	  note,	  ‘coding	  is	  analysis’,	  a	  process	  that	  entails	  dissecting	  a	  text	  
into	  parts	  while	  keeping	  the	  relations	  between	  those	  parts	  intact	  (1994:	  56).	  Codes	  are	  tags	  or	  
labels	  for	  separating	  texts	  into	  units	  of	  meaning	  and	  they	  can	  be	  descriptive	  or	  inferential	  in	  
nature	  (ibid).	  Descriptive	  codes,	  which	  assign	  a	  chunk	  of	  text	  to	  a	  particular	  phenomenon,	  are	  
typically	  created	  before	  inferential	  codes,	  which	  capture	  more	  complex,	  latent	  meanings	  (ibid:	  
58).	  There	  are	  different	  methods	  for	  generating	  codes:	  The	  researcher	  could	  create	  a	  




approach,	  generate	  codes	  as	  they	  appear	  to	  emerge	  from	  the	  texts,	  moving	  toward	  increasingly	  
abstract	  codes	  through	  iterative	  reviews	  (ibid).	  The	  former	  approach	  has	  been	  criticized	  for	  
being	  ‘a	  priori’	  and	  for	  moulding	  the	  data	  into	  pre-­‐existing	  conceptual	  schemes,	  the	  latter	  is	  
said	  to	  encourage	  a	  more	  open-­‐minded	  and	  context-­‐sensitive	  approach	  (ibid).	  However,	  as	  
Miles	  and	  Huberman	  observe,	  even	  with	  grounded	  theory	  approaches	  the	  ultimate	  objective	  is	  
to	  match	  the	  observations	  to	  a	  theory	  or	  set	  of	  constructs	  (ibid)	  –	  it	  is	  therefore	  not	  as	  
unstructured	  or	  inductive	  as	  some	  would	  maintain.	  	  
Since	  part	  of	  the	  conceptual	  frame	  adopted	  for	  this	  research	  entailed	  examining	  the	  utility	  of	  
the	  model	  of	  social	  practice	  and	  the	  choices	  associated	  with	  representing	  the	  different	  aspects	  
of	  practice	  (as	  developed,	  principally,	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Van	  Leeuwen)	  for	  purposes	  of	  better	  
understanding	  identity	  regulation	  of	  legal	  professional	  identity,	  I	  had	  an	  extensive	  ‘start	  list’	  of	  
codes	  with	  which	  to	  work.	  As	  described	  in	  chapter	  four,	  however,	  Van	  Leeuwen’s	  work	  
provided	  too-­‐extensive	  a	  list.	  After	  struggling	  and	  experimenting	  with	  some	  of	  Van	  Leeuwen’s	  
categories	  in	  relation	  to	  my	  data,	  I	  opted	  for	  a	  relatively	  streamlined	  set	  of	  codes	  that	  
nevertheless	  allowed	  for	  complex	  layers	  of	  descriptive	  and	  inferential	  analysis.	  A	  detailed	  
account	  of	  this	  process	  is	  provided	  in	  chapter	  four.	  	  
I	  first	  developed	  my	  set	  of	  codes	  in	  relation	  to	  what	  I	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  richest	  portion	  of	  the	  
data,	  namely	  the	  last	  half	  of	  lecture	  21	  and	  lecture	  22	  in	  which	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  lectures	  was	  the	  
legal	  profession	  as	  such.	  When	  I	  was	  satisfied	  that	  the	  set	  of	  codes	  I	  was	  using	  would	  allow	  me	  
to	  construct	  a	  coherent	  narrative,	  I	  used	  them	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  data.	  The	  first	  
layering	  of	  descriptive	  codes	  entailed	  distinguishing	  representational	  meanings	  in	  the	  text	  
relating	  to	  particular	  legal	  professional	  roles.	  The	  terms	  designating	  legal	  professional	  roles	  
were	  known,	  but	  not	  predetermined	  by	  me.	  My	  background	  in	  law	  enabled	  me	  to	  recognize	  
and	  distinguish	  between	  these	  roles.	  I	  was	  thus	  able	  to	  determine	  that	  a	  chunk	  of	  text,	  for	  
instance,	  related	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  attorney,	  another	  related	  to	  that	  of	  the	  judge,	  another	  to	  
the	  role	  of	  the	  Director	  of	  Public	  Prosecutions,	  and	  so	  on.	  I	  named	  the	  chunks	  of	  data	  relating	  to	  
each	  professional	  role	  ‘quotations’.	  Using	  ATLAS.ti,	  I	  was	  easily	  able	  to	  produce	  a	  report	  of	  all	  
the	  quotations	  for	  a	  particular	  legal	  professional	  role.	  I	  numbered	  these	  sequentially	  and	  




lists	  of	  quotations	  attached	  to	  each	  of	  the	  primary	  roles	  I	  analyzed	  for	  purposes	  of	  my	  findings	  
are	  attached	  as	  Appendices	  4A	  –	  J.	  Most	  of	  the	  quotations	  I	  identified	  were	  distinct	  and	  a	  few	  
were	  partially	  overlapping	  (as	  when	  the	  lecturer	  would	  start	  off	  talking	  about	  advocates	  and	  
then	  shift	  to	  talk	  about	  judges).	  In	  a	  few	  instances,	  however,	  his	  talk	  of	  the	  different	  legal	  
professionals	  was	  so	  interwoven	  that	  it	  was	  difficult	  to	  assign	  the	  quotation	  to	  one	  professional	  
role	  rather	  than	  another.	  The	  following	  quotation	  (from	  L22:66)	  serves	  as	  an	  example:	  	  
LECTURER:	  OK.	  Those	  are	  the	  two,	  um,	  parts	  of	  the	  profession	  that	  I	  think	  most	  of	  you	  are	  going	  
to	  go	  into.	  Um,	  there	  ..	  those	  are	  the	  two	  private,	  uh,	  private	  parts	  of	  the	  profession.	  Um,	  and	  in	  
both	  these,	  um,	  uh,	  professions,	  you	  will	  make,	  you’ll	  make	  a	  living.	  Definitely.	  You’ll	  make	  a	  
good	  living.	  And	  the	  higher	  up	  you	  go	  in	  these	  professions	  the	  better	  your	  living	  is.	  	  
In	  this	  passage	  the	  lecturer	  is	  referring	  to	  both	  the	  role	  of	  the	  attorney	  and	  the	  role	  of	  the	  
advocate	  because	  these	  are	  the	  two	  professional	  roles	  associated	  (both	  in	  terms	  of	  my	  own	  
knowledge	  and	  with	  the	  lecturer’s	  subsequent	  exposition)	  with	  the	  ‘private	  parts	  of	  the	  
profession’.	  Separating	  this	  passage	  into	  separate	  ‘bits’	  relating	  to	  each	  role	  would	  have	  been	  
impossible	  and	  I	  therefore	  coded	  the	  quotation	  for	  both	  roles.	  In	  the	  list	  of	  quotations	  for	  each	  
role	  I	  have	  indicated	  where	  a	  quotation	  was	  coded	  twice	  in	  this	  manner	  by	  listing	  the	  legal	  
professional	  roles	  in	  square	  brackets	  (e.g.	  [Attorney]	  [Advocate])	  above	  the	  particular	  
quotation,	  and	  in	  my	  findings	  I	  use	  the	  sign	  of	  equivalence	  (e.g.	  Att-­‐Q29=Adv-­‐Q49)	  to	  show	  
where	  the	  same	  quotation	  was	  used	  in	  different	  sets.	  The	  latter	  example	  also	  shows	  that	  I	  
developed	  a	  system	  of	  abbreviations	  to	  refer	  to	  particular	  quotations.	  Thus	  the	  letter	  ‘Q’	  
indicates	  that	  the	  reader	  should	  have	  regard	  to	  the	  quotations	  relevant	  to	  a	  particular	  role,	  
while	  ‘Att’	  refers	  the	  reader	  to	  the	  set	  of	  quotations	  relating	  to	  the	  ‘Attorney’.	  The	  number	  ‘29’	  
indexes	  the	  29th	  quotation	  in	  the	  attorney	  set.	  The	  list	  of	  abbreviations	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  
different	  legal	  professionals	  is	  as	  follows	  (a	  consolidated	  list	  of	  all	  the	  abbreviations	  used	  for	  
quotations	  and	  extracts	  is	  contained	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  chapter	  five):	  	  
	   AC	   	   Articled	  clerk	  
	   Att	   	   Attorney	  	  
	   Adv	   	   Advocate	  




	   J	   	   Judge	  
	   L	   	   Lawyer	  
	   LA	   	   Legal	  Academic	  	  
	   M	   	   Magistrate	  
	   P	   	   Public	  Prosecutor	  
	   SAdv	   	   State	  Advocate	  	  
Figure	  4:	  Abbreviations	  used	  to	  designate	  legal	  professionals.	  	  
My	  first	  layer	  of	  descriptive	  coding	  thus	  enabled	  me	  to	  produce	  sets	  of	  quotations	  from	  across	  
the	  22	  lecture	  transcripts	  grouped	  according	  to	  particular	  legal	  professional	  roles.	  The	  next	  (and	  
more	  onerous)	  step,	  entailed	  analyzing	  each	  set	  of	  quotations	  according	  to	  the	  codes	  I	  had	  
derived/developed	  from	  Van	  Leeuwen’s	  scheme.	  As	  outlined	  in	  Diagram	  4.1	  in	  chapter	  four,	  
the	  model	  I	  developed	  was	  categorized	  along	  four	  broad	  dimensions	  –	  social	  action,	  
circumstances	  of	  social	  action,	  social	  actors	  and	  values	  –	  with	  each	  dimension	  further	  
subdivided	  into	  a	  number	  of	  categories.	  The	  analysis	  thus	  entailed	  analyzing	  each	  set	  of	  
quotations	  four	  times,	  reading	  and	  coding	  the	  same	  data	  first	  for	  the	  representation	  of	  social	  
action	  (and	  its	  relevant	  sub-­‐categories),	  then	  for	  the	  representation	  of	  circumstances	  of	  social	  
action	  (and	  its	  relevant	  sub-­‐categories),	  and	  so	  on.	  It	  thus	  involved	  seeing	  the	  same	  quotation	  
from	  different	  vantage	  points,	  invoking	  different	  portions	  of	  the	  text.	  For	  example,	  the	  text	  
below	  (Att-­‐Q2,	  or	  the	  second	  quotation	  in	  the	  attorney	  set)	  represents	  the	  attorney	  in	  social	  
action	  (e.g.	  ‘looking’	  for	  a	  piece	  of	  legislation;	  ‘going’	  to	  a	  client’s	  library;	  and	  ‘falling	  around’)	  
but	  also	  represents	  the	  circumstances	  of	  that	  social	  action	  (locating	  the	  attorney,	  for	  instance,	  
in	  the	  ‘client’s	  library’;	  or	  implying	  a	  stressful	  state	  in	  that	  the	  attorney	  is	  ‘in	  a	  hurry’):	  
LECTURER:	  ...	  Ladies	  and	  gentlemen	  it	  might	  seem	  like	  a	  very	  stupid	  trivial	  detail	  um	  but	  if	  you	  
are	  looking	  for	  a	  piece	  of	  legislation	  and	  you’re	  in	  a	  hurry	  and	  its	  not	  the	  law	  library	  uh	  where	  
you	  now	  know,	  hopefully	  all	  of	  you	  now	  know	  where	  the	  Butterworths	  and	  the	  Jutas	  um	  uh	  
statutes	  are.	  Go	  to	  a	  um	  uh	  uh	  client’s	  library	  or	  you	  go	  into	  another	  attorney’s	  library	  you	  must	  
immediately	  be	  able	  to	  go	  to	  the	  Butterworths.	  Um	  you	  know,	  it’s	  no	  use	  you	  falling	  around	  
there	  saying	  ‘um	  we	  oh	  we	  oh	  where	  will	  I	  find	  the	  ….’	  You	  must	  know.	  What’s	  going	  on.	  (L6:47)	  	  
 
The	  second	  layer	  of	  analysis	  thus	  involved	  dissecting	  each	  quotation	  into	  different	  ‘bits’	  of	  text.	  




quotations’	  I	  have	  preferred	  the	  generic	  term	  of	  extracts	  to	  refer	  to	  these	  bits.	  An	  ‘extract’	  thus	  
refers	  to	  text	  within	  a	  quotation	  that	  relates	  to	  one	  of	  the	  categories	  I	  developed	  to	  describe	  
the	  representation	  of	  legal	  professionals	  in	  social	  practice.	  As	  with	  the	  quotations,	  I	  developed	  
a	  system	  of	  referencing	  for	  each	  set	  of	  extracts,	  as	  follows:	  
	   SA	   	   Social	  Action	  	  
	   CSA	   	   Circumstances	  of	  Social	  Action	  	  
	   SAct	   	   Social	  Actors	  
	   V	   	   Values	  	  
Figure	  5:	  Abbreviations	  used	  to	  designate	  main	  analytical	  categories.	  	  
Using	  the	  quotation	  number	  as	  a	  point	  of	  reference,	  I	  then	  ordered	  each	  set	  of	  extracts	  
alphabetically.	  Thus	  ‘Att-­‐SA1a’	  refers	  the	  reader	  to	  the	  first	  extract	  representing	  social	  action	  in	  
the	  first	  quotation	  of	  the	  attorney	  set;	  J-­‐CSA4b	  to	  the	  second	  extract	  representing	  
circumstances	  of	  social	  action	  in	  the	  fourth	  quotation	  in	  the	  judge	  set,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  
In	  order	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  depth	  and	  complexity	  of	  my	  analytical	  process	  in	  as	  transparent	  a	  
manner	  as	  possible,	  I	  developed	  analytical	  tables	  for	  each	  of	  the	  major	  legal	  professional	  roles	  I	  
analyzed	  –	  these	  being	  the	  ones	  that	  were	  associated	  with	  the	  greatest	  number	  of	  quotations	  
in	  the	  data	  set.	  There	  are	  four	  analytical	  tables	  for	  each	  professional	  role,	  one	  each	  for	  the	  
extracts	  pertaining	  to	  social	  action,	  circumstances	  of	  social	  action,	  social	  actors	  and	  values	  
respectively.	  The	  format	  of	  the	  tables	  for	  these	  four	  categories	  are	  not	  exactly	  the	  same,	  for	  
they	  capture	  the	  different	  sub-­‐categories	  pertaining	  to	  each	  category	  (as	  in	  the	  reference	  to	  
‘Active’,	  ‘Transactive’,	  ‘Semiotic’	  social	  actions	  below,	  for	  instance).	  The	  sub-­‐categories	  are	  
outlined	  in	  detail	  in	  chapter	  four.	  	  
JUDGE:	  ANALYTICAL	  TABLES	  	  












1	   that’s	  where	  you	  have	  the	  
different	  judges	  uh	  who	  gives	  on	  
the	  same	  set	  of	  facts	  uh	  four	  or	  
five	  different	  judgments	  




2:	  CIRCUMSTANCES	  OF	  SOCIAL	  ACTION	  (CSA)	  
JUDGE	  
QUOTATION	  NO.	  




1	   NONE	   	  
2	   you	  can	  believe	  on	  a	  spiritual	  level,	  you	  can	  believe	  
‘this	  is	  how	  law	  works,	  law	  is	  just	  a	  reflection	  of	  a	  




3:	  SOCIAL	  ACTORS	  (SAct)	  
JUDGE	  
QUOTATION	  NO.	  
EXTRACTS:	  SOCIAL	  ACTORS	  (SAct)	   CLASSIFICATION/CATEGORIZATION	  
NOMINATION/PARTIES	  
1	   NONE	   	  
2	   sit	  in	  judgment	  of	  others	  objectively	   PARTIES	  –	  Included	  	  	  
	  
4:	  VALUES	  	  
JUDGE	  –	  
QUOTES	  
EXTRACTS:	  VALUES	  (V)	  	   CONTENT	   FORM	  
1	   NONE	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
2	   you	  can	  believe	  on	  a	  spiritual	  level,	  you	  can	  believe	  ‘this	  is	  
how	  law	  works,	  law	  is	  just	  a	  reflection	  of	  a	  higher	  law’	  and	  
still	  be	  a	  judge	  and	  sit	  in	  judgment	  of	  others	  objectively.	  




Figure	  6:	  Extracts	  from	  analytical	  tables	  for	  the	  role	  of	  the	  judge.	  
The	  analytical	  tables	  accordingly	  detail	  every	  single	  choice	  I	  made	  relating	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  
data.	  They	  are	  saved	  in	  the	  relevant	  folder	  and	  sub-­‐folders	  on	  the	  CD-­‐ROM	  accompanying	  this	  
thesis.	  The	  write-­‐up	  of	  my	  findings	  in	  chapter	  five	  references	  the	  extracts	  in	  the	  analytical	  
tables	  extensively	  and	  inclusion	  of	  the	  tables	  thus	  enables	  the	  reader	  to	  check	  these	  references	  
him	  or	  herself.	  	  
As	  described	  in	  chapter	  four,	  after	  experimenting	  with	  various	  frames	  for	  the	  write-­‐up	  of	  the	  
findings,	  I	  decided	  upon	  a	  narrative	  that	  was	  in	  the	  first	  instance	  structured	  around	  the	  main	  




the	  roles	  were	  linked	  and,	  as	  described	  in	  greater	  detail	  in	  chapter	  five,	  was	  able	  to	  group	  some	  
of	  the	  roles	  into	  a	  ‘preferred’	  career	  path,	  and	  others	  into	  a	  ‘shadow’	  career	  path.	  	  Within	  each	  
role	  I	  then	  built	  the	  narrative	  around	  the	  analytical	  categories	  of	  social	  action,	  circumstances	  of	  
social	  action,	  social	  actors	  and	  values	  respectively.	  As	  Janesick	  notes,	  the	  ultimate	  decisions	  
about	  the	  narrative	  reside	  with	  the	  researcher.	  ‘Like	  the	  choreographer,	  the	  researcher	  must	  
find	  the	  most	  effective	  way	  to	  tell	  the	  story	  and	  to	  convince	  the	  audience	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  
study	  (2000:	  389).	  My	  narrative	  was	  supported	  by	  the	  use	  of	  ‘quasi-­‐statistics’	  (a	  term	  coined	  to	  
refer	  to	  the	  use	  of	  simple	  numerical	  results	  that	  can	  be	  readily	  derived	  from	  the	  data)	  (Maxwell,	  
1996:	  95).	  As	  Maxwell	  observes,	  many	  of	  the	  conclusions	  of	  quantitative	  studies	  have	  an	  
implicit	  quantitative	  component	  (ibid).	  For	  purposes	  of	  my	  research,	  for	  instance,	  I	  was	  able	  to	  
count	  the	  number	  of	  times	  forms	  of	  social	  action	  were	  coded	  as	  active	  or	  passive,	  transactive	  or	  
non-­‐transactive,	  and	  so	  on	  and	  express	  these	  as	  percentages	  of	  the	  total	  number	  of	  extracts	  
relating	  to	  the	  phenomenon	  in	  question.	  	  
The	  final	  step	  in	  the	  analysis	  entailed	  comparing	  the	  lecturer’s	  representations	  across	  the	  main	  
legal	  professional	  roles	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  the	  primary	  themes	  relating	  to	  legal	  professional	  
identity	  that	  could	  be	  said	  to	  emerge	  from	  the	  lecturer’s	  talk.	  In	  undertaking	  this	  task	  I	  also	  had	  
regard	  to	  the	  themes	  suggested	  by	  ‘official’	  discourses	  on	  legal	  professionalism	  and	  the	  
discourse	  that	  emerges	  from	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  teaching	  of	  legal	  ethics	  outlined	  in	  chapter	  
one.	  I	  relied	  in	  the	  first	  instance	  on	  cognitive	  mind-­‐mapping	  to	  determine	  the	  relationships	  
amongst	  the	  themes	  evident	  in	  my	  findings.	  This	  enabled	  me	  to	  see	  nodes	  and	  clusters	  in	  the	  
data.	  The	  second	  technique	  entailed	  drafting	  a	  comparative	  table	  for	  each	  of	  the	  main	  
conceptual	  claims	  of	  the	  thesis	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  how	  the	  findings	  relative	  to	  each	  
professional	  role	  related	  to	  the	  claim.	  The	  comparative	  table,	  in	  particular,	  facilitated	  my	  
discussion	  of	  the	  findings	  in	  chapter	  six.	  The	  quasi-­‐statistics	  relevant	  to	  each	  role	  were	  also	  
valuable	  in	  assessing	  the	  amount	  of	  evidence	  related	  to	  each	  theme.	  
5.5	   Strategies	  for	  ensuring	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  research	  	  
It	  is	  customary	  for	  researchers	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  validity,	  reliability	  and	  




qualitative	  paradigm.	  Janesick,	  however,	  is	  critical	  of	  this	  ‘trinity’	  –	  which	  she	  argues	  is	  derived	  
from	  a	  psychometric	  perspective	  –	  to	  research	  of	  a	  qualitative	  nature	  (2000:	  393).	  	  The	  criteria	  
of	  reliability	  (in	  the	  sense	  of	  replicability)	  and	  generalizability	  are,	  in	  her	  view,	  ‘pointless’	  in	  case	  
studies	  in	  particular,	  where	  the	  value	  of	  the	  study	  is	  at	  least	  in	  part	  its	  uniqueness	  (ibid:	  394;	  
see	  also	  Maxwell,	  1996:	  91).	  Wodak	  and	  Meyer	  similarly	  argue	  that	  classical	  concepts	  of	  
reliability	  and	  objectivity	  employed	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  quantitative	  research	  cannot	  be	  applied	  to	  
assess	  the	  quality	  of	  qualitatively-­‐oriented	  methods	  such	  as	  CDA	  in	  an	  unmodified	  fashion	  
(2009:	  31).	  Rigorous	  ‘objectivity’	  cannot	  be	  reached	  by	  means	  of	  discourse	  analysis.	  Each	  
analysis	  ‘must	  itself	  be	  examined	  as	  potentially	  embedding	  the	  beliefs	  and	  ideologies	  of	  the	  
analyst	  and	  therefore	  guiding	  the	  analysis	  towards	  the	  analysts’	  preconceptions’	  (ibid:	  32).	  	  
I	  nevertheless	  consider	  it	  important	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  question	  of	  validity,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  how	  
credible	  or	  believable	  the	  research	  is.	  Maxwell	  proposes	  that	  the	  key	  concept	  for	  validity	  is	  the	  
validity	  threat,	  or	  ‘how	  you	  might	  be	  wrong’	  (1996:	  88),	  and	  highlights	  the	  specific	  validity	  
threats	  that	  arise	  in	  the	  case	  of	  description,	  interpretation	  and	  theory	  (ibid:	  89).	  	  
The	  main	  threat	  to	  valid	  description	  is	  inaccuracy	  or	  incompleteness	  of	  the	  data	  (ibid).	  This	  is	  
largely	  solved	  by	  the	  audio-­‐visual	  recordings	  of	  the	  lectures	  and	  verbatim	  transcription	  of	  the	  
recordings	  (ibid).	  As	  noted	  above,	  I	  recorded	  all	  22	  of	  my	  research	  subject’s	  lectures	  on	  video	  
and	  undertook	  the	  detailed	  transcription	  of	  this	  material	  myself.	  This	  produced	  what	  Maxwell	  
refers	  to	  as	  ‘rich	  data’;	  i.e.	  data	  that	  are	  rich	  and	  complete	  enough	  to	  provide	  and	  full	  and	  
revealing	  picture	  of	  what	  is	  going	  on	  (ibid:	  95).	  	  
The	  validity	  threats	  to	  interpretation	  are	  more	  complex.	  They	  include	  the	  possibility	  of	  
researcher	  bias	  –	  the	  imposition	  of	  the	  researcher’s	  own	  framework	  or	  meaning	  which	  can	  lead,	  
for	  example,	  to	  the	  selection	  of	  data	  that	  fit	  the	  researcher’s	  existing	  theory	  or	  preconceptions	  
(ibid:	  90);	  and	  reactivity,	  being	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  researcher	  influenced	  the	  setting	  or	  
individuals	  studied	  (ibid:	  91).	  I	  have	  already	  covered	  the	  issue	  of	  reactivity	  in	  discussing	  how	  I	  
managed	  the	  issue	  of	  data	  collection,	  and	  the	  effects	  that	  my	  video-­‐taping	  of	  the	  subject’s	  




My	  response	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  researcher	  bias	  has	  been	  five-­‐fold:	  Firstly,	  as	  outlined	  in	  section	  
2	  above,	  I	  have	  attempted	  to	  bracket	  and	  articulate	  my	  own	  subjectivities	  or	  possible	  biases.	  
Secondly,	  I	  have	  solicited	  feedback	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  people,	  primarily	  through	  my	  participation	  
in	  a	  group	  of	  PhD	  students	  working	  under	  my	  supervisor	  Professor	  Yael	  Shalem.	  Maxwell	  notes	  
that	  soliciting	  feedback	  from	  others	  is	  an	  extremely	  useful	  strategy	  for	  identifying	  validity	  
threats	  and	  exposing	  biases,	  assumptions	  and	  flaws	  in	  one’s	  own	  logic	  or	  methods	  (ibid:	  94).	  
The	  PhD	  group,	  which	  came	  into	  existence	  at	  the	  time	  I	  registered	  for	  the	  PhD	  and	  is	  still	  
running,	  generally	  meets	  on	  a	  three-­‐week	  to	  monthly	  basis	  for	  two	  hours	  allowing	  students	  
who	  are	  at	  various	  stages	  of	  their	  research	  to	  present	  their	  work	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  critical	  and	  
constructive	  feedback.	  Over	  the	  years,	  I	  have	  had	  an	  opportunity	  to	  present	  to	  this	  group	  four	  
or	  five	  times,	  and	  each	  occasion	  was	  valuable	  in	  causing	  me	  to	  question	  my	  approach,	  methods	  
or	  interpretation	  more	  deeply.	  In	  January	  2011	  I	  also	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  present	  my	  
research	  at	  the	  annual	  meeting	  of	  the	  Law	  Teacher’s	  Association	  of	  South	  Africa	  in	  
Stellenbosch,	  South	  Africa.	  Furthermore,	  at	  all	  times	  the	  research	  was	  conducted	  under	  the	  
supervision	  of	  both	  an	  education	  professor	  and	  a	  legal	  professor.	  This	  was	  done	  in	  an	  attempt	  
to	  ensure	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  research	  for	  both	  an	  education	  and	  a	  legal	  audience.	  Fourthly,	  as	  
noted	  in	  the	  section	  on	  data	  analysis	  above,	  my	  development	  of	  the	  analytical	  tables,	  and	  their	  
inclusion	  in	  this	  thesis,	  was	  done	  with	  the	  intent	  of	  opening	  up	  my	  analytical	  choices	  to	  scrutiny	  
and	  this	  fact	  alone	  caused	  me	  to	  seriously	  question	  and	  consider	  each	  choice	  as	  if	  from	  an	  
outside	  perspective.	  The	  final	  strategy	  I	  employed	  –	  that	  of	  the	  ‘member	  checks’	  or	  ‘respondent	  
validation	  (Babbie	  &	  Mouton,	  2001:	  275–6)	  –	  is	  one	  of	  the	  main	  ways	  of	  guarding	  against	  
researcher	  bias.	  The	  purpose	  of	  a	  member	  check	  is	  to	  allow	  those	  who	  are	  the	  subject	  of	  
research	  to	  affirm	  that	  the	  research,	  including	  description,	  interpretation	  and	  theory-­‐building,	  
is	  accurate	  and	  authentic.	  My	  research	  subject	  expressed	  a	  wish	  to	  be	  involved	  only	  at	  the	  end	  
of	  the	  research	  process	  and	  did	  not	  therefore	  exercise	  the	  opportunity	  to	  check	  the	  transcripts	  
or	  be	  involved	  in	  the	  data	  analysis	  process.	  I	  provided	  him	  with	  a	  near-­‐final	  draft	  of	  the	  thesis	  
together	  with	  the	  analytical	  tables	  and	  we	  met	  about	  two	  weeks	  later	  on	  10	  August	  2011	  to	  
discuss	  the	  findings	  and	  claims	  I	  had	  put	  forward.	  The	  lecturer	  affirmed	  that	  the	  findings	  and	  
my	  discussion	  thereof	  resonated	  with	  him.	  He	  remarked	  that	  the	  conceptual	  framework	  and	  




could	  so	  easily	  have	  drifted	  into	  ‘hogwash’	  or	  ‘anecdotal	  rubbish’.	  He	  was	  not	  really	  surprised	  at	  
the	  extent	  to	  which	  representations	  of	  legal	  professionals	  featured	  in	  his	  classroom	  talk,	  
admitting	  that	  one	  of	  his	  objects	  had	  always	  been	  to	  instill	  in	  the	  ‘children’	  that	  they	  are	  one	  
day	  going	  to	  be	  professionals.	  The	  value	  of	  being	  part	  of	  this	  particular	  research	  for	  him	  was	  
that	  while	  he	  had	  formerly	  talked	  about	  legal	  professionals	  ‘intuitively’	  he	  had	  now	  resolved	  to	  
make	  his	  representations	  of	  legal	  professionals	  a	  formal	  part	  of	  his	  teaching	  methodology.	  At	  
this	  meeting	  I	  expressly	  asked	  him	  whether	  there	  was	  any	  aspect	  of	  the	  report	  which	  he	  desired	  
should	  be	  left	  out	  on	  ethical	  or	  personal	  grounds	  (I	  was	  thinking,	  for	  instance,	  of	  the	  revelation	  
of	  his	  wife’s	  salary	  at	  one	  point	  in	  the	  lectures),	  but	  he	  insisted	  that	  he	  was	  completely	  
comfortable	  with	  the	  report’s	  content	  and	  that	  nothing	  should	  be	  excluded.	  	  
4.	   SUMMARY	  
This	  chapter	  has	  outlined	  the	  research	  paradigm,	  design	  and	  methodologies	  I	  selected	  for	  
purposes	  of	  engaging	  with	  the	  research	  questions	  identified	  at	  the	  end	  of	  chapter	  one,	  and	  
grounding	  the	  conceptual	  claims	  identified	  at	  the	  end	  of	  chapter	  two.	  Whilst	  avoiding	  an	  
upfront	  labeling	  of	  my	  research	  as	  falling	  within	  a	  qualitative	  paradigm,	  my	  responses	  to	  key	  
ontological,	  epistemological	  and	  methodological	  questions	  indicate	  that	  the	  research	  is	  clearly	  
of	  a	  qualitative	  orientation.	  I	  have	  emphasized	  the	  integrative	  and	  iterative	  manner	  in	  which	  I	  
was	  able	  to	  develop	  my	  research	  design	  and	  put	  forward	  reasons	  for	  situating	  my	  use	  of	  CDA	  
within	  a	  single	  case	  study.	  As	  regards	  methodological	  issues:	  I	  have	  outlined	  my	  criteria	  for	  the	  
selection	  of	  the	  course	  in	  which	  the	  study	  was	  conducted	  as	  well	  as	  the	  research	  subject;	  fully	  
articulated	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  I	  gained	  access	  to	  the	  site	  of	  research	  as	  well	  as	  the	  ethical,	  
informed	  consent	  of	  my	  research	  subject	  and	  the	  students	  he	  taught	  in	  the	  year	  in	  which	  the	  
research	  was	  conducted;	  explained	  and	  justified	  my	  methods	  of	  data	  collection;	  provided	  a	  
detailed	  account	  of	  my	  processes	  of	  data	  analysis;	  and	  set	  forth	  the	  strategies	  I	  adopted	  to	  
enhance	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  research.	  In	  the	  next	  chapter	  I	  focus	  on	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  I	  






DEVELOPING	  THE	  ANALYTICAL	  CODES	  	  
1.	   INTRODUCTION	  
The	  purpose	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  provide	  an	  account	  of	  how	  I	  went	  about	  developing	  a	  
workable	  set	  of	  codes	  for	  analyzing	  the	  lecture	  material.	  One	  of	  the	  key	  claims	  framing	  this	  
research	  is	  that	  the	  elements	  of	  social	  practice	  –	  as	  constituted	  by	  a	  range	  of	  sociosemantic	  
categories	  and	  their	  linguistic	  realizations	  –	  provide	  a	  useful	  schema	  for	  understanding	  how	  
representations	  function	  as	  the	  raw	  materials	  out	  of	  which	  a	  professional	  identity	  is	  fashioned.	  
In	  exploring	  this	  claim,	  my	  initial	  aspiration	  was	  to	  make	  use	  of	  Van	  Leeuwen’s	  richly	  detailed	  
identification	  and	  analysis	  of	  such	  categories	  and	  their	  realizations	  in	  Discourse	  and	  Practice	  
(2008).	  As	  intimated	  in	  chapter	  three,	  however,	  I	  found	  that	  taking	  too	  much	  from	  the	  
smorgasbord	  of	  options	  he	  presents	  actually	  inhibited	  my	  construction	  of	  a	  narrative	  about	  the	  
patterns	  of	  representation	  relating	  to	  legal	  professionals	  in	  classroom	  talk.	  It	  was	  therefore	  
necessary	  to	  be	  selective.	  	  
As	  indicated	  in	  chapter	  two,	  I	  commence	  this	  chapter	  with	  an	  explanation	  of	  what	  I	  understand	  
by	  representational	  meanings	  as	  distinguished	  from	  interactional	  and	  identificational	  meanings.	  
I	  then	  provide	  a	  birds-­‐eye	  view	  of	  the	  sociosemantic	  inventory	  of	  representational	  meanings	  
Van	  Leeuwen	  develops	  in	  Discourse	  and	  Practice.	  The	  third	  part	  of	  the	  chapter	  tracks	  my	  two	  
analytical	  phases	  –	  the	  first	  phase	  of	  struggle	  arising	  out	  of	  my	  attempt	  to	  work	  with	  too	  many	  
codes,	  and	  the	  second	  phase	  of	  selection,	  supplementation	  and	  refinement.	  The	  chapter	  
concludes	  with	  an	  explanation	  and	  demonstration	  of	  the	  package	  of	  codes	  I	  subsequently	  used	  
to	  parse	  the	  data.	  	  
2.	   DISTINGUISHING	  REPRESENTATIONAL,	  INTERACTIONAL	  AND	  IDENTIFICATIONAL	  
MEANINGS	  	  
In	  section	  4.2.1	  of	  chapter	  two	  I	  outlined	  my	  understanding	  of	  the	  multi-­‐functionality	  of	  




to	  patterns	  in	  representation,	  structuring	  action	  and	  interaction,	  and	  identification	  respectively.	  
One	  of	  the	  most	  illuminating	  moments	  in	  my	  research	  journey	  was	  realizing	  that	  
representational,	  interactional	  and	  identificational	  meanings	  combine	  in	  different	  ways	  to	  
construct	  different	  roles	  (identity	  regulation,	  the	  main	  focus	  of	  this	  thesis)	  as	  well	  as	  speakers’	  
identifications	  with	  these	  (identity	  work)	  within	  a	  single	  text.	  A	  text	  captures	  a	  social	  event	  
(such	  as	  a	  classroom	  lecture)	  in	  all	  its	  complexity,	  but	  the	  event	  may	  be	  guided	  by	  more	  than	  
one	  social	  practice	  and	  hence	  constitute	  multiple	  roles.	  This	  is	  particularly	  true	  where	  one	  social	  
practice	  is	  recontextualized	  within	  another	  (as	  when	  the	  social	  practices	  of	  lawyering	  are	  
spoken	  about	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  legal	  classroom	  –	  see	  section	  3	  of	  chapter	  two	  above).	  It	  was	  
thus	  important	  for	  me	  not	  only	  to	  be	  able	  to	  distinguish	  representational	  from	  interactional	  and	  
identificational	  meanings,	  but	  also	  to	  identify	  which	  representational	  meanings	  were	  significant	  
for	  my	  research.	  In	  this	  section	  I	  wish	  to	  illustrate	  my	  understanding	  of	  the	  different	  meaning	  
types	  (as	  well	  as	  the	  representational	  meanings	  in	  which	  I	  was	  most	  interested)	  with	  recourse	  
to	  a	  longer	  extract61	  drawn	  from	  the	  second	  lecture	  in	  the	  data	  series	  (L2:09	  –	  65).	  The	  extract	  
contains	  an	  interaction	  between	  the	  lecturer	  and	  students	  on	  Rex	  v	  Brown,	  a	  court	  case	  decided	  
in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  that	  dealt	  with	  the	  crime	  of	  sodomy.	  For	  reasons	  of	  space	  I	  have	  not	  
reproduced	  the	  relevant	  section	  of	  the	  transcript	  in	  its	  entirety	  here	  (for	  this	  the	  reader	  may	  
now	  turn	  to	  Appendix	  5A).	  
2.1	   Interactional	  meanings	  	  	  
I	  commence	  with	  interactional	  meanings	  because	  these	  are	  foregrounded	  by	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  
extract	  as	  a	  classroom	  lecture;	  i.e.	  the	  roles	  that	  are	  constituted	  by	  the	  interactions	  in	  the	  piece	  
are	  those	  of	  the	  teacher	  and	  learners.	  This	  can	  be	  seen	  most	  clearly	  through	  the	  ‘eliciting	  
exchange’.62	  A	  number	  of	  such	  eliciting	  exchanges	  are	  present	  in	  this	  extract.63	  It	  commences,	  
for	  instance,	  with	  the	  following	  turns	  between	  the	  lecturer	  and	  a	  particular	  student:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  I	  am	  using	  the	  term	  ‘extract’	  here	  to	  refer	  simply	  to	  a	  lengthy	  section	  of	  text,	  and	  not	  in	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  I	  have	  
developed	  the	  term	  in	  section	  3.5.4	  of	  chapter	  three.	  	  
62	  In	  their	  groundbreaking	  study	  of	  classroom	  discourse,	  Sinclair	  and	  Coulthard	  (1975)	  attempted	  to	  identify	  the	  
features	  that	  distinguished	  discourse	  as	  pedagogical.	  They	  found	  that	  a	  lesson	  could	  be	  divided	  into	  a	  number	  of	  
‘transactions’	  which	  comprised	  of	  different	  types	  of	  ‘exchanges’	  between	  teachers	  and	  pupils.	  The	  ‘eliciting	  




EXAMPLE	  1	  	  (L	  =	  LECTURER;	  S4	  =	  STUDENT	  FOUR)	  
L:	   Now	  is	  there	  anybody	  who	  can	  start	  with	  Rex	  v	  Brown,	  is	  there	  anybody	  who	  can	  give	  us	  
the	  um	  facts	  in	  Rex	  v	  Brown?	  [Two	  students	  a	  male	  and	  a	  female	  raise	  their	  hands,	  L	  
addresses	  the	  male]	  …	  
…	  
S4:	  	   Um	  there	  was	  a	  group	  of	  sadomasochistic	  homosexuals	  …	  
L:	   OK	  now	  you	  must	  explain	  what	  all	  those	  words	  mean	  to	  us,	  we	  don’t	  know	  what	  that	  
means.	  	  
S4:	  	   All	  right	  ….	  
L:	  	   What	  is	  a	  homosexual?	  	  
S4:	  	   Um,	  homosexual	  is	  a	  man	  who	  has	  sexual	  interest	  in	  another	  man	  (said	  with	  slightly	  
mirthful	  expression).	  	  
L:	  	   Can	  you	  have	  female	  homosexuals?	  
S4:	  	   Course	  you	  can	  …	  oh	  well	  	  
L:	  	   (Laughs	  together	  with	  whole	  class)	  A	  ha	  course	  you	  can	  ...	  it’s	  not	  so	  of	  course.	  No,	  we	  call	  
people	  who	  are	  interested	  in	  the	  same	  gender	  we	  call	  them,	  well	  the	  popular	  name	  is	  gay	  
but	  that	  also	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  bit	  problematic.	  But	  gay	  people,	  I’ve	  heard	  people	  of	  this	  
persuasion	  call	  them	  ‘queer’,	  the	  word	  ‘queer’	  is	  no	  longer	  considered	  to	  be	  um	  offensive.	  
Um	  queer	  legal	  theory	  is	  an	  acceptable	  word.	  But	  there	  is	  this	  distinction.	  Homosexual	  is	  
the	  word	  referring	  to	  men	  preferring	  to	  have	  sexual	  intercourse	  with	  	  their	  uh	  own	  
gender,	  men	  and	  men,	  and	  lesbian	  is	  where	  you	  have	  female,	  um,	  variety.	  	  
The	  patterning	  of	  questions	  and	  responses	  in	  this	  extract	  is	  what	  I	  understand	  by	  interactional	  
meanings.	  This	  is	  no	  ordinary	  conversation	  about	  the	  definition	  of	  homosexuals,	  it	  is	  one	  in	  
which	  one	  party	  (the	  lecturer)	  stands	  in	  a	  position	  to	  not	  only	  question	  another	  (the	  student)	  
but	  to	  evaluate	  that	  response.	  Between	  the	  lecturer’s	  initial	  question	  and	  evaluation	  in	  this	  
extract	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  further	  questions	  –	  the	  lecturer,	  as	  it	  were	  ‘holds	  out’	  (the	  
phenomenon	  of	  ‘non-­‐uptake’	  that	  Mertz	  found	  to	  be	  so	  pervasive	  in	  the	  classrooms	  of	  her	  
research)	  on	  the	  student’s	  response,	  attempting	  to	  steer	  his	  thinking	  in	  a	  particular	  direction.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
often	  in	  the	  speech	  function	  of	  a	  question;	  (b)	  a	  response	  by	  the	  learner;	  and	  (c)	  feedback	  from	  the	  teacher	  that	  
evaluates	  the	  learner’s	  response	  (outlined	  in	  Fairclough,	  1992:	  14).	  




The	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  lecturer	  controls	  the	  interaction	  –	  initiating	  questions	  and	  
determining	  the	  topic	  –	  and	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  students	  respond	  to	  his	  questioning,	  thus	  
constitutes	  the	  roles	  of	  teacher	  and	  learner	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  interactional	  meanings.	  	  
2.2	   Representational	  meanings	  	  
From	  the	  lecture	  material	  reproduced	  immediately	  above,	  it	  may	  already	  be	  evident	  that	  while	  
the	  patterning	  of	  the	  interaction	  between	  lecturer	  and	  students	  gives	  effect	  to	  the	  roles	  of	  
teacher/learner,	  at	  least	  two	  other	  forms	  of	  identity,	  and	  the	  social	  practices	  in	  which	  they	  are	  
embedded,	  are	  being	  represented:	  Homosexuality	  and	  sadomasochism.	  The	  actors	  in	  these	  
practices	  are	  introduced	  by	  Student	  4	  through	  an	  existential	  process	  clause	  (‘T]here	  was	  a	  
group	  of	  sadomasochistic	  homosexuals’	  –	  L2:	  14)	  which	  simply	  assumes	  that	  a	  group	  of	  people	  
identified	  primarily	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  sexual	  preference,	  exists.	  A	  form	  of	  identity	  regulation	  
then	  takes	  place	  as	  the	  lecturer	  proceeds	  to	  question	  and	  problematize	  the	  student’s	  
understanding	  of	  the	  identity	  tag	  ‘sadomasochistic	  homosexuals’.	  This	  culminates	  in	  his	  opinion	  
on	  the	  word	  that	  best	  represents	  persons	  with	  a	  homosexual	  preference	  (‘queer’),	  and	  the	  
restriction	  of	  the	  word	  ‘homosexual’	  to	  refer	  only	  to	  men	  having	  sexual	  intercourse	  with	  other	  
men.	  While	  the	  lecturer’s	  aim	  may	  have	  been	  only	  to	  elicit	  the	  facts	  of	  the	  case	  of	  Rex	  v	  Brown,	  
at	  the	  same	  time	  he	  was	  therefore	  shaping	  and	  engaging	  with	  students’	  existing	  conceptions	  of	  
homosexuality	  (and	  later	  in	  the	  extract	  on	  sadomasochism)	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  representational	  
meanings.	  	  
Tracking	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  various	  kinds	  of	  social	  practice	  and	  their	  constituent	  roles	  in	  legal	  
classroom	  talk	  could	  be	  a	  fascinating	  venture	  (law	  being,	  in	  itself,	  an	  inherently	  
recontextualizing	  social	  practice).	  For	  my	  purposes,	  however,	  the	  representations	  that	  were	  of	  
most	  interest	  were	  those	  relating	  to	  legal	  professionals,	  the	  social	  practices	  in	  which	  they	  were	  
represented	  as	  engaging	  and	  the	  values	  associated	  therewith.	  This	  occurs	  at	  L2:63	  and	  64	  in	  the	  
extract	  where	  the	  lecturer	  speaks	  explicitly	  about	  being	  a	  judge.	  The	  term	  judge	  signals	  a	  
particular	  legal	  professional	  role	  and	  in	  these	  two	  paragraphs	  the	  lecturer	  constructs	  meanings	  
and	  storylines	  around	  this	  role.	  Although	  he	  acknowledges	  that	  he	  cannot	  get	  the	  quotation	  




of	  the	  judge’s	  words.	  In	  the	  extract	  judges	  are	  represented	  as	  not	  only	  engaged	  in	  the	  social	  
action	  of	  ‘sitting	  in	  judgment’	  of	  others,	  but	  also	  in	  the	  actions	  of	  ‘recreation’	  with	  their	  families	  
and	  ‘socializing’	  with	  their	  friends.	  This	  represents	  judges	  as	  ordinarily,	  or	  normatively,	  having	  
family	  and	  friends.	  Secondly,	  the	  judges	  are	  represented	  as	  having	  certain	  beliefs:	  As	  not	  
agreeing	  that	  males	  should	  have	  intercourse	  with	  one	  another,	  as	  considering	  this	  ‘abhorrent’;	  
as	  people	  who	  regard	  sadomasochism	  as	  ‘completely	  abhorrent’	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  Christian	  or	  a	  
decency	  point	  of	  view.	  It	  seems	  clear	  that	  the	  judges	  in	  this	  instance	  were	  not	  homosexual	  or	  a	  
sadomasochist.	  From	  this	  flows	  the	  subtle	  message	  that	  judges	  shouldn’t	  be	  homosexual	  or	  
sadomasochist	  –	  they	  should	  rather	  be	  family-­‐oriented,	  bastions	  of	  respect	  in	  their	  
communities,	  inscribed	  with	  the	  religious	  identity	  of	  a	  Christian.	  Thirdly,	  through	  the	  explicit	  
injunctions	  against	  leaving	  aside	  ‘personal	  baggage’	  judges	  are	  represented	  as	  having	  to	  set	  
aside	  their	  emotions,	  even	  though	  they	  are	  signaled	  as	  being	  people	  of	  strong	  emotion	  –	  it	  is	  
not	  simply	  that	  they	  dislike	  homosexuality	  or	  find	  it	  distasteful,	  the	  emotion	  is	  extreme,	  the	  
practice	  of	  homosexuality	  is	  ‘abhorrent’.	  What	  I	  am	  pointing	  to	  here,	  is	  that	  while	  the	  lecturer’s	  
primary	  focus	  in	  this	  extract	  may	  have	  been	  an	  epistemological	  one	  focused	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  
legal	  reasoning,	  he	  also	  says	  a	  lot	  about	  judges	  as	  particular	  kinds	  of	  people,	  engaged	  in	  doing	  
particular	  things	  in	  relation	  to	  others	  and	  guided	  by	  particular	  values.	  It	  is	  such	  
representational	  meanings	  that	  constitute	  the	  core	  of	  my	  analysis.	  	  
2.3	   Identificational	  meanings	  
Although	  they	  do	  not	  feature	  significantly	  in	  my	  analysis,	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  completeness	  I	  will	  
briefly	  outline	  my	  understanding	  of	  identificational	  meanings.	  It	  should	  be	  clear	  that	  a	  variety	  of	  
social	  roles	  –	  teacher,	  learner,	  homosexual,	  sadomasochist,	  judge	  –	  are	  constituted	  in	  the	  
extract	  under	  consideration	  through	  both	  interactional	  and	  representational	  meanings.	  
Identificational	  meanings	  relate	  to	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  speakers	  use	  language	  to	  position	  
themselves	  in	  relation	  to	  these	  roles.	  For	  the	  most	  part,	  for	  instance,	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  
lecturer	  takes	  his	  turns	  in	  the	  extract	  under	  consideration	  is	  unproblematic,	  indexing	  a	  secure	  
identification	  with	  the	  role	  of	  the	  teacher.	  A	  less-­‐experienced	  teacher,	  less	  assured	  of	  his	  
identification	  with	  a	  teacher	  role	  may	  have	  commenced	  the	  extract	  by	  saying:	  ‘Well,	  I	  think	  




everybody?’	  This	  lecturer,	  however,	  is	  assured	  of	  his	  position:	  He	  takes,	  rather	  than	  waits	  for	  a	  
turn,	  determines	  the	  topic,	  interrupts	  students	  and	  so	  on.64	  	  
Both	  lecturer	  and	  students	  also	  position	  themselves	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  social	  roles	  constructed	  
on	  the	  basis	  of	  representational	  meanings.	  Student	  4’s	  positioning	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  role	  of	  
‘homosexual’	  at	  L2:18:43–4	  is	  revealed	  not	  so	  much	  by	  what	  he	  says	  –	  which	  appears	  to	  be	  an	  
attempt	  to	  provide	  a	  neutral,	  unbiased	  definition	  of	  a	  homosexual	  person	  –	  but	  by	  his	  facial	  
expression	  at	  the	  time,	  which	  I	  could	  probably	  most	  accurately	  describe	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  
suppress	  laughter.65	  The	  lecturer’s	  relationship	  to	  ‘homosexuality’	  is	  developed	  more	  explicitly	  
(at	  L2:21).	  He	  identifies	  with	  his	  representation	  of	  homosexuality	  in	  a	  rather	  careful	  way,	  
perhaps	  aware	  that	  the	  topic	  could	  be	  a	  sensitive	  one.	  His	  commitment	  to	  saying	  that	  
homosexuals	  are	  ‘gay’	  or	  ‘queer’	  is	  carefully	  hedged:	  He	  consistently	  uses	  the	  pronoun	  ‘we’	  
rather	  than	  ‘I,	  thus	  deflecting	  attention	  away	  from	  his	  own	  views;	  he	  associates	  the	  term	  ‘gay’	  
with	  a	  ‘popular	  view’	  but	  then	  goes	  on	  to	  qualify	  that	  this	  may	  be	  problematic.	  He	  legitimates	  
his	  use	  of	  the	  word	  ‘queer’	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  the	  people	  to	  whom	  this	  designation	  is	  directed	  
use	  it	  themselves,	  and	  so	  on.	  But	  then	  at	  L2:29:65–7	  his	  use	  of	  a	  stereotypical	  designation	  –	  the	  
‘leather	  fairies’	  –	  suggests	  a	  subtle,	  covert	  alignment	  with	  Student	  4’s	  position.	  	  
When	  the	  lecturer	  speaks	  in	  the	  voice	  of	  one	  of	  the	  judges	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Rex	  v	  Brown,	  however,	  
he	  exhibits	  a	  different	  form	  of	  positioning	  –	  positioning	  not	  so	  much	  himself	  but	  the	  students	  in	  
relationship	  to	  the	  judge.	  His	  first	  use	  of	  the	  pronoun	  ‘we’	  (‘when	  we	  sit	  in	  judgment	  on	  a	  
matter	  like	  this’)	  positions	  the	  students	  as	  part	  of	  the	  judicial	  community,	  as	  insiders	  who	  have	  
ascended	  the	  legal	  hierarchy	  and	  now	  occupy	  the	  exalted	  position	  of	  being	  able	  to	  sit	  in	  
judgment	  of	  others.	  This	  is	  in	  itself	  interesting	  because	  only	  a	  tiny	  percentage	  of	  law	  students	  
will	  ever	  go	  on	  to	  become	  judges.	  But	  in	  this	  paragraph	  the	  lecturer	  consistently	  positions	  them	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64	  The	  only	  time	  his	  confidence	  seems	  to	  falter	  is	  at	  L2:62	  where	  he	  seems	  a	  bit	  out	  his	  depth	  in	  responding	  to	  the	  
student’s	  commonsense	  reasoning	  around	  the	  legal	  and	  non-­‐legal	  construction	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘guilty’.	  He	  points	  
out	  that	  the	  rules	  are	  different	  in	  England	  and	  concedes	  that	  he	  is	  ‘not	  quite	  sure	  how	  it	  works’	  (L2:62:137).	  There	  
are	  a	  few	  false	  beginnings	  (‘Um	  so	  …	  but	  don’t	  …	  L2:62:143)	  and	  a	  concession	  that	  he	  forgot	  to	  tell	  students	  not	  to	  
read	  the	  whole	  case.	  
65	  There	  are	  many	  different	  ways	  in	  which	  this	  could	  be	  interpreted	  –	  one	  could	  argue	  that	  the	  student	  is	  not	  a	  
homosexual	  and	  that	  his	  suppressed	  laughter	  arises	  from	  his	  tendency	  to	  mock	  and	  deride	  homosexuals	  in	  
contexts	  that	  do	  not	  require	  ‘political	  correctness’.	  It	  is	  impossible	  to	  know	  what	  the	  student	  meant	  at	  that	  point	  
without	  perhaps	  knowing	  more	  about	  him	  or	  interviewing	  him.	  The	  point	  is,	  however,	  that	  the	  very	  subtle	  shift	  in	  




in	  this	  role	  through	  the	  repeated	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘you’.	  In	  so	  doing	  he	  also	  aligns	  them	  with	  the	  
normative	  associations	  discussed	  previously:	  It	  is	  the	  students	  whom	  he	  is	  addressing,	  and	  not	  
only	  his	  representation	  of	  judges,	  who	  are	  positioned	  as	  people	  who	  believe	  homosexuality	  or	  
sadomasochism	  is	  ‘abhorrent’.	  Whilst	  everything	  I	  have	  discussed	  in	  this	  sub-­‐section	  constitutes	  
my	  understanding	  of	  identificational	  meanings,	  I	  have	  only	  really	  expanded	  on	  this	  last	  type	  –	  
the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  lecturer	  positions	  students	  in	  relation	  to	  legal	  professional	  roles	  –	  in	  
my	  analysis.	  This	  was	  done	  mainly	  in	  order	  to	  investigate	  the	  claim	  made	  in	  the	  literature	  that	  
students	  are	  invariably	  positioned	  in	  the	  role	  of	  the	  legal	  advocate	  (Cramton,	  1977:	  256).	  	  
3.	   VAN	  LEEUWEN’S	  FRAMEWORK	  FOR	  THE	  ANALYSIS	  OF	  REPRESENTATIONAL	  MEANINGS	  	  
Having	  established	  that	  my	  core	  focus	  was	  constituted	  by	  representational	  meanings	  relating	  to	  
various	  types	  of	  legal	  professional,	  I	  turn	  now	  to	  Van	  Leeuwen’s	  inventory	  of	  socio-­‐semantic	  
categories	  for	  representational	  meanings	  and	  their	  most	  common	  linguistic	  realizations.	  As	  
explained	  in	  chapter	  two,	  although	  Van	  Leeuwen	  starts	  off	  with	  a	  very	  complex	  model	  of	  social	  
practice	  comprising	  at	  least	  ten	  constituent	  elements	  (2008:	  6	  –	  10,	  see	  my	  discussion	  in	  section	  
4.2.3	  of	  chapter	  two),	  he	  subsequently	  develops	  his	  scheme	  for	  representational	  meanings	  in	  
terms	  of	  the	  representation	  of	  social	  actors,	  social	  action,	  time	  and	  space	  respectively.	  In	  line	  
with	  his	  strong	  emphasis	  on	  recontextualization	  and	  the	  elements	  that	  are	  added	  to	  a	  social	  
practice	  in	  the	  recontextualizing	  process,	  he	  also	  devotes	  separate	  chapters	  of	  this	  work	  to	  the	  
discursive	  construction	  of	  legitimation	  and	  purpose.	  	  
I	  wish	  to	  emphasize	  the	  richness	  of	  the	  options	  identified	  in	  Van	  Leeuwen’s	  work	  and	  have	  
therefore	  outlined	  the	  full	  range	  of	  options	  he	  presents	  for	  the	  three	  chapters	  upon	  which	  I	  
relied	  the	  most,66	  namely	  those	  dealing	  with	  the	  representation	  of	  social	  actors,	  social	  actions	  
and	  legitimation	  respectively	  in	  Appendix	  5B.	  The	  three	  tables	  in	  this	  Appendix	  identify	  the	  
fundamental	  socio-­‐semantic	  choices	  in	  each	  category,	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  these	  are	  typically	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66	  Van	  Leeuwen’s	  chapter	  on	  the	  representation	  of	  space	  emphasizes	  visual	  representations	  of	  space	  in	  the	  
classroom,	  whereas	  my	  focus	  was	  more	  on	  the	  text	  of	  the	  classroom	  that	  related	  to	  the	  representation	  of	  
professional	  practice.	  I	  also	  chose	  not	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  representation	  of	  time	  as	  I	  found,	  during	  my	  first	  attempt	  at	  
analysis,	  that	  times	  –	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  durations	  and	  specific	  points	  in	  time	  –	  did	  not	  feature	  significantly	  in	  the	  




realized	  linguistically,	  and	  the	  possible	  implications	  of	  each	  socio-­‐semantic	  choice	  for	  processes	  
of	  meaning-­‐making.	  
As	  a	  study	  of	  the	  tables	  in	  Appendix	  5B	  will	  show,	  the	  codes	  potentially	  available	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  
Van	  Leeuwen’s	  work	  constituted,	  for	  the	  sociosemantic	  categories	  relating	  to	  social	  action,	  
social	  actors	  and	  legitimation	  alone,	  at	  least	  36	  different	  major	  codes	  and	  37	  sub-­‐codes.	  When	  I	  
first	  presented	  the	  range	  of	  codes	  I	  intended	  to	  try	  out	  to	  my	  supervisors	  (and	  this	  was	  already	  
a	  selection	  from	  the	  full	  range	  of	  codes	  Van	  Leeuwen	  presents)	  the	  wise	  advice	  I	  received	  was	  
that	  it	  would	  be	  ‘jolly	  difficult	  to	  operationalize	  all	  of	  them’	  and	  that	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  
‘arrange	  them	  relationally	  and	  trim	  them	  so	  that	  the	  work	  is	  manageable’.67	  This	  need	  lay	  at	  the	  
centre	  of	  my	  subsequent	  coding	  journey.	  	  
4.	   MY	  CODING	  JOURNEY	  	  
4.1	   First	  attempt	  
As	  noted	  in	  chapter	  three,	  my	  first	  attempt	  to	  develop	  the	  codes	  was	  based	  on	  what	  I	  
considered	  to	  be	  the	  richest	  relevant	  part	  of	  my	  data,	  namely	  the	  lectures	  that	  specifically	  
focused	  on	  the	  legal	  profession	  (the	  second	  half	  of	  lecture	  21	  and	  lecture	  22	  in	  the	  series).	  
These	  alone	  comprised	  over	  1200	  lines	  of	  text.	  My	  chief	  difficulty	  at	  this	  point	  was	  deciding	  
upon	  the	  primary	  axes	  of	  analysis	  and	  their	  sequence.	  Initially	  I	  had	  thought	  to	  use	  the	  model	  of	  
social	  practice	  advocated	  by	  Van	  Leeuwen	  as	  the	  primary	  axis	  of	  analysis;	  i.e.	  I	  would	  firstly	  
identify	  all	  the	  social	  actions,	  social	  actors,	  times,	  spaces	  and	  forms	  of	  legitimation	  in	  the	  text;	  
subject	  each	  of	  these	  broad	  categories	  to	  more	  detailed	  analysis	  using	  a	  selection	  of	  the	  socio-­‐
semantic	  categories	  outlined	  in	  Appendix	  5B;	  and	  then	  write	  up	  the	  findings	  in	  a	  similarly-­‐
structured	  manner.	  I	  thus	  envisaged	  having	  a	  findings	  chapter	  that	  focused	  firstly	  on	  social	  
action	  and	  perhaps	  social	  actors,	  one	  devoted	  to	  legitimation	  and	  possibly	  a	  third	  devoted	  to	  
the	  representation	  of	  time	  and	  space.	  Each	  of	  the	  findings	  chapters	  would	  address	  the	  
representation	  of	  these	  categories	  across	  the	  full	  series	  of	  22	  lectures.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




An	  extract	  (the	  first	  two	  lines)	  of	  the	  first	  analytical	  table	  I	  developed	  in	  accordance	  with	  this	  
grand	  strategy,	  one	  which	  divided	  the	  text	  of	  lectures	  21	  and	  22	  into	  the	  broad	  categories	  of	  
social	  action,	  social	  actors,	  time	  and	  space	  respectively,	  is	  contained	  in	  Appendix	  5C.	  In	  this	  
table	  I	  also	  addressed	  what	  I	  considered	  to	  be	  representation	  of	  the	  resources	  of	  the	  legal	  
professional,	  albeit	  that	  Van	  Leeuwen	  didn’t	  cover	  this	  category.	  This	  first	  level	  of	  analysis	  I	  
termed	  the	  ‘social	  practice	  analysis’.	  I	  then	  sought	  to	  develop	  my	  analysis	  of	  social	  action	  and	  
social	  actors	  using	  more	  detailed	  categories,	  and	  an	  extract	  (the	  first	  two	  lines)	  of	  the	  results	  of	  
this	  effort	  are	  set	  out	  in	  Appendix	  5D.	  As	  this	  particular	  table	  shows,	  the	  socio-­‐semantic	  
categories	  I	  was	  able	  to	  accommodate	  seemed	  quite	  sparse:	  I	  attempted	  to	  distinguish	  
between	  more	  and	  less	  generic	  forms	  of	  social	  action	  and	  used	  this	  distinction	  to	  structure	  the	  
table.	  I	  also	  attempted	  a	  full-­‐scale	  transitivity	  analysis	  (explained	  more	  fully	  in	  section	  5.1	  
below)	  of	  all	  the	  clauses	  relating	  to	  each	  social	  action.	  As	  far	  as	  social	  actors	  were	  concerned,	  I	  
simply	  identified	  whether	  the	  social	  actor	  in	  each	  actor	  was	  included	  or	  excluded	  in	  the	  action,	  
whether	  they	  were	  active	  or	  passive	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  action	  and	  whether	  their	  gender	  was	  
indexed.	  At	  this	  stage,	  the	  primacy	  of	  role	  –	  which	  I	  at	  that	  stage	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  ‘identity	  
category’	  –	  had	  already	  begun	  to	  assert	  itself,	  for	  I	  sought	  to	  identify	  which	  ‘identity	  category’	  
was	  being	  constituted	  by	  the	  representation	  of	  each	  social	  action	  and	  its	  associated	  social	  
actors.	  	  
Instead	  of	  attempting	  to	  write	  up	  my	  analysis	  of	  these	  analytical	  findings	  (a	  move	  which,	  in	  
hindsight	  would	  have	  saved	  a	  lot	  of	  time	  by	  revealing	  at	  an	  earlier	  stage	  that	  the	  path	  I	  was	  
following	  was	  leading	  to	  a	  dead	  end),	  I	  then	  launched	  into	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  forms	  of	  
legitimation	  in	  the	  same	  body	  of	  text.	  An	  extract	  (the	  first	  two	  lines)	  of	  the	  results	  of	  this	  table	  
are	  contained	  in	  Appendix	  5E.	  The	  first	  column	  on	  the	  left	  borrows	  from	  Van	  Leeuwen’s	  
categories	  (‘R(G)’	  for	  instance,	  refers	  to	  the	  form	  of	  legitimation	  being	  predominantly	  a	  goal-­‐
oriented	  rationalization)	  and	  the	  remaining	  categories	  (‘object’,	  ‘object	  type’,	  ‘knock-­‐on	  effect’,	  
‘constitutive	  outside’,	  ‘basis’	  and	  ‘source	  –	  voice’)	  were	  elaborations	  of	  my	  own.	  Before	  
attempting	  a	  similar	  analysis	  of	  ‘time’	  and	  ‘space’	  in	  the	  data,	  I	  wisely	  attempted	  to	  write	  up	  the	  




The	  first	  major	  problem	  I	  experienced	  with	  the	  analytical	  strategy	  outlined	  above	  was	  that	  it	  
was	  massively	  time-­‐consuming,	  given	  the	  amount	  of	  text	  I	  was	  attempting	  to	  analyze.	  The	  
process	  ate	  up	  a	  substantial	  part	  of	  my	  2010	  sabbatical	  year	  and	  I	  realized,	  as	  my	  supervisor	  
had	  advised,	  that	  I	  would	  only	  be	  able	  to	  operationalize	  a	  few	  of	  Van	  Leeuwen’s	  sociosemantic	  
categories.	  The	  critical	  problem,	  however,	  was	  revealed	  in	  my	  attempt	  to	  construct	  a	  narrative	  
based	  on	  my	  legitimation	  analysis	  (Appendix	  5E).	  My	  narrative	  was	  structured	  according	  to	  the	  
analytical	  categories	  in	  the	  table	  (e.g.	  I	  wrote	  firstly	  about	  the	  objects	  of	  legitimation	  in	  the	  
data,	  then	  the	  object	  types,	  and	  so	  on).	  Disappointingly,	  the	  result	  was	  unacceptably	  
fragmented	  –	  meaning	  had	  slipped	  away	  down	  the	  smooth	  sides	  of	  my	  analytical	  matrix.	  The	  
codes	  I	  was	  using,	  in	  addition	  to	  what	  I	  was	  choosing	  as	  my	  primary	  axis	  of	  analysis	  (the	  
elements	  of	  social	  practice),	  were	  not	  enabling	  me	  to	  tell	  the	  story	  of	  the	  stories	  that	  emerged	  
around	  legal	  professionals	  in	  the	  lecturer’s	  classroom	  talk.	  It	  was	  therefore	  necessary	  to	  start	  
over.	  	  	  
4.2	   Second	  attempt	  	  
I	  therefore	  returned	  to	  the	  data,	  reading	  and	  re-­‐reading	  the	  text	  of	  lectures	  21	  and	  22	  and	  I	  
realized	  that	  the	  elements	  of	  social	  practice,	  rather	  than	  being	  the	  primary	  axis	  of	  analysis,	  
needed	  to	  be	  attached	  to	  a	  legal	  professional	  role.	  Distinguishing	  representational	  meanings	  
relating	  to	  the	  particular	  professional	  roles	  in	  the	  text	  thus	  constituted	  my	  first	  act	  of	  coding.	  
Once	  I	  had	  a	  set	  of	  quotations	  relating	  to	  each	  professional	  role,	  I	  asked	  myself	  which	  of	  the	  
sociosemantic	  categories	  developed	  by	  Van	  Leeuwen	  would	  best	  enable	  me	  to	  construct	  a	  
narrative	  around	  each	  of	  the	  legal	  professional	  roles	  that	  peopled	  the	  lecturer’s	  classroom	  talk.	  
Specifically,	  I	  asked	  myself	  which	  codes	  would	  be	  conducive	  to	  constructing	  a	  narrative	  around	  
what	  the	  various	  types	  of	  legal	  professional	  do,	  how	  they	  do	  it,	  who	  they	  are	  (and	  with	  whom	  
they	  interact)	  and	  why.	  I	  also	  took	  into	  account	  which	  codes	  would	  enable	  me	  to	  respond	  to	  
the	  discourses	  on	  legal	  professionalism	  outlined	  in	  chapter	  one.	  	  
This	  interrogation	  led	  me	  to	  the	  four	  broad	  analytical	  categories	  that	  structure	  my	  discussion	  of	  




• WHAT	  legal	  professionals	  DO	  invoked	  the	  sociosemantic	  category	  of	  social	  action.	  
Because	  I	  wished	  to	  make	  a	  claim	  about	  the	  representation	  of	  legal	  professionals	  as	  
powerful	  or	  powerless	  actors,	  I	  sought	  firstly	  to	  determine	  whether	  lawyers	  were	  
ACTIVE	  or	  PASSIVE	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  social	  actions	  in	  which	  they	  were	  represented	  as	  
engaging,	  and	  whether	  their	  actions	  were	  TRANSACTIVE	  or	  NON-­‐TRANSACTIVE;	  i.e.	  
extending	  to	  people,	  things	  or	  phenomena	  as	  the	  objects	  of	  action	  or	  not.	  I	  also	  wished	  
to	  make	  claims	  regarding	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  power	  exercised	  by	  legal	  professionals	  and	  
found	  that	  distinguishing	  between	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  action	  as	  MATERIAL	  or	  SEMIOTIC	  
assisted	  me	  in	  this	  purpose.	  	  
• HOW	  legal	  professionals	  do	  what	  they	  do	  invoked	  what	  I	  termed	  circumstances	  of	  social	  
action.	  Here	  I	  considered	  it	  important	  to	  examine	  what	  the	  lecturer	  constituted	  as	  the	  
RESOURCES	  of	  the	  legal	  professional,	  what	  they	  were	  representing	  as	  ‘having’	  or	  
‘needing’.	  Because	  of	  the	  frequency	  of	  claims	  regarding	  the	  negative	  emotional	  tone	  of	  
the	  legal	  professional	  world	  I	  also	  had	  regard	  to	  the	  representation	  of	  EMOTION	  relating	  
to	  each	  legal	  professional	  role.	  This	  aspect	  of	  social	  life	  is	  not	  dealt	  with	  in	  Van	  
Leeuwen’s	  book	  but,	  as	  noted	  in	  chapter	  two,	  the	  work	  of	  Martin	  and	  Rose	  (2004)	  on	  
appraisal	  had	  already	  been	  brought	  to	  my	  attention.	  They	  distinguish	  the	  negotiation	  of	  
affect	  (how	  people	  express	  their	  feelings	  in	  discourse)	  as	  one	  of	  three	  major	  attitude-­‐
types	  in	  text	  (ibid:	  25)	  and	  I	  was	  therefore	  able	  to	  draw	  upon	  this	  work	  to	  better	  
understand	  representation	  of	  the	  emotions	  of	  legal	  professionals	  in	  my	  data.	  Rather	  
than	  a	  full-­‐blown	  analysis	  of	  the	  spatial	  world	  of	  the	  various	  legal	  professionals,	  I	  sought	  
simply	  to	  determine	  where	  they	  located.	  The	  code	  of	  LOCATION	  enabled	  me	  to	  respond	  
to	  claims	  in	  the	  legal	  education	  literature	  that	  legal	  professionals	  are	  located	  
predominantly	  in	  the	  physical	  space	  of	  the	  court.	  	  	  
• WHO	  legal	  professionals	  are	  invoked	  the	  category	  of	  social	  actors.	  Following	  Van	  
Leeuwen’s	  understanding	  of	  classification	  (reference	  to	  social	  actors	  by	  means	  of	  the	  
major	  categories	  a	  given	  society	  differentiates	  between	  classes	  of	  people	  –	  2008:	  42),	  I	  
firstly	  sought	  to	  determine	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  lecturer	  had	  CLASSIFIED	  legal	  
professionals	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  GENDER,	  RACE	  and	  CLASS.	  I	  also	  took	  notice	  of	  whether	  




what	  other	  bases	  they	  were	  CATEGORIZED	  (i.e.	  identified	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  identities	  or	  
functions	  they	  share	  with	  others	  –	  see	  Van	  Leeuwen,	  2008:	  40).	  I	  also	  wished	  to	  pay	  
attention	  to	  the	  range	  of	  social	  actors	  in	  the	  legal	  professional	  world,	  and	  here	  I	  
concentrated	  only	  on	  whether	  such	  actors	  were	  INCLUDED	  or	  EXCLUDED.	  	  
• WHY	  lawyers	  do	  what	  they	  do	  invoked	  Van	  Leeuwen’s	  category	  of	  legitimation,	  but	  
which	  I	  have	  instead	  chosen	  to	  call	  the	  representation	  of	  value.	  This	  term	  better	  
captures	  my	  attempt	  to	  relay	  both	  the	  form	  and	  the	  content	  of	  the	  key	  legitimations	  
and	  their	  bases	  in	  the	  lecturer’s	  classroom	  talk.	  I	  concentrated	  firstly	  on	  legitimations	  
(and	  delegitimations)	  of	  LEGAL	  PROFESSIONALS	  THEMSELVES	  –	  whether	  the	  lecturer	  
evaluated	  lawyers	  in	  a	  positive	  or	  negative	  light	  and	  the	  basis	  for	  him	  doing	  so	  –	  and	  
then	  on	  his	  legitimations	  (and	  delegitimations)	  of	  LEGAL	  PROFESSIONAL	  WORK.	  For	  the	  
latter	  category	  I	  invoked	  the	  MacIntyrian	  distinction	  between	  the	  INTERNAL	  and	  
EXTERNAL	  GOODS	  of	  the	  practice	  (outlined	  in	  greater	  detail	  in	  section	  5.4	  below).	  For	  
every	  legitimation	  identified	  in	  the	  text	  I	  considered	  whether	  it	  took	  the	  form	  of	  a	  
reference	  to	  AUTHORITY,	  MORAL	  EVALUATION,	  a	  PURPOSIVE	  CONSTRUCTION	  or	  
MYTHOPOESIS.	  
In	  addition	  to	  these	  codes,	  I	  also	  paid	  attention	  to	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  meanings	  were	  
associated	  with	  each	  other.	  The	  two	  constructions	  that	  interested	  me	  most	  were	  
RELATIONAL	  PROCESS	  CLAUSES	  and	  what	  I	  term	  ‘IF-­‐THEN’	  clauses.	  Relational	  process	  
clauses	  are	  a	  process-­‐type	  in	  the	  Hallidayean	  transitivity	  system,	  which	  is	  described	  more	  
fully	  in	  section	  5.1	  below.	  ‘If-­‐then’	  clauses	  are	  those	  that	  are	  semantically	  related	  to	  each	  
other	  through	  conditionality	  or	  through	  causality;	  i.e.	  they	  either	  express	  the	  condition	  
upon	  which	  the	  other	  takes	  place	  or	  will	  take	  place,	  or	  they	  specify	  the	  (inevitable)	  
consequence	  of	  a	  certain	  course	  of	  action	  or	  state	  of	  affairs.	  As	  I	  read	  through	  the	  data,	  
both	  relational	  process	  clauses	  and	  if-­‐then	  constructions	  stood	  out	  as	  playing	  a	  particular	  
role	  in	  solidifying	  or	  concretizing	  the	  shape	  of	  the	  legal	  professional	  world	  the	  lecturer	  was	  
creating	  in	  the	  classroom:	  The	  former	  by	  defining	  one	  experience	  in	  terms	  of	  another	  such	  
that	  they	  become	  inextricably	  linked,	  the	  latter	  by	  positing	  one	  particular	  type	  of	  experience	  




Figure	  7	  below	  sets	  out	  these	  codes	  in	  a	  graphical	  format:	  	  
	  
Figure	  7:	  Overview	  of	  analytical	  codes.	  
Across	  all	  the	  roles	  these	  analytical	  codes	  allowed	  me	  to	  examine	  the	  same	  extracts	  of	  text	  
from	  different	  vantage	  points	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  seemed	  to	  	  exhaust	  the	  meaning	  potential	  of	  
the	  text	  with	  minimal	  degrees	  of	  overlap.	  This	  suggested	  to	  me	  that	  they	  were	  functioning	  
appropriately	  to	  provide	  analytically	  distinct	  and	  meaningful	  lenses	  to	  flesh	  out	  
representational	  meanings.	  	  
5.	   DESCRIPTION	  OF	  THE	  CODES	  	  	  
The	  description	  of	  the	  codes	  in	  this	  section	  seeks	  primarily	  to	  set	  forth	  the	  basis	  upon	  which	  I	  
recognized	  the	  codes	  in	  the	  legal	  material,	  and	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  I	  distinguished	  them	  from	  
each	  other.	  In	  my	  discussion	  I	  rely	  on	  extracts	  taken	  from	  the	  lecture	  material.	  The	  
identification	  of	  specific	  linguistic	  realizations	  for	  each	  sociosemantic	  category	  served	  mainly	  to	  
assist	  in	  the	  identification	  of	  each	  category	  (as	  noted	  in	  chapter	  two,	  language	  lacks	  bi-­‐




linguistic	  mechanisms	  –	  Van	  Leeuwen,	  2008:	  23).	  The	  linguistic	  forms	  of	  realization	  did	  not	  
serve	  as	  codes	  in	  themselves.	  	  
5.1	   Social	  Action	  	  
In	  order	  to	  explain	  the	  codes	  chosen	  for	  my	  analysis	  of	  social	  action,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  outline	  
briefly	  the	  ‘transitivity’	  system	  developed	  by	  Halliday	  –	  a	  grammatical	  system	  for	  construing	  the	  
world	  of	  experience	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  number	  of	  process	  types	  (Halliday,	  2004:	  170)	  (this	  is	  merely	  
important	  background	  information	  –	  unlike	  my	  first	  attempt	  at	  analysis,	  the	  process	  types	  do	  
not	  feature	  in	  the	  final	  analysis	  as	  codes	  per	  se).	  At	  the	  root	  of	  the	  transitivity	  system	  is	  an	  
observation	  that	  our	  most	  powerful	  impression	  of	  experience	  is	  of	  a	  flow	  of	  events	  or	  actions.	  
Language,	  through	  the	  grammar	  of	  the	  clause,	  imposes	  order	  on	  the	  endless	  flow	  of	  actions.	  It	  
not	  only	  separates	  out	  actions	  from	  one	  another,	  but	  also	  enables	  us	  to	  distinguish	  between	  
different	  types.	  There	  are	  six	  such	  types	  in	  the	  Hallidayan	  transitivity	  system.	  The	  most	  basic	  is	  
the	  distinction	  between	  processes	  that	  occur	  ‘out	  there’	  in	  the	  world	  around	  us	  (outer	  
experience,	  as	  in	  example	  4.1	  below)	  and	  those	  that	  we	  experience	  going	  on	  inside	  ourselves	  in	  
the	  world	  of	  consciousness	  (including	  cognition,	  perception,	  emotion	  and	  imagination,	  as	  in	  
example	  4.2)	  (ibid).	  The	  material	  process	  clause	  represents	  outer	  experience,	  while	  the	  mental	  
process	  clause	  represents	  inner	  experience.	  	  
4.1	   The	  litigation	  department	  does	  all	  the	  backroom	  work.	  
4.2	   Judges	  interpret	  uh	  rules.	  
The	  third	  type	  of	  process	  in	  Halliday’s	  system	  is	  the	  relational	  process	  clause	  that	  encompasses	  
actions	  of	  identifying	  and	  classifying	  the	  world	  by	  relating	  one	  experience	  to	  another,	  as	  in	  ‘The	  
advocate	  is	  the	  person	  who	  appears	  in	  court’.	  In	  this	  case	  one	  type	  of	  classification	  (‘advocate’)	  
is	  related	  to	  another	  (‘person	  who	  appears	  in	  court’).68	  By	  linking	  such	  classifications,	  in	  my	  
view	  relational	  process	  clauses	  play	  a	  particularly	  important	  role	  in	  ‘cementing’	  meanings.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68	  Halliday	  distinguishes	  three	  kinds	  of	  relational	  process:	  Identifying	  (as	  when	  x	  is	  identified	  with	  an	  adjective	  or	  a	  
noun);	  circumstantial	  (as	  when	  x	  is	  located	  ‘at’	  a	  place);	  and	  possessive	  (as	  when	  x	  ‘has’	  or	  ‘gets’	  something)	  




In	  addition	  to	  material,	  mental	  and	  relational	  clauses,	  which	  are	  the	  main	  types	  of	  process	  in	  
the	  English	  language,	  Halliday	  distinguishes	  three	  further	  categories	  which	  lie	  at	  the	  border	  of	  
these	  three	  main	  types	  (ibid:	  171).	  Lying	  at	  the	  border	  between	  material	  and	  mental	  process	  
clauses	  are	  behavioural	  process	  clauses,	  which	  represent	  the	  outer	  manifestations	  of	  inner	  
workings,	  the	  acting	  out	  of	  processes	  of	  consciousness	  and	  physiological	  states,	  as	  in	  ‘[s]o	  you	  
have	  three	  four	  hours	  every	  night	  that	  you	  can	  sleep’.	  Verbal	  process	  clauses	  -­‐	  as	  in	  ‘There’s	  not	  
somebody	  who	  will	  come	  and	  knock	  on	  your	  door	  at	  five	  o	  clock	  and	  say:	  “Why	  are	  you	  still	  
here”’	  –	  lie	  at	  the	  border	  between	  mental	  and	  relational	  clauses	  because,	  while	  emanating	  
from	  the	  mental	  capacity	  for	  speech,	  they	  also	  capture	  the	  processes	  of	  symbolization,	  the	  
manner	  in	  which	  we	  encode,	  identify	  and	  classify	  the	  world	  in	  speech	  sounds.	  Lastly,	  on	  the	  
borderline	  between	  relational	  and	  material	  process	  clauses	  are	  those	  concerned	  with	  existence	  
or	  possession,	  which	  Halliday	  designates	  as	  existential	  process	  clauses	  (ibid),	  as	  in	  ‘[n]owadays	  
there	  is	  the	  School	  of	  Legal	  Practice	  …’	  or	  ‘[y]ou’ve	  got	  your	  own	  law	  reports.	  You’ve	  got	  your	  
own	  work,	  you’ve	  got	  your	  own	  telephone’	  etc.	  With	  this	  background	  in	  mind,	  I	  turn	  now	  to	  the	  
codes	  I	  actually	  used	  to	  unpack	  the	  representation	  of	  social	  action.	  	  
The	  primary	  codes	  I	  used	  to	  code	  social	  action	  were	  Van	  Leeuwen’s	  distinctions	  between	  
active/passive,	  transactive/non-­‐transactive	  and	  semiotic/material	  forms	  of	  action.	  All	  these	  
sub-­‐categories	  are	  implicated	  in	  constituting	  power:	  Powerful	  actors	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  
positioned	  as	  active	  in	  social	  action,	  as	  extending	  their	  power	  over	  objects	  (transactive	  action)	  
and	  as	  carrying	  out	  actions	  that	  are	  more	  closely	  situated	  to	  processes	  in	  the	  mind	  rather	  than	  
carried	  out	  in	  the	  physical	  world.	  
5.1.1	   Active/passive	  positioning	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  social	  action	  	  
Strictly	  speaking,	  determining	  whether	  legal	  professionals	  were	  active	  or	  passive	  in	  relation	  to	  
the	  social	  actions	  in	  which	  they	  were	  represented	  as	  engaging,	  belongs	  to	  Van	  Leeuwen’s	  
category	  of	  role	  allocation	  (2008:	  32),	  a	  socio-­‐semantic	  category	  pertaining	  to	  social	  actors	  
rather	  than	  social	  action.	  From	  my	  point	  of	  view,	  coding	  the	  social	  action	  as	  passive	  or	  active	  in	  
relation	  to	  a	  particular	  set	  of	  actors	  such	  as	  legal	  professionals	  conveys	  information	  both	  about	  




(i.e.	  both	  ‘who’	  and	  ‘what’).	  I	  was	  therefore	  comfortable	  with	  utilizing	  this	  code	  pair	  under	  the	  
rubric	  of	  social	  action.	  In	  accordance	  with	  the	  system	  of	  transitivity	  outlined	  immediately	  
above,	  activation/passivation	  can	  be	  studied	  by	  paying	  attention	  to	  the	  grammatical	  participant	  
roles	  assigned	  to	  social	  actors.	  Thus	  activated	  social	  actors	  are	  coded	  as	  the	  actors	  in	  material	  
clauses,	  behavers	  in	  behavioural	  clauses,	  sensors	  in	  mental	  clauses,	  sayers	  in	  verbal	  clauses,	  
and	  so	  on;	  passivated	  actors	  are	  coded	  as	  the	  recipients	  or	  clients	  in	  material	  clauses,	  receivers	  
in	  verbal	  clauses	  or	  assignees	  in	  relational	  clauses	  (Halliday,	  2004:	  260).	  In	  example	  4.3	  the	  
addressee	  of	  the	  lecturer’s	  talk	  –	  being	  ‘you’	  as	  advocate	  –	  is	  coded	  as	  the	  actor	  in	  a	  series	  of	  
material	  clauses:	  	  
4.3	   You	  work	  on	  your	  own.	  You	  work	  on	  your	  own.	  You	  have	  your	  own	  office,	  you	  have	  your	  
own	  secretary	  which	  you	  appoint	  and	  you	  pay	  for.	  You’ve	  got	  your	  own	  law	  reports.	  
In	  contrast	  ‘secretary’	  is	  passivated	  through	  the	  use	  of	  a	  possessive	  pronoun	  (Van	  Leeuwen,	  
2008:	  33);	  e.g.	  ‘your	  own	  secretary’	  both	  activates	  the	  representation	  of	  ‘you’	  as	  an	  advocate,	  
and	  passivates	  the	  people	  who	  are	  secretaries.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  represents	  the	  action	  
associated	  with	  advocates	  as	  ‘appointing’	  and	  with	  secretaries	  as	  ‘being	  appointed’.	  In	  general,	  
I	  did	  not	  encounter	  any	  real	  problems	  in	  coding	  actions	  as	  active	  or	  passive	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  
relationship	  to	  the	  particular	  legal	  professional.	  	  
5.1.2	   Transactive/non-­‐transactive	  social	  action	  	  
Van	  Leeuwen	  clearly	  regards	  the	  next	  pair	  of	  codes	  –	  whether	  the	  action	  was	  represented	  as	  
transactive	  or	  non-­‐transactive	  –	  as	  a	  sociosemantic	  choice	  pertaining	  to	  social	  action	  (ibid:	  60).	  
Transactive	  actions	  always	  involve	  two	  participants:	  the	  ‘actor’	  and	  the	  ‘goal’	  –	  being	  the	  
person,	  phenomenon	  or	  thing	  to	  or	  over	  which	  the	  process	  extends	  (example	  4.4).	  Non-­‐
transactive	  actions	  involve	  only	  one	  participant	  (ibid,	  example	  4.5).	  As	  noted	  in	  Appendix	  5B,	  
non-­‐transactive	  action	  tends	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  less	  powerful	  social	  groups	  (ibid)	  
4.4	   [I]f	  you’re	  a	  natural	  lawyer,	  you	  must	  have	  a	  system	  -­‐	  somewhere	  -­‐	  against	  which	  you	  
can	  test	  your	  positive	  law.	  




One	  of	  the	  more	  vexing	  questions	  I	  encountered	  when	  undertaking	  the	  coding	  was	  whether	  
actions	  in	  which	  legal	  professionals	  were	  coded	  as	  passive	  were	  necessarily	  non-­‐transactive.	  
Example	  4.6,	  for	  instance,	  is	  taken	  from	  the	  set	  of	  quotations	  dealing	  with	  the	  generic	  category	  
of	  the	  lawyer.	  In	  this	  extract,	  the	  lawyer	  is	  being	  addressed	  by	  the	  judge	  and	  in	  the	  moment	  
that	  he	  is	  being	  addressed	  he	  is	  passive	  (notwithstanding	  that	  he	  may	  in	  turn	  be	  addressing	  the	  
judge	  in	  the	  next	  moment).	  As	  the	  goal	  of	  the	  judge’s	  verbal	  process,	  it	  seemed	  strained	  to	  say	  
that	  ‘being	  addressed’	  is	  a	  process	  that	  extends	  to	  the	  judge	  in	  a	  similar	  fashion,	  even	  though	  
there	  are	  clearly	  two	  participants	  in	  the	  clause.	  	  
4.6	   [I]f	  the	  judge	  asks	  you	  ‘Please	  address	  me	  on	  the	  following	  point	  …	  
For	  this	  reason	  my	  coding	  of	  non-­‐transactive	  action	  encompasses	  (a)	  situations	  where	  the	  legal	  
professional	  is	  active	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  action,	  but	  the	  action	  does	  not	  extend	  to	  any	  particular	  
goal;	  and	  (b)	  situations	  where	  the	  legal	  professional	  is	  passive	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  action.	  	  
For	  all	  transactive	  actions	  I	  sought	  also	  to	  identify	  the	  goal	  or	  ‘object’	  of	  the	  action.	  This	  
entailed	  paying	  attention	  to	  the	  object	  following	  a	  transactive	  verb.	  In	  this	  I	  allowed	  myself	  to	  
be	  led	  by	  the	  data	  in	  conjunction	  with	  my	  knowledge	  of	  the	  discipline	  of	  law.	  In	  example	  4.7,	  for	  
instance,	  the	  object	  of	  the	  advocate’s	  action	  of	  ‘getting’	  is	  ‘precedents’	  which	  is	  a	  concept	  
familiar	  to	  me	  as	  the	  statements	  on	  the	  law	  that	  emerge	  from	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  courts.	  This	  I	  
coded	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  more	  generic	  category	  ‘law’.	  In	  example	  4.8	  the	  object	  of	  ‘impressing’	  is	  
‘the	  people’	  which	  it	  is	  clear	  from	  the	  context	  are	  the	  legal	  professional’s	  clients.	  The	  client	  is	  
similarly	  the	  object	  in	  example	  4.9,	  though	  now	  backgrounded	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘court	  work’.	  	  	  
4.7	   So	  he	  will	  get	  all	  the	  precedents	  that	  is	  in	  favour	  of	  your	  case.	  
4.8	   You	  must	  impress	  the	  people.	  
4.9	   The	  advocates	  do	  the	  court	  work.	  
Whilst	  the	  distinction	  between	  active/passive	  and	  transactive/non-­‐transactive	  social	  actions	  (as	  
well	  as	  the	  distinction	  between	  material/semiotic	  action	  described	  below)	  applied	  to	  all	  the	  
social	  actions	  identified	  (thus	  enabling	  me	  to	  present	  ‘quasi-­‐statistics’	  on	  the	  patterning	  of	  
these	  particular	  codes),	  the	  various	  objects	  that	  emerged	  from	  the	  lecture	  material	  were	  more	  




professionals	  and	  clients	  emerged	  as	  the	  dominant	  categories)	  and	  at	  times	  an	  action	  extended	  
to	  more	  than	  one	  object.	  In	  example	  4.10,	  for	  instance,	  the	  judge’s	  action	  of	  judging	  a	  case	  
extends,	  firstly,	  to	  the	  legal	  parties	  involved	  in	  the	  case	  before	  him	  or	  her	  and,	  secondly,	  to	  
what	  I	  termed	  ‘ultimate	  outcomes’	  –	  avoidance	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  chaos.	  	  
	   4.10	   [I]f	  you	  judge	  a	  case,	  you	  are	  not,	  you	  must	  avoid	  creating	  chaos.	  
The	  objects	  in	  my	  data	  were	  thus	  not	  capable	  of	  quantitative	  measurement	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  
the	  other	  codes	  within	  the	  category	  of	  social	  action.	  The	  various	  objects	  that	  emerged	  from	  my	  
lecture	  material	  are	  fully	  described	  in	  chapter	  five.	  
5.1.3	   Material/semiotic	  action	  	  
Van	  Leeuwen’s	  distinction	  between	  material	  and	  semiotic	  action	  expresses	  a	  choice	  between	  
representing	  an	  action	  as	  ‘doing’	  or	  ‘meaning’	  (2008:	  59).	  The	  former,	  related	  to	  the	  material	  
process	  clause	  in	  the	  Hallidayean	  transitivity	  system,	  represents	  an	  action	  that	  has,	  at	  least	  
potentially,	  a	  material	  purpose	  or	  effect	  on	  a	  participant	  in	  the	  clause,	  which	  may	  be	  any	  
abstract	  or	  concrete	  thing	  (ibid:	  59	  –	  60).	  The	  latter	  is	  represented	  as	  occurring	  within	  the	  realm	  
of	  inner	  experience	  and	  is	  thus	  associated	  with	  mental	  and	  verbal	  process	  clauses	  (ibid:	  60).	  
One	  of	  the	  difficulties	  with	  this	  distinction,	  raised	  at	  one	  of	  the	  sessions	  at	  which	  I	  presented	  to	  
the	  PhD	  group	  of	  which	  I	  formed	  part,	  was	  that	  ‘doing’	  also	  involves	  a	  mental	  element.	  Thus,	  
while	  I	  had	  categorized	  ‘drafting’	  as	  a	  material	  rather	  than	  a	  semiotic	  action,	  members	  of	  the	  
group	  argued	  that	  the	  act	  of	  ‘drafting’,	  as	  contemplated	  in	  example	  4.11,	  is	  a	  mental	  rather	  
than	  a	  material	  process	  that	  requires	  considerable	  intellectual	  skills.	  	  
4.11	   [O]ur	  laws	  are	  not	  drafted	  with	  any	  kind	  of	  elegance,	  ours	  laws	  are	  very	  poorly	  drafted	  
in	  this	  country.	  …	  	  But	  in	  South	  Africa	  we	  don’t	  make	  good	  laws,	  they’re	  drafted	  by	  civil	  
servants	  …	  so	  …	  your	  bright	  lawyers	  are	  in	  private	  practice.	  And	  only	  the	  duds	  go	  into	  
civil	  service	  and	  they	  draft	  laws.	  
Employing	  Van	  Leeuwen’s	  definition	  of	  material	  action,	  however,	  there	  is	  clearly	  a	  material	  
effect	  on	  a	  participant	  (‘laws’)	  in	  this	  extract.	  Moreover,	  from	  my	  experience	  working	  for	  a	  legal	  
consultancy,	  the	  connotation	  of	  the	  word	  ‘draft’	  evoked	  an	  effect	  on	  a	  concrete	  thing;	  i.e.	  a	  




deleting	  and	  amending	  certain	  sections,	  fixing	  commas	  and	  inserting	  full	  stops	  and	  so	  on.	  The	  
presence	  or	  absence	  of	  a	  mental	  element	  was	  therefore	  not	  the	  central	  distinguishing	  feature	  
between	  material	  and	  semiotic	  action,	  but	  was	  rather	  whether	  the	  action	  had	  a	  ‘material’	  effect	  
on	  any	  thing.	  On	  this	  basis,	  however,	  most	  of	  the	  actions	  undertaken	  by	  the	  legal	  professionals	  
in	  my	  sample	  would	  have	  been	  coded	  as	  material,	  rather	  than	  semiotic.	  Van	  Leeuwen’s	  
categories	  in	  this	  instance	  did	  not	  assist	  in	  capturing	  a	  subtle	  difference	  in	  the	  data	  between	  
actions	  that	  are	  more	  or	  less	  tied	  to	  a	  physical,	  concrete	  context.	  This	  is	  evident	  when	  one	  
contrasts	  the	  action	  of	  ‘drafting’	  laws,	  as	  outlined	  above,	  with	  an	  action	  such	  as	  ‘creating’	  laws.	  
The	  latter	  is	  more	  clearly	  associated	  with	  law	  as	  a	  normative	  system,	  rather	  than	  as	  document	  
upon	  which	  the	  legal	  drafter	  toils.	  ‘Create’	  is	  also	  a	  more	  general	  term	  than	  ‘draft’.	  For	  this	  
reason,	  my	  distinction	  between	  material	  and	  semiotic	  actions	  differs	  somewhat	  from	  Van	  
Leeuwen’s.	  In	  working	  with	  the	  data	  I	  coded	  action	  as	  ‘material’	  if	  a	  material	  process	  clause	  was	  
present	  and	  if	  the	  action	  was	  more	  closely	  linked	  to	  a	  physical,	  concrete	  context.	  Semiotic	  
action	  encompassed	  mental	  and	  verbal	  process	  clauses	  as	  well	  as	  material	  process	  clauses	  that	  
involved	  semiotic	  rather	  than	  material	  participants	  or	  where	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  action	  was	  more	  
semiotic	  than	  material	  in	  nature.	  The	  generality	  of	  the	  action	  was	  an	  important	  pointer	  in	  this	  
regard.	  
5.2	   Circumstances	  of	  Social	  Action	  	  
In	  order	  to	  code	  the	  circumstances	  of	  legal	  professionals,	  I	  relied	  on	  three	  sub-­‐categories:	  
Resources,	  location	  and	  emotion.	  	  
5.2.1	   Resources	  	  
For	  purposes	  of	  describing	  representation	  of	  the	  resources	  of	  legal	  professionals,	  I	  was	  largely	  
on	  my	  own,	  as	  this	  aspect	  was	  not	  covered	  by	  any	  of	  the	  authors	  upon	  whom	  I	  relied.	  I	  read	  and	  
also	  searched	  the	  transcripts	  for	  the	  verbs	  ‘have’,	  ‘need’	  and	  ‘get’	  as	  I	  found	  that	  the	  objects	  of	  
these	  verbs	  generally	  indexed	  the	  resources	  in	  the	  text.	  I	  included	  within	  this	  category	  both	  
reference	  to	  tangible,	  physical	  resources	  (as	  in	  example	  4.12)	  and	  intangible	  resources	  




4.12	   [B]ut	  if	  you	  are	  in	  a	  profession	  you	  must	  have	  a	  car,	  you	  must	  have	  a	  cellphone	  …	  
4.13	   You	  must	  have	  a	  very	  good	  reputation.	  
5.2.2	   Emotion	  
From	  the	  work	  of	  Martin	  and	  Rose	  on	  appraisal,	  I	  drew	  only	  from	  their	  exposition	  on	  the	  
representation	  of	  affect	  (2004:	  24–27).	  Halliday’s	  mental	  and	  behavioural	  process	  clauses	  also	  
assisted	  in	  identifying	  sections	  of	  the	  text	  that	  dealt	  with	  emotion.	  The	  two	  main	  sub-­‐
categorizations	  I	  found	  to	  be	  useful	  were	  whether	  the	  affect	  was	  positive	  or	  negative	  in	  nature,	  
and	  whether	  the	  representation	  of	  emotion	  was	  direct	  or	  implicit.	  It	  was	  not	  particularly	  
difficult	  to	  identify	  an	  emotion	  as	  positive	  (example	  4.14)	  or	  negative	  in	  nature	  (example	  4.15)	  
(although	  as	  I	  proceeded	  with	  the	  analysis	  it	  struck	  me	  how	  much	  this	  depends	  on	  general	  
cultural	  understandings).	  Emotions	  represented	  directly	  (both	  examples	  4.14	  and	  4.15)	  were	  
also	  fairly	  easy	  to	  spot.	  	  
The	  indirect	  representation	  of	  emotions	  was	  more	  challenging	  and	  involved	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  
mechanisms.	  More	  than	  representation	  of	  the	  behavioural	  manifestations	  of	  emotion	  which	  
Martin	  and	  Rose	  put	  forward	  as	  clear	  examples	  of	  the	  indirect	  expression	  of	  emotion	  (ibid:	  26),	  
I	  found	  that	  in	  many	  cases	  the	  lecturer’s	  description	  of	  the	  conditions	  surrounding	  a	  particular	  
action	  (as	  in	  example	  4.16,	  where	  one	  can	  imagine	  the	  emotional	  toll	  of	  working	  18	  hours	  a	  
day),	  or	  the	  expression	  of	  a	  reaction	  to	  those	  conditions	  (as	  in	  example	  4.17	  where	  the	  
lecturer’s	  insertion	  of	  a	  ‘thank	  heavens’	  indexes	  an	  emotional	  relationship	  of	  aversion	  to	  
working	  in	  the	  matrimonial	  courts),	  served	  to	  index	  a	  particular	  emotion.	  	  	  
4.14	   I	  send	  him	  off	  to	  jail	  and	  I	  feel	  wonderful	  you	  know	  I	  say	  ‘rot	  in	  hell	  I	  hope	  you	  never	  
come	  out.’	  
4.15	   And	  of	  course,	  you	  know,	  I	  was	  tired,	  I	  was	  irritated	  um	  uh	  I	  was	  cross	  with	  this	  man,	  I	  
was	  cross	  with	  my	  colleagues,	  cross	  with	  the	  world	  
4.16	   I	  didn’t	  know	  that	  I	  was	  just	  working	  18	  hours	  a	  day	  trying	  to	  get	  these	  mountains	  of	  
files	  out	  of	  my	  office.	  
4.17	   [W]hen	  I	  was	  a	  magistrate	  I	  had	  to	  serve	  for	  a	  uh	  limited	  period	  of	  time	  thank	  heavens	  in	  
the	  um	  matrimonial	  court.	  




In	  order	  to	  determine	  representation	  of	  the	  location	  of	  legal	  professionals	  I	  paid	  attention	  to	  
any	  description	  of	  the	  physical	  space	  in	  which	  legal	  professionals	  were	  located	  (example	  4.18);	  
to	  the	  object	  of	  the	  preposition	  ‘in’	  (or,	  less	  commonly,	  ‘into’	  or	  ‘from)	  (example	  4.19);	  and	  the	  
lecturer’s	  use	  of	  the	  word	  ‘go’	  or	  ‘go	  to’	  (example	  4.20).	  	  
4.18	   And	  there	  I	  got	  a	  corner	  office,	  a	  beautiful	  large	  office	  with	  an	  inter-­‐leading	  door	  to	  my	  
secretary’s	  office	  
4.19	   [Y]ou	  are	  admitted	  in	  court	  as	  an	  attorney.	  
4.20	   So	  please,	  if	  you	  go	  to,	  if	  you	  go	  to	  a	  firm	  of	  attorneys	  …	  
5.3	   Social	  Actors	  
For	  purposes	  of	  the	  representation	  of	  legal	  professionals	  as	  social	  actors	  I	  drew	  upon	  Van	  
Leeuwen’s	  distinctions	  between	  classification,	  categorization	  and	  nomination	  (though	  not	  in	  
the	  hierarchy	  in	  which	  he	  develops	  them	  –	  see	  2008:	  40	  –	  45)	  in	  addition	  to	  whether	  the	  social	  
actors	  with	  whom	  legal	  professionals	  were	  represented	  as	  interacting	  were	  included	  or	  
excluded	  in	  the	  action.	  	  
5.3.1	   Classification	  and	  categorization	  
The	  distinction	  between	  nomination	  and	  categorization	  rests	  upon	  whether	  social	  actors	  are	  
represented	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  unique	  identity	  or	  whether	  they	  are	  represented	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  
identities	  and	  functions	  they	  share	  with	  others	  (ibid).	  Classification	  in	  turn	  is	  presented	  by	  Van	  
Leeuwen	  as	  a	  sub-­‐category	  of	  categorization	  whereby	  social	  actors	  are	  identified	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  
the	  major	  categories	  by	  which	  a	  particular	  society	  differentiates	  among	  classes	  of	  people	  (ibid:	  
43).	  For	  purposes	  of	  this	  research	  I	  regarded	  the	  classifications	  of	  gender,	  race	  and	  class	  as	  
being	  most	  significant.	  Linguistically,	  classifications	  (like	  categorizations	  more	  broadly)	  usually	  
appear	  as	  classifiers	  in	  nominal	  groups,	  such	  as	  ‘the	  white	  judge’,	  or	  ‘the	  middle-­‐aged	  
magistrate’	  (ibid).	  For	  gender	  classification,	  however,	  I	  found	  that	  the	  most	  prominent	  marker	  
was	  pronoun	  usage,	  whilst	  for	  class	  classifications	  contextual	  understandings	  played	  a	  more	  
significant	  role.	  In	  example	  4.21,	  for	  instance,	  the	  lecturer’s	  reference	  to	  the	  earning	  capacity	  of	  
a	  senior	  advocate	  clearly	  situates	  the	  particular	  legal	  professional	  type	  as	  within	  the	  class	  of	  
high	  earners,	  but	  this	  depends	  on	  one’s	  contextual	  understanding	  that	  an	  annual	  salary	  of	  four	  




member	  of	  the	  higher	  classes	  is	  in	  turn	  suggested	  by	  the	  description	  of	  his	  speaking	  voice	  as	  
‘very	  civilized’.	  	  
4.21	   And	  a	  very	  civilized	  English	  voice	  on	  the	  other	  side:’	  Excuse	  me,	  but	  um	  may	  I	  please	  talk	  
with	  magistrate	  Serfontein?’	  
4.22	   And	  a	  senior	  advocate,	  well	  as	  I	  said,	  gets	  from	  four	  to	  five	  up	  to	  eight	  million	  in	  a	  year.	  
Racial	  classifications	  involved	  classifiers	  in	  nominal	  groups	  as	  well	  as	  contextual	  understandings.	  
In	  addition	  to	  these	  three	  sub-­‐categories,	  I	  also	  paid	  attention	  to	  the	  classifiers	  in	  nominal	  
groups	  more	  generally,	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  whether	  there	  were	  any	  patterns	  evident	  in	  the	  
identification	  of	  legal	  professionals	  in	  terms	  of	  group	  features.	  Apart	  from	  racial,	  gender	  and	  
class	  classifications	  I	  paid	  attention	  to	  other	  classifiers	  in	  the	  nominal	  group	  and	  these	  I	  
discussed	  under	  the	  rubric	  of	  ‘categorization’.	  
5.3.2	   Nominations	  
For	  each	  legal	  professional	  role	  I	  identified	  nominations.	  These	  usually	  imply	  a	  special	  sort	  of	  
status.	  Van	  Leeuwen	  points	  out	  that	  in	  stories	  nameless	  characters	  fulfill	  only	  passing,	  
functional	  roles	  and	  do	  not	  become	  points	  of	  identification	  for	  readers	  or	  listeners	  (ibid:	  41).	  
Nomination	  is	  typically	  realized	  by	  proper	  nouns	  (example	  4.23).	  	  
4.23	   But	  sometimes	  you	  get	  a	  very	  good	  attorney.	  Like	  Dr	  Dale	  now	  …	  
My	  identification	  of	  nominations	  fed	  into	  my	  study	  of	  gender	  and	  race	  classification	  as	  I	  was	  
able	  to	  use	  my	  knowledge	  of	  the	  South	  African	  legal	  profession	  to	  know	  whether	  the	  lecturer	  
was	  speaking	  about	  a	  male	  or	  female,	  or	  a	  black	  or	  white	  person.	  	  
5.3.3	   Inclusion/exclusion	  of	  social	  actors69	  	  
The	  reasons	  for	  including	  or	  excluding	  social	  actors	  may	  be	  varied:	  Their	  inclusion	  may	  be	  
tangential	  and	  thus	  trivial	  to	  the	  main	  themes	  of	  the	  utterance	  or	  it	  may	  be	  assumed	  that	  
readers	  already	  know	  who	  the	  social	  actors	  are	  so	  that	  inclusion	  would	  be	  over-­‐communicative	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  The	  reader	  can	  here	  note	  that	  in	  the	  legal	  profession	  there	  are	  specific	  terms	  to	  designate	  the	  social	  actors	  with	  
whom	  legal	  professionals	  engage.	  The	  attorney	  or	  advocate	  would	  engage	  with	  ‘clients’	  but	  the	  same	  people	  
would	  be	  ‘parties’	  before	  judges	  or	  magistrates.	  The	  same	  person	  might	  be	  an	  ‘accused’	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  public	  
prosecutor	  or	  magistrate	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  criminal	  trial.	  I	  have	  utilized	  this	  nomenclature	  in	  the	  analytical	  tables	  




(ibid:	  30).	  Alternately,	  the	  exclusion	  of	  certain	  social	  actors	  may	  be	  motivated	  in	  order	  to	  block	  
access	  to	  more	  detailed	  knowledge	  of	  a	  practice,	  or	  it	  may	  signify	  the	  play	  of	  power	  in	  discourse	  
–	  the	  automatic	  exclusion	  of	  certain	  social	  actors	  as	  a	  manner	  of	  knowing	  and	  speaking,	  which	  
disguises	  the	  underlying	  power	  relations	  between	  those	  actors	  (ibid:	  30).	  Inclusion	  is	  relatively	  
easy	  to	  spot	  –	  the	  use	  of	  proper	  or	  common	  nouns	  to	  designate	  particular	  people	  or	  groups	  of	  
people.	  Exclusion	  occurs	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  wider	  variety	  of	  linguistic	  mechanisms.70	  The	  excluded	  
actor	  may	  not	  be	  mentioned	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  specific	  action,	  but	  they	  could	  be	  present	  
elsewhere	  in	  the	  text.	  The	  ‘classic’	  mechanism	  of	  passive	  agent	  deletion	  (as	  in	  example	  4.24,	  
where	  the	  firm	  of	  attorneys	  is	  present	  through	  their	  action	  of	  ‘frowning	  upon’	  the	  cession)	  also	  
serves	  to	  exclude	  social	  actors.	  
4.24	   The	  contract	  may	  be	  ceded,	  but	  it	  is	  frowned	  upon,	  it	  is	  not	  something	  you	  must	  try	  and	  
do.	  
Nominalizations	  and	  process	  nouns	  similarly	  allow	  for	  the	  exclusion	  of	  social	  actors.	  
Nominalization	  involves	  the	  conversion	  of	  a	  verb	  (‘to	  create’)	  into	  a	  noun-­‐like	  word	  (‘creation’),	  
and	  thus	  semantically,	  the	  conversion	  of	  a	  process	  into	  an	  entity	  (Fairclough,	  2003:	  143).	  In	  the	  
process	  social	  actors	  may	  be	  excluded,	  as	  in	  example	  4.25	  where	  the	  clients	  who	  are	  applying	  
for	  mineral	  rights	  are	  excluded	  through	  the	  nominalization	  ‘application’.	  	  
4.25	  	  	  	  If	  there’s	  an	  application	  for	  the	  prospecting	  of	  new	  mineral	  rights,	  then	  obviously	  you	  can	  
appoint	  uh	  Dr	  Dale	  uh	  to	  appear	  in	  the	  High	  Court.	  
Process	  nouns	  are	  part	  of	  the	  nominal	  (noun)	  vocabulary	  of	  English	  but	  belong	  to	  a	  particular	  
sub-­‐category	  with	  a	  special	  connection	  with	  verbs	  (and	  thus	  processes)	  (ibid).	  Examples	  include	  
‘activities’,	  ‘progress’	  and	  ‘support’.	  In	  example	  4.26	  the	  word	  ‘support’	  is	  used	  twice,	  each	  time	  
concealing	  a	  different	  set	  of	  agents:	  
4.26	   Um	  (clears	  throat),	  three	  things	  that	  you	  must	  have	  tech	  …	  formally.	  LLB,	  six	  month’s	  
pupilage	  without	  payment,	  nobody	  pays	  you,	  you	  must	  have	  financial	  support	  to	  live	  for	  
six	  months,	  uh,	  without	  support	  uh	  to	  live	  for	  six	  months	  without	  a	  salary.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70	  For	  purposes	  of	  the	  analysis	  I	  did	  not	  consider	  it	  necessary	  to	  rely	  on	  Van	  Leeuwen’s	  further	  distinctions	  




In	  the	  first	  instance,	  ‘support’	  could	  refer	  to	  a	  spouse	  or	  family	  members	  who	  would	  support	  
the	  would-­‐be	  advocate	  or	  ‘pupil’	  during	  her	  six-­‐month	  period	  of	  pupilage.	  In	  the	  second	  
instance,	  ‘support’	  is	  referring	  to	  the	  advocate	  to	  whom	  a	  pupil	  is	  assigned,	  who	  does	  not	  
support	  the	  pupil	  with	  a	  salary.	  	  
5.4	   Values	  	  
My	  coding	  of	  legitimations	  of	  legal	  professionals	  themselves	  and	  legal	  professional	  work	  
respectively,	  both	  proceeded	  along	  two	  dimensions.	  For	  legal	  professionals	  themselves,	  I	  simply	  
sought	  to	  determine	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  legitimation	  (positive	  assessment)	  or	  a	  delegitimation	  
(negative	  assessment).	  For	  legal	  professional	  work	  I	  distinguished	  whether	  the	  legitimation	  
indexed	  an	  internal	  or	  an	  external	  good.	  For	  both	  legal	  professionals	  themselves	  and	  legal	  
professional	  work	  I	  examined	  whether	  the	  legitimation/delegitimation	  took	  the	  form	  of	  a	  
reference	  to	  authority,	  moral	  evaluation,	  purposive	  construction	  or	  the	  use	  of	  mythopoesis.	  	  
5.4.1	   Internal/external	  goods	  
As	  noted	  above,	  my	  distinction	  between	  internal	  and	  external	  goods	  was	  drawn	  on	  that	  
established	  by	  MacIntyre	  in	  After	  Virtue	  (1981).	  MacIntyre	  situates	  his	  understanding	  of	  
internal	  and	  external	  goods	  within	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘practice’	  which	  he	  defines	  as	  ‘any	  coherent	  
and	  complex	  form	  of	  socially	  established	  cooperative	  human	  activity	  through	  which	  goods	  
internal	  to	  that	  form	  of	  activity	  are	  realized	  in	  the	  course	  of	  trying	  to	  achieve	  those	  standards	  of	  
excellence	  which	  are	  appropriate	  to,	  and	  partially	  definitive	  of	  that	  form	  of	  activity	  …’	  (ibid:	  
175).	  Accurately	  capturing	  the	  internal	  goods	  of	  a	  practice	  is	  not	  easily	  achieved:	  Firstly	  because	  
they	  can	  only	  be	  specified	  in	  terms	  of	  some	  particular	  practice	  and	  by	  means	  of	  examples	  from	  
such	  practice;	  secondly,	  because	  ‘they	  can	  only	  be	  identified	  and	  recognized	  by	  the	  experience	  
of	  participating	  in	  the	  practice	  in	  question.	  Those	  who	  lack	  the	  relevant	  experience	  are	  
incompetent	  thereby	  as	  judges	  of	  internal	  goods’	  (ibid:	  176).	  Given	  what	  I	  have	  already	  noted	  
about	  the	  ‘Outsider-­‐I’	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  chapter	  three,	  I	  was	  aware	  of	  my	  own	  possible	  
deficiencies	  in	  this	  regard.	  MacIntyre,	  however,	  provides	  some	  guidelines	  in	  the	  recognition	  of	  
internal	  goods:	  They	  are	  integrally	  linked	  to	  the	  standards	  of	  excellence	  of	  the	  practice	  and	  




(ibid:	  178).	  This	  also	  entails	  ‘subordinating	  ourselves	  within	  the	  practice	  in	  our	  relationship	  to	  
other	  practitioners’	  (ibid).	  They	  are,	  furthermore,	  those	  goods	  that	  are	  transmuted	  with	  the	  
history	  of	  the	  activity	  (ibid:	  181)	  and	  they	  are	  always	  more	  than	  a	  set	  of	  technical	  skills	  (ibid:	  
180).	  External	  goods	  are	  more	  easily	  recognized,	  being	  those	  that	  are	  ‘externally	  and	  
contingently’	  attached	  to	  the	  practice	  ‘by	  the	  accidents	  of	  social	  circumstance’	  (ibid:	  176).	  They	  
typically	  take	  the	  form	  of	  prestige,	  status	  and	  money	  (ibid).	  When	  achieved	  they	  are	  always	  
some	  individual’s	  property	  and	  possession	  (ibid:	  178).	  It	  is	  a	  characteristic	  feature	  of	  external	  
goods	  that	  the	  more	  someone	  has	  of	  them,	  the	  less	  there	  is	  for	  other	  people	  and	  they	  are	  thus	  
typically	  objects	  of	  competition	  (ibid).	  The	  achievement	  of	  internal	  goods,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  
a	  good	  for	  the	  whole	  community	  who	  participates	  in	  the	  practice	  (ibid).	  MacIntyre	  emphasizes,	  
however,	  that	  external	  goods	  genuinely	  are	  goods	  that	  ‘no	  one	  can	  despise	  …altogether	  
without	  a	  certain	  hypocrisy’	  (ibid:	  183).	  It	  is	  internal	  goods,	  however,	  which	  are	  central	  to	  
maintaining	  the	  integrity	  and	  meaningfulness	  of	  the	  practice.	  	  
MacIntyre’s	  characterization	  of	  external	  goods	  assisted	  me	  in	  identifying	  them	  reasonably	  
easily	  in	  the	  text.	  In	  example	  4.27,	  for	  instance,	  status	  and	  power	  are	  indexed	  by	  the	  adjectival	  
phrase	  ‘hugely	  influential’,	  while	  in	  example	  4.28	  material	  rewards	  and	  status	  are	  present	  
through	  the	  references	  to	  ‘a	  better	  salary’	  and	  ‘more	  senior	  work’.	  	  
4.27	   So	  the	  chief	  magistrate	  is	  a	  hugely	  influential	  political	  person.	  
4.28	   Stay	  on	  a	  little	  while	  as	  a	  professional	  assistant	  or	  associate,	  uh,	  it’s	  at	  a	  better	  salary	  
and	  there	  you	  get	  more	  senior	  work.	  
Identifying	  the	  internal	  goods	  associated	  with	  legal	  professional	  work	  was	  much	  more	  tricky.	  
Here	  an	  ability	  to	  identify	  legitimations	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  form	  (explained	  below)	  was	  of	  real	  
assistance	  because	  they	  pointed	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  an	  internal	  good.	  In	  example	  4.29,	  for	  
instance,	  the	  purpose	  of	  bringing	  accused	  persons	  to	  court	  13	  is	  signaled	  as	  not	  letting	  them	  
‘rot’	  in	  jail.	  The	  internal	  goods	  lying	  behind	  this	  statement	  constitute	  a	  rich	  and	  well-­‐developed	  
set	  of	  principles	  relating	  to	  fairness	  in	  the	  administration	  of	  justice	  and	  upholding	  the	  rights	  of	  
accused	  persons.	  	  
4.29	   In	  order	  not	  to	  let	  the	  people	  rot	  in	  jail,	  you	  bring	  them	  to	  the	  magistrates’	  court	  to	  what	  




In	  general,	  however,	  I	  found	  the	  identification	  of	  internal	  goods	  fairly	  challenging	  and	  seemed	  
to	  rely	  very	  heavily	  on	  contextual	  understandings	  derived	  from	  my	  experience	  of	  participation	  
in	  the	  discipline	  of	  law	  (and	  that	  only	  from	  an	  academic	  perspective).	  
5.4.2	   Authority,	  moral	  evaluation,	  rationalization	  and	  mythopoesis	  	  
For	  the	  form	  in	  which	  values	  were	  expressed	  I	  relied	  on	  Van	  Leeuwen’s	  four	  categories	  of	  
legitimation:	  Authority,	  moral	  evaluation,	  rationalization	  and	  mythopoesis	  (2008:	  105	  –	  106).	  	  
Authorization	  is	  legitimation	  by	  fiat,	  where	  the	  answer	  to	  the	  spoken	  or	  unspoken	  ‘why’	  of	  
legitimation	  is	  ‘because	  I	  say	  so’	  or	  ‘because	  so-­‐and-­‐so	  says	  so’	  (ibid:	  106).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  
authorization,	  there	  may	  have	  been	  a	  time	  when	  the	  purpose	  and	  underlying	  moral	  values	  of	  
the	  social	  action	  being	  legitimized	  were	  made	  explicit,	  but	  over	  time	  –	  as	  a	  practice	  becomes	  a	  
tradition	  or	  institution	  –	  their	  articulation	  is	  seen	  as	  unnecessary.	  Van	  Leeuwen	  distinguishes	  
among	  a	  variety	  of	  forms	  of	  authorization	  which	  differ	  according	  to	  the	  agent	  or	  ‘force’	  from	  
which	  the	  authorization	  proceeds	  and	  their	  corresponding	  typical	  linguistic	  realizations	  (ibid:	  
106	  –	  107).	  Although	  linguistic	  patterns	  signaling	  legitimation	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  authority	  include	  
verbal	  process	  clauses	  in	  which	  the	  projected	  clause	  contains	  some	  form	  of	  obligation	  modality	  
(ibid:	  106)	  and	  verbal	  or	  mental	  process	  clauses	  that	  situate	  an	  ‘expert’	  as	  the	  subject	  (ibid:	  
107).	  In	  example	  4.30,	  which	  involves	  a	  verbal	  process	  clause	  (and	  which	  I	  have	  held	  indexes	  
the	  internal	  good	  of	  rationality	  –	  because	  the	  judge	  must	  provide	  reasons	  for	  his	  decision),	  
accepting	  the	  reasons	  put	  forward	  by	  the	  judge	  must	  flow	  simply	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  speaks	  
as	  a	  judge.	  	  
4.30	   The	  judge	  will,	  when	  he	  starts	  giving	  his	  order,	  just	  before	  that,	  towards	  the	  end,	  he	  will	  
say	  these	  are	  the	  reasons	  why	  I	  decided	  like	  I	  decided.	  
Example	  4.31	  also	  relates	  to	  the	  work	  of	  judges	  and	  signals	  the	  internal	  good	  of	  legal	  certainty.	  
Legitimation	  of	  this	  good	  is	  linked	  to	  the	  judge’s	  decision	  and	  thus	  the	  judge’s	  authority.	  The	  
process	  type	  involved,	  however,	  is	  mental	  rather	  than	  verbal.	  Example	  4.32,	  in	  turn,	  involves	  
the	  legitimation	  of	  the	  deputy	  chief	  justice	  (a	  positive	  evaluation)	  –	  in	  this	  case	  linked	  both	  to	  
his	  occupation	  of	  the	  office	  of	  the	  deputy	  chief	  justice,	  but	  also	  to	  the	  high	  institutional	  status	  




4.31	   But	  in	  general	  the	  judge	  will	  always	  decide	  on	  the	  minimum	  change	  in	  society.	  
4.32	   Who’s	  the	  deputy	  chief	  justice,	  he’s	  on	  sabbatical	  at	  Wits	  now	  …	  he’s	  sitting	  here	  in	  
Wits,	  he’s	  doing	  sabbatical	  work,	  he’s	  also	  the	  chancellor	  of	  this	  university.	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  moral	  evaluation,	  the	  legitimation	  is	  based	  on	  values	  other	  than	  the	  value	  that	  
lies	  in	  the	  recognition	  of	  various	  forms	  of	  authority	  (ibid:	  109).	  According	  to	  Van	  Leeuwen,	  in	  
some	  cases	  moral	  value	  is	  simply	  asserted	  by	  ‘troublesome’	  words	  (such	  as	  ‘good’	  or	  ‘bad’),	  but	  
in	  most	  cases	  moral	  evaluations	  index	  particular	  discourses	  of	  moral	  value.	  For	  example,	  a	  
discourse	  of	  moral	  value	  relating	  to	  law	  might	  be	  indexed	  by	  such	  words	  as	  ‘human	  rights’,	  
‘equality’,	  ‘just’,	  ‘non-­‐arbitrariness’	  and	  so	  on.	  Such	  words,	  however,	  only	  hint	  at	  the	  underlying	  
discourses	  –	  they	  do	  not	  make	  the	  explicit	  and	  debatable.	  As	  Van	  Leeuwen	  puts	  it,	  ‘[t]hey	  
trigger	  a	  moral	  concept,	  but	  are	  detached	  from	  the	  system	  of	  interpretation	  from	  which	  they	  
derive	  …’	  (ibid:	  110).	  There	  is	  as	  a	  result	  no	  explicit,	  linguistically	  motivated	  method	  for	  
identifying	  moral	  evaluations	  –	  they	  can	  only	  be	  ‘recognized’	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  ‘our	  commonsense	  
cultural	  knowledge’	  (ibid).	  Nevertheless,	  it	  was	  helpful	  to	  know	  that	  a	  few	  linguistic	  forms	  point	  
to	  the	  presence	  of	  moral	  evaluation	  in	  texts	  (ibid:	  110).	  These	  include	  evaluative	  adjectives	  (as	  
in	  example	  4.33),	  abstractions	  (as	  in	  example	  4.34	  where	  the	  quality	  that	  is	  distilled	  from	  the	  
social	  practice	  of	  being	  a	  public	  prosecutor	  is	  boredom)	  and	  analogies	  (as	  in	  example	  4.35	  
where	  the	  role	  of	  legal	  academics	  in	  producing	  research	  for	  publication	  in	  legal	  journals	  is	  
delegitimated	  through	  comparison	  with	  a	  mouse	  running	  around	  and	  around,	  senselessly,	  in	  its	  
wheel).	  
4.33	   When	  I	  was	  a	  when	  I	  was	  a	  specialist	  prosecutor	  one	  of	  my	  glorious	  cases	  that	  I	  
prosecuted	  was	  sommer	  a	  very	  quick	  case	  that	  was	  sent	  to	  my	  court.	  
4.34	   Um	  it’s	  not	  boring	  like	  being	  a	  public	  prosecutor.	  
4.35	   [T]he	  only	  people	  reading	  journal	  articles,	  learned	  journal	  articles,	  are	  the	  thirty	  percent	  
of	  academics	  who	  are	  involved	  in	  the	  publishing	  of	  those	  articles	  …	  [the]	  …	  other	  …	  
seventy	  percent	  of	  the	  other	  academics	  never	  read	  it.	  So	  you	  know	  it’s	  a	  you	  know	  it’s	  a	  
its	  like	  a	  little	  mouse	  in	  one	  of	  these	  little	  wheels.	  
Rationalization	  involves	  ‘reference	  to	  the	  goals	  and	  uses	  of	  institutionalized	  social	  action	  and	  to	  
the	  knowledges	  that	  society	  has	  constructed	  to	  endow	  them	  with	  cognitive	  validity	  (ibid:	  106).	  
This	  form	  of	  legitimation	  relies	  on	  purposive	  constructions	  though,	  as	  Van	  Leeuwen	  explains,	  




qualifies	  as	  a	  legitimation	  if	  it	  contains	  a	  level	  of	  ‘moralization’	  (ibid:	  113–114);	  i.e.	  it	  should	  
index	  discourses	  of	  moral	  value.	  A	  purpose	  construction	  requires	  three	  elements:	  (a)	  the	  object	  
whose	  purpose	  is	  being	  constructed;	  (b)	  the	  purpose,	  which	  can	  be	  a	  process,	  an	  action	  or	  a	  
state;	  and	  (c)	  a	  purpose	  link	  (such	  as	  a	  nonfinite	  clause	  beginning	  with	  ‘to’)	  (ibid:	  126).	  Even	  
though	  the	  undergirding	  rationality	  appears	  to	  be	  made	  more	  explicit,	  reference	  to	  the	  relevant	  
discourse	  of	  moral	  value	  is	  still	  oblique	  (ibid:	  113).	  In	  example	  4.36,	  from	  the	  lawyer’s	  
perspective	  the	  purpose	  of	  receiving	  people	  who	  seek	  advice	  is	  that	  they	  will	  be	  paying	  a	  
thousand	  to	  three	  thousand	  rand	  an	  hour	  (thus	  indexing	  an	  external	  good).	  In	  example	  4.37	  the	  
purpose	  of	  the	  magistrate	  hearing	  the	  case	  is	  constructed	  as	  avoiding	  a	  situation	  where	  the	  
accused	  will	  stay	  in	  jail	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  weekend	  (thus	  referring	  obliquely	  to	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  
accused,	  considerations	  of	  fairness	  and	  so	  on).	  	  
4.36	   People	  come	  to	  you	  …	  and	  they	  pay	  you	  a	  thousand	  to	  three	  thousand	  rand	  an	  hour,	  to	  
get	  advice	  from	  you	  because	  you	  know.	  
4.37	   I	  am	  reluctantly	  hearing	  this	  case	  because	  I’m	  the	  only	  sitting	  court	  that	  can	  hear	  this	  
case	  otherwise	  this	  man	  will	  stay	  in	  jail	  for	  the	  rest	  …	  of	  the	  weekend.	  
Mythopoesis	  is	  legitimation	  achieved	  through	  storytelling	  (ibid:	  117).	  These	  can	  take	  a	  moral	  or	  
a	  cautionary	  slant.	  In	  cautionary	  tales	  (ibid:	  118),	  the	  narrator	  elaborates	  the	  outcomes	  of	  
failing	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  norms	  of	  social	  practices.	  The	  use	  of	  mythopoesis,	  however,	  may	  
contain	  all	  the	  other	  forms	  of	  legitimation.	  A	  few	  cautionary	  tales	  were	  present	  in	  the	  data,	  
including	  the	  lengthy	  tale	  of	  the	  secretary	  in	  the	  attorney’s	  office	  and	  the	  law	  teacher’s	  
experience	  of	  sentencing	  an	  offender	  to	  prison	  for	  a	  first	  offence.	  	  
5.5	   Relational	  and	  ‘if	  then’	  clauses	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  codes	  described	  above,	  I	  took	  note	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  relational	  and	  ‘if	  then’	  
clauses.	  These	  constructions	  are	  not	  explicitly	  included	  in	  the	  analytical	  tables	  –	  rather	  I	  simply	  
noted	  them	  as	  I	  proceeded	  with	  the	  write-­‐up	  of	  the	  findings.	  At	  noted	  above,	  ‘if-­‐then’	  
constructions	  can	  specify	  a	  condition	  precedent	  (as	  in	  example	  4.38	  where	  a	  condition	  
precedent	  to	  being	  invited	  as	  an	  acting	  judge	  in	  the	  highest	  courts	  is	  being	  ‘deemed	  fit’)	  or	  




to	  the	  failed	  lawyer	  is	  to	  become	  a	  politician).	  My	  argument	  is	  that	  both	  such	  uses	  function	  to	  
solidify	  or	  ‘cement’	  meanings.	  	  
4.38	   if	  you	  are	  deemed	  to	  be	  fit,	  they	  are	  invited	  as	  an	  acting	  judge	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  
or	  to	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  	  
4.39	   You	  know	  if	  a	  lawyer	  is	  a	  failure,	  a	  dismal	  failure,	  the	  only	  thing	  that	  that	  remains	  open	  to	  him	  is	  
to	  become	  a	  politician.	  
This	  is	  arguably	  even	  truer	  of	  relational	  clauses,	  which	  link	  two	  phenomenon	  in	  a	  very	  tight	  
relationship,	  as	  in	  example	  4.40	  where	  appearing	  in	  court	  and	  being	  intimidated	  are	  linked	  in	  a	  
manner	  that	  seemingly	  allows	  for	  few	  exceptions.	  	  
4.40	   [A]ppearing	  in	  a	  court	  is	  very	  very	  intimidating.	  
6.	   SUMMARY	  	  
In	  this	  chapter	  I	  have	  outlined	  the	  processes	  I	  undertook	  to	  develop	  a	  set	  of	  codes	  to	  analyze	  
the	  lecture	  material.	  I	  started	  off	  explaining	  and	  illustrating	  the	  differences	  between	  
representational,	  interactional	  and	  identificational	  forms	  of	  meaning	  and	  indicated	  that	  my	  
focus	  fell	  squarely	  on	  representational	  meanings.	  I	  briefly	  outlined	  Van	  Leeuwen’s	  approach	  to	  
systematizing	  representational	  meanings	  and	  illustrated	  in	  Appendix	  5B	  the	  richness	  of	  the	  
categories	  he	  develops	  for	  the	  three	  chapters	  of	  his	  work	  on	  which	  I	  relied	  the	  most.	  	  I	  then	  
describe	  my	  two	  attempts	  to	  work	  with	  Van	  Leeuwen’s	  data	  –	  the	  first	  ending	  in	  
disappointment,	  the	  second	  involving	  selecting	  and	  developing	  codes	  that	  I	  considered	  would	  
be	  useful	  in	  constructing	  narratives	  around	  the	  key	  legal	  professional	  roles	  in	  the	  text.	  I	  finally	  
described	  each	  code	  used	  in	  the	  analysis,	  with	  references	  to	  the	  lecture	  material	  for	  illustration	  
purposes.	  	  	  
The	  following	  chapter	  presents	  the	  findings	  that	  emerged	  from	  the	  application	  of	  this	  analytical	  






REPRESENTATIONS	  OF	  LEGAL	  PROFESSIONALS	  AND	  THEIR	  SOCIAL	  PRACTICES	  	  
1.	   INTRODUCTION	  	  
In	  this	  chapter	  I	  piece	  together	  the	  scattered	  representations	  of	  legal	  professionals	  and	  their	  
social	  practices	  that	  occurred	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  22	  classroom	  lectures	  I	  observed	  and	  
transcribed.	  	  By	  organizing	  these	  representations	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  various	  elements	  of	  social	  
practice	  which	  my	  language	  of	  description	  fleshes	  out,	  I	  am	  able	  to	  show	  how	  the	  lecturer’s	  
classroom	  talk	  constituted	  different	  legal	  professional	  roles.	  The	  picture	  that	  emerges	  is	  richly	  
detailed,	  providing	  an	  extensive	  array	  of	  discursive	  resources	  to	  name	  and	  describe	  legal	  
professionals	  and	  their	  social	  practices.	  According	  to	  the	  conceptual	  frame	  outlined	  in	  chapter	  
two,	  such	  discursive	  resources	  lie	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  identity	  regulation	  in	  the	  classroom,	  for	  they	  
not	  only	  (re)present	  legal	  professionals	  and	  their	  social	  practices	  in	  particular	  culturally-­‐
bounded	  ways,	  they	  establish	  a	  foundation	  for	  the	  next	  generation	  of	  incumbents	  to	  fashion	  
their	  professional	  identities	  as	  they	  appropriate	  and	  begin	  to	  use	  these	  discursive	  resources	  in	  
their	  own	  talk.	  	  The	  nature	  of	  language	  and	  meaning	  is	  such	  however,	  that	  there	  is	  always	  space	  
for	  a	  new	  generation	  to	  shift,	  challenge	  or	  reject	  the	  discursive	  resources	  that	  are	  presented	  to	  
them.	  However,	  in	  doing	  this	  they	  work	  against	  the	  assumption	  that	  what	  is	  represented	  is	  the	  
norm.	  This	  was	  true	  of	  the	  representations	  of	  legal	  professionals	  and	  their	  social	  practices	  in	  
the	  classroom	  of	  my	  study	  for	  they	  tended	  to	  be	  presented	  as	  the	  ways	  things	  work,	  or	  the	  way	  
things	  simply	  are.	  	  
Using	  the	  various	  content	  words	  that	  designate	  legal	  professionals	  in	  a	  South	  African	  context,	  I	  
identified	  the	  quotations	  in	  my	  data	  set	  which	  represented	  different	  legal	  professional	  roles	  
and/or	  some	  aspect	  of	  their	  social	  practices.	  I	  then	  classified	  each	  according	  to	  the	  dominant	  
legal	  professional	  role	  represented.	  The	  number	  of	  quotations	  attached	  to	  each	  role	  is	  set	  out	  





	  Legal	  Professional	  Roles	   No.	  of	  Quotations:	  





half)	  –	  22	  
No.	  of	  Quotations:	  
Total	  
GENERIC	  CATEGORY	  	   	   	   	  
Lawyer	   38	   3	   41	  
PREFERRED	  CAREER	  PATH	  	   	   	   	  
Articled	  clerk/candidate	  attorney	   2	   9	   11	  
Attorney	  	   11	   22	   33	  
Attorney	  specialization:	  Conveyancer	   0	   1	   1	  
Attorney	  specialization:	  Notary	   0	   3	   3	  
Advocate	  	   26	   29	   54	  
Judge	  	   70	   9	   79	  
SHADOW	  CAREER	  PATH	  	   	   	   	  
Public	  prosecutor	  	   2	   4	   6	  
State	  advocate	   0	   3	   3	  
Magistrate	   20	   6	   26	  
NICHE	  CAREERS	   	   	   	  
In-­‐house	  legal	  counsel	  	   0	   2	   2	  
Law	  commissioner	  	   0	   1	   1	  
Legal	  academic	   	   	   11	   9	   20	  
State	  attorney	  	   1	   2	   3	  
State	  legal	  adviser	   0	   1	   1	  
ADMINISTRATIVE	  POSITIONS	  	   	   	   	  
Clerk	  of	  the	  maj	  court	  	   0	   1	   1	  
Master	  of	  the	  High	  Court	  	   0	   1	   1	  
Registrar	  of	  deeds	   0	   1	   1	  
Registrar	  of	  patents,	  trademarks	  and	  copyright	   0	   1	   1	  
Registrar	  of	  the	  High	  Court	   0	   1	   1	  
POLITICAL	  APPOINTMENTS	   	   	   	  
Director	  of	  Public	  Prosecutions	   4	   1	   5	  
Family	  advocate	  	   0	   1	   1	  
Human	  Rights	  Commissioner	  	   0	   3	   3	  
Public	  Defender	  	   0	   1	   1	  
Public	  Protector	  	   0	   1	   1	  




The	  words	  used	  to	  name	  legal	  professionals	  were	  both	  generic	  and	  specific.	  The	  generic	  term	  
used	  was	  the	  word	  ‘lawyer’.71	  The	  bulk	  of	  the	  quotations,	  were	  however	  associated	  with	  24	  
specific	  naming	  words	  for	  legal	  professionals.	  It	  is	  these	  particular	  ‘naming	  words’	  that	  
identified	  and	  thus	  distinguished	  particular	  professional	  roles.	  A	  variety	  of	  positions	  in	  the	  
public	  service	  were	  mentioned	  in	  the	  lecture	  dealing	  specifically	  with	  the	  legal	  profession,	  but	  
in	  most	  instances	  this	  was	  the	  first	  time	  they	  received	  a	  mention.	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  
judge,	  the	  advocate,	  the	  attorney	  and	  the	  magistrate	  emerged	  as	  dominant.	  	  
The	  table	  also	  indicates	  that	  reference	  to	  ‘lawyers’	  and	  specific	  types	  of	  legal	  professional	  in	  the	  
lectures	  not	  focussed	  on	  the	  legal	  profession	  (i.e.	  lectures	  1	  to	  the	  first	  half	  of	  lecture	  21)	  were	  
significant,	  in	  some	  cases	  far	  exceeding	  the	  quotations	  in	  the	  legal	  profession	  lectures	  (as	  for	  
the	  roles	  of	  the	  lawyer,	  the	  judge	  and	  the	  magistrate)	  in	  other	  instances	  almost	  equivalent	  to	  
the	  quotations	  in	  the	  latter	  (e.g.	  the	  role	  of	  the	  advocate).	  I	  thought	  that	  this	  finding,	  in	  itself,	  
lent	  support	  to	  my	  hunch	  that	  the	  communication	  of	  messages	  about	  lawyers	  and	  the	  legal	  
profession	  is	  pervasive	  in	  classroom	  talk,	  even	  where	  this	  is	  not	  the	  primary	  focus	  of	  the	  
curriculum.	  	  
The	  representation	  of	  legal	  professional	  roles	  in	  the	  lecturer’s	  classroom	  talk	  were	  linked	  into	  
two	  major	  career	  paths.	  The	  first,	  represented	  as	  the	  overwhelmingly	  preferred	  career	  path,	  
linked	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  articled	  clerk,	  attorney	  and	  the	  advocate,	  with	  the	  role	  of	  the	  judge,	  
reserved	  for	  the	  very	  best	  advocates,	  at	  the	  pinnacle.	  The	  second,	  represented	  as	  the	  more	  
menial,	  disparaged	  or	  shadow	  career	  path	  linked	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  public	  prosecutor,	  state	  
advocate	  and	  magistrate.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  preferred	  career	  path,	  where	  the	  progression	  
through	  the	  roles	  was	  linear,	  the	  progression	  of	  roles	  in	  the	  shadow	  career	  path	  was	  alternative	  
(either	  public	  prosecutor-­‐state	  advocate	  or	  public	  prosecutor-­‐magistrate).	  The	  roles	  of	  the	  legal	  
academic,	  in-­‐house	  legal	  counsel,	  law	  commissioner	  and	  state	  legal	  adviser	  were	  represented	  
as	  alternative,	  niche	  careers	  in	  relation	  to	  these	  two	  career	  paths.	  As	  representative	  of	  the	  
niche	  careers,	  I	  discuss	  the	  role	  of	  the	  legal	  academic	  because	  it	  had	  the	  most	  quotations	  and	  
was	  also	  linked	  to	  becoming	  an	  advocate	  and	  a	  judge	  in	  very	  exceptional	  circumstances.	  In	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71	  The	  term	  ‘legal	  practitioner’,	  one	  of	  the	  key	  concepts	  in	  the	  Draft	  Legal	  Practices	  Bill	  (2010),	  was	  never	  used,	  and	  





addition	  to	  these	  roles,	  the	  lecturer	  made	  cursory	  mention	  of	  various	  administrative	  roles,	  as	  
well	  as	  roles	  which	  are	  dependent	  upon	  some	  form	  of	  political	  appointment.	  I	  will	  not	  deal	  with	  
administrative	  roles	  save	  to	  say	  that	  these	  were	  generally	  represented	  as	  being	  menial	  in	  
nature	  (indexed	  by	  the	  lecturer’s	  use	  of	  the	  generic	  term	  ‘factotums’	  to	  refer	  to	  such	  roles	  at	  
L22:110:726).	  As	  regards	  political	  appointments,	  I	  will	  deal	  only	  with	  the	  Director	  of	  Public	  
Prosecutions	  as	  the	  others,	  with	  only	  one	  quotation	  apiece,	  do	  not	  really	  accommodate	  an	  
extended	  discussion.	  The	  relationship	  between	  the	  roles	  and	  the	  different	  career	  paths	  is	  
illustrated	  in	  Figure	  8	  below.	  	  
	  
Figure	  8:	  Overview	  of	  Career	  Paths	  and	  Roles.	  Arrow	  weight	  indicates	  preference,	  arrows	  show	  linkages	  and	  
progression.	  Roles	  in	  bold	  and	  italics	  are	  discussed	  further	  in	  this	  chapter.	  
In	  section	  2	  of	  this	  chapter,	  I	  commence	  with	  a	  reconstruction	  of	  the	  lecturer’s	  representations	  
around	  the	  generic	  role	  ‘lawyer’.	  Thereafter	  I	  reconstruct	  each	  of	  the	  roles	  linked	  into	  the	  
preferred	  and	  shadow	  career	  paths	  respectively.	  Section	  3	  deals	  with	  the	  preferred	  career	  path	  
and	  covers	  the	  	  roles	  of	  the	  articled	  clerk,	  attorney,	  advocate	  and	  judge.	  Although	  the	  role	  of	  
the	  judge	  is	  linked	  into	  this	  preferred	  career	  path,	  I	  treat	  it	  separately	  from	  the	  others	  because	  
the	  judge	  –	  occupying	  a	  position	  of	  state	  authority	  –	  is	  differently	  positioned	  from	  the	  other	  




Section	  4	  outlines	  the	  shadow	  career	  path,	  encompassing	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  public	  prosecutor,	  
state	  advocate	  and	  magistrate,	  with	  the	  role	  of	  the	  magistrate	  similarly	  treated	  separately.	  
Section	  5	  moves	  on	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  legal	  academic,	  while	  Section	  concludes	  with	  the	  Director	  
of	  Public	  Prosecutions	  as	  representative	  of	  legal	  professional	  roles	  linked	  to	  political	  
appointments.	  	  
In	  each	  case,	  I	  use	  the	  model	  of	  the	  legal	  professional	  in	  social	  practice	  outlined	  in	  chapter	  four	  
to	  structure	  my	  discussion.	  In	  this	  regard,	  the	  outline	  and	  discussion	  of	  the	  analytical	  codes	  in	  
sections	  4.2	  and	  5	  of	  chapter	  four	  refer.	  Figure	  7,	  which	  presented	  the	  codes	  in	  a	  graphical	  









2.	   THE	  LAWYER	  AS	  GENERIC	  CATEGORY	  	  
2.1	   Social	  action	  	  
An	  analysis	  of	  the	  41	  quotations	  associated	  with	  the	  generic	  term	  ‘lawyer’	  yielded	  46	  extracts	  
which	  positioned	  lawyers	  in	  relation	  to	  forms	  of	  ‘doing’	  or	  action	  in	  the	  text.	  The	  overall	  
representation	  that	  arose	  from	  these	  46	  extracts	  is	  that	  lawyers	  are	  active	  and	  powerful	  agents,	  
whose	  mastery	  over	  the	  semiotic	  domains	  of	  laws,	  language	  and	  information	  places	  them	  in	  a	  
position	  of	  authority	  over	  other	  people.	  The	  instances	  in	  which	  social	  action	  was	  coded	  as	  
passive,	  non-­‐transactive	  or	  material	  highlighted	  areas	  of	  potential	  vulnerability	  –	  waiting	  for	  
clients,	  being	  paid	  by	  clients	  and	  being	  ‘gossiped’	  about	  –	  over	  which	  lawyers	  seemingly	  
exercise	  less	  control.	  	  
The	  lecturer	  constituted	  lawyers	  in	  social	  action	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  represented	  them	  as	  
overwhelmingly	  active	  (87%),	  substantially	  transactive	  (73%)	  and	  primarily	  exercising	  semiotic	  
power	  (73%).	  The	  most	  significant	  semiotic	  form	  over	  which	  lawyers	  were	  represented	  as	  
actively	  exercising	  power	  is	  law	  itself	  (associated	  with	  41%	  of	  the	  transactive	  quotations).	  
Lawyers	  ‘work	  with	  laws’	  (L-­‐SA10)	  but	  the	  source	  of	  their	  power	  over	  laws	  does	  not	  lie	  in	  
knowledge	  of	  the	  law	  per	  se:	  The	  law	  is	  a	  ‘very	  difficult	  mistress’,	  a	  ‘vast	  field’	  (L-­‐SA5b)	  and	  
nobody	  can	  therefore	  claim	  ‘to	  know	  everything	  that	  there	  is	  to	  know	  about	  the	  law’	  (L-­‐SA5b).	  
Instead,	  the	  lawyer’s	  power	  over	  law	  lies	  in	  the	  capacity	  to	  ‘find’	  the	  law	  (L-­‐SA29);	  to	  ‘read’	  
court	  cases	  and	  other	  legal	  texts	  with	  understanding	  (L-­‐SA26);	  and	  to	  ‘interpret’	  legislation	  (L-­‐
SA16;	  L-­‐SA20).	  These	  capacities	  are	  so	  important	  as	  to	  be	  definitive	  of	  lawyers.	  The	  lecturer,	  for	  
instance,	  implores	  his	  students	  to	  read	  their	  court	  cases:	  ‘Students,	  I	  don’t	  know	  why,	  but	  
students	  are	  lazy	  to	  read	  the	  case’,	  he	  says.	  Shrugging	  his	  shoulders	  in	  despair	  he	  continues	  ‘I	  
don’t	  understand	  it.	  You	  know	  that	  is	  …	  what	  makes	  you	  a	  lawyer.	  If	  you	  don’t	  read	  court	  cases	  
you’re	  not	  a	  lawyer’	  (L-­‐SA26).	  A	  relational	  clause	  (‘that	  is	  what	  makes	  you	  a	  lawyer’)	  and	  an	  if-­‐
then	  clause	  (‘If	  you	  don’t	  read	  court	  cases	  [then]	  you’re	  not	  a	  lawyer)	  signal	  the	  solidity	  and	  
importance	  of	  this	  relationship	  in	  the	  lecturer’s	  semantic	  universe.	  	  
But	  lawyers’	  power	  over	  laws	  is	  much	  greater	  than	  simply	  being	  able	  to	  find,	  read	  and	  interpret	  




able	  to	  ‘test’	  laws	  against	  a	  higher	  system	  of	  moral	  authority	  (L-­‐SA1)	  and	  are	  thus	  capable	  of	  
assuming	  the	  authority	  to	  do	  this.	  ‘Finding’	  and	  ‘drafting’	  the	  law	  are	  relatively	  closely	  situated	  
to	  material	  processes,	  but	  ‘reading’,	  ‘interpreting’,	  ‘developing’	  and	  ‘creating’	  laws	  situate	  the	  
lawyer	  in	  a	  realm	  of	  more	  generalized	  action	  and	  abstract	  concepts.	  	  
An	  initial	  clue	  to	  the	  hierarchy	  of	  the	  semiotic	  over	  the	  material	  –	  a	  theme	  which	  will	  be	  
explored	  in	  relation	  to	  all	  the	  roles	  represented	  in	  the	  data	  –	  is	  given	  by	  the	  context	  in	  which	  
the	  lecturer	  uses	  the	  term	  ‘draft’.	  Elsewhere,	  the	  lecturer	  refers	  to	  lawyers	  engaging	  in	  the	  
more	  semiotic	  actions	  of	  ‘developing’	  and	  ‘creating’	  laws,	  but	  when	  he	  refers	  to	  ‘drafting’	  laws,	  
he	  speaks	  of	  how	  poorly	  laws	  are	  drafted	  in	  South	  Africa.	  And	  they	  are	  ‘not	  drafted	  with	  any	  
kind	  of	  elegance’	  because	  they	  are	  ‘drafted	  by	  civil	  servants’	  (L-­‐SA7).	  What	  can	  you	  expect,	  the	  
lecturer	  asks,	  because	  the	  ‘bright	  lawyers	  are	  in	  private	  practice.	  And	  only	  the	  duds	  go	  into	  civil	  
service	  and	  they	  draft	  laws.’	  (L-­‐SA7).	  	  In	  this	  utterance	  the	  lecturer	  collocates	  the	  term	  ‘draft’	  –	  
a	  word	  closer	  to	  the	  material,	  painstaking	  process	  of	  writing	  and	  rewriting	  the	  text	  of	  legislation	  
according	  to	  the	  design	  of	  higher-­‐placed	  policy-­‐makers	  –	  with	  both	  ‘civil	  service’	  and	  ‘duds’,	  
while	  he	  collocates	  the	  term	  ‘	  private	  practice’	  with	  ‘bright	  lawyers’.	  In	  this	  way	  the	  lecturer	  
paints	  drafting,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  public	  sphere	  of	  legal	  work,	  in	  an	  inferior	  light.	  	  
The	  secret	  to	  lawyer’s	  power	  over	  laws,	  however,	  lies	  in	  their	  power	  over	  another,	  more	  
general,	  semiotic	  form	  –	  language.	  ‘For	  a	  lawyer,	  languages	  is	  like	  the	  secret’	  (L-­‐Q40),	  the	  
lecturer	  says	  at	  one	  point.	  ‘If	  you	  are	  not	  good	  with	  languages,	  if	  you	  are	  not	  good	  with	  words,	  
understanding	  words,	  writing	  words,	  speaking	  words,	  then	  the	  legal	  profession	  is	  going	  to	  be	  
very	  hostile.	  A	  very	  hostile	  environment	  for	  you’	  (L-­‐SA18).	  Once	  again,	  an	  ‘if-­‐then’	  clause	  
establishes	  the	  importance	  of	  this	  relationship.	  This	  secret	  in	  relation	  to	  language	  lies	  at	  the	  
very	  heart	  of	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  legal	  profession	  and	  is	  the	  basis	  for	  its	  exclusivity:	  	  
LECTURER:	  So	  the	  legal	  profession	  ladies	  and	  gentlemen,	  this	  profession	  that	  you	  so	  eagerly	  
want	  to	  enter,	  the	  legal	  profession	  started	  with	  a	  monopoly.	  It	  started	  with	  a	  mystery.	  It	  started	  
in	  a	  temple.	  …[Y]ou	  would	  bring	  your	  case	  to	  the	  temple	  to	  the	  priests	  to	  find	  out	  whether	  you	  
had	  an	  action	  and	  whether	  there	  was	  a	  good	  day	  on	  which	  you	  could	  bring	  your	  action.	  …[L]aw	  
is	  an	  elitist	  or	  an	  exclusive	  profession.	  And	  it	  is	  exclusive	  because	  we	  almost	  have	  our	  own	  
language,	  in	  the	  old	  days	  people	  used	  Latin,	  but	  we	  almost	  have	  our	  own	  language.	  And	  we	  have	  




We	  know	  the	  mysteries	  behind	  the	  legal	  texts.	  And	  that	  is	  that	  is	  that	  is	  the	  origin	  um	  of	  the	  of	  
the	  legal	  profession.	  (L-­‐Q28)	  
The	  secret	  has	  to	  do	  with	  understanding	  that	  it	  is	  language	  that	  lies	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  social	  
conflict	  (L-­‐SA19a),	  and	  that	  lawyers	  grapple	  with	  this	  conflict	  ‘by	  understanding	  words	  in	  their	  
very	  very	  difficult	  and	  multifaceted	  way	  in	  which	  they	  operate’	  (L-­‐SA18;	  see	  also	  L-­‐SA23;	  L-­‐
SA27c).	  The	  lecturer	  models	  and	  indexes	  this	  capacity	  at	  various	  points.	  For	  example,	  in	  relation	  
to	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  term	  ‘common	  law’,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  a	  lengthy	  exposition	  he	  highlights	  for	  
students	  that	  ‘this	  is	  exactly	  the	  kind	  of	  thing	  that	  will	  be	  expected	  of	  you	  as	  a	  lawyer.	  This	  is	  
one	  word.	  Common	  law.	  And	  I	  have	  now	  in	  fifteen	  minutes,	  I	  don’t	  know	  how	  long,	  given	  you	  at	  
least	  five	  or	  six	  distinct	  different	  meanings	  of	  that	  one	  word.	  And	  it	  would	  be	  expected	  of	  you	  
as	  a	  lawyer	  one	  day	  to	  read	  a	  sentence	  and	  from	  that	  sentence	  to	  deduct	  what	  does	  the	  
‘common	  law’	  mean	  …	  in	  that	  sentence’	  (L-­‐SA15).	  	  
However,	  the	  ‘secret’	  also	  has	  to	  do	  with	  understanding	  the	  power	  that	  flows	  from	  
recontextualizating	  the	  world	  in	  legal	  language.	  ‘If	  you’re	  a	  lawyer	  then	  things	  have	  a	  legal	  
meaning’	  (L-­‐SA39a).	  Thus,	  the	  lecturer	  corrects	  a	  student	  when	  she	  refers	  to	  the	  ‘full	  title’	  
(everyday	  language)	  rather	  than	  the	  ‘long	  title’	  (legal	  language)	  of	  a	  statute	  because	  ‘if	  you	  
don’t	  use	  the	  right	  word	  it	  doesn’t	  work’	  (L-­‐SA12).	  And	  he	  shows	  how	  the	  everyday	  meaning	  of	  
the	  words	  ‘without	  prejudice’	  carry	  important	  and	  different	  connotations	  in	  a	  legal	  context:	  
That	  they	  refer	  not	  only	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘not	  harming’	  but	  also	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘not	  being	  bound’,	  
or	  reserving	  one’s	  rights	  in	  the	  process	  of	  litigation	  (L-­‐SA39d).	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  mastery	  over	  laws,	  language	  and	  legal	  language,	  the	  lecturer	  advocates	  that	  
mastery	  over	  information	  –	  a	  kind	  of	  general	  knowledge	  of	  society	  –	  is	  definitive	  of	  being	  a	  
lawyer	  (L-­‐SA6;	  L-­‐SA9;	  L-­‐SA24).	  He	  reacts	  with	  deep	  shock,	  for	  instance,	  when	  he	  discovers	  that	  
students	  are	  unaware	  of	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  chancellor	  of	  their	  university	  (L-­‐Q9)	  and	  admonishes	  
them:	  ‘You	  must	  know	  these	  things	  ladies	  and	  gentlemen,	  if	  you	  are	  going	  to	  become	  a	  lawyer	  
you	  must	  be	  informed	  in	  our	  society,	  in	  your	  community	  and	  if	  he’s	  the	  chancellor	  of	  your	  
university	  …	  you	  are	  going	  to	  run	  into	  trouble,	  you	  must	  know	  this,	  ladies	  and	  gentleman,	  I’m	  
making	  a	  joke	  about	  this	  now	  because	  it’s	  hot	  and	  it’s	  a	  long	  lecture	  but	  please	  don’t	  




emphasis,	  note	  the	  relational	  clause).	  This	  requires	  that	  lawyers	  must	  ‘read’	  and	  ‘know’	  a	  
variety	  of	  things:	  They	  must	  read	  the	  law	  reports	  every	  month,	  the	  newspaper	  ‘every	  day’,	  and	  
the	  professional	  journal	  every	  two	  weeks.	  They	  must	  know	  what’s	  going	  on	  in	  the	  university,	  
the	  bar	  and	  the	  side-­‐bar,	  they	  must	  know	  which	  cases	  are	  before	  the	  courts,	  and	  who	  are	  the	  
most	  important	  ‘movers	  and	  shakers’	  in	  the	  country	  (L-­‐SA9e).	  	  
	  Their	  mastery	  of	  laws,	  language	  and	  information	  is	  the	  source	  of	  lawyers’	  potency	  in	  relation	  
to,	  and	  over,	  a	  range	  of	  others.	  It	  is	  firstly	  a	  power	  that	  is	  exercised	  in	  relation	  to	  clients.	  A	  
lawyer	  not	  only	  ‘advises’	  clients	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  his	  knowledge	  of	  laws,	  language	  and	  
information	  (L-­‐SA9d),	  he	  needs	  to	  ‘impress’	  them	  with	  this	  knowledge	  so	  that	  they	  will	  reward	  
him	  handsomely	  (L-­‐SA38).	  	  
Assuming	  a	  client’s	  interests	  and	  point	  of	  view,	  it	  is	  secondly	  a	  power	  exercised	  in	  relation	  to	  
‘the	  other	  side’	  (L-­‐SA39a),	  the	  legal	  team	  representing	  the	  person	  with	  whom	  the	  client	  has	  a	  
misunderstanding.	  This	  was	  most	  vividly	  illustrated	  in	  L-­‐Q39	  where	  the	  lecturer	  stated:	  	  
LECTURER:	  Ladies	  and	  gentlemen	  if	  you	  are	  opening	  litigation…	  If	  you	  are	  just	  feeling	  the	  water,	  
if	  you	  exchange	  your	  first	  documents,	  before	  you	  start	  exchanging	  pleadings,	  you	  are	  writing	  to	  
the	  other	  side	  and	  you	  say:	  ‘Look’,	  according	  to	  my	  client,	  this	  is	  what	  happened.	  My	  client	  says	  
this	  is	  what	  happened.	  Um	  …	  if	  this	  is	  true,	  we	  are	  going	  to	  sue	  you.	  Um	  …	  if	  you	  want	  to,	  if	  you	  
want	  to	  negotiate,	  if	  you	  want	  to	  talk,	  you	  know,	  lets	  do	  so.’	  (L-­‐Q39)	  
In	  this	  short	  extract	  the	  lecturer	  represented	  the	  lawyer	  engaging	  in	  a	  number	  of	  material	  
processes	  –	  ‘exchanging	  documents’,	  ‘exchanging	  pleadings’,	  and	  ‘writing	  to	  the	  other	  side’	  but	  
these	  are	  encompassed	  within	  the	  broader	  semiotic	  action	  of	  ‘opening	  litigation’.	  The	  lawyer	  is	  
represented	  as	  the	  confident	  initiator	  of	  this	  process	  who	  has	  no	  reservations	  about	  employing	  
that	  most	  powerful	  of	  legal	  phrases:	  ‘We	  are	  going	  to	  sue	  you’	  in	  relation	  to	  other	  people.	  But	  
in	  this	  representation	  the	  lawyer	  also	  assumes	  power	  over	  managing	  the	  litigation	  process	  by	  
inviting	  ‘the	  other	  side’	  to	  negotiation	  and	  discussion.	  	  
The	  lawyer’s	  potency	  ascends	  a	  notch	  in	  the	  actions	  of	  ‘arguing’,	  ‘convincing’	  and	  ‘persuading’	  
(L-­‐SA27d;	  L-­‐SA33):	  ‘That	  is	  what	  lawyers	  do.	  They	  argue	  to	  convince	  you’	  (L-­‐SA33	  –	  note,	  again,	  
the	  presence	  of	  a	  relational	  clause	  defines	  what	  lawyers	  ‘do’	  in	  terms	  of	  verbal	  dueling).	  For	  this	  




not	  very	  valuable.	  ‘If	  you	  can’t	  share	  that	  knowledge,	  if	  you	  can’t	  convince	  somebody	  else,	  of	  
your	  point	  of	  view	  …	  it’s	  useless.	  Its	  dead	  gold	  in	  the	  safe’	  (L-­‐SA11).	  By	  defining	  the	  criterion	  for	  
success	  in	  these	  terms,	  lawyers	  are	  represented	  as	  extremely	  potent	  players	  in	  the	  semiotic	  
domain	  because	  they	  effectively	  possess	  the	  power	  to	  change	  how	  somebody	  else	  thinks	  or	  
feels.	  	  
However,	  their	  highest	  form	  of	  power	  resides	  in	  their	  capacity	  to	  pronounce	  or	  have	  a	  ‘say’	  
over	  things	  and	  people.	  They	  are	  represented	  as	  having	  the	  capacity	  to	  speak	  in	  an	  influential	  
moral	  voice	  (even	  if	  they	  do	  not	  always	  exercise	  this	  capacity),	  as	  when	  the	  lecturer’s	  ‘natural	  
lawyer’	  ‘says’	  to	  a	  government	  that	  passes	  a	  law	  prohibiting	  a	  black	  man	  from	  falling	  in	  love	  
with	  a	  white	  woman:	  ‘Sorry,	  is	  not	  in	  accordance	  to	  the	  higher	  law.	  It	  is	  an	  unjust	  law	  and	  
therefore	  the	  citizens	  that	  is	  (sic)	  oppressed	  by	  this	  law	  have	  the	  right	  to	  disobey	  that	  law’	  (L-­‐
SA3).	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  underestimate	  the	  extent	  of	  this	  power,	  which	  is	  truly	  far-­‐reaching:	  It	  is	  an	  
authority	  that	  can	  face	  up	  to	  other	  forms	  of	  authority	  (governments,	  for	  instance)	  and	  define	  
what	  is	  just	  and	  unjust	  and	  who	  does	  or	  does	  not	  have	  a	  right	  to	  do	  something.	  However,	  it	  is	  
also	  a	  power	  that	  can	  entrench	  existing	  forms	  of	  inequality	  as	  when	  the	  lecturer	  refers	  to	  Hugo	  
de	  Groot,	  the	  ‘great	  Dutch	  lawyer’	  of	  the	  16	  century,	  who	  said	  in	  one	  of	  his	  books:	  ‘You	  can’t	  
trust	  with	  money	  a	  woman	  that	  is	  not	  a	  …	  ‘umbaarkoopvrou’,	  if	  a	  female	  is	  not	  a	  public	  
merchant	  you	  cannot	  trust	  her	  with	  money’	  (L-­‐SA17).	  Although	  the	  lecturer	  discredits	  this	  view	  
–	  it	  is	  ‘a	  little	  bit	  chauvinistic’	  but	  more	  importantly,	  contradicts	  the	  right	  to	  gender	  equality	  in	  
the	  South	  African	  Constitution	  –	  the	  point	  I	  wish	  to	  underline	  here	  is	  simply	  that	  lawyers	  are	  
represented	  as	  having	  this	  far-­‐reaching	  capacity	  –	  to	  pronounce	  on	  what	  should	  be	  and	  thereby	  
contribute	  to	  defining	  the	  semiotic	  placement	  and	  material	  circumstances	  of	  whole	  categories	  
of	  people,	  as	  Hugo	  de	  Groot’s	  writings	  on	  law	  did	  for	  the	  position	  of	  women	  in	  relation	  to	  
money	  for	  many	  centuries.	  	  	  
Representations	  of	  lawyers	  as	  passive	  (13%	  of	  social	  actions)	  or	  non-­‐transactive	  (27%)	  in	  
relation	  to	  social	  action,	  or	  as	  engaged	  in	  material	  action	  (27%)	  were	  far	  less	  frequent.	  Where	  
they	  did	  occur	  they	  pointed	  toward	  the	  soft	  underbelly	  of	  the	  lawyer’s	  otherwise	  seemingly	  




The	  relationship	  between	  lawyers	  and	  their	  clients	  is	  complex.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  a	  lawyer’s	  
position	  is	  very	  powerful:	  They	  are	  privy	  to	  clients’	  sensitive	  information;	  they	  are	  capable	  of	  
recontextualizing	  their	  client’s	  problems	  in	  legal	  language;	  and	  they	  steer	  the	  course	  of	  
engagement	  with	  the	  persons	  with	  whom	  a	  client	  has	  a	  dispute.	  However,	  the	  relationship	  is	  
ambiguous	  because	  lawyers	  are	  also	  dependent	  on	  clients	  for	  work	  –	  they	  are	  the	  lawyer’s	  
‘bread-­‐and-­‐butter’	  (L-­‐Q23).	  The	  quotations	  in	  which	  the	  lawyer’s	  relation	  to	  action	  was	  passive,	  
non-­‐transactive	  and	  material	  related	  to	  this	  feature	  of	  the	  lawyer-­‐client	  relationship,	  with	  the	  
lecturer	  depicting	  ‘lawyers’	  as	  ‘sitting’	  and	  ‘waiting’	  for	  clients	  to	  come	  to	  them	  (L-­‐SA9b;	  L-­‐
SA21).	  The	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘lawyer’	  in	  this	  particular	  context,	  however,	  needs	  to	  be	  qualified,	  
for	  the	  need	  to	  ‘sit	  and	  wait’	  for	  clients	  applies	  only	  to	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  attorney	  and	  the	  
advocate.72	  Further,	  because	  South	  Africa	  has	  a	  divided	  bar,	  it	  is	  only	  really	  attorneys	  who	  ‘sit	  
and	  wait’	  for	  people	  to	  come	  ‘off-­‐the-­‐street’	  with	  their	  problems:	  Advocates,	  as	  litigation	  
specialists,	  are	  reliant	  on	  the	  attorneys	  for	  work	  who	  thus	  constitute	  the	  ‘clients’	  of	  the	  
advocates.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  advocate,	  therefore,	  their	  relationship	  to	  clients	  is	  bound	  up	  with	  
their	  relationship	  to	  other	  lawyers.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  regard	  that	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  lecturer’s	  
comment	  about	  lawyers’	  irresistible	  desire	  to	  ‘gossip’	  emerges.	  Lawyers,	  and	  particularly	  
advocates,	  cannot	  avoid	  the	  possibility	  that	  their	  performance	  in	  court	  will	  be	  talked	  about	  (a	  
passive,	  semiotic	  action),	  and	  thus	  impact	  on	  their	  ability	  to	  attract	  future	  work.	  	  
2.2	   Circumstances	  of	  social	  action	  	  
The	  41	  quotations	  associated	  with	  the	  term	  lawyer	  not	  only	  pointed	  to	  the	  key	  social	  actions	  in	  
which	  lawyers	  are	  engaged	  but	  also	  provided	  information	  on	  the	  circumstances	  associated	  with	  
those	  actions.	  Within	  this	  set,	  a	  total	  of	  16	  extracts	  contained	  further	  information	  on	  the	  
resources	  lawyers	  employ	  in	  their	  social	  practices;	  6	  provided	  some	  detail	  on	  the	  emotional	  
‘ground-­‐tone’	  of	  being	  a	  lawyer;	  and	  4	  provided	  insight	  into	  the	  locations	  in	  which	  lawyers	  
function.	  	  
The	  resources	  which	  lawyers	  were	  represented	  as	  needing	  to	  have	  –	  the	  ‘tools	  of	  the	  trade’	  (L-­‐
CSA10;	  L-­‐CSA18)	  –	  confirmed	  the	  semiotic	  nature	  of	  their	  work.	  Lawyers	  work	  with	  language	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




and	  ‘words’	  (L-­‐CSA4;	  L-­‐CSA18;	  L-­‐CSA28;	  L-­‐CSA38;	  L-­‐CSA40);	  books	  (L-­‐CSA18;	  L-­‐CSA25);	  
dictionaries	  (L-­‐CSA18;	  L-­‐CSA39);	  court	  cases	  (L-­‐CSA27b),	  including	  such	  specialized	  tools	  as	  
‘headnotes’73	  (L-­‐CSA27a)	  and	  ‘noter-­‐uppers’	  and	  ‘indexes’	  (L-­‐CSA29).74	  	  
The	  one	  resource	  which	  lawyers	  were	  represented	  as	  specifically	  not	  having	  –	  the	  resource	  of	  
time	  (L-­‐CSA27b;	  L-­‐CSA27d;	  L-­‐CSA41)	  –	  introduces	  a	  new	  theme	  in	  the	  lawyer	  narrative.	  ‘People	  
in	  practice,	  for	  instance,	  don’t	  have	  time	  to	  write	  journal	  articles’.	  They	  write	  ‘short	  little	  
superficial	  things’	  for	  the	  De	  Rebus	  and	  Without	  Prejudice	  because	  ‘they	  haven’t	  got	  time	  to	  go	  
and	  do	  thorough	  research	  …’	  (L-­‐CSA41,	  my	  emphases).	  These	  representations	  about	  not	  having	  
time	  serve	  as	  an	  indirect	  expression	  of	  a	  negative	  emotional	  state:	  Stress.	  This	  emotional	  state	  
accounted	  for	  4	  of	  the	  6	  extracts	  coded	  for	  emotional	  content.	  In	  the	  lecturer’s	  representations	  
lawyers	  are	  people	  who	  work	  in	  stressful	  and	  pressurized	  environments.	  Although	  ‘preparation	  
is	  everything’,	  lawyers	  must	  be	  capable	  of	  thinking	  ‘on	  their	  feet’,	  of	  responding	  intelligently	  
and	  wittily	  to	  a	  challenge	  where	  they	  have	  not	  prepared	  (L-­‐CSA30b).	  Thus,	  in	  court,	  if	  the	  judge	  
says	  ‘Please	  address	  me	  on	  the	  following	  point’,	  the	  lawyer	  must	  be	  able	  to	  look	  ‘very	  very	  
hastily	  for	  some	  authority’	  and	  then	  argue	  the	  point	  before	  the	  judge,	  even	  though	  he	  or	  she	  
may	  not	  have	  been	  able	  to	  read	  the	  whole	  case	  but	  only	  the	  headnote	  (L-­‐CSA27b).	  A	  lawyer	  
who	  is	  unable	  to	  meet	  the	  challenges	  of	  the	  profession	  should	  not	  expect	  care	  and	  nurturing,	  
only	  hostility	  (L-­‐CSA18).	  	  
Despite	  operating	  in	  stressful	  and	  hostile	  environments,	  lawyers	  must	  be	  able	  to	  maintain	  a	  
façade	  of	  emotional	  calm.	  ‘If	  you’re	  a	  lawyer,	  you	  must	  never	  do	  anything	  if	  you	  are	  in	  a	  bad	  
mood	  or	  if	  you	  are	  emotionally	  unstable’	  (L-­‐CSA37).	  An	  ‘if-­‐then’	  clause	  in	  this	  quotation	  
represents	  needing	  to	  be	  emotionally	  stable	  as	  the	  inevitable	  and	  normative	  consequence	  of	  
being	  a	  lawyer.	  Lawyers	  are	  thus	  presented	  with	  a	  double	  challenge:	  They	  must	  not	  only	  be	  
able	  to	  cope	  with	  working	  in	  stressful	  environments,	  they	  must	  also	  be	  effective	  at	  separating	  
themselves	  from	  the	  stress	  and	  presenting	  a	  cool	  and	  calm	  façade.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  The	  main	  publishers	  of	  court	  cases	  in	  South	  Africa	  conventionally	  publish	  a	  short	  summary	  that	  precedes	  the	  
publication	  of	  the	  judgment	  given	  by	  a	  judge	  in	  a	  particular	  case.	  This	  summary	  is	  called	  the	  ‘headnote’.	  	  
74	  An	  ‘index’	  and	  ‘noter	  upper’	  relates	  to	  the	  indexes	  of	  court	  cases	  published	  by	  the	  two	  main	  legal	  publishing	  
houses	  in	  South	  Africa,	  Juta	  and	  LexisNexis:	  Butterworths.	  By	  using	  this	  tool	  practitioners	  can	  ascertain	  which	  cases	  




It	  was	  interesting	  to	  see	  how	  the	  lecturer	  at	  one	  point	  engaged	  with	  this	  emotional	  
characterization	  of	  the	  lawyer’s	  working	  environment,	  attempting	  to	  offer	  students	  an	  
alternative	  model.	  Lawyers,	  he	  cautioned,	  frequently	  don’t	  read	  their	  instructions	  from	  clients	  
carefully.	  They	  tend	  to	  be	  ‘quick,	  clever,	  and	  wrong’	  (L-­‐Q23).	  He	  urges	  his	  students:	  ‘Go	  and	  sit	  
down,	  read	  the	  instruction.	  Take	  it	  in,	  read	  it	  again,	  make	  sure	  you	  know	  what	  the	  client	  wants.	  
Um	  you	  know,	  there’s	  no	  rush	  whatsoever.	  We	  are	  not	  working	  with	  the	  lives	  of	  other	  people,	  
you	  are	  not	  a	  paediatrician	  or	  a	  cardiac	  surgeon,	  nobody’s	  going	  to	  die,	  I’ve	  never	  seen	  anybody	  
die	  in	  a	  law	  office.	  Um	  so	  there’s	  no	  urgency,	  although	  I	  might	  be	  saying	  something	  to	  the	  
contrary	  -­‐	  sit,	  relax	  see	  that	  you	  know	  what	  is	  going	  on’	  (L-­‐Q23,	  my	  emphasis).	  	  
With	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  location	  of	  the	  ‘court’	  and	  the	  ‘office’,	  the	  lecturer	  seldom	  linked	  the	  
‘lawyer’	  to	  specific	  working	  environments.	  Lawyers	  were	  by	  and	  large	  represented	  as	  operating	  
in	  a	  world	  of	  semiotic	  forms	  (laws,	  language	  and	  information)	  and	  thus	  in	  a	  curiously	  physically	  
dis-­‐located	  fashion.	  In	  the	  few	  instances	  where	  a	  specific	  location	  was	  mentioned,	  however,	  the	  
location	  that	  emerged	  as	  preeminent	  was	  the	  court	  (L-­‐CSA25b;	  L-­‐CSA27c;	  L-­‐CSA30a;	  L-­‐CSA31),	  
the	  ‘theatre’	  (L-­‐CSA30a)	  of	  the	  lawyer’s	  ‘performance’	  (L-­‐CSA31).	  	  	  
2.3	   Social	  actors	  	  
This	  section	  considers	  how	  the	  lecturer	  represented	  both	  lawyers	  and	  their	  clients	  as	  social	  
actors.	  	  
2.3.1	   Lawyers	  	  
While	  I	  was	  not	  able	  to	  find	  any	  specific	  classification	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  class	  in	  the	  41	  lawyer	  
quotations,	  gender,	  and	  to	  a	  much	  lesser	  extent,	  racial	  classification	  was	  evident	  in	  the	  text.	  	  
Gender	  proved	  to	  be	  the	  most	  straightforward	  and	  explicit	  classification	  of	  lawyers.	  In	  the	  
majority	  of	  instances	  the	  lecturer’s	  references	  to	  lawyers	  were	  gender-­‐neutral	  but	  in	  5	  (12%)	  of	  
the	  41	  quotations	  there	  was	  a	  specific	  gender	  classification.	  In	  4	  of	  these	  extracts	  the	  gender	  
classification	  was	  indeed	  male	  (L-­‐SAct3b;	  L-­‐SAct5b;	  L-­‐SAct7b;	  L-­‐	  SAct17a),	  and	  in	  the	  remaining	  
one	  it	  was	  gender-­‐inclusive	  (the	  lecturer’s	  reference	  in	  L-­‐SAct1b	  to	  ‘man-­‐made,	  woman-­‐made,	  




St	  Augustine	  and	  St	  Thomas	  Aquinas	  (L-­‐SAct3a)	  and	  the	  ‘great	  Dutch	  lawyer’	  Hugo	  de	  Groot	  (L-­‐
SAct17b)	  –	  which	  also	  involved	  reference	  to	  males.	  None	  of	  the	  quotations	  therefore	  referred	  
exclusively	  to	  female	  lawyers.	  	  
The	  racial	  classification	  of	  lawyers	  was	  even	  subtler.	  Apart	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  two	  instances	  
of	  nomination	  in	  the	  text	  mentioned	  above	  referred	  to	  white	  males,	  in	  the	  41	  lawyer	  quotations	  
the	  lecturer	  only	  used	  the	  classifiers	  ‘black’	  and	  ‘white’	  once	  –	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  ‘unjust’	  
apartheid	  laws	  which	  prohibited	  a	  ‘black	  man’	  from	  falling	  in	  love	  with	  a	  ‘white	  woman’	  (L-­‐Q3).	  
However,	  the	  black	  man	  and	  white	  woman	  in	  this	  example	  were	  clearly	  not	  represented	  as	  
lawyers.	  Instead	  of	  classifiers,	  racial	  classification	  arose	  from	  very	  subtle	  contextual	  references	  
to	  the	  use	  of	  language.	  The	  first	  occurred	  in	  the	  following	  exchange	  (L-­‐SAct8)	  between	  the	  
lecturer	  and	  Student	  15	  (a	  black,	  male	  student):	  	  
STUDENT	  15:	  Government	  Gaz	  /	  Government	  Gazette	  what	  what	  …	  
LECTURER:	  The	  what	  what	  what	  government	  what	  is	  the	  government	  what	  is	  this	  thing	  
Government	  Gazette.	  You	  can’t	  talk	  like	  that	  like	  a	  lawyer	  you	  can’t	  use	  ‘what	  what’,	  it’s	  not	  
legal	  phraseology	  ….	  
STUDENT	  15:	  It’s	  a	  document	  keeps	  the	  [gestures	  with	  hands]	  Act	  and	  ..	  
LECTURER:	  OK	  I	  don’t	  understand	  what	  you’re	  saying	  …	  
In	  this	  extract	  Student	  15	  uses	  the	  phrase	  ‘what	  what’	  to	  signify	  his	  lack	  of	  certainty	  about	  the	  
term	  ‘Government	  Gazette’.	  In	  my	  own	  classes	  and	  the	  classroom	  I	  observed	  for	  my	  research	  I	  
observed	  that	  black	  students	  use	  the	  phrase	  ‘what	  what’	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  ‘or	  whatever’	  or	  ‘kind	  
of’.	  The	  lecturer	  took	  great	  exception	  to	  this	  phrase,	  specifically	  categorized	  it	  as	  lying	  outside	  
the	  domain	  of	  ‘legal	  phraseology’	  and	  warned	  the	  student	  that	  he	  can’t	  ‘talk	  like	  that	  like	  a	  
lawyer’.	  	  Because	  it	  is	  primarily	  black	  students	  who	  use	  the	  phrase	  ‘what	  what’	  the	  association	  
that	  could	  arise	  from	  this	  exchange	  is	  that	  black	  ways	  of	  speaking	  are	  antagonistic,	  and	  possibly	  
inferior	  to,	  the	  ways	  of	  speaking	  like	  a	  lawyer.	  The	  broader	  point	  which	  the	  lecturer	  may	  have	  
wanted	  to	  make	  through	  this	  exchange	  was	  possibly	  that	  ‘slang’	  is	  not	  appropriate	  in	  a	  legal	  
context,	  but	  because	  he	  did	  not	  highlight	  any	  uses	  of	  slang	  in	  relation	  to	  white	  students,	  or	  link	  
white	  students’	  language	  use	  to	  the	  language	  used	  by	  lawyers,	  the	  classification	  that	  arises	  
from	  the	  exchange	  seems	  racial.	  	  	  




occurred	  when	  Student	  3	  (a	  white	  female)	  asked	  the	  lecturer	  whether	  it	  was	  beneficial	  for	  
lawyers	  to	  know	  a	  ‘European’	  language.	  The	  lecturer	  affirmed	  this	  and	  continued:	  ‘And	  that’s	  
why,	  in	  the	  apartheid	  days	  unfortunately	  they	  prescribed	  that	  you	  must	  have	  English,	  Afrikaans	  
and	  Latin.	  And	  I	  would	  say	  English,	  Afrikaans,	  Latin	  plus	  a	  European	  language.	  And	  an	  African	  
language.	  Yes	  say	  Afrikaans	  and	  or	  any	  other	  African	  language.	  English	  at	  a	  first-­‐year	  level,	  Latin	  
at	  a	  first-­‐year	  level	  and	  a	  European	  language	  at	  a	  first	  year	  level.	  Otherwise	  you	  can’t	  become	  a	  
lawyer’	  (L-­‐SAct40).	  The	  subtle	  discrimination	  against	  African	  languages	  arises	  here	  through	  the	  
manner	  in	  which	  English,	  Afrikaans,	  Latin	  and	  a	  European	  language	  are	  mentioned	  first,	  while	  
the	  reference	  to	  an	  African	  language	  seems	  to	  be	  tagged	  on	  as	  an	  afterthought.	  Then	  follows	  a	  
sentence	  in	  which	  the	  lecturer	  affects	  some	  repair	  by	  placing	  Afrikaans	  and	  an	  African	  language	  
on	  the	  same	  level,	  posing	  them	  as	  alternatives	  for	  the	  essential	  language	  requirements	  of	  the	  
lawyer.	  	  
Lawyers	  were	  also	  categorized	  on	  bases	  other	  than	  the	  social	  classifications	  of	  gender,	  race	  and	  
class.	  The	  lecturer	  referred	  to	  ‘natural’	  lawyers	  (L-­‐SAct1a),	  ‘constitutional’	  lawyers	  (L-­‐SAct16);	  
‘successful’	  lawyers	  (L-­‐SAct9b)	  and	  lawyers	  who	  are	  ‘failures’	  (L-­‐SAct7a);	  ‘good’	  lawyers	  (L-­‐
SAct27;	  L-­‐SAct30a)	  and	  ‘exceptional’	  lawyers’	  (L-­‐SAct30b).	  A	  distinction	  between	  lawyers	  who	  
are	  in	  private	  practice	  and	  those	  who	  are	  in	  public	  or	  civil	  service,	  emerged	  only	  once	  in	  this	  
particular	  set	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  action	  of	  ‘drafting’	  laws	  and	  was	  clearly	  associated	  with	  a	  
delegitimation	  of	  civil	  service	  employment	  in	  relation	  to	  private	  practice	  (L-­‐SAct7c).	  	  
2.3.2	   Clients	  	  
Clients	  were	  present	  or	  included	  in	  the	  social	  action	  more	  times	  (5	  extracts)	  than	  they	  were	  
backgrounded	  (3	  extracts)	  and	  in	  3	  extracts	  the	  lecturer	  mixed	  terms	  that	  both	  included	  and	  
suppressed	  clients	  as	  social	  actors.	  The	  latter	  set	  is	  especially	  interesting	  for	  tracing	  how	  clients	  
are	  progressively	  backgrounded	  as	  the	  lawyer	  proceeds	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  client’s	  problems	  
through,	  in	  particular,	  the	  courts.	  	  
Clients	  are	  initially	  present	  as	  the	  ‘people’	  or	  the	  people	  ‘off	  the	  street’	  who	  come	  to	  the	  lawyer	  
seeking	  legal	  advice	  (L-­‐SAct5a;	  L-­‐SAct9a;	  L-­‐SAct21)	  for	  which	  they	  will	  pay	  handsomely	  (L-­‐




miscommunication	  (L-­‐SAct19).	  Shifts	  in	  their	  status	  occur	  as	  ‘people’	  become	  identified	  on	  the	  
basis	  of	  the	  ‘problems’	  they	  bring	  to	  the	  lawyer:	  ‘Because	  what	  lawyers	  do	  is	  they	  sit	  in	  their	  
office	  and	  they	  wait	  for	  people	  …	  to	  come	  off	  the	  street	  to	  bring	  their	  problems	  to	  them.	  And	  it	  
can	  be	  anything.	  It	  can	  be	  from	  the	  theft	  of	  an	  artwork	  to	  a	  divorce	  to	  a	  rape	  to	  a	  …	  disputed	  …	  
testament,	  a	  will’	  (L-­‐SAct21).	  The	  characterization	  of	  the	  client’s	  problem	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  
categories	  provided	  by	  laws	  and	  legal	  doctrine	  –	  theft	  of	  an	  artwork,	  divorce,	  rape;	  etc	  –	  is	  one	  
of	  the	  initial	  and	  most	  important	  steps	  in	  recontextualizing	  an	  everyday	  problem	  as	  a	  legal	  
problem.	  The	  problem	  then	  becomes	  a	  ‘case’	  (L-­‐SAct14;	  L-­‐SAct28).	  Sometimes	  the	  name	  of	  the	  
client	  involved	  in	  the	  case	  is	  retained	  as	  an	  identifier	  (as	  in	  ‘the	  Harris	  case’)	  but	  this	  is	  not	  a	  
given.	  The	  words	  ‘problems’	  and	  ‘cases’	  therefore	  are	  discursive	  resources	  that	  progressively	  
facilitate	  the	  backgrounding	  of	  clients	  as	  social	  actors.	  The	  impacts	  of	  this	  semantic	  shift	  are	  
likely	  complex	  and	  multifaceted	  but	  from	  one	  perspective	  they	  allow	  lawyers	  to	  distance	  
themselves	  from	  the	  messy	  conflicts	  with	  which	  lawyers	  frequently	  have	  to	  grapple,	  much	  like	  
the	  medical	  ‘case’	  may	  allow	  doctors	  to	  distance	  themselves	  from	  the	  body	  and	  issues	  of	  life	  
and	  death.	  	  
The	  other	  shift	  present	  in	  the	  lecturer’s	  representations	  was	  the	  movement	  from	  ‘people’	  to	  
‘client’.	  This	  involves	  complex	  shifts	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  power	  exercised	  by	  lawyers	  and	  clients	  
vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  each	  other.	  As	  people	  become	  clients,	  it	  becomes	  important	  for	  the	  lawyer	  to,	  for	  
instance,	  ‘impress’	  the	  client	  (L-­‐SAct38)	  and	  to	  make	  very	  sure	  that	  he	  or	  she	  knows	  ‘what	  the	  
client	  wants’	  (L-­‐SAct23).	  This	  places	  the	  client	  in	  a	  position	  of	  power	  over	  the	  lawyer.	  On	  the	  
other	  hand,	  as	  the	  lawyer	  assumes	  control	  over	  managing	  the	  dispute	  that	  lies	  at	  the	  core	  of	  
the	  client’s	  troubles,	  the	  use	  of	  the	  possessive	  pronoun	  constructs	  clients	  as	  owned	  by	  lawyers;	  
i.e.	  he	  or	  she	  becomes	  ‘my	  client’	  (L-­‐Q39)	  and	  his	  or	  her	  voice	  in	  defining	  the	  dispute	  is	  taken	  
over	  by	  the	  voice	  of	  the	  lawyer	  (L-­‐SAct39).	  The	  client	  is	  also	  instrumentalized	  in	  being	  
characterized	  as	  the	  lawyer’s	  ‘bread-­‐and-­‐butter’	  (L-­‐SAct23).	  	  	  
2.4	   Values	  	  
There	  were	  25	  extracts	  associated	  with	  valuing	  or	  devaluing	  lawyers	  or	  their	  work	  within	  the	  




devalued.	  Of	  the	  fifteen	  relating	  to	  evaluation	  of	  lawyers’	  work,	  9	  (60%)	  related	  to	  the	  internal	  
goods	  of	  the	  practice	  and	  6	  (40%)	  to	  external	  goods.	  In	  all	  25	  extracts	  valuation	  and	  devaluation	  
were	  predominantly	  constituted	  through	  the	  strategy	  of	  moral	  evaluation	  (76%	  of	  the	  extracts),	  
rather	  than	  through	  rationalizations	  (20%)	  or	  through	  references	  to	  authority	  (5%).	  Unlike	  legal	  
reasoning,	  therefore,	  which	  is	  predominantly	  guided	  by	  reference	  to	  legal	  authority,	  the	  values	  
associated	  with	  being	  a	  lawyer	  enter	  professional	  discourse	  through	  the	  somewhat	  
problematic,	  subtler	  route	  of	  moral	  evaluation.	  	  
Not	  surprisingly	  (given	  the	  lecturer’s	  somewhat	  cynical	  outlook	  on	  the	  profession	  alluded	  to	  in	  
chapter	  3),	  in	  9	  of	  the	  10	  instances	  where	  the	  lecturer	  provided	  an	  evaluation	  of	  lawyers	  it	  was	  
negative.	  Lawyers	  in	  general	  were	  represented	  as	  people	  who	  are	  somewhat	  lacking	  in	  
intellectual	  capacity	  (the	  classification	  system	  invented	  by	  Linaeus	  is	  so	  ‘absolutely	  basic	  and	  
simple’	  that	  ‘[e]ven	  lawyers	  can	  understand	  it’	  –	  L-­‐V32),	  who	  are	  sometimes	  slapdash	  about	  
reading	  the	  instructions	  of	  their	  clients	  (L-­‐V23),	  and	  who	  cannot	  resist	  the	  urge	  to	  ‘gossip’	  about	  
their	  colleagues,	  although	  this	  is	  both	  gossip	  in	  a	  ‘negative’	  and	  a	  ‘positive’	  sense	  (L-­‐V31).	  
Specific	  groups	  of	  lawyers	  tended	  to	  be	  devalued	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  lack	  of	  capacity,	  
particularly	  intellectual	  capacity:	  ‘Constitutional	  lawyers’	  are	  devalued	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  
failure	  to	  understand	  the	  proper	  relationship	  between	  the	  Constitution	  and	  Roman-­‐Dutch	  law	  
(L-­‐V16);	  lawyers	  who	  enter	  civil	  service	  are	  devalued	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  they	  are	  ‘duds’	  (LV7c);	  
and	  lawyers	  who	  become	  politicians	  are	  devalued	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  they	  are	  the	  ‘worst	  people	  
…	  who	  can	  succeed	  at	  nothing	  else	  but	  sitting	  there	  and	  making	  noises’	  (L-­‐V7a	  –	  though	  this	  
representation	  was	  couched	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  ‘joke’).	  ‘Natural	  lawyers’	  however,	  those	  who	  
believe	  that	  laws	  should	  be	  tested	  against	  a	  higher	  source	  of	  moral	  authority,	  were	  devalued	  on	  
the	  basis	  of	  their	  lack	  of	  ‘moral	  courage’	  (L-­‐V3a).	  The	  lecturer	  suggested	  that	  during	  apartheid	  
the	  ‘right’	  thing	  for	  a	  natural	  lawyer	  to	  do	  would	  have	  been	  to	  advocate	  civil	  disobedience	  –	  to	  
recommend	  that	  force	  or	  revolution	  could	  be	  used	  to	  overthrow	  the	  government	  that	  made	  the	  
law.	  But	  the	  ‘natural	  lawyers’	  in	  his	  representation	  –	  specifically	  St	  Augustine	  and	  St	  Thomas	  
Aquinas	  –	  lacked	  the	  moral	  courage	  to	  do	  so,	  and	  gave	  preference	  to	  the	  value	  of	  order	  over	  
justice	  (L-­‐V3b,	  c).	  This	  seems	  to	  represent	  justice	  as	  antithetical	  to	  order,	  and	  lawyers	  who	  work	  




order	  and	  justice	  appears	  to	  rule	  out	  the	  possibility	  of	  acting	  with	  moral	  courage	  within	  the	  
status	  quo.	  	  
Notwithstanding	  the	  fact	  that	  lawyers	  as	  such	  were	  devalued,	  the	  lecturer	  suggested	  two	  
internal	  goods	  of	  the	  practice.	  The	  first	  centred	  around	  a	  vision	  of	  law	  as	  the	  bastion	  of	  order	  
(L-­‐V3c);	  objectivity,	  rationality	  and	  thoroughness	  (L-­‐V2;	  L-­‐V23;	  L-­‐V41;	  L-­‐V37);	  and	  certainty	  (L-­‐
V10b).	  The	  second	  is	  somewhat	  more	  problematically	  and	  tenuously	  categorized	  as	  an	  internal	  
good:	  The	  importance	  of	  an	  elegant	  or	  impressive	  presentation,	  which	  appeared	  in	  3	  of	  the	  9	  
extracts	  associated	  with	  internal	  goods.	  The	  lecturer	  advised	  students	  to	  put	  things	  ‘elegantly’	  
in	  both	  their	  spoken	  and	  written	  forms	  of	  expression.	  At	  L-­‐V35,	  for	  instance,	  he	  equates	  the	  
‘more	  lawyerly’	  way	  of	  saying	  something	  with	  ‘the	  more	  elegant’	  way	  of	  putting	  it,	  and	  at	  L-­‐V7b	  
he	  evaluates	  the	  drafting	  of	  legislation	  in	  South	  Africa	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  its	  ‘elegance’.	  He	  also	  
opined	  that	  having	  knowledge	  is	  not	  as	  important	  as	  being	  able	  to	  ‘project	  yourself’,	  for	  
without	  this	  knowledge	  is	  ‘dead	  gold	  in	  the	  safe’	  (L-­‐V11).	  The	  quality	  of	  elegance	  can	  be	  
regarded	  as	  an	  internal	  good,	  but	  it	  is	  a	  somewhat	  ‘shallow’	  one,	  for	  it	  hints	  at	  the	  potential	  for	  
form	  to	  overshadow	  content;	  i.e.	  what	  lawyers	  are	  standing	  for	  when	  they	  prosecute	  or	  defend	  
someone	  comes	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  less	  important	  than	  the	  veneer	  of	  the	  prosecution	  or	  defence.	  	  
In	  a	  South	  African	  context,	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  lecturer	  linked	  the	  practice	  of	  lawyers	  to	  the	  
values	  of	  the	  Constitution	  would	  constitute	  an	  important	  internal	  good.	  	  Thus	  the	  practice	  
would	  be	  ‘good’	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  promoted	  constitutional	  values.	  There	  was	  only	  one	  
instance	  of	  such	  a	  linkage	  in	  the	  lawyer	  role:	  Having	  outlined	  Hugo	  de	  Groot’s	  somewhat	  
‘chauvinistic’	  notions	  around	  women’s	  capacity	  to	  handle	  money,	  the	  lecturer	  continued	  as	  
follows:	  ‘Can	  we	  use	  that	  as	  part	  of	  our	  common	  law?	  No!	  Of	  course	  not.	  What	  will	  stop	  us?	  
Section	  49(2)	  will	  stop	  use	  because	  it	  says	  yes,	  look	  at	  the	  Roman-­‐Dutch	  law,	  but	  if	  you	  get	  an	  
absurdity	  such	  as	  this	  then	  ignore	  it.	  Obviously	  that	  is	  not	  the	  way	  we	  think	  anymore	  …’(L-­‐
V17a).	  The	  value	  affirmed	  here	  is	  gender	  equality	  and	  the	  lecturer,	  through	  his	  devaluation	  of	  
Hugo	  de	  Groot’s	  ideas	  (they	  constitute	  an	  ‘absurdity’	  and	  are	  ‘obviously’	  not	  the	  way	  we	  think	  
anymore)	  implies	  that	  lawyers	  need	  to	  think	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  promotes	  gender	  equality.	  	  




the	  material	  rewards	  lawyers	  can	  enjoy	  (L-­‐V9a;	  L-­‐V10a;	  L-­‐V38a).	  Interestingly,	  all	  of	  these	  
quotations	  were	  in	  the	  form	  of	  purposive	  constructions	  (involving	  the	  use	  of	  ‘to’	  or	  ‘so	  that’);	  
i.e.	  constructions	  that	  make	  the	  rationality	  of	  particular	  forms	  of	  action	  explicit.	  Thus	  lawyers	  
must	  learn	  how	  to	  use	  legislation	  and	  cases	  ‘to	  earn	  money’	  (L-­‐V10a)	  and	  clients	  must	  be	  
impressed	  ‘so	  that’	  they	  will	  pay	  R20	  000	  an	  hour	  for	  legal	  advice	  (L-­‐V38a).	  This	  suggests	  that	  
the	  ultimate	  value	  orientating	  lawyers	  in	  their	  work	  is	  material	  reward.	  However,	  the	  lecturer	  
also	  pointed	  to	  other	  external	  goods:	  Being	  ‘successful’	  (L-­‐V9b);	  and	  belonging	  to	  a	  profession	  
that	  was	  ‘elitist’,	  ‘distinguished’	  and	  ‘specialized	  (L-­‐V28).	  	  
2.5	   Summary	  	  
Reconstruction	  of	  the	  lecturer’s	  representations	  of	  the	  generic	  category	  of	  the	  lawyer	  provides	  
valuable	  insight	  into	  the	  nature	  of	  power	  exercised	  by	  lawyers,	  the	  purposes	  and	  values	  of	  law	  
and	  the	  legal	  profession,	  the	  nature	  of	  legal	  work,	  legal	  relationships,	  and	  the	  social	  profile	  of	  
the	  profession.	  The	  forms	  of	  power	  lawyers	  wield	  are	  semiotic,	  not	  material,	  as	  confirmed	  not	  
only	  by	  the	  way	  their	  social	  actions	  are	  framed	  but	  also	  by	  the	  semiotic	  nature	  of	  the	  ‘tools’	  of	  
their	  trade	  and	  the	  tendency	  not	  to	  locate	  them	  in	  any	  particular	  physical	  space.	  The	  lecturer	  
explicitly	  states	  that	  their	  power	  lies	  not	  so	  much	  in	  knowing	  the	  law	  as	  being	  able	  to	  
manipulate	  it:	  To	  find,	  read,	  understand,	  develop	  and	  create	  laws.	  The	  ability	  to	  manipulate	  lies	  
in	  a	  power	  over	  language	  –	  ‘Language	  is	  the	  secret’	  –	  and,	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent,	  information	  in	  the	  
sense	  of	  a	  general	  knowledge	  of	  society.	  The	  exercise	  of	  such	  powers	  to	  their	  greatest	  potential	  
impacts	  both	  at	  a	  personal	  and	  societal	  level:	  Through	  argumentation	  and	  persuasion,	  a	  lawyer	  
can	  change	  the	  way	  somebody	  else	  thinks	  or	  feels;	  at	  a	  societal	  level,	  lawyers	  are	  cloaked	  with	  
the	  capacity	  to	  shape	  but	  also	  authoritatively	  determine	  the	  moral	  framework	  that	  guides	  
ordered	  relationships.	  This	  feeds	  into	  the	  purposes	  and	  values	  of	  law	  and	  the	  profession.	  The	  
internal	  goods	  of	  the	  profession	  –	  of	  which	  there	  were	  a	  greater	  number	  represented	  than	  
external	  goods	  –	  include	  order,	  objectivity,	  rationality	  and	  thoroughness	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
upholding	  of	  constitutional	  values.	  While	  the	  lecturer	  evaluated	  lawyers	  themselves	  in	  an	  
overwhelmingly	  negative	  way	  his	  criticism	  affirms,	  albeit	  in	  an	  inverted	  fashion,	  a	  set	  of	  traits	  
related	  to	  these	  values,	  for	  it	  implies	  that	  lawyers	  should	  be	  thorough,	  with	  both	  a	  superior	  




framed	  (and	  sometimes	  explicitly	  so)	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  pursuit	  of	  money,	  success	  and	  exclusivity.	  
The	  nature	  of	  legal	  work	  tended	  to	  be	  framed	  in	  terms	  of	  adversarial	  models	  of	  justice;	  i.e.	  it	  is	  
oriented	  toward	  ‘the	  other	  side’,	  and	  to	  verbal	  duelling	  (‘arguing’,	  ‘convincing’,	  ‘persuading’)	  in	  
court,	  and	  tended	  to	  be	  coloured	  by	  a	  negative	  emotional	  tone.	  This	  was	  constituted	  by	  the	  
lecturer’s	  implicit	  suggestion	  that	  the	  working	  conditions	  of	  the	  lawyer	  are	  highly	  stressful:	  
Time	  is	  a	  resource	  that	  eludes	  them	  and	  they	  are	  frequently	  placed	  in	  situations	  where	  they	  
must	  ‘perform’	  and	  ‘impress’	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  sufficient	  preparation.	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  range	  of	  
relationships	  present	  in	  the	  text,	  it	  emerges	  that	  the	  need	  to	  perform	  and	  impress	  applies	  not	  
only	  to	  clients	  but	  also	  to	  other	  legal	  professionals	  as	  lawyers	  cannot	  resist	  the	  urge	  to	  gossip	  
about	  each	  other.	  The	  lawyer’s	  relationship	  with	  clients	  is	  complex	  and	  multi-­‐layered:	  Included	  
in	  the	  social	  action	  more	  times	  than	  backgrounded,	  the	  client	  is	  both	  elevated	  –	  in	  	  being	  the	  
person	  whom	  the	  lawyer	  must	  impress	  –	  and	  diminished	  in	  status	  through	  a	  variety	  of	  
discursive	  strategies	  that	  reframe	  the	  client,	  as	  a	  concrete	  human	  being,	  in	  terms	  of	  legal	  
problems,	  categories,	  and	  types	  of	  legal	  work.	  In	  the	  process	  the	  client	  is	  both	  constructed	  as	  
an	  object	  of	  ownership	  and	  instrumentalized.	  The	  social	  profile	  of	  the	  profession	  that	  emerges	  
from	  reconstructing	  the	  lecturer’s	  narrative	  on	  the	  lawyer	  is	  surprisingly	  inclusive:	  Most	  
references	  to	  lawyers	  are	  gender-­‐neutral	  or	  inclusive	  and	  there	  were	  few	  explicit	  markers	  of	  
race	  or	  class.	  However,	  there	  were	  also	  subtle	  features	  of	  the	  classroom	  talk	  –	  the	  failure,	  for	  
instance,	  to	  explicitly	  categorize	  lawyers	  as	  exclusively	  female	  or	  to	  include	  female	  
nominations,	  and	  the	  disassociation	  of	  ‘black’	  ways	  of	  talking	  from	  talking	  like	  a	  lawyer	  –	  that	  






3.	   THE	  PREFERRED	  CAREER	  PATH	  	  
The	  preferred	  career	  path	  was	  constructed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  more	  than	  30	  quotations	  occurring	  
predominantly	  in	  the	  lectures	  dealing	  with	  the	  legal	  profession.	  The	  roles	  comprising	  the	  
preferred	  career	  path	  centred	  around	  the	  symbols	  of	  the	  ‘side-­‐bar’	  (referring	  to	  attorneys),	  the	  
‘bar’	  (referring	  to	  advocates)	  and	  the	  ‘bench’	  (referring	  to	  judges).	  Although	  these	  roles	  were	  
marked	  as	  preferable	  to	  those	  comprising	  the	  shadow	  career	  path,	  the	  progression	  from	  being	  
an	  attorney,	  to	  being	  an	  advocate,	  to	  being	  a	  judge	  involved	  a	  movement	  from	  a	  lower,	  to	  a	  
higher,	  to	  the	  very	  highest	  role	  possible	  in	  the	  legal	  profession.	  Thus	  while	  both	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  
attorney	  and	  the	  advocate	  were	  indexed	  as	  preferable,	  they	  were	  still	  less	  preferable	  in	  
proportion	  to	  their	  distance	  from	  being	  a	  judge.	  They	  were	  in	  a	  sense	  represented	  almost	  
instrumentally,	  as	  necessary	  (and	  possibly	  trying)	  steps	  to	  be	  taken	  by	  the	  very	  few	  who	  ascend	  
to	  the	  very	  top	  of	  the	  legal	  professional	  hierarchy.	  	  
The	  lecturer’s	  representation	  of	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  attorney	  and	  advocate	  as	  the	  most	  probable	  
and	  desirable	  points	  of	  entry	  into	  the	  legal	  profession	  for	  most	  law	  students	  was	  constituted	  by	  
two	  key	  utterances.	  The	  first	  framed	  the	  very	  beginning	  of	  the	  lecture	  devoted	  to	  the	  legal	  
profession	  as	  follows:	  	  
LECTURER:	  Let	  us	  talk	  about	  the	  legal	  profession	  now	  shortly	  ladies	  and	  gentlemen.	  It’s	  
something	  that	  fascinates	  you,	  um,	  and,	  uh,	  let	  us	  start,	  uh,	  not	  at	  the	  top	  but,	  um	  at	  the	  part	  of	  
the	  profession	  which	  would	  probably	  be,	  uh,	  the	  part	  where	  you’re	  going	  to	  enter	  the	  profession.	  
South	  Africa’s	  got	  a	  divided	  bar,	  we’ve	  got	  a	  bar,	  um,	  where	  we	  have,	  um	  advocates,	  and	  I	  will	  
come	  to	  the	  advocates	  just	  now.	  And	  then	  we’ve	  got	  what	  we	  call	  a	  side-­‐bar.	  Uh,	  and	  in	  the	  
side-­‐bar	  we	  have	  the	  attorneys.’	  (Att-­‐Q12,	  my	  emphasis)	  
Notable	  here	  is	  that	  the	  lecturer	  constitutes	  preference	  by	  actively	  positioning	  the	  group	  of	  
students	  in	  relation	  to	  these	  two	  particular	  roles	  by	  way	  of	  the	  collective	  pronoun	  ‘you’	  (at	  this	  
point	  the	  key	  differences	  between	  the	  role	  of	  the	  attorney	  and	  the	  advocate	  had	  not	  been	  
developed	  so	  the	  connotations	  of	  being	  positioned	  in	  relation	  to	  both	  the	  bar	  and	  the	  side-­‐bar	  
are	  not	  clear).	  This	  positioning	  is	  reaffirmed	  in	  a	  statement	  that	  frames	  the	  end	  of	  his	  discussion	  
of	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  attorney	  and	  advocate:	  
LECTURER:	  ‘OK.	  Those	  are	  the	  two,	  um,	  parts	  of	  the	  profession	  that	  I	  think	  most	  of	  you	  are	  




and	  in	  both	  these,	  um,	  uh,	  professions,	  you	  will	  make,	  you’ll	  make	  a	  living.	  Definitely.	  You’ll	  
make	  a	  good	  living.	  And	  the	  higher	  up	  you	  go	  in	  these	  professions	  the	  better	  your	  living	  is.’	  (Att-­‐
Q29=Adv-­‐Q49)	  
What	  the	  second	  statement	  adds,	  however,	  is	  a	  categorization	  of	  these	  two	  roles,	  through	  a	  
relational	  process	  clause,	  as	  the	  ‘private	  parts’	  of	  the	  profession.	  This	  adds	  to	  a	  carving	  up	  of	  
the	  legal	  profession	  into	  ‘private’	  and	  ‘public’	  spheres.	  However,	  it	  also	  legitimizes	  entry	  into	  
and	  progression	  through	  the	  private	  sphere	  by	  way	  of	  two	  purposive	  constructions	  -­‐	  ‘you’ll	  
make	  a	  good	  living’	  and	  ‘the	  higher	  up	  you	  go	  the	  better	  your	  living	  is’.	  	  
In	  his	  depiction	  of	  the	  progression	  through	  the	  preferred	  career	  path,	  the	  lecturer	  spends	  more	  
time	  describing	  the	  steps	  required	  to	  become	  an	  attorney	  (which	  entails	  first	  becoming	  an	  
‘articled	  clerk’	  for	  a	  period	  of	  two	  years)	  (AC-­‐Q3=Att-­‐Q15;75	  AC-­‐Q6;	  Att-­‐Q14,	  16),	  than	  he	  does	  
for	  becoming	  an	  advocate	  (which	  entails	  being	  a	  ‘pupil’	  for	  a	  period	  of	  a	  year	  under	  the	  
guidance	  of	  an	  advocate)	  (Adv-­‐Q17).	  The	  processes	  are	  similar	  in	  some	  respects	  in	  that	  both	  the	  
aspirant	  attorney/advocate	  are	  depicted	  as	  being	  fairly	  active	  and	  in	  control	  of	  initially	  pursuing	  
their	  career	  option.	  To	  become	  an	  attorney	  the	  process	  commences	  with	  studying	  for	  and	  
obtaining	  the	  four	  or	  five-­‐year	  LL.B,	  though	  the	  lecturer	  points	  out	  that	  the	  profession	  regards	  
the	  five-­‐year	  degree	  as	  ‘preferable’	  (Att-­‐Q14)	  –	  thus	  indicating	  a	  position	  on	  the	  extensive	  
debate76	  on	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  the	  four-­‐year	  LL.B	  (introduced	  in	  the	  late	  1990s)	  over	  the	  
former	  postgraduate	  model	  (entailing	  five	  years	  of	  study,	  and	  which	  is	  still	  opted	  for	  by	  some	  
students).	  The	  next	  stage	  generally	  involves	  actively	  finding	  a	  ‘principal’	  (‘somebody	  that	  you	  
know	  and	  that	  you	  trust	  and	  that	  will	  be	  willing	  to	  train	  you	  in	  the	  legal	  profession’),	  making	  an	  
appointment	  with	  the	  prospective	  principal,	  requesting	  him	  or	  her	  to	  consider	  you	  for	  articles	  
of	  clerkship	  and	  entering	  into	  a	  contract	  for	  that	  purpose	  (Att-­‐Q15).	  During	  the	  two	  years	  of	  
articled	  clerkship,	  the	  clerk	  ‘is	  salaried’	  and	  does	  legal	  work	  in	  order	  to	  pass	  the	  Law	  Society’s	  
admission	  examination	  (Att-­‐Q15).	  Having	  passed	  the	  admissions	  examination,	  the	  attorney	  is	  
admitted	  in	  court	  as	  an	  attorney	  and	  may	  then	  practice	  for	  his	  or	  her	  own	  account	  (Att-­‐Q16).	  To	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75	  The	  use	  of	  an	  ‘=’	  sign	  points	  to	  those	  quotations	  that	  are	  exactly	  included	  in	  more	  than	  one	  identity.	  As	  
explained	  in	  the	  chapter	  on	  methodology	  this	  is	  justified	  because	  different	  aspects	  of	  the	  quotation	  would	  be	  
relevant	  to	  the	  different	  identities.	  A	  small	  number	  of	  quotations	  were	  included	  in	  more	  than	  one	  identity	  when	  
carving	  up	  the	  quotation	  to	  apply	  to	  separate	  identities	  would	  have	  detracted	  from	  the	  overall	  meaning	  of	  the	  
quotation.	  	  




become	  an	  advocate	  the	  process	  similarly	  involves	  ‘getting’	  a	  ‘master’	  –	  being	  a	  senior	  advocate	  
or	  advocate	  in	  whom	  one	  has	  confidence,	  entering	  into	  a	  contract	  with	  him	  and	  going	  with	  him	  
so	  that	  he	  can	  ‘show	  you	  the	  ropes’.	  Thereafter	  the	  candidate	  writes	  the	  bar	  examination	  and	  is	  
admitted	  in	  court	  as	  an	  advocate	  (Adv-­‐Q17).	  Unlike	  the	  articled	  clerk,	  the	  pupil	  (trainee	  
advocate)	  receives	  no	  salary	  during	  the	  period	  of	  his	  or	  her	  pupilage.	  	  	  
Practically,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  choose	  to	  become	  an	  advocate	  without	  first	  becoming	  an	  attorney.	  
In	  South	  Africa	  it	  is	  also	  not	  possible	  to	  be	  both	  an	  advocate	  and	  an	  attorney	  at	  the	  same	  
time.77	  What	  was	  interesting,	  however,	  was	  the	  amount	  of	  time	  the	  lecturer	  expended	  (in	  part	  
driven	  by	  student	  interest	  on	  this	  issue)	  explaining	  and	  justifying	  why	  becoming	  an	  attorney	  
before	  becoming	  an	  advocate	  was	  critical	  to	  success.	  The	  logic	  of	  this	  move	  was	  laid	  bare	  in	  the	  
following	  statement	  (made	  by	  the	  lecturer	  in	  Lecture	  16	  in	  response	  to	  comments	  made	  by	  
Student	  3):	  
LECTURER:	  Well,	  uh	  you	  know,	  it’s	  a	  difficult	  question.	  It’s	  like,	  you	  know,	  it	  really	  is	  a	  difficult	  
question.	  Because	  if	  you	  are	  at	  the	  bar	  uh	  uh	  and	  when	  I	  say	  at	  the	  bar	  it	  means	  if	  you’re	  an	  
advocate,	  you	  rely	  one	  hundred	  percent	  on	  the	  um	  side-­‐bar,	  and	  those	  are	  the	  attorneys	  to	  send	  
you	  briefs,	  to	  send	  you	  um	  to	  send	  you	  work.	  So	  if	  you	  go	  directly	  from	  university	  to	  the	  bar	  
you’re	  going	  to	  sit	  in	  an	  office	  somewhere	  here	  in	  Johannesburg	  and	  wait	  for	  your	  telephone	  to	  
ring	  and	  it’s	  never	  going	  to	  ring.	  Because	  nobody	  knows	  about	  you.	  So	  in	  that	  sense	  it	  is	  much	  
much	  better	  to	  go,	  do	  your	  articles,	  build	  up	  your	  contacts	  as	  they	  say,	  during	  your	  articles	  …	  see	  
that	  you	  know	  the	  attorneys	  in	  your	  firm	  uh	  very	  very	  well	  so	  that	  at	  least	  they	  will	  brief	  you	  
when	  you’re	  an	  advocate	  …	  (Att-­‐Q7;	  see	  also	  Adv-­‐Q16).	  	  
The	  reliance	  of	  advocates	  on	  attorneys	  for	  work	  –	  and	  hence	  the	  need	  to	  be	  known	  amongst	  
attorneys	  –	  was	  emphasized	  again	  later	  on	  in	  the	  series	  of	  lectures.	  But	  this	  time	  the	  lecturer	  
provided	  a	  far	  stronger	  evaluation	  of	  anyone	  who	  considers	  going	  to	  the	  bar	  before	  they	  have	  
been	  to	  the	  side-­‐bar.	  In	  response	  to	  a	  question	  on	  this	  issue	  from	  Student	  1,	  he	  answers:	  
LECTURER:	  ...	  	  you’re	  a	  fool	  because	  as	  I’ve	  just	  shown	  you	  by	  the	  the	  the	  magazine,	  it	  all	  
depends	  on	  your	  reputation.	  And	  what	  kind	  of	  reputation	  have	  you	  got?	  Um,	  you	  know,	  you’re	  a	  
beautiful	  girl	  from	  Scotland	  and	  that’s	  not	  going	  to	  help.	  It	  helps	  with	  other	  things	  but	  it’s	  not	  
going	  to	  help	  with	  the	  law.	  But,	  if	  you	  do	  your	  articles	  first	  then	  at	  least	  you’re	  getting	  to	  know	  
the	  attorneys.	  And	  you’re	  getting	  to	  know	  the	  partners	  at	  that	  firm	  and	  other	  firms	  because	  
every	  case	  that	  you	  do	  in	  your	  two	  years’	  articles	  you	  have	  to	  work	  with	  other	  attorneys.	  And	  if	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




you	  impress	  them,	  even	  in	  the	  magistrates’	  court,	  you	  appear	  there	  and	  you	  make	  a	  name	  for	  
yourself,	  far	  far	  better	  …	  Um,	  you	  know.	  I	  would	  agree	  with	  that.	  Um.	  I	  would	  say	  nobody	  can	  go	  
to	  the	  Bar	  before	  they’ve	  been	  to	  the	  side-­‐bar.	  But	  there’s	  no	  such	  rule.	  It’s	  a	  split	  bar	  so	  you	  
can	  do	  what	  you	  want.	  (Att-­‐Q28	  =	  Adv-­‐Q45)	  
The	  lecturer’s	  evaluation	  of	  Student	  1	  as	  a	  ‘fool’	  for	  going	  to	  the	  bar	  straight	  after	  studying,	  is	  
saved	  from	  impertinence	  only	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  is	  an	  imagined	  position.	  It	  is	  interesting	  that	  
neither	  Student	  1	  herself,	  nor	  any	  other	  student	  in	  the	  class	  challenged	  his	  opinion,	  or	  
attempted	  to	  open	  up	  the	  issue	  for	  debate.	  Further,	  in	  the	  second	  quote	  the	  emphasis	  is	  not	  so	  
much	  on	  knowing	  but	  also	  impressing	  the	  other	  attorneys	  –	  this	  corresponds	  with	  the	  
importance,	  highlighted	  in	  the	  role	  of	  the	  lawyer	  –	  of	  impressing	  clients.	  	  
This	  theme	  was	  reinforced	  by	  the	  lecturer’s	  positive	  reference	  to	  people	  who	  were	  successfully	  
following	  this	  route,	  the	  clearest	  example	  relating	  to	  a	  former	  student.	  After	  explaining	  how	  she	  
had	  published	  a	  short	  note	  on	  prescription	  whilst	  employed	  as	  a	  candidate	  attorney	  (articled	  
clerk)	  at	  a	  certain	  Johannesburg	  law	  firm,	  he	  goes	  on	  to	  say:	  
LECTURER:	  If	  she’s	  going	  to	  the	  bar,	  she’s	  now	  a	  candidate	  attorney,	  she’s	  working	  to	  qualify,	  
she	  qualifies	  at	  the	  end	  of	  this	  year.	  If	  she	  then	  stays	  on	  another	  year	  or	  so	  at	  [name	  of	  firm],	  big	  
firm,	  lots	  of	  contacts,	  she	  then	  goes	  to	  the	  bar,	  everybody	  knows	  that	  she’s	  an	  authority	  on	  
prescription.	  And	  that	  -­‐	  that’s	  how	  you	  get	  people	  to	  phone	  you.	  That’s	  how	  you	  get	  people	  to	  
phone	  you.	  That’s	  how	  the	  legal	  profession	  works,	  ladies	  and	  gentlemen,	  that	  is	  unfortunately	  
how	  it	  works.	  (AC-­‐Q9;	  see	  also	  Adv-­‐Q28)	  
The	  lecturer’s	  use	  of	  the	  evaluative	  term	  ‘unfortunately’	  signals	  that	  whilst	  a	  young	  legal	  
professional	  has	  a	  choice	  to	  become	  an	  advocate	  straight	  out	  of	  studies,	  a	  failure	  to	  succeed	  
would	  almost	  certainly	  flow	  from	  this	  move	  because	  this	  ‘is’	  	  (a	  relational	  process	  clause)	  how	  
the	  legal	  profession	  works.	  The	  spectre	  of	  failure	  was	  in	  turn	  powerfully	  constituted	  by	  the	  
lecturer’s	  representation	  of	  failed	  advocates.	  ‘I	  can	  assure	  you’,	  he	  starts:	  	  
LECTURER:	  …	  there	  are	  people	  sitting	  here,	  um,	  in	  town	  or	  at	  um,	  Sandton,	  praying	  for	  the	  
telephone	  to	  ring.	  Uh,	  and	  they’re	  sitting	  there	  week	  after	  week,	  hopefully	  only	  week	  after	  week	  
and	  not	  month	  after	  month.	  Um,	  because,	  you	  know,	  I’ve	  heard	  of	  people	  sitting	  on	  the	  library	  
steps	  of	  the,	  of	  the	  chambers	  in	  Sandton,	  uh,	  trying	  to	  conduct	  a	  practice	  from	  the	  library	  steps.	  
I	  mean,	  can’t	  go	  into	  the	  library	  because	  the	  library	  is,	  is	  preserved	  (sic)	  for	  the	  members	  of	  the	  
Bar.	  Sit	  on	  the	  steps	  and	  trying	  to	  get	  your	  practice	  going.	  I	  mean	  that’s	  not	  [clears	  throat]	  that’s	  




This	  representation	  construes	  the	  need	  to	  progress	  from	  being	  an	  attorney	  to	  being	  an	  
advocate	  not	  so	  much	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  making	  a	  success,	  but	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  professional	  survival.	  	  
At	  two	  points	  the	  lecturer	  affirmed	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  divided	  bar	  through	  relational	  clauses	  
that	  linked	  this	  division	  of	  work	  between	  attorneys	  and	  advocates	  to	  a	  ‘better’	  arrangement	  (‘It	  
is	  better	  that	  the	  advocates	  do	  the	  court	  work	  and	  the	  attorney	  does	  …	  the	  off-­‐the-­‐street	  work,	  
the	  preparation’	  –	  Att-­‐Q22;	  Adv-­‐Q39)	  –	  as	  contrasted	  with	  linking	  ‘mixing’	  the	  work	  of	  an	  
advocate	  to	  being	  ‘stupid’	  (Att-­‐Q22).	  	  
The	  lecturer	  not	  only	  linked	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  attorney	  and	  advocate,	  but	  also	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  
advocate	  and	  judge.	  The	  emphasis	  in	  this	  progression	  –	  which	  includes	  the	  progression	  from	  
being	  ‘junior	  counsel’	  or	  ‘counsel’	  to	  ‘senior	  counsel’	  (Adv-­‐Q21	  –	  4)	  –	  falls	  	  on	  the	  elite	  qualities	  
of	  the	  few	  individuals	  who	  succeed	  in	  climbing	  the	  professional	  ladder.	  Although	  admitting	  that	  
not	  everyone	  would	  agree	  with	  him,	  and	  providing	  a	  few	  counter-­‐cultural	  examples	  (Att-­‐Q23=J-­‐
Q77;	  J-­‐Q78),	  the	  lecturer	  remarks	  that	  ‘the	  idea	  is	  the	  very	  best	  senior	  advocates.	  The	  very	  best	  
of	  the	  practicing	  advocates	  are	  appointed	  as	  judges’	  (Adv-­‐Q25;	  see	  also	  Adv-­‐Q35;	  Adv-­‐Q50;	  J-­‐
Q75).	  However,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  move	  from	  being	  an	  attorney	  to	  an	  advocate	  –	  which	  remains	  
to	  a	  certain	  extent	  under	  an	  individual’s	  control	  –	  the	  move	  from	  advocate	  to	  judge	  is	  
characterized	  by	  a	  lack	  of	  control,	  where	  the	  decision	  to	  appoint	  a	  senior	  advocate	  as	  a	  judge	  
rests	  primarily	  with	  agents	  within	  the	  judicial	  hierarchy	  themselves,	  or	  with	  agents	  in	  
government	  (Adv-­‐Q3=J-­‐Q20;	  Adv-­‐Q6=Adv-­‐Q30).	  	  	  
The	  lecturer’s	  two	  counter-­‐cultural	  examples	  relating	  to	  the	  progression	  from	  advocate	  to	  
judge	  included	  a	  reference	  to	  the	  judge	  Kathy	  Sackswell	  (sic),78	  who	  was	  appointed	  to	  a	  post	  in	  
the	  Witwatersrand	  Local	  Division	  from	  practicing	  as	  an	  attorney	  (Att-­‐Q23=J-­‐Q77),	  and	  judge	  
Carole	  Lewis,	  formerly	  a	  legal	  academic,	  who	  was	  appointed	  to	  a	  post	  in	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  
Appeal	  (J-­‐Q78).	  
Having	  outlined	  the	  salient	  linkages	  between	  the	  roles	  that	  constitute	  the	  preferred	  career	  
path,	  I	  turn	  now	  to	  a	  more	  detailed	  description	  of,	  firstly,	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  articled	  clerk,	  
attorney	  and	  advocate	  and,	  secondly,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  judge.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




3.1	   The	  Articled	  Clerk,	  Attorney	  and	  Advocate	  	  
3.1.1	   Social	  action	  	  
The	  number	  of	  extracts	  pertaining	  to	  social	  action	  increased	  through	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  articled	  
clerk,	  attorney	  and	  advocate	  respectively;	  i.e.	  there	  were	  35	  extracts	  pertaining	  to	  social	  action	  
in	  the	  11	  quotations	  relating	  to	  the	  articled	  clerk;	  71	  extracts	  in	  the	  33	  quotations	  relating	  to	  
the	  attorney;	  and	  110	  social	  action	  extracts	  in	  the	  53	  quotations	  relating	  to	  the	  advocate.	  These	  
extracts	  followed	  the	  trend	  mentioned	  above	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  lawyer	  role	  in	  that	  in	  the	  majority	  
of	  instances	  the	  action	  was	  coded	  as	  active	  (65%	  for	  the	  articled	  clerk;	  81.5%	  for	  the	  attorney;	  
and	  66%	  for	  the	  advocate)	  and	  transactive	  (63%	  for	  the	  articled	  clerk;	  68.5%	  for	  the	  attorney;	  
and	  52%	  for	  the	  advocate).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  both	  the	  attorney	  and	  advocate	  semiotic	  actions	  
predominated	  over	  material	  ones	  (60%	  for	  the	  attorney;	  54%	  for	  the	  advocate)	  but	  in	  the	  case	  
of	  the	  articled	  clerk	  semiotic	  and	  material	  actions	  were	  present	  on	  an	  almost	  equal	  basis	  (48.5%	  
semiotic;	  51.5%	  material).	  Whilst	  still	  in	  the	  majority	  these	  percentages	  were	  generally	  lower	  
than	  those	  evident	  in	  the	  representation	  of	  lawyer’s	  social	  actions	  reflecting	  the	  lecturer’s	  more	  
nuanced	  representation	  of	  the	  social	  action	  of	  these	  particular	  roles.	  	  
In	  general,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  pattern	  evident	  in	  the	  lawyer	  role	  –	  the	  almost	  cerebral	  flow	  of	  
power	  over	  law,	  language	  and	  information	  which	  then	  enabled	  power	  to	  be	  extended	  over	  
people	  –	  the	  objects	  over	  which	  the	  powers	  of	  articled	  clerks,	  attorneys	  and	  advocates	  
extended	  were	  more	  diverse.	  Prominent	  in	  all	  three	  cases	  was	  the	  extension	  of	  active	  and	  
transactive	  social	  actions	  over	  other	  lawyers	  as	  well	  as	  the	  personnel	  of	  a	  legal	  office.	  The	  
lecturer	  thus	  represented	  these	  roles	  as	  part	  of	  a	  social	  network,	  detailing	  their	  forms	  of	  
interaction.	  Various	  abstract	  entities	  such	  as	  the	  ‘firm’,	  roleplayers	  in	  court	  proceedings	  such	  as	  
witnesses	  and	  opponents,	  and	  various	  features	  of	  the	  physical	  context	  in	  which	  lawyers	  operate	  
also	  featured	  as	  the	  objects	  of	  the	  social	  actions	  of	  the	  articled	  clerk,	  attorney	  and	  advocate.	  	  	  
Like	  the	  lawyer	  role,	  there	  was	  a	  fair	  amount	  of	  emphasis	  on	  articled	  clerks,	  attorneys	  and	  
advocates	  acting	  in	  relation	  to	  laws.	  Semiotic	  forms	  of	  action	  over	  this	  object	  reflected	  these	  
roles’	  differing	  power	  relationships	  towards	  law.	  Thus,	  while	  an	  articled	  clerk	  needs	  to	  ‘learn’	  




the	  law	  (Adv-­‐SA43a)	  and	  ‘argue’	  for	  or	  against	  cases	  (Adv-­‐SA5e;	  Adv-­‐SA12).	  Interestingly,	  the	  
only	  instance	  in	  which	  attorneys	  were	  represented	  in	  a	  semiotic	  form	  of	  action	  toward	  the	  law	  
was	  the	  action	  of	  ‘contravening’	  the	  Trust	  Monies	  Act	  (Att-­‐SA19f).	  Otherwise,	  attorneys’	  forms	  
of	  action	  toward	  law	  were	  mainly	  represented	  as	  material	  –	  the	  processes	  of	  physically	  
searching	  for	  laws	  in	  a	  library	  (Att-­‐SA2a	  –	  c)	  and	  buying	  law	  reports	  and	  statutes	  (Att-­‐SA3b	  –	  d).	  
While	  the	  lecturer	  also	  represented	  the	  advocate	  acting	  materially	  toward	  the	  law,	  the	  actions	  
themselves	  were	  qualitatively	  more	  rarified	  for	  they	  focused	  on	  the	  early	  twentieth-­‐century	  
practice	  of	  ‘collecting’	  judgments	  in	  order	  to	  assemble	  these	  into	  a	  law	  report,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
practice	  of	  collecting	  rare	  copies	  of	  the	  Roman-­‐Dutch	  old	  authorities	  (Adv-­‐SA9;	  Adv-­‐SA11a;	  Adv-­‐
SA14).	  Thus	  while	  the	  attorney	  searches	  for	  laws	  within	  a	  collection	  assembled	  by	  someone	  
else,	  the	  advocate	  is	  the	  assembler:	  Either	  of	  a	  law	  report	  or	  of	  a	  private	  library.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  
the	  former,	  the	  advocate	  essentially	  determined	  which	  judgments	  were	  reported	  and	  which	  
thus	  became	  law	  (Adv-­‐SA11b).	  
In	  contrast	  to	  the	  lawyer	  role,	  however,	  there	  was	  much	  less	  emphasis	  on	  information	  and	  
language.	  None	  of	  the	  attorney’s	  social	  actions	  could	  be	  regarded	  as	  extending	  over	  
information,	  and	  only	  two	  extended	  over	  language.	  Interestingly	  these	  both	  related	  to	  an	  
attorney,	  Denys	  Reitz,	  writing	  creatively	  (Att-­‐SA10b;	  Att-­‐SA11a)	  with	  the	  capacity	  of	  writing	  
creatively	  linked	  to	  being	  an	  ‘intellectual’	  (Att-­‐SA10b).	  For	  the	  advocate,	  none	  of	  the	  social	  
actions	  could	  be	  regarded	  as	  extending	  over	  language	  and	  only	  one	  extended	  over	  information	  
(Adv-­‐SA2	  –	  using	  the	  debates	  of	  Hansard).	  	  
The	  most	  interesting	  representation	  pertaining	  to	  information	  as	  the	  object	  of	  social	  action	  
occurred	  in	  the	  quotations	  relating	  to	  the	  articled	  clerk.	  The	  lecturer’s	  anecdote	  of	  his	  first	  few	  
weeks	  as	  an	  articled	  clerk	  in	  a	  firm	  of	  attorneys	  (AC-­‐Q5)	  is	  a	  cautionary	  tale	  of	  a	  young	  man	  
who,	  drowning	  under	  a	  mountain	  of	  work	  and	  knowing	  that	  he	  needs	  to	  learn	  the	  law,	  
mistakenly	  thinks	  that	  his	  principal	  is	  the	  primary	  source	  of	  information:	  ‘if	  I	  wanted	  to	  learn	  
something	  I	  went	  to	  the	  partner	  and	  I	  said	  how	  do	  you,	  how	  do	  you	  redeem	  a	  trademark	  in	  
Papua	  New	  Guinea?’	  (AC-­‐SA5c).	  Unaware	  of	  the	  socio-­‐cultural	  dynamic	  within	  this	  particular	  
law	  firm	  he	  blindly	  transgresses	  the	  unspoken	  rule	  that	  his	  first	  port	  of	  call	  should	  have	  been	  




know	  or	  I	  haven’t	  got	  the	  book	  here	  then	  go	  to	  the	  manager	  or	  the	  partner	  to	  find	  out’	  (AC-­‐
SA5d).	  The	  unfortunate	  result	  was	  that	  	  
LECTURER:	  ‘I	  irritated	  the	  living	  daylights	  out	  of	  her	  because	  I	  didn’t	  ask	  her	  anything’	  (AC-­‐SA5f)	  
and	  ‘instead	  of	  getting	  off	  on	  the	  right	  foot	  she	  then	  decided	  she	  would	  boycott	  me.	  And	  
everything	  I	  did,	  uh,	  she	  sabotaged.	  You	  know.	  She	  would	  take	  a	  file,	  every	  file	  that	  I	  did	  and	  she	  
would	  listen	  to	  my	  dictation.	  If	  I	  made	  an	  error	  she	  would	  take	  my	  dictation	  to	  the	  senior	  
partner	  and	  say	  “You’re	  going	  to	  lose	  money	  here	  this	  man	  doesn’t	  know	  what	  he’s	  doing”’	  (AC-­‐
SA5g).	  	  
What	  is	  interesting	  about	  this	  representation	  is	  that	  it	  highlights	  the	  importance	  for	  the	  young	  
lawyer	  of	  not	  only	  being	  informed	  about	  current	  affairs	  or	  the	  technical	  aspects	  of	  laws,	  but	  
also	  about	  the	  dynamics	  of	  human	  relationships	  in	  particular	  legal	  professional	  contexts.	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  lawyer,	  the	  lawyer’s	  power	  over	  clients	  was	  represented	  as	  
primarily	  semiotic	  (‘advising’	  clients	  and	  attempting	  to	  ‘impress’	  them)	  and	  based	  on	  their	  
mastery	  of	  laws,	  language	  and	  information.	  For	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  articled	  clerk,	  attorney	  and	  
advocate	  the	  lecturer	  provided	  a	  more	  detailed	  picture	  of	  the	  material	  actions	  that	  lie	  behind	  or	  
precede	  the	  more	  abstract	  actions	  of	  ‘advising’	  or	  ‘impressing’.	  This	  was	  most	  well-­‐developed	  in	  
the	  case	  of	  the	  attorney.	  These	  material	  actions,	  whilst	  not	  only	  providing	  an	  indication	  of	  the	  
types	  of	  work	  in	  which	  articled	  clerks,	  attorneys	  and	  advocates	  engage,	  also	  hinted	  at	  the	  
reality	  that	  they	  all	  have	  to	  work	  very	  hard	  in	  order	  to	  stand	  in	  assume	  the	  position	  of	  an	  expert	  
(Att-­‐SA30b;	  Adv-­‐SA37	  c	  and	  d;	  Adv-­‐SA44a).	  Thus	  the	  young	  articled	  clerk	  was	  represented	  as	  
‘doing’	  all	  kinds	  of	  legal	  work	  (AC-­‐SA3d)	  and	  ‘doing’	  trademarks	  (AC-­‐SA5b)	  in	  particular,	  but	  
needing	  to	  work	  ‘18	  hours	  a	  day’	  in	  order	  to	  remove	  the	  ‘mountains	  of	  files’	  off	  his	  desk	  (AC-­‐
SA5e).	  Attorneys	  were	  represented	  as	  doing	  the	  ‘off-­‐the-­‐street	  work’	  (Att-­‐SA22c):	  ‘Doing’	  the	  
administration	  of	  a	  legal	  case	  (Att-­‐SA13c;	  Att-­‐SA28a),	  the	  divorce	  of	  a	  god-­‐daughter	  (Att-­‐
SA22b),	  or	  trademark	  and	  commercial	  work	  (Att-­‐SA27b)	  or	  ‘attending’	  to	  the	  formalities	  for	  the	  
purchase	  of	  a	  building	  (Att-­‐SA19b).	  In	  the	  best	  example	  of	  the	  lecturer	  representing	  the	  
material	  actions	  an	  attorney	  must	  undertake	  in	  order	  to	  do	  an	  aspect	  of	  ‘off-­‐the-­‐street’	  work	  
(the	  ‘backroom	  work’	  required	  for	  litigation),	  the	  lecturer	  said:	  	  
LECTURER:	  The	  litigation	  department	  -­‐	  well	  they	  do	  maj	  court,	  maj	  court	  litigation	  obviously,	  




get	  all	  the	  expert	  witnesses	  together,	  you	  get	  all	  the	  statements	  together,	  you	  get	  the	  file	  
together…	  You	  drive	  around,	  um	  and	  get	  the	  statements	  from	  witnesses,	  you	  drive	  around	  and	  
um	  uh	  do	  inspections	  in	  loco,	  and	  things	  like	  that.	  You	  do	  all	  the	  prep	  [becomes	  tongue-­‐tied]	  
preparatory	  work	  so	  that	  you	  can	  give	  the,	  uh,	  advocate	  a	  decent	  file	  that	  he	  can	  work	  from.	  
(Att-­‐SA27a)	  
What	  is	  interesting	  about	  this	  representation	  is	  the	  implication	  of	  a	  step-­‐down	  in	  glamour:	  
Driving	  around,	  getting	  statements	  together,	  organizing	  files	  and	  so	  on	  are	  diffused,	  tiring	  and	  
tedious	  tasks.	  The	  advocate’s	  actions	  in	  relation	  to	  clients,	  by	  contrast,	  were	  far	  more	  focused	  
and	  abstract	  (such	  as	  ‘taking’	  a	  brief	  to	  court	  (Adv-­‐SA30a;	  Adv-­‐SA31a),	  and	  ‘promoting’	  a	  case	  
(Adv-­‐SA5b)).	  This	  served	  as	  another	  instance	  where	  the	  materiality	  (but	  also	  specificity	  of	  social	  
action)	  was	  used	  to	  mark	  a	  lower	  status.	  	  
There	  were	  two	  other	  prominent	  themes	  in	  the	  lecturer’s	  representation	  of	  the	  social	  actions	  of	  
articled	  clerks,	  attorneys	  and	  advocates	  insofar	  as	  these	  related	  to	  clients.	  They	  both	  hinted	  at	  
additional	  bases	  for	  the	  power	  of	  these	  roles	  over	  clients,	  namely,	  the	  capacity	  to	  charge	  fees	  
(AC-­‐SA5b)	  –	  even	  as	  high	  as	  R20	  000	  an	  hour	  (Adv-­‐SA21d;	  Adv-­‐SA32d),	  and,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  
attorney,	  the	  custody	  of	  trust	  monies.	  The	  latter	  serves	  to	  illustrate	  how	  the	  position	  of	  trust	  
which	  attorneys	  occupy	  can	  be	  used	  to	  their	  own	  advantage,	  with	  the	  client	  having	  little,	  if	  any,	  
control	  over	  their	  conduct.	  In	  two	  different	  lectures,	  the	  lecturer	  noted	  that	  attorneys	  act	  as	  
custodians	  for	  huge	  transactions	  (Att-­‐SA19a),	  such	  as	  the	  deposit	  required	  for	  the	  purchase	  of	  
fixed	  property	  (Att-­‐SA19b	  and	  c).	  Such	  monies	  are	  paid	  into	  the	  attorney’s	  trust	  account	  (Att-­‐
SA4a).	  However,	  at	  the	  same	  time	  attorneys	  cannot	  keep	  their	  hands	  off,	  cannot	  resist	  
accessing	  trust	  monies	  (Att-­‐SA19g	  and	  i).	  They	  may	  attempt	  to	  draw	  on	  trust	  monies	  (Att-­‐
SA19d),	  use	  trust	  monies	  to	  make	  personal	  loans	  to	  members	  of	  their	  family	  (Att-­‐SA4b)	  and,	  in	  
the	  worst	  instance,	  steal	  from	  the	  trust	  account	  (Att-­‐SA6).	  Over	  all	  these	  actions	  the	  client	  has	  
little	  control	  or	  redress	  –	  even	  where	  the	  attorney	  has	  paid	  the	  monies	  back	  immediately	  (Att-­‐
SA4c).	  ‘Beware	  students’,	  the	  lecturer	  warns	  ‘make	  it	  extremely	  difficult	  for	  anyone	  within	  the	  
firm	  to	  access	  trust	  monies’	  (Att-­‐SA19h).	  
Turning	  then	  to	  what	  was	  relatively	  new	  in	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  articled	  clerk,	  attorney	  and	  advocate	  
–	  the	  prominence	  given	  to	  the	  extension	  of	  social	  action	  to	  other	  lawyers	  and	  to	  legal	  office	  




relationship:	  (i)	  between	  articled	  clerk	  as	  trainee	  and	  attorney	  as	  trainer	  (as	  ‘principal’);	  (ii)	  
between	  pupil	  (novice	  advocate)	  and	  advocate	  (as	  the	  trainer	  or	  ‘pupil	  master’);79	  (iii)	  among	  
attorneys	  or	  advocates	  as	  colleagues;80	  (iv)	  between	  articled	  clerks	  and	  attorneys	  and	  office	  
personnel;	  (v)	  between	  attorneys	  and	  advocates	  as	  regards	  the	  provision	  of	  legal	  work	  through	  
the	  referral	  system;	  (vi)	  between	  advocates	  and	  witnesses	  in	  the	  context	  of	  litigation;	  (vii)	  
between	  advocates	  and	  judges	  as	  regards	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  they	  relate	  to	  each	  other	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  a	  courtroom;	  and	  (viii)	  between	  individual	  practitioners	  and	  their	  professional	  
bodies.81	  	  
In	  these	  relationships	  the	  coding	  of	  social	  action	  as	  active	  or	  passive	  was	  used	  to	  mark	  the	  
power	  differentials	  between	  the	  constituent	  roles	  as	  well	  as	  the	  complexities	  of	  the	  
relationship.	  Roles	  were	  not	  represented	  as	  being	  thoroughly	  powerful	  or	  powerless;	  i.e.	  
consistently	  powerful/powerless	  in	  all	  relationships.	  	  The	  most	  ambiguous	  in	  this	  regard	  were	  
the	  roles	  of	  the	  advocate	  and	  the	  articled	  clerk.	  	  
In	  the	  relationship	  between	  advocate	  and	  witness	  the	  advocate	  was	  always	  active	  in	  –	  for	  
example	  –	  asking	  piercing	  and	  tenacious	  questions	  (Adv-­‐SA18a;	  Adv-­‐SA42e);	  attacking	  (Adv-­‐
SA42f)	  and	  chipping	  away	  at	  the	  witness	  (Adv-­‐SA42c).	  In	  fact	  the	  witness	  was	  never	  even	  
present	  as	  a	  social	  actor.	  In	  the	  relationship	  between	  attorneys	  and	  advocates	  regarding	  the	  
provision	  of	  work	  through	  the	  referral	  system,	  attorneys	  were	  almost	  always	  represented	  as	  
active	  (they	  send	  advocates	  work	  (Att-­‐SA7a);	  instruct	  advocates	  (Att-­‐SA32);	  and	  know,	  when	  
they	  get	  a	  case,	  which	  advocates	  to	  brief	  (Att-­‐SA9))	  while	  advocates	  were	  almost	  always	  
represented	  as	  passive:	  They	  rely	  on	  attorneys	  to	  send	  briefs	  (Adv-­‐SA16a	  and	  d);	  need	  to	  be	  
appointed	  or	  briefed	  (Adv-­‐SA5a;	  Adv-­‐SA21c;	  Adv-­‐SA23;	  Adv-­‐SA27;	  Adv-­‐SA29a	  and	  b;	  Adv-­‐
SA31b);	  need	  to	  be	  known	  and	  spoken	  about	  (Adv-­‐SA16c;	  Adv-­‐SA18d;	  Adv-­‐SA19a;	  Adv-­‐SA42b),	  
and	  face	  the	  spectre	  of	  not	  being	  contacted	  (Adv-­‐SA16b;	  Adv-­‐SA19e;	  Adv-­‐SA46a);	  and	  not	  being	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79	  See	  Adv-­‐SA17a	  –	  f	  and	  Adv-­‐SA18c.	  This	  particular	  relationship	  is	  not	  discussed	  further	  in	  the	  text	  below	  as	  being	  
less	  significant	  compared	  to	  the	  other	  relationships.	  	  
80	  See	  Att-­‐SA1a	  –	  c;	  Att-­‐SA13a;	  Att-­‐SA16c;	  Att-­‐SA21a;	  Adv-­‐SA18b;	  Adv-­‐SA20a;	  Adv-­‐SA22;	  Adv-­‐SA28a;	  Adv-­‐SA42a;	  
Adv-­‐SA45;	  Adv-­‐SA19b;	  Adv-­‐SA32a;	  Adv-­‐SA32c.	  This	  particular	  relationship	  is	  similarly	  not	  discussed	  further	  in	  the	  
text	  below.	  
81	  See	  Att-­‐SA18a;	  Att-­‐SA19e;	  Adv-­‐SA8;	  Adv-­‐SA19d.	  This	  particular	  relationship	  is	  similarly	  not	  discussed	  further	  in	  




employed	  (Adv-­‐SA46e;	  Adv-­‐SA47d).	  Two	  ‘if-­‐then’	  constructions	  emphasize	  the	  inevitability	  of	  
the	  advocate’s	  reliance	  on	  the	  attorneys:	  ‘if	  you	  are	  at	  the	  bar	  …	  you	  rely	  one	  hundred	  percent	  
on	  the	  side-­‐bar’	  and	  from	  the	  same	  quotation,	  ‘if	  you	  go	  directly	  from	  university	  to	  the	  bar	  
you’re	  going	  to	  sit	  in	  an	  office	  somewhere	  here	  in	  Johannesburg	  and	  wait	  for	  your	  telephone	  to	  
ring	  and	  it’s	  never	  going	  to	  ring	  …’	  (Att-­‐Q7;	  Adv-­‐Q16).	  The	  advocate	  was	  represented	  as	  a	  
powerful	  actor	  in	  the	  courtroom	  through	  his	  mode	  of	  relating	  to	  the	  judge;	  i.e.	  in	  appearing	  
before	  the	  judge	  (Adv-­‐SA33a);	  addressing	  the	  judge	  (Adv-­‐SA35d	  and	  e);	  laying,	  putting	  or	  
presenting	  authorities	  before	  the	  judge	  (Adv-­‐SA1b;	  Adv-­‐SA4b;	  Adv-­‐SA4c;	  Adv-­‐SA5d);	  informing	  
the	  judge	  of	  every	  single	  possible	  authority	  (Adv-­‐SA4b);	  confronting	  the	  judge	  with	  his	  side	  of	  
the	  argument	  (Adv-­‐SA4a);	  and	  trying	  to	  convince	  the	  judge	  (Adv-­‐SA5d).	  However,	  the	  inferiority	  
of	  his	  power	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  judge	  was	  marked	  by	  the	  active	  social	  action	  of	  apologizing	  to	  the	  
judge	  (Adv-­‐SA34b;	  Adv-­‐SA35g)	  as	  well	  as	  the	  passive	  actions	  of	  having	  authorities	  rejected	  by	  
the	  judge	  (Adv-­‐SA7);	  being	  questioned	  by	  the	  judge	  (Adv-­‐SA34a);	  having	  his	  case	  thrown	  out	  by	  
judge	  (Adv-­‐SA34d;	  Adv-­‐SA35c);	  and	  being	  ‘stuffed’	  by	  the	  judge	  (Adv-­‐SA35f).	  All	  of	  the	  latter	  
extracts	  from	  quotations	  34	  and	  35	  were	  characterized	  by	  the	  use	  of	  if-­‐then	  constructions,	  
entrenching	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  magnitude	  of	  an	  error	  and	  the	  stakes	  that	  rest	  on	  the	  perfection	  of	  
one’s	  presentation	  of	  a	  case.	  	  
The	  situation	  of	  the	  articled	  clerk	  at	  the	  bottom	  rung	  of	  the	  professional	  ladder	  was	  aptly	  
constituted	  through	  the	  lecturer’s	  anecdote	  of	  his	  first	  encounter	  with	  a	  legal	  secretary	  and	  
how	  she	  sabotaged	  his	  work	  (AC-­‐SA5g)	  and	  ruined	  his	  reputation	  in	  the	  firm	  (AC-­‐SA5i).	  Based	  
on	  this	  experience,	  the	  lecturer	  advises	  students	  to	  ‘beware	  of	  the	  typists’	  (Att-­‐SA33)	  and	  to	  
‘get	  on’	  with	  the	  office	  manager	  and	  the	  office	  personnel	  (AC-­‐SA5h;	  Att-­‐SA21);	  just	  to	  ‘count	  on	  
them	  and	  just	  say	  yes	  sir	  no	  sir	  or	  whatever	  you	  say’	  (AC-­‐SA5h).	  However,	  this	  situation	  is	  only	  
temporary	  and	  is	  based	  on	  the	  perception	  that	  articled	  clerks	  are	  ‘threatening’	  (underscored	  by	  
the	  use	  of	  an	  if-­‐then	  clause),	  and	  thus	  powerful:	  	  
LECTURER:	  ‘If	  you	  enter	  into	  a	  law	  firm	  as	  an	  articled	  clerk	  you	  are	  a	  threat	  to	  everybody.	  You	  
are	  a	  threat	  to	  everybody	  and	  you	  don’t	  know	  that.	  And	  the	  people	  who	  are	  most	  threatened	  by	  
you	  are	  of	  course	  the	  office	  personnel	  that’s	  been	  there	  for	  years	  and	  years	  and	  who,	  uh,	  has	  
got	  a	  vested	  interest	  in	  the	  firm	  and	  all	  they	  see	  is	  this	  young	  upstart’s	  coming	  from	  university	  




start	  earning	  more	  than	  they	  do	  and	  they	  start	  shunting	  them	  around’	  (AC-­‐Q4).	  	  
If	  the	  articled	  clerk	  follows	  the	  trajectory	  of	  the	  preferred	  career	  path	  they	  will	  ascend	  to	  the	  
role	  of	  the	  advocate	  and	  then	  practically	  ‘own’	  a	  secretary	  (Adv-­‐SA32b;	  Adv-­‐SA44b).	  
Apart	  from	  the	  coding	  of	  social	  action	  as	  active	  or	  passive	  in	  these	  relationships,	  it	  is	  also	  
interesting	  that	  the	  verbs	  chosen	  to	  capture	  action	  constitute	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  relationships	  as	  
harsh	  and	  aggressive:	  Advocates	  ‘attack’	  witnesses	  and	  ‘confront’	  the	  judge;	  judges	  ‘throw’	  the	  
advocates’	  case	  out	  of	  court;	  legal	  secretaries	  ‘sabotage’	  and	  ‘ruin’	  but	  are	  at	  the	  same	  time	  
‘shunted	  around’	  by	  articled	  clerks	  become	  partners.	  All	  of	  these	  words	  conjure	  up	  a	  divisive	  
and	  aggressive	  professional	  environment.	  	  	  
3.1.2	   Circumstances	  of	  social	  action	  	  
The	  lecturer’s	  representation	  of	  the	  circumstances	  in	  which	  articled	  clerks,	  attorneys	  and	  
advocates	  carry	  out	  their	  social	  action	  was	  not	  proportional	  to	  the	  number	  of	  quotations	  
associated	  with	  each.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  that	  whereas	  the	  total	  number	  of	  quotations	  for	  these	  
roles	  stood	  roughly	  in	  the	  ratio	  of	  1:3:5	  (i.e.	  with	  11	  quotations	  for	  the	  articled	  clerk,	  33	  for	  the	  
attorney	  and	  54	  for	  the	  advocate),	  the	  ratios	  for	  the	  extracts	  relating	  to	  resources,	  emotional	  
content	  and	  location	  respectively	  were	  very	  different.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  advocate	  there	  were	  39	  
extracts	  associated	  with	  resources,	  in	  contrast	  to	  3	  extracts	  for	  the	  articled	  clerk	  and	  14	  extracts	  
for	  the	  attorney	  (giving	  a	  ratio	  of	  roughly	  1:5:13).	  In	  contrast,	  with	  16	  extracts	  relating	  to	  
emotional	  content	  for	  the	  articled	  clerk,	  and	  14	  and	  13	  extracts	  on	  emotional	  content	  for	  the	  
attorney	  and	  advocate	  respectively,	  the	  ratio	  was	  almost	  1:1:1.	  As	  regards	  location,	  there	  were	  
15	  extracts	  for	  the	  articled	  clerk,	  18	  extracts	  for	  the	  attorney	  and	  24	  extracts	  for	  the	  advocate	  
(a	  ratio	  of	  roughly	  3:6:8).	  This	  shows	  that	  the	  lecturer	  portrayed	  the	  advocate	  as	  having	  
resources	  that	  were	  far	  richer	  and	  more	  diverse	  than	  those	  at	  the	  disposal	  of	  the	  articled	  clerk	  
or	  the	  attorney,	  while	  highlighting	  the	  emotional	  content	  of	  the	  articled	  clerk’s	  work	  and,	  to	  a	  
lesser	  extent,	  the	  attorney’s	  work,	  to	  a	  greater	  extent.	  Both	  representational	  patterns	  index	  
social	  power:	  Access	  to	  a	  greater	  range	  of	  resources	  is	  associated	  with	  greater	  social	  power,	  
whilst	  susceptibility	  to	  difficult	  emotions	  arguably	  signals	  the	  lack	  of	  it.	  	  




tended	  to	  be	  semiotic	  in	  nature.	  For	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  articled	  clerk,	  attorney	  and	  advocate,	  it	  
was	  only	  really	  the	  advocate	  who	  was	  represented	  as	  using	  resources	  such	  as	  ‘language’,	  
‘words’,	  ‘books’,	  and	  ‘court	  cases’	  (see	  Adv-­‐CSA2;	  Adv-­‐CSA4;	  Adv-­‐CSA5a;	  Adv-­‐CSA5b).	  	  While	  
attorneys	  were	  also	  represented	  as	  using	  cases,	  this	  tended	  more	  toward	  reference	  to	  law	  
reports	  as	  physical	  resources:	  ‘In	  the	  old	  days’,	  the	  lecturer	  stated,	  ‘if	  you	  had	  to	  set	  up	  shop	  as	  
a	  one-­‐man	  uh	  attorney,	  you	  had	  to	  buy	  a	  whole	  set	  of	  Law	  Reports	  from	  eighteen	  voetsek	  till	  
today.	  And	  that	  would	  cost	  you	  something	  like	  fifty	  to	  eighty	  thousand	  bucks,	  depending	  on	  
whether	  they’re	  bound	  or	  not’	  (Att-­‐CSA3b).	  Nowadays,	  with	  the	  availability	  of	  excellent	  
electronic	  resources	  (Att-­‐CSA3a),	  ‘[y]ou	  can	  really	  start	  practicing	  with	  a	  pile	  of	  CDs	  …	  Not	  
taking	  up	  more	  than	  five	  square	  inches	  on	  your	  desk	  (Att-­‐CSA3c).	  	  
A	  semiotic	  resource	  that	  featured	  in	  all	  three	  roles,	  however,	  was	  that	  of	  reputation.	  This	  
resource	  played	  a	  critical	  role	  in	  constituting	  the	  preferred	  career	  path	  because	  it	  is	  the	  need	  
for	  a	  good	  reputation	  that	  drives	  an	  aspiring	  advocate	  to	  first	  become	  an	  attorney.	  
Unsurprisingly,	  while	  the	  lecturer	  mentioned	  the	  need	  for	  reputation	  in	  regard	  to	  both	  the	  
articled	  clerk	  and	  the	  attorney	  (AC-­‐CSA9c;	  Att-­‐CSA28),	  it	  featured	  most	  prominently	  in	  relation	  
to	  the	  advocate	  (Adv-­‐CSA16b;	  Adv-­‐CSA20b;	  Adv-­‐CSA28b;	  Adv-­‐CSA29;	  Adv-­‐CSA42a;	  Adv-­‐
CSA45b).	  A	  resource	  closely	  related	  to	  that	  of	  ‘having	  reputation’	  was	  the	  need	  to	  ‘have	  
extreme	  expertise’	  which	  was	  mentioned	  in	  the	  context	  of	  attorneys	  wishing	  to	  appear	  in	  the	  
higher	  courts	  (Att-­‐CSA25b).	  	  
The	  lecturer	  also	  emphasized	  the	  importance	  of	  qualifications	  (Att-­‐CSA14;	  Att-­‐CSA20).	  For	  the	  
advocate,	  emphasis	  was	  laid	  on	  not	  only	  obtaining	  the	  required	  qualifications	  (Adv-­‐CSA47a;	  
Adv-­‐CSA48a),	  but	  obtaining	  these	  with	  distinction:	  ‘Now	  if	  you’re	  straight	  through	  your	  LLB	  by	  
you	  know	  getting	  60	  or	  68%	  you	  know	  that’s	  not	  good	  enough.	  You	  must	  get	  your	  LLB	  cum	  
laude’	  (Adv-­‐CSA16c,	  see	  also	  Adv-­‐CSA16d).	  	  
Interestingly,	  the	  need	  to	  know	  ‘your	  ethics’	  (probably	  a	  reference	  to	  the	  rules	  of	  professional	  
conduct	  upheld	  by	  the	  Law	  Society	  and	  the	  General	  Council	  of	  the	  Bar),	  was	  represented	  
instrumentally,	  as	  an	  integral	  requirement	  (together	  with	  the	  ‘Rules	  of	  Court’	  or	  ‘etiquette)	  for	  




LECTURER:	  ‘Bar	  exam	  -­‐	  lots	  of	  work	  -­‐	  but	  you	  must	  know	  your	  Rules	  of	  Court.	  And	  your	  ethics.	  
Ethics,	  remember	  that,	  if	  you	  prepare	  for	  the	  bar	  exam	  those	  are	  the	  things	  that	  they’re	  going	  to	  
ask.	  Your	  Rules	  of	  Court.	  You	  must	  know	  your	  etiquette,	  your	  Rules	  of	  Court	  and	  your	  ethics.	  
What	  may	  and	  may	  you	  …	  can’t	  you	  do	  (Adv-­‐CSA48b).	  	  
Apart	  from	  these	  semiotic	  resources,	  the	  lecturer	  also	  mentioned	  a	  number	  of	  material	  
resources	  which	  an	  articled	  clerk,	  attorney	  or	  advocate	  would	  need,	  such	  as	  a	  desk,	  office,	  or	  
study	  (AC-­‐CSA5c;	  Att-­‐CSA3c;	  Adv-­‐CSA15;	  Adv-­‐CSA32b);	  files,	  file	  numbers	  and	  numbers	  to	  
charge	  fees	  (AC-­‐CSA1a;	  AC-­‐CSA5c);	  a	  telephone,	  cellphone	  or	  dictaphone	  (Adv-­‐CSA32b;	  Adv-­‐
CSA47b);	  and	  office	  personnel	  such	  as	  a	  secretary,	  office	  manager	  and	  librarian	  (AC-­‐CSA5c;	  Att-­‐
CSA3b;	  Att-­‐CSA13b);	  and	  a	  car	  (Att-­‐CSA27;	  Adv-­‐CSA47b).	  The	  necessity	  of	  having	  such	  resources	  
–	  and	  the	  broader	  resource	  of	  having	  money	  to	  buy	  such	  resources	  –	  was	  most	  marked	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  the	  advocate	  through	  the	  use	  of	  if-­‐then	  constructions:	  ‘[I]f	  you	  are	  in	  a	  profession	  you	  
must	  have	  a	  car,	  you	  must	  have	  a	  cellphone,	  you	  must	  have	  money	  to	  entertain	  people,	  you	  
must	  have	  money	  to	  go	  out,	  you	  must	  have	  money	  to	  buy	  books,	  you	  must	  have	  money	  to	  buy,	  
money	  to	  buy	  make-­‐up,	  you	  want	  to	  buy	  nice	  clothes’	  (Adv-­‐Q47).	  	  
The	  lecturer	  made	  extended	  reference	  to	  the	  resources	  employed	  by	  advocates	  in	  the	  process	  
of	  litigation,	  such	  as	  affidavits	  (Adv-­‐CSA5b;	  Adv-­‐CSA34a),	  expert	  witnesses	  (Adv-­‐CSA34a);	  and	  
the	  litigation	  department	  in	  a	  firm	  of	  attorneys	  (Adv-­‐CSA40a).	  The	  chief	  focus,	  however,	  fell	  on	  
the	  resource	  of	  the	  ‘brief’	  as	  both	  a	  semiotic	  and	  material	  resource.	  A	  brief,	  the	  lecturer	  
explains,	  is	  the	  instruction	  the	  advocate	  receives	  from	  the	  attorney	  (Adv-­‐CSA31b);	  i.e.	  it	  
constitutes	  the	  advocate’s	  mandate	  to	  represent	  a	  side	  on	  a	  particular	  case.	  Apart	  from	  
providing	  an	  extended	  description	  of	  the	  brief	  as	  a	  physical	  document	  (that	  it	  is	  blue,	  folded	  in	  a	  
particular	  way,	  tied	  with	  a	  pink	  ribbon,	  and	  carried	  by	  the	  advocate	  to	  court)	  the	  lecturer	  also	  
remarks	  in	  passing	  that	  ‘it	  comes	  from	  the	  formula	  of	  the	  praetor’	  (Adv-­‐CSA30a).	  The	  praetor	  in	  
this	  reference	  establishes	  a	  symbolic	  linkage	  to	  the	  republican	  and	  classical	  eras	  of	  Roman	  law,	  
while	  the	  references	  to	  the	  very	  specific	  physical	  form	  of	  the	  brief	  suggests	  an	  age-­‐old	  tradition,	  
the	  reasons	  for	  which	  are	  mostly	  unknown	  or	  forgotten	  by	  most.	  These	  references	  seem	  to	  
romanticize	  the	  role	  of	  the	  advocate:	  There	  is	  something	  exciting	  about	  bearing	  under	  one’s	  
arm	  the	  blue	  document,	  tied	  with	  its	  pink	  ribbon	  as	  one	  strides	  into	  court.	  It	  would	  serve	  as	  a	  




lecturer	  invests	  a	  material	  object	  with	  complex	  symbolic	  meanings.	  	  
The	  lecturer,	  however,	  invests	  the	  brief	  with	  an	  additional	  meaning:	  It	  is	  also	  the	  advocate’s	  
‘bread-­‐and-­‐butter’	  (Adv-­‐CSA31b)	  (but	  one	  instance	  of	  the	  ‘bread-­‐and-­‐butter’	  metaphor	  in	  the	  
data).	  It	  is	  an	  interesting	  metaphor	  because,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  context	  of	  successful	  advocates,	  it	  is	  
misleading	  –	  if	  an	  advocate	  is	  making	  between	  four	  and	  eight	  million	  rand	  a	  year,	  his	  or	  her	  
lifestyle	  is	  considerably	  higher	  than	  the	  bread-­‐and-­‐butter	  level.	  The	  lecturer,	  however,	  may	  
have	  used	  the	  metaphor	  to	  highlight	  the	  dependence	  of	  advocates	  upon	  attorneys.	  The	  lecturer	  
also	  points	  out	  that	  ‘if	  you	  have	  friends	  becoming	  legal	  advisors	  to	  large	  firms,	  they	  are	  very	  
good	  to	  know.	  Uh,	  these	  are	  people	  who	  will	  brief	  you	  if	  you	  are	  going	  to	  become	  an	  advocate.	  
They	  will	  brief	  you	  and	  they	  will	  give	  you	  fat	  briefs’	  (Adv-­‐CSA29).	  This	  posits	  the	  befriending	  of	  
in-­‐house	  counsel	  as	  a	  purely	  instrumental	  action.	  	  
Similarly	  to	  the	  lecturer’s	  representations	  around	  the	  brief,	  his	  representations	  regarding	  the	  
manner	  of	  dress	  of	  the	  advocate	  skillfully	  invested	  material	  objects	  with	  symbolic	  meaning.	  This	  
occurred	  by	  way	  of	  reference	  to	  the	  formal	  apparel	  of	  the	  advocate	  –	  the	  advocate’s	  robe	  –	  as	  
well	  as	  ordinary	  forms	  of	  dress.	  As	  regards	  the	  former,	  the	  lecturer	  explains	  to	  students	  that	  the	  
chief	  implication	  of	  acquiring	  the	  title	  of	  ‘senior	  counsel’	  or	  ‘SC’	  (Adv-­‐CSA21a,	  in	  itself	  a	  
resource)	  is	  that	  ‘you	  get	  to	  wear	  now	  not	  only	  a	  cotton	  robe,	  but	  you	  can	  wear	  silk	  robe’	  (Adv-­‐
CSA21b).	  As	  regards	  the	  latter,	  the	  lecturer	  emphasized	  that	  as	  an	  advocate	  ‘you	  must	  be	  able	  
to	  present	  yourself’	  (Adv-­‐CSA43b).	  For	  this	  reason	  it	  is	  essential	  for	  the	  advocate	  to	  have	  ‘nice	  
clothes’:	  
LECTURER:	  	  ‘[Y]ou	  can’t,	  you	  know,	  not	  be	  well-­‐dressed,	  you’re	  an	  advocate,	  you	  must	  dress	  
very	  very	  well	  you	  must	  impress	  the	  people.	  You	  can’t	  sit	  there	  with	  uh	  a	  denim	  and	  slacks	  …	  it	  
just	  doesn’t	  work.	  If	  you	  …	  if	  you’ve	  got	  a	  multi-­‐million	  contract	  that	  is	  a	  bit	  shaky	  and	  you	  want	  
to	  take	  it	  to	  court	  and	  you	  get	  to	  this	  guy	  and	  he	  looks	  like	  you	  look	  now	  today	  …	  Not	  that,	  not	  
that	  you	  don’t	  look	  beautiful	  but,	  um,	  you	  know,	  this	  is	  not,	  you	  know,	  he’s	  going	  to	  say	  ‘uuuh,	  
you	  know,	  please,	  this	  guy	  doesn’t	  know	  what	  he’s	  doing	  or	  this	  girl	  doesn’t	  know	  what	  she’s	  
doing.	  She’s	  in	  a	  pink	  Oxford	  tracksuit	  [gestures	  towards	  one	  of	  the	  students]	  please,	  you	  know’.	  
You	  must	  power	  dress:	  black,	  red,	  white;	  high	  heels,	  silk	  stockings,	  pencil-­‐striped	  skirt,	  jacket,	  
neat	  hair,	  and,	  you	  know,	  power,	  power,	  power.’	  
In	  this	  extract	  a	  pink	  Oxford	  track	  suit,	  denim	  and	  slacks	  are	  correlated	  with	  not	  knowing	  what	  




capacity	  to	  defend	  a	  multi-­‐million	  rand	  contract	  in	  court.	  The	  lecturer’s	  notion	  of	  ‘power	  dress’	  
however,	  is	  decidedly	  gender-­‐biased.	  One	  could	  infer,	  from	  this	  statement,	  that	  it	  is	  only	  
women	  who	  must	  compensate	  for	  their	  power	  deficit	  before	  the	  court	  by	  donning	  the	  sexually	  
suggestive	  (high	  heels,	  silk	  stockings)	  uniform	  of	  the	  prototypical	  female	  corporate	  officer.	  
What	  is	  also	  interesting	  about	  this	  quotation,	  similarly	  to	  Adv-­‐Q45,82	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  indirect	  
impertinence,	  once	  more	  directed	  at	  a	  female	  student.	  	  
The	  final	  resource-­‐type	  that	  featured	  prominently,	  but	  only	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  
advocate,	  were	  the	  naming	  of	  character	  traits	  deemed	  essential	  for	  the	  advocate	  to	  possess.	  
These	  included	  wisdom	  (Adv-­‐CSA13);	  an	  eye	  for	  detail	  (Adv-­‐CSA36);	  being	  a	  good	  public	  
speaker	  (Adv-­‐CSA37b);	  not	  being	  shy,	  but	  liking	  ‘intellectual	  violence’	  (Adv-­‐CSA37c);	  being	  
perceptive,	  brilliant	  and	  tenacious	  (Adv-­‐CSA42e);	  and	  having	  a	  razor-­‐sharp	  intelligence	  (Adv-­‐
CSA43a),	  an	  extremely	  well-­‐developed	  ‘legal	  feeling’	  (Adv-­‐CSA43a)	  and	  an	  encyclopaedic	  
knowledge	  of	  the	  law	  (Adv-­‐CSA43a).	  In	  many	  cases,	  these	  qualities	  were	  linked	  via	  an	  if-­‐then	  
construction	  to	  the	  lecturer’s	  counsel	  to	  ‘stay	  away’	  from	  the	  legal	  profession:	  ‘If	  you	  don’t	  
have	  an	  eye	  for	  detail	  if	  you’re	  a,	  if	  you’re	  a	  more	  of	  a	  forest	  type	  person	  and	  you	  can’t	  see	  the	  
detail,	  you	  can’t	  see	  the	  leaves	  for	  the	  forest	  (gestures	  ‘no’).	  Stay	  away.	  Don’t	  even	  try	  to	  
become	  an	  advocate’	  (Adv-­‐CSA36).	  In	  an	  interesting	  anecdote	  about	  his	  former	  colleague	  
Andrew,	  the	  lecturer	  illustrated	  the	  embodiment	  of	  these	  resources	  in	  practice:	  	  
	  
LECTURER:	  Um,	  he’s	  a,	  he’s	  a	  small	  unopposing	  little	  man.	  He’s	  not	  a,	  you	  know,	  fiery	  lion	  or	  
something.	  But,	  he	  chips	  at	  you	  until	  you	  crack.	  And	  he	  doesn’t	  …	  I	  remember	  I	  gave	  a	  paper	  on	  
unjustified	  enrichment	  (coughs)	  and	  I	  gave	  the	  paper	  first	  thing	  in	  the	  morning,	  it	  was	  a	  day	  
session,	  um	  and	  he	  was	  fascinated	  at	  the,	  at	  my	  view,	  that	  I	  had	  on	  this,	  uh	  specific	  issue	  ...	  it’s	  
complicated	  and	  I	  can’t	  even	  remember	  it.	  But	  it	  was	  a	  novel	  view	  on	  extending	  unjustified	  
enrichment.	  And	  he,	  as	  soon	  as	  the	  session	  was	  over	  he	  came	  to	  me	  and,	  you	  know,	  he	  ..	  it	  was	  
teatime	  I	  can	  remember	  and	  he	  was	  standing	  here	  and	  he	  said:	  ‘Um	  you	  said	  this	  and	  this	  ..	  what	  
exactly	  did	  you	  mean?’	  And	  he	  went	  on	  and	  on	  and	  on	  ..	  throughout	  teatime,	  throughout	  uh	  the	  
second	  session	  the	  the	  mid-­‐morning	  session,	  throughout	  lunch	  time.	  And	  I	  said	  ‘Andrew,	  please,	  
dear	  God,	  can	  I	  eat	  I	  mean,	  I	  don’t	  want	  to	  be	  rude	  but,	  you	  know,	  can	  I	  just	  have	  a	  break?’	  And	  
he	  said	  ‘Yes	  but	  uh	  um	  what	  exactly	  did	  you	  mean,	  you	  can	  eat	  you	  can	  talk	  to	  me	  while	  you	  eat.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82	  In	  Adv-­‐Q45,	  quoted	  in	  the	  section	  outlining	  the	  preferred	  career	  path	  above,	  the	  lecturer	  tells	  a	  young	  female	  
student	  that	  she	  would	  be	  a	  ‘fool’	  to	  go	  immediately	  from	  university	  to	  the	  Bar,	  and	  counsels	  that	  while	  she	  may	  





And	  he	  stayed	  with	  me	  until	  that	  afternoon	  that	  we,	  that	  the	  conference	  was	  over,	  he	  did	  not	  
give	  up	  until	  he	  understood	  exactly	  what	  was	  going	  on.	  And	  he	  didn’t	  uh,	  he	  didn’t	  accept	  uh	  my	  
version	  of	  it	  at	  all.	  First	  of	  all	  I	  had	  to	  explain	  it	  to	  him	  and	  then,	  you	  know,	  he	  started	  attacking	  
me	  on	  why,	  why	  it	  couldn’t	  be.	  So,	  um,	  that	  is	  the	  kind	  of	  person	  that	  you	  want,	  uh,	  as	  an	  
advocate.	  (Adv-­‐CSA42f)	  
In	  this	  extract,	  a	  relational	  clause	  (‘that	  is	  the	  kind	  of	  person	  that	  you	  want	  …	  as	  an	  advocate)	  
links	  all	  these	  qualities	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  advocate.	  At	  another	  point	  the	  lecturer	  refers	  more	  
broadly	  to	  being	  one	  of	  the	  ‘bright	  stars’	  which	  he	  links,	  via	  an	  if-­‐then	  construction,	  to	  ‘making	  
it’	  at	  the	  bar	  (Adv-­‐CSA19b).	  	  
The	  theme	  of	  having	  too	  much	  work	  for	  the	  time	  available	  in	  which	  to	  complete	  it	  (i.e.	  not	  
having	  enough	  time)	  also	  featured	  strongly	  in	  all	  three	  roles.	  Articled	  clerks	  must	  ‘run	  around’	  
(AC-­‐CSA1a).	  On	  their	  very	  first	  day	  of	  taking	  up	  articles	  of	  clerkship,	  young	  articled	  clerks	  are	  
given	  their	  own	  secretary,	  desk,	  office,	  number	  to	  charge	  fees,	  and	  so	  on	  –	  not	  because	  these	  
resources	  are	  essential	  to	  their	  learning	  –	  but	  because	  ‘they	  [attorneys]	  haven’t	  got	  time	  not	  to	  
give	  it	  to	  you’	  (AC-­‐CSA5d).	  The	  pressure	  is	  immediately	  on	  to	  start	  earning	  fees	  for	  the	  firm:	  
‘You	  must	  start	  earning	  now.	  You	  must	  start	  doing	  trademarks’	  (AC-­‐CSA5d).	  Not	  having	  enough	  
time	  also	  manifests	  in	  having	  to	  work	  abnormally	  long	  hours.	  Thus	  the	  articled	  clerk	  is	  working	  
‘18	  hours	  a	  day’	  (AC-­‐CSA5f);	  the	  lecturer’s	  wife	  Isobel,	  an	  attorney,	  needs	  to	  work	  ‘extremely	  
hard’	  (Att-­‐CSA30a);	  and	  the	  advocate	  typically	  only	  manages	  to	  get	  ‘three	  to	  four	  hours	  sleep	  a	  
night’	  (Adv-­‐CSA37d).	  In	  one	  of	  the	  earlier	  lectures,	  the	  lecturer	  also	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  the	  
situation	  in	  other	  countries	  is	  the	  same,	  if	  not	  worse,	  than	  in	  South	  Africa.	  Speaking	  of	  the	  
possibility	  of	  ‘transferring’	  to	  another	  jurisdiction,	  he	  remarks	  of	  the	  situation	  in	  England:	  ‘If	  you	  
want	  to	  go	  to	  England	  and	  you	  want	  to	  live	  with	  those	  hideous	  people	  then	  you	  can	  go	  there.	  
They’ll	  make	  you	  …	  they’ll	  not	  make	  you	  a	  partner,	  they’ll	  make	  you	  an	  associate,	  they’ll	  pay	  
you	  nothing,	  and	  you’ll	  work	  like	  a	  dog.	  For	  the	  rest	  of	  your	  life’	  (Att-­‐CSA1e,	  my	  emphasis),	  and	  
of	  the	  situation	  in	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America:	  ‘perhaps	  you	  can	  go	  there.	  I	  don’t	  know	  why	  
you	  want	  to	  go	  there	  you’ll	  probably	  also	  work,	  you	  know,	  24	  hours	  a	  day’	  (Att-­‐CSA1f).	  	  
As	  noted	  in	  the	  overview	  of	  the	  lawyer	  role	  above,	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  being	  overworked	  is	  
associated	  with	  a	  negative,	  stressful	  emotional	  state.	  In	  these	  roles	  the	  lecturer	  provides	  clues	  




nature	  of	  the	  work,	  specifically,	  keeping	  track	  of	  the	  never-­‐ending	  stream	  of	  documents	  which	  
are	  involved	  in	  bringing	  a	  dispute	  to	  court:	  	  
LECTURER:	  You	  know	  what	  pagination	  is?	  	  You	  have	  a	  file	  of	  ten	  thousand	  pages	  and	  every	  day	  a	  
new	  document	  arrives	  to	  be	  put	  into	  that	  file.	  Sometimes,	  the	  order	  changes	  …	  	  you	  paginate	  it	  
in	  pen	  because	  it	  changes.	  And	  it’s	  paginated	  from	  page	  one	  to	  page	  ten	  thousand.	  Correctly.	  If	  
it	  is	  not	  correct	  then	  the	  judge	  can	  throw	  out	  your	  case	  (Adv-­‐CSA34c,	  my	  emphases).	  
The	  last	  sentence	  of	  this	  extract	  hints,	  however,	  at	  the	  main	  variable	  driving	  the	  work	  of	  
advocates	  and	  attorneys	  involved	  in	  litigation:	  The	  judge	  expects	  a	  file	  that	  is	  substantively	  and	  
technically	  perfect.	  If	  there	  is	  even	  the	  slightest	  technical	  error,	  the	  judge	  can	  decline	  to	  
adjudicate	  the	  matter	  and	  require	  the	  attorneys	  and	  advocates	  to	  go	  through	  the	  lengthy,	  
tedious	  and	  time-­‐consuming	  process	  of	  placing	  the	  case	  on	  the	  court	  roll	  again	  (Adv-­‐CSA34d;	  
Adv-­‐CSA35b;	  Adv-­‐CSA35c).	  One	  of	  the	  most	  important	  implications	  of	  a	  case	  being	  thrown	  out	  
of	  court	  is	  that	  costs	  would	  then	  have	  been	  wasted	  (Adv-­‐CSA35d)	  and	  both	  the	  advocate	  and	  
attorney	  would	  then	  need	  to	  face	  a	  very	  angry	  client.	  	  
However,	  the	  lecturer	  also	  presented	  legal	  professionals	  as	  kinds	  of	  people	  who	  thrive	  on	  
‘nervous	  tension’.	  Responding	  to	  Student	  3’s	  tale	  of	  her	  experience	  of	  a	  day	  in	  court,	  and	  how	  
she	  could	  feel	  the	  nervous	  tension	  in	  the	  room	  which	  was	  ‘just	  too	  awful	  for	  words’	  (Adv-­‐
CSA54),	  he	  remarks	  of	  his	  partner	  Isobel:	  ‘No	  well	  some	  people	  thrive	  on	  that,	  some	  people	  live	  
like	  …	  [Isobel],	  I	  mean	  if	  she	  doesn’t	  have	  an	  adrenalin	  rush	  every	  five	  minutes	  you	  know	  she	  
gets	  bored.	  So	  some	  people	  really	  like	  that,	  they	  thrive	  on	  that	  nervous	  tension	  and	  they	  are	  
their	  best	  and	  sharpest	  when	  they	  have	  [that]’	  (Att-­‐CSA31).	  The	  caveat	  is	  that	  ‘its	  impossible	  to	  
sustain	  it	  for	  weeks	  and	  weeks	  and	  months	  and	  months	  and	  then	  you	  must	  take	  a	  break	  um	  you	  
must	  look	  after	  yourself	  …	  it’s	  a	  high-­‐tension	  job’	  (Att-­‐CSA31).	  	  
Most	  of	  the	  explicitly-­‐mentioned	  emotions	  in	  the	  data	  pertaining	  to	  articled	  clerks,	  attorneys	  
and	  advocates	  were	  what	  would	  commonly	  be	  regarded	  as	  ‘negative’	  emotional	  states:	  
irritation	  (AC-­‐CSA5g;	  Adv-­‐CSA42b);	  fear	  (AC-­‐CSA5h;	  Adv-­‐CSA33a);	  hatred	  (Adv-­‐CSA42c);	  terror	  
(AC-­‐CSA4d).	  This	  often	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  inevitable	  state	  of	  affairs	  (marked	  by	  an	  if-­‐then	  




LECTURER:	  [I]f	  you	  stand	  up	  in	  court,	  and	  you	  will	  feel	  that	  (shakes	  head)	  I	  hope	  every	  one	  of	  
you	  will	  at	  least	  once	  in	  your	  life	  have	  that	  feeling	  of	  appearing	  in	  a	  court.	  You	  are,	  and	  I	  don’t	  
care	  who	  you	  are,	  if,	  you	  can	  be	  Sydney	  Kentridge,	  if	  you	  appear	  in	  court	  you	  are	  scared.	  And	  if	  
you	  are	  not	  scared	  then	  you	  are	  not	  prepared.	  (Adv-­‐CSA33a)83	  
What	  is	  interesting	  in	  this	  statement	  is	  how	  being	  afraid	  is	  linked	  to	  being	  prepared.	  The	  best	  
explanation	  of	  this	  is	  seemingly	  that	  preparation	  fully	  exposes	  you	  to	  the	  complexity	  and	  
difficulty	  of	  the	  issues	  at	  stake	  and	  the	  burden	  of	  persuasion	  that	  rests	  upon	  your	  shoulders.	  	  
The	  lecturer	  characterizes	  the	  legal	  profession	  in	  general	  in	  a	  negative	  emotional	  light	  when	  he	  
remembers	  working	  for	  his	  mother’s	  firm	  as	  a	  young	  boy	  during	  the	  vacation:	  ‘I	  was	  a	  sweet	  
little	  boy	  and	  very	  nice	  personality	  and	  everybody	  loved	  me’	  (AC-­‐CSA8b).	  ‘I	  thought	  well	  this	  is	  
what	  legal	  practice	  is	  going	  to	  be	  like,’	  he	  continues,	  ‘but,	  um,	  I	  discovered	  that	  it’s	  not’	  (AC-­‐
CSA8c).	  He	  proceeds	  to	  caution	  on	  the	  seemingly	  inevitable	  (using	  an	  ‘if-­‐then’	  construction),	  
stating:	  ‘[A]nd	  if	  you	  enter	  into	  a	  law	  firm	  you	  will	  discover	  this	  within	  a	  year	  or	  so’	  (ibid).	  	  
Compared	  to	  the	  lawyer	  role,	  the	  specific	  working	  environments	  of	  articled	  clerks,	  attorneys	  
and	  advocates	  were	  represented	  to	  a	  greater	  extent	  and	  in	  a	  greater	  variety.	  The	  predominant	  
site	  in	  the	  case	  of	  each	  role	  was	  not	  surprising:	  Articled	  clerks,	  who	  do	  not	  yet	  have	  the	  right	  of	  
appearance	  in	  court,	  were	  almost	  always	  located	  in	  a	  law	  firm	  (AC-­‐CSA4a;	  AC-­‐CSA5a;	  AC-­‐CSA5j;	  
AC-­‐CSA8a;	  AC-­‐CSA8d;	  AC-­‐CSA9a;	  AC-­‐CSA9d;	  AC-­‐CSA10;	  AC-­‐CSA11b)	  or	  in	  the	  more	  detailed	  sites	  
within	  the	  firm	  (such	  as	  the	  ‘trade	  mark	  department’	  (AC-­‐CSA5b)	  or	  the	  ‘beautiful	  large	  office	  
with	  an	  inter-­‐leading	  door	  to	  my	  secretary’s	  office’	  (AC-­‐CSA5e)).	  Attorneys,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  
were	  almost	  evenly	  located	  in	  the	  firm	  or	  office	  (Att-­‐CSA1a;	  Att-­‐CSA2c;	  Att-­‐CSA7b;	  Att-­‐CSA21;	  
Att-­‐CSA30b);	  and	  in	  the	  court	  (Att-­‐CSA16;	  Att-­‐CSA22;	  Att-­‐CSA24;	  Att-­‐CSA25a;	  Att-­‐CSA23).	  The	  
lecturer	  uses	  location	  to	  suggest	  a	  potential	  division	  between	  more	  and	  less	  successful	  
attorneys	  when	  he	  casually	  remarks	  that	  attorneys	  sit	  in	  ‘big	  large	  buildings’	  or	  in	  ‘derelict	  old	  
renovated	  houses’	  (Att-­‐CSA13a).	  	  The	  advocate	  was	  predominantly	  represented	  in	  court	  (Adv-­‐
CSA1;	  Adv-­‐CSA16e;	  Adv-­‐CSA23;	  Adv-­‐CSA30b;	  Adv-­‐CSA31a;	  Adv-­‐CSA32c;	  Adv-­‐CSA33b;	  Adv-­‐
CSA34b;	  Adv-­‐CSA35a;	  Adv-­‐CSA39)	  –	  in	  a	  number	  of	  instances	  the	  role	  of	  the	  advocate	  was	  even	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83	  It	  was	  interesting	  to	  observe	  how	  this	  theme	  emerged	  in	  a	  presentation	  given	  by	  a	  female	  advocate	  to	  my	  first	  
year	  Introduction	  to	  Law	  class	  of	  2011.	  She	  stated	  that	  every	  advocate,	  before	  they	  appear	  in	  court	  for	  the	  first	  




defined,	  by	  way	  of	  a	  relational	  clauses,	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  they	  are	  the	  legal	  professionals	  who	  
appear	  in	  court	  (Adv-­‐CSA37a)	  or	  whose	  work	  involves	  the	  preparation	  of	  everything	  for	  court	  
(Adv-­‐SA32c).	  Advocates	  were	  otherwise	  represented	  as	  being	  ‘at	  the	  bar’	  (Adv-­‐CSA18;	  Adv-­‐
CSA19;	  Adv-­‐CSA28a;	  Adv-­‐CSA45a)	  or	  in	  their	  ‘offices’	  or	  ‘chambers’	  at	  the	  bar	  (Adv-­‐CSA19a;	  
Adv-­‐CSA44).	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  lecturer’s	  advice	  to	  students	  that	  they	  should	  not	  proceed	  to	  the	  
bar	  straight	  out	  of	  university,	  he	  represents	  a	  select	  group	  of	  academics	  as	  moving	  directly	  from	  
the	  university	  to	  the	  bar	  (Adv-­‐CSA16f;	  Adv-­‐CSA20a;	  Adv-­‐CSA20c;	  Adv-­‐CSA42d).	  This	  is	  justified	  
on	  the	  basis	  that	  such	  academics	  had	  already	  established	  good	  reputations.	  Geographically,	  
there	  was	  a	  slight	  preference	  given	  to	  identifying	  Johannesburg	  as	  the	  site	  of	  social	  action	  (Att-­‐
CSA10a;	  Att-­‐CSA19b;	  Att-­‐CSA23;	  Adv-­‐CSA16a).	  
3.1.3	   Social	  actors	  	  
Articled	  clerks,	  attorneys	  and	  advocates	  as	  social	  actors	  	  
Gender	  classification	  of	  these	  three	  roles	  was	  pervasive,	  tending	  toward	  bias	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  
male	  as	  one	  ascended	  the	  legal	  hierarchy.	  There	  were	  surprisingly	  no	  instances	  of	  racial	  
classification	  in	  any	  of	  the	  roles	  although	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  lawyer	  role	  I	  was	  able	  to	  discern	  
classification	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  class,	  especially	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  advocate.	  	  
For	  the	  articled	  clerk	  and	  the	  attorney	  –	  the	  two	  roles	  occupying	  the	  lowest	  slots	  on	  the	  
preferred	  career	  path	  –	  classification	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  gender	  was	  equivalent;	  i.e.	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
the	  articled	  clerk,	  2	  extracts	  involved	  male	  classification	  (AC-­‐SAct8;	  AC-­‐SAct11c),	  and	  2	  involved	  
female	  classification	  (AC-­‐SAct9b;	  AC-­‐SAct9d);	  for	  the	  attorney,	  4	  extracts	  involved	  male	  
classification	  (Att-­‐SAct4a;	  Att-­‐SAct10e;	  Att-­‐SAct18;	  Att-­‐SAct25b),	  4	  involved	  female	  
classification	  (Att-­‐SAct8;	  Att-­‐SAct30a;	  Att-­‐SAct31a);	  and	  one	  was	  gender	  inclusive	  (Att-­‐SAct15).	  
In	  both	  cases,	  however,	  the	  female	  classifications	  arose	  from	  the	  lecturer	  talking	  about	  a	  
specific	  individual:	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  articled	  clerk,	  his	  former	  student	  and	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  
attorney,	  his	  partner,	  Isobel.	  Thus	  when	  the	  lecturer	  spoke	  about	  articled	  clerks	  or	  attorneys	  
more	  generally	  the	  classification	  was	  always	  male.	  The	  lecturer’s	  nominations	  exhibited	  a	  not	  
dissimilar	  pattern:	  There	  was	  one	  female	  nomination	  for	  the	  articled	  clerk	  (AC-­‐SAct9a),	  and	  4	  




SAct31b)	  nominations	  for	  the	  attorney	  respectively.	  	  	  
The	  gender	  classification	  of	  the	  advocate,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  evinced	  a	  clear	  gender	  bias.	  
Twelve	  extracts	  involved	  male	  classification	  (Adv-­‐SAct1;	  Adv-­‐SAct5b;	  Adv-­‐SAct7;	  Adv-­‐SAct14;	  
Adv-­‐SAct17;	  Adv-­‐SAct18a;	  Adv-­‐SAct20a;	  Adv-­‐SAct24;	  Adv-­‐SAct30b;	  Adv-­‐SAct34b;	  Adv-­‐SAct35b;	  
Adv-­‐SAct42)	  and	  only	  three	  were	  female.	  There	  were	  two	  nominations	  in	  the	  text	  and	  both	  
were	  male	  (Adv-­‐SAct33a;	  Adv-­‐SAct51).	  Of	  the	  female	  classifications	  of	  advocates,	  one	  again	  
referred	  to	  his	  former	  student	  who	  he	  postulated	  as	  ‘going	  to	  the	  bar’	  (Adv-­‐SAct28).	  The	  
remaining	  two	  extracts	  are	  fascinating	  for	  elucidating	  the	  lecturer’s	  complex	  stereotyping	  of	  the	  
female	  advocate	  in	  contrast	  to	  one	  put	  forward	  by	  Student	  3	  (a	  female).	  Relating	  how	  she	  had	  
shadowed	  an	  attorney	  for	  a	  school	  project,	  she	  relates	  the	  following	  incident:	  	  
STUDENT	  3:	  I	  met	  up	  with,	  well	  I	  met	  some	  of	  his	  colleagues,	  there	  was	  a	  lovely	  tall	  blond	  lady	  -­‐	  I	  
don’t	  recall	  her	  name	  -­‐	  lovely	  tall	  blond	  woman	  and	  she	  was	  an	  advocate	  and	  she	  was	  wearing	  
her	  robes	  and	  walking,	  you	  know	  we	  all	  walked	  across	  the	  road	  and	  it	  was	  very	  romantic	  and	  
everything	  we	  sat	  in	  the	  Brazilian	  [class	  and	  lecturer	  laugh],	  we	  had	  lunch	  and	  she	  asked	  me	  all	  
questions	  about	  school	  and	  then	  she	  said	  ‘Oh	  you	  studied	  French	  at	  school!’,	  she	  started	  rattling	  
off	  in	  French	  for	  like	  half	  an	  hour	  and	  I	  just	  sat	  there	  with	  a	  mouth	  full	  of	  teeth.	  
The	  student’s	  female	  advocate	  is	  a	  woman	  of	  the	  world.	  She	  wears	  her	  robes	  with	  confidence,	  
lunches	  in	  a	  restaurant	  opposite	  the	  court,	  speaks	  a	  foreign	  language	  with	  ease	  and	  
demonstrates	  an	  interest	  in	  things	  academic.	  She	  is	  physically	  arresting	  –	  lovely,	  tall	  and	  blond.	  
The	  lecturer	  juxtaposed	  this	  with	  the	  following	  image	  of	  the	  female	  advocate	  by	  responding:	  	  
LECTURER:	  Ja	  that’s	  the	  stereotypical,	  that’s	  the	  stereotypical	  idea	  that	  I	  have	  of	  a	  of	  a	  female	  
advocate	  but	  I’m	  uh	  I	  shouldn’t	  talk	  to	  you	  about	  that	  but	  um	  tall,	  long,	  blond,	  um	  you	  know	  
multi-­‐faceted,	  multi-­‐functioning,	  multi-­‐tasking	  uh	  super	  elastowoman,	  you	  know	  three	  children	  
on	  the	  hip	  and	  uh	  you	  know	  five	  hundred	  thousand	  briefs	  on	  this	  side,	  that’s	  what	  you	  must	  be.	  
The	  lecturer’s	  stereotypical	  idea	  of	  the	  female	  advocate	  parts	  significantly	  from	  that	  of	  the	  
student.	  While	  the	  student’s	  representation	  suggests	  that	  the	  female	  advocate	  she	  
encountered	  was	  talented	  in	  many	  ways,	  the	  lecturer	  now	  takes	  this	  to	  an	  extreme	  –	  she	  is	  
‘multi-­‐faceted,	  multi-­‐functioning,	  multitasking’.	  His	  reference	  to	  ‘three	  children	  on	  the	  hip’	  
removes	  the	  female	  advocate	  from	  the	  site	  of	  professional	  work	  and	  places	  her	  in	  the	  




Further,	  his	  reference	  to	  the	  female	  advocate	  as	  being	  a	  ‘super	  elastowoman’	  who	  has	  both	  
three	  children	  on	  the	  hip	  and	  ‘five	  hundred	  thousand	  briefs	  on	  the	  side’	  suggests	  that	  the	  
female	  advocate	  must	  overcompensate	  if	  she	  does	  choose	  to	  have	  children;	  i.e.	  she	  must	  
accept	  an	  extraordinary	  number	  of	  briefs.	  As	  a	  result	  she	  must	  be	  a	  ‘superwoman’	  balancing	  an	  
impossible	  set	  of	  responsibilities.	  	  
There	  were	  11	  extracts	  relating	  to	  class	  classification	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  advocate,	  and	  1	  extract	  
of	  this	  nature	  relating	  to	  the	  attorney.	  The	  class	  classifications	  were	  of	  three	  kinds:	  There	  were	  
representations	  indicating	  that	  advocates	  (and	  to	  a	  much	  lesser	  extent	  attorneys)	  are	  situated	  
in	  the	  upper	  classes;	  one	  representation	  hinting	  at	  class	  divisions	  within	  the	  advocates’	  
profession;	  and	  two	  representations	  implying	  that	  succeeding	  as	  an	  advocate	  requires	  access	  to	  
financial	  resources	  that	  only	  members	  of	  the	  upper	  or	  at	  least	  the	  higher	  middle	  classes	  would	  
have.	  The	  first	  of	  these	  kinds	  of	  classification	  revolved	  around	  representations	  of	  the	  resources	  
which	  advocates	  acquire	  or	  can	  demand:	  The	  advocate’s	  study	  is	  ‘huge’	  (Adv-­‐SAct15a),	  his	  
children	  are	  well-­‐educated	  and	  have	  ‘of	  course’	  emigrated	  (Adv-­‐SAct15b),	  while	  another	  
advocate	  has	  done	  ‘exceptionally	  well’	  at	  the	  bar	  (Adv-­‐SAct20b).	  The	  advocate’s	  profession	  is	  	  
‘very	  lucrative’	  and	  ‘well-­‐paid’	  (Adv-­‐SAct44a),	  their	  fees	  are	  unapologetically	  ‘exorbitant’	  (Adv-­‐
SAct23c),	  running	  into	  ‘millions	  of	  rand’	  (Adv-­‐SAct23b).	  More	  specifically	  the	  advocate	  can	  
charge	  not	  R3000	  an	  hour	  but	  ‘R20	  000	  an	  hour’	  (Adv-­‐SAct21a)	  and	  can	  earn	  anything	  ‘from	  
four	  to	  five	  up	  to	  eight	  million	  [rand]	  in	  a	  year’	  (Adv-­‐SAct53b)	  (in	  comparison	  the	  lecturer	  makes	  
it	  known	  that	  his	  wife,	  an	  attorney,	  earns	  between	  3	  and	  3.5	  million	  rand	  a	  year	  –	  Att-­‐SAct30b).	  
Interestingly,	  in	  both	  instances	  where	  the	  lecturer	  mentions	  specific	  figures	  for	  the	  annual	  
income	  of	  an	  advocate	  and	  attorney	  he	  refers	  to	  numbers	  only	  (‘four	  to	  five	  up	  to	  eight’,	  ‘three,	  
three-­‐point	  five’),	  and	  leaves	  off	  the	  word	  ‘million’,	  yet	  it	  is	  obvious	  he	  is	  referring	  to	  figures	  of	  
this	  quantum	  in	  the	  comparison	  he	  makes	  between	  the	  salary	  of	  a	  judge	  and	  an	  advocate	  (at	  
Adv-­‐SAct53b).	  Not	  all	  advocates	  are	  successful	  however,	  and	  in	  conjuring	  up	  the	  advocate	  
trying	  to	  conduct	  his	  practice	  from	  the	  library	  steps,	  he	  hints	  at	  the	  serious	  class	  divisions	  that	  
exist	  within	  the	  profession	  (Adv-­‐SAct46).	  The	  last	  category	  of	  class	  classification	  is	  interesting	  
for	  it	  addresses	  the	  issue	  of	  access	  to	  the	  profession	  –	  whilst	  advocates	  are	  clearly	  capable	  of	  




place	  in	  order	  to	  break	  into	  the	  profession?	  The	  lecturer	  did	  not	  deal	  with	  this	  question	  directly,	  
but	  two	  of	  his	  representations	  at	  least	  suggest	  that	  the	  conditions	  of	  the	  professional	  world	  of	  
advocates	  are	  such	  that	  you	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  succeed	  if	  you	  have	  access	  to	  financial	  resources.	  
In	  talking	  about	  the	  compulsory	  training	  advocates	  undergo	  (‘pupillage’),	  he	  goes	  on	  to	  remark:	  
LECTURER:	  ‘six	  month’s	  pupilage	  without	  payment,	  nobody	  pays	  you,	  you	  must	  have	  financial	  
support	  to	  live	  for	  six	  months,	  uh,	  without	  support	  uh	  to	  live	  for	  six	  months	  without	  a	  salary.	  
Perhaps	  you	  might,	  you	  might	  think	  it’s	  easy	  to	  do	  that	  as	  a	  student	  it	  is,	  you	  know,	  because	  
you’ve	  got	  lots	  of	  support	  structures.’	  (Adv-­‐SAct47a)	  
The	  lecturer’s	  assumption	  in	  the	  last	  sentence	  of	  this	  extract	  configures	  the	  student	  in	  a	  
particular	  way,	  whereas	  in	  fact	  many	  students	  do	  not	  have	  the	  financial	  resources	  or	  support	  
structures	  to	  survive	  for	  six	  months	  without	  any	  income.	  This	  particular	  requirement,	  therefore,	  
functions	  as	  a	  barrier	  to	  the	  profession	  for	  the	  lower	  classes	  (though	  the	  lecturer	  does	  not	  
appear	  to	  regard	  it	  as	  such).	  In	  similar	  vein	  he	  reels	  off	  a	  host	  of	  other	  resources	  (cellphone,	  car,	  
entertainment,	  books,	  make-­‐up,	  nice	  clothes)	  that	  money	  can	  buy	  and	  which	  are,	  apparently,	  
essential	  for	  success	  as	  an	  advocate	  (Adv-­‐SAct47b).	  	  
There	  were	  a	  variety	  of	  other	  bases	  upon	  which	  the	  lecturer	  classified	  articled	  clerks,	  advocates	  
and	  attorneys.	  These	  included	  physical	  appearance	  and	  ethnicity	  (his	  reference	  to	  ‘attractive	  
Jewish	  lady	  at	  AC-­‐SAct9c);	  age	  (AC-­‐SAct11b);	  language	  preference	  (Att-­‐SAct10h);	  and	  other	  
occupations	  (politician,	  farmer	  –	  see	  Att-­‐SAct10d).	  The	  two	  most	  frequent	  bases	  for	  
categorization	  were,	  however,	  seniority	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  status	  (Att-­‐SAct22b;	  Adv-­‐SAct52;	  Adv-­‐
SAct53)	  and	  intellectual	  capacity	  (AC-­‐SAct11a;	  Att-­‐SAct10f;	  Adv-­‐SAct18b;	  Adv-­‐SAct19b;	  Adv-­‐
SAct44b;	  Adv-­‐SAct50).	  
Clients	  and	  other	  role-­‐players	  	  
To	  a	  fairly	  significant	  extent,	  clients	  were	  backgrounded	  rather	  than	  included	  in	  the	  social	  
actions	  of	  articled	  clerks,	  attorneys	  and	  advocates:	  For	  the	  articled	  clerk,	  there	  were	  no	  extracts	  
in	  which	  clients	  were	  included	  in	  the	  social	  action,	  and	  three	  extracts	  in	  which	  they	  were	  
backgrounded,	  for	  the	  attorney,	  clients	  were	  included	  in	  four	  and	  backgrounded	  in	  ten	  extracts;	  




I	  did	  not	  discern	  any	  interesting	  themes	  in	  the	  social	  actors	  who	  were	  included	  in	  the	  social	  
action	  of	  the	  attorney	  (Att-­‐SAct2;	  Att-­‐SAct4b;	  Att-­‐SAct13	  and	  Att-­‐SAct22a)	  and	  the	  advocate	  	  
(Adv-­‐SAct5a;	  Adv-­‐SAct23a).	  Similarly	  to	  the	  lawyer	  role,	  clients	  were	  recontextualized	  and	  
backgrounded	  by	  way	  of	  reference	  to	  specific	  legal	  problems	  such	  as	  ‘mergers	  and	  acquisitions’	  
or	  ‘trademarks’	  and	  so	  on	  (AC-­‐SAct5b;	  Att-­‐SAct17b;	  Att-­‐SAct27d)	  as	  well	  as	  a	  range	  of	  other	  
depersonalizing	  nouns,	  such	  as	  ‘legal	  work’	  (AC-­‐SAct3;	  Att-­‐SAct17a);	  ‘off-­‐the-­‐street	  work’	  (Att-­‐
SAct22c);	  ‘backroom	  work’	  (Att-­‐SAct27a);	  ‘labour	  relations’	  (Att-­‐SAct10g);	  ‘maj	  court	  litigation’	  
(Att-­‐SAct27b);	  ‘case’	  (Att-­‐SAct5;	  Att-­‐SAct9;	  Adv-­‐SAct4;	  Adv-­‐SAct11;	  Adv-­‐SAct19a;	  Adv-­‐SAct22;	  
Adv-­‐SAct34a);	  ‘matter’	  (Adv-­‐SAct21b);	  ‘papers’	  (Adv-­‐SAct34a);	  and	  ‘file’	  (AC-­‐SAct5e;	  Att-­‐
SAct27c;	  Adv-­‐SAct34a;	  Adv-­‐SAct34c;	  Adv-­‐SAct35a).	  The	  terms	  ‘case’	  and	  ‘file’	  were	  thus	  used	  
most	  frequently	  across	  the	  three	  roles	  for	  purposes	  of	  backgrounding	  clients.	  An	  interesting	  
instance	  of	  backgrounding	  occurred	  in	  the	  role	  of	  the	  advocate	  when	  the	  lecturer	  stated	  that	  
the	  advocate	  appears	  ‘on	  behalf	  of	  an	  attorney’	  (Adv-­‐SAct32).	  This	  highlights	  professional	  
relations	  between	  advocate	  and	  attorney,	  rather	  than	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  advocate	  
and	  client.	  Backgrounding	  in	  this	  particular	  instance	  was	  therefore	  achieved	  by	  substitution	  (of	  
another	  social	  actor)	  rather	  than	  through	  the	  use	  of	  depersonalizing	  nouns.	  	  
The	  only	  other	  social	  actor	  which	  featured	  prominently	  –	  and	  this	  only	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  articled	  
clerk	  –	  was	  the	  legal	  secretary	  AC-­‐SAct4;	  AC-­‐SAct5a,	  c,	  d,	  f).	  The	  personal	  trials	  and	  tribulations	  
the	  lecturer	  experienced	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  a	  legal	  secretary	  at	  the	  firm	  where	  he	  completed	  his	  
articles	  have	  already	  been	  outlined	  in	  the	  section	  on	  social	  action	  above.	  It	  is	  also	  interesting	  to	  
observe,	  however,	  the	  discursive	  strategies	  the	  lecturer	  employed	  to	  configure	  the	  legal	  
secretary	  as	  a	  ‘larger-­‐than-­‐life’,	  negatively-­‐stereotyped	  character.	  The	  first	  strategy	  involved	  
intertextuality	  –	  referring	  to	  what	  his	  mother	  had	  ‘always	  said’	  and	  a	  series	  of	  relational	  clauses	  
that	  positioned	  the	  legal	  secretary	  in	  the	  category	  of	  ‘the	  worst	  things’	  and	  things	  that	  cause	  
terror):	  	  
LECTURER:	  My	  mother	  always	  said,	  there’s	  nothing,	  nothing	  worse,	  and	  I	  hope	  I’m	  not	  offending	  
somebody	  here	  but	  it	  is	  true,	  I	  mean	  as	  my	  personal	  experience	  there’s	  nothing	  worse	  than	  a	  
professional	  typist,	  uh,	  in	  a	  law	  firm,	  a	  secretary.	  There	  is	  nothing,	  nothing	  worse.	  They	  always	  
have	  personal	  problems,	  they	  never	  have	  enough	  money,	  they	  always	  want	  to	  borrow	  money	  




The	  relational	  clauses	  in	  this	  extract	  (‘there’s	  nothing	  worse	  than	  a	  professional	  typist	  …	  There	  
is	  nothing,	  nothing	  worse’	  and	  ‘they	  are	  absolute	  terrors’)	  therefore	  do	  two	  types	  of	  work:	  They	  
position	  legal	  secretaries	  in	  a	  particular	  way	  and	  generalize	  the	  lecturer’s	  evaluations	  to	  all	  legal	  
secretaries.	  	  
The	  other	  discursive	  strategy	  the	  lecturer	  employed	  to	  negatively-­‐stereotype	  the	  legal	  secretary	  
involved	  a	  description	  of	  her	  physical	  appearance:	  	  
LECTURER:	  And	  there	  I	  got	  a	  corner	  office,	  a	  beautiful	  large	  office	  with	  an	  inter-­‐leading	  door	  to	  
my	  secretary’s	  office	  and	  there	  was	  my	  secretary	  sitting	  in	  the	  corner.	  And	  she	  was	  enormous.	  
She	  was	  really,	  you	  know,	  she	  was	  an	  enormous	  person	  and	  she	  had,	  uh,	  make-­‐up,	  you	  know,	  
false	  eyelashes	  and	  dark	  dark	  makeup.	  
The	  lecturer	  prefers	  the	  adjective	  ‘enormous’	  to	  ‘very	  fat’.	  In	  Western	  society	  being	  fat	  is	  
associated	  with	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  ego-­‐weakness:	  Lack	  of	  mastery	  over	  one’s	  drives,	  unhappiness	  
driving	  the	  need	  to	  eat	  and	  so	  on,	  and	  so	  tends	  to	  confirm	  his	  earlier	  statement	  that	  legal	  
secretaries	  always	  ‘have	  personal	  problems’.	  His	  choice	  of	  the	  term	  ‘enormous’,	  however,	  also	  
allows	  him	  to	  capture	  the	  power	  she	  jealously	  guards	  in	  her	  small	  domain	  of	  the	  legal	  firm.	  	  
3.1.4	   Values	  	  
There	  were	  relatively	  few	  extracts	  dealing	  with	  the	  valuation	  or	  devaluation	  of	  articled	  clerks,	  
attorneys	  and	  advocates	  per	  se.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  articled	  clerk	  there	  were	  no	  extracts	  of	  this	  
nature	  at	  all,	  for	  the	  advocate	  there	  was	  one	  positive,	  one	  negative	  and	  one	  ambiguous	  
evaluation;	  and	  for	  the	  attorney	  three	  negative	  and	  three	  positive	  evaluations.	  All	  these	  
extracts	  involved	  the	  use	  of	  moral	  evaluation	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  encoding	  value.	  	  
The	  lecturer’s	  negative	  evaluations	  of	  attorneys	  were	  all	  based	  on	  his	  perception	  of	  a	  central	  
character	  flaw	  which	  he	  generalized	  to	  all	  attorneys:	  The	  incapacity	  to	  resist	  the	  temptation	  to	  
steal	  trust	  monies	  (Att-­‐V4;	  Att-­‐V6;	  Att-­‐V19).	  The	  lecturer’s	  positive	  evaluations	  of	  attorneys	  all	  
related	  to	  specific	  attorneys,	  and	  thus	  tended	  to	  confirm	  the	  perception	  that	  attorneys,	  as	  a	  
rule,	  are	  morally	  suspect.	  ‘But	  sometimes	  you	  get	  a	  very	  good	  attorney’	  (Att-­‐V25,	  my	  emphasis),	  
the	  lecturer	  began,	  in	  speaking	  about	  a	  contemporary	  example	  of	  a	  very	  good	  attorney,	  Dr	  




academic	  institution	  –	  are	  thus	  goods	  which	  are	  apparently	  very	  difficult	  to	  come	  by	  in	  the	  
attorneys’	  profession.	  The	  lecturer’s	  other	  positive	  evaluation	  of	  a	  specific	  attorney	  –	  his	  
representations	  around	  Denys	  Reitz,	  an	  attorney	  active	  in	  the	  mid-­‐twentieth	  century,	  centred	  
on	  him	  being	  a	  ‘very	  impressive’	  man	  (Att-­‐V10a,	  b),	  an	  evaluation	  based	  on	  his	  creative	  abilities,	  
contribution	  to	  labour	  relations	  in	  South	  Africa,	  and	  founding	  of	  one	  of	  the	  ‘great’	  law	  firms	  in	  
Johannesburg.	  	  
For	  the	  advocate,	  the	  positive	  evaluation	  was	  cemented	  in	  a	  relational	  clause,	  through	  a	  clear	  
association	  between	  the	  advocate’s	  profession	  and	  ‘the	  very	  best	  lawyers’	  for	  whom	  this	  
profession	  is	  ‘reserved’	  (Adv-­‐V44d).	  The	  lecturer’s	  negative	  evaluation	  of	  advocates	  related	  to	  
the	  thoroughness	  or	  rigour	  with	  which	  the	  advocate	  argued	  before	  the	  judge.	  Such	  rigour	  
seemingly	  entails	  an	  element	  of	  honesty,	  with	  a	  corresponding	  ethical	  obligation	  resting	  upon	  
advocates	  to	  acknowledge	  when	  there	  is	  a	  good	  argument	  against	  them.	  Referring	  to	  the	  orator	  
Cicero,	  he	  remarks:	  ‘[H]e	  just	  he	  talks,	  like	  an	  advocate	  in	  a	  trial	  you	  know	  he’s	  not	  going	  to	  say	  
“Oh	  excuse	  me	  judge	  here’s	  a	  very	  good	  point	  against	  me	  if	  you	  don’t	  mind	  looking	  at	  this”	  -­‐	  it’s	  
what	  they	  should	  do	  but	  they	  don’t’	  (Adv-­‐V1).	  	  The	  lecturer’s	  more	  ambiguous	  evaluation	  of	  
advocates	  also	  related	  to	  thoroughness,	  which	  he	  uses	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  differentiating	  between	  
advocates	  when	  he	  says:	  ‘Of	  course	  not	  all	  advocate	  are	  the	  same.	  And	  some	  advocates	  are	  
more	  thorough	  than	  others’	  (Adv-­‐V4,	  my	  emphasis).	  	  
Surprisingly,	  there	  was	  not	  a	  single	  extract	  elucidating	  the	  internal	  goods	  of	  the	  work	  of	  an	  
attorney,	  and	  only	  one	  and	  four	  extracts	  of	  this	  nature	  relating	  to	  the	  articled	  clerk	  and	  
advocate	  respectively.	  As	  there	  were	  so	  few	  extracts,	  and	  because	  all	  involved	  the	  use	  of	  moral	  
evaluation,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  discern	  any	  normative	  pattern.	  In	  two	  instances,	  the	  lecturer	  hints	  
that	  legal	  professionals	  should	  be	  individuals	  who	  are	  ethically	  upstanding:	  The	  articled	  clerk	  is	  
interviewed	  to	  determine	  whether	  she	  is	  a	  ‘fit	  and	  proper’	  person	  (AC-­‐V7);	  the	  advocate	  is	  
promoted	  to	  the	  position	  of	  ‘senior	  counsel’	  if	  he	  is	  a	  ‘person	  of	  substance’	  (Adv-­‐V22a).	  While	  
being	  a	  ‘fit	  and	  proper	  person’	  and	  a	  ‘person	  of	  substance’	  may	  be	  the	  discursive	  tip	  of	  a	  
submerged	  iceberg	  of	  values	  that	  partly	  constitute	  the	  internal	  goods	  of	  the	  profession,	  the	  
values	  themselves	  remain	  just	  that	  –	  submerged.	  The	  values	  implicit	  in	  the	  lecturer’s	  remark	  




‘sound’	  (Adv-­‐V6b),	  remain	  similarly	  opaque.	  Values	  are	  more	  explicit	  in	  the	  lecturer’s	  insistence	  
that	  in	  order	  to	  convince	  the	  judge	  to	  accept	  his	  authorities,	  the	  advocate	  must	  use	  logic	  and	  
rationality	  (Adv-­‐V5),	  and	  this	  resonates	  with	  the	  invocation	  of	  these	  internal	  goods	  in	  the	  
lawyer	  role.	  There	  was	  only	  one	  extract	  in	  which	  a	  duty	  of	  care	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  advocate	  
towards	  his	  client	  was	  even	  marginally	  apparent.	  Rounding	  up	  his	  emotionally-­‐charged	  
description	  of	  an	  advocate	  appearing	  before	  a	  judge	  in	  circumstances	  where	  the	  advocate’s	  
papers	  are	  not	  completely	  correct	  he	  concludes:	  	  
LECTURER:	  And	  then	  you’ve	  wasted	  costs.	  You’ve	  wasted	  thousands	  of	  rand	  by	  appearing	  and	  
preparing	  to	  appear	  for	  that	  day	  for	  trial	  in	  court	  and	  it’s	  just	  thrown	  out	  because	  you’ve	  made	  
something	  wrong.	  You’ve	  referred	  to	  section	  2(1)	  instead	  of	  section	  1(2).	  	  (Adv-­‐V35,	  my	  
emphasis)	  
The	  lecturer’s	  reference	  to	  ‘wasted	  costs’	  in	  this	  extract	  invokes	  the	  client	  as	  a	  backgrounded	  
social	  actor,	  for	  it	  is	  ultimately	  the	  client	  who	  pays	  such	  costs.	  Use	  of	  the	  word	  ‘waste’	  and	  
moreover	  wasting	  ‘thousands	  of	  rand’	  suggests	  a	  gross	  dereliction	  of	  duty	  based	  on	  such	  values	  
as	  efficiency,	  frugality	  and	  trust	  in	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  advocate	  applies	  his	  highly-­‐paid	  
services.	  However	  such	  client-­‐centred	  values	  are	  also	  overshadowed	  in	  this	  extract	  by	  the	  
reference	  to	  formal,	  procedural	  correctness	  (referring	  to	  section	  2(1)	  rather	  than	  to	  section	  
1(2)).	  	  
External	  goods	  were	  far	  more	  frequently	  represented	  in	  the	  data:	  Across	  the	  three	  roles	  48	  
extracts	  were	  associated	  with	  a	  variety	  of	  external	  goods,	  but	  a	  breakdown	  of	  this	  figure	  reveals	  
that	  more	  than	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  these	  were	  made	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  advocate	  (33	  extracts	  for	  the	  
advocate;	  9	  for	  the	  attorney,	  and	  6	  for	  the	  articled	  clerk).	  A	  significantly	  higher	  proportion	  of	  
the	  extracts	  encoding	  external	  goods	  achieved	  this	  through	  the	  use	  of	  purposive	  constructions	  
(29	  extracts),	  than	  through	  moral	  evaluation	  (19	  extracts).	  This	  means	  that	  the	  linkages	  
between	  certain	  actions	  and	  external	  goods	  were	  explicitly	  rationalized.	  	  
By	  far	  the	  greatest	  number	  of	  extracts	  constituting	  external	  goods	  related	  to	  material	  rewards	  
(evident	  in	  19	  of	  the	  extracts:	  AC-­‐V2;	  AC-­‐V3;	  AC-­‐V4;	  AC-­‐V5;	  Att-­‐V15;	  Att-­‐V17b;	  Att-­‐V27;	  Att-­‐V30;	  
Adv-­‐V20;	  Adv-­‐V21;	  Adv-­‐V22b;	  Adv-­‐V23;	  Adv-­‐V29;	  Adv-­‐V31;	  Adv-­‐V32c;	  Adv-­‐V44b;	  Adv-­‐V45b;	  




obtain	  or	  the	  fees	  one	  could	  charge	  as	  a	  legal	  professional,	  linked	  to	  an	  evaluation	  of	  the	  extent	  
of	  such	  income,	  or	  a	  statement	  of	  such	  income	  in	  explicit	  terms.	  It	  also	  involved	  financial	  
evaluations	  of	  specific	  types	  of	  work.	  The	  work	  undertaken	  by	  the	  litigation	  department	  in	  a	  
firm	  of	  attorneys,	  for	  instance,	  is:	  
LECTURER:	  ‘[n]ot	  lucrative,	  not	  lucrative’	  …	  even	  in	  commercial	  litigation	  or	  insurance	  litigation	  
where	  you’re	  talking	  about	  millions	  of	  rand,	  not	  lucrative.	  Rather	  do	  something	  more	  lucrative	  
like	  trademarks	  or	  patents	  or	  the..	  uh,	  commercial	  work	  straight-­‐forward	  commercial	  work,	  um	  
uh	  mergers	  and	  acquisitions,	  management	  buy-­‐outs,	  things	  like	  that.	  Very,	  very	  lucrative.	  	  (Att-­‐
V27,	  emphasis	  by	  lecturer)	  
The	  other	  two	  external	  goods	  that	  featured	  prominently	  were	  reputation	  and	  status	  (both	  
evident	  in	  8	  extracts).	  I	  have	  already	  spoken	  in	  part	  about	  both	  as	  kinds	  of	  resources,	  under	  the	  
section	  on	  the	  circumstances	  of	  social	  action	  above.	  That	  I	  was	  able	  to	  do	  so	  reflects	  their	  
position	  in	  a	  hierarchy	  of	  values	  constructed	  by	  the	  lecturer,	  they	  are	  instrumental.	  The	  
lecturer’s	  former	  student	  writes	  a	  short	  note	  in	  the	  De	  Rebus	  so	  that	  she	  can	  build	  up	  her	  
reputation	  (AC-­‐V9),	  you	  should	  aspire	  to	  obtain	  your	  LL.B	  cum	  laude	  so	  that	  you	  will	  be	  
distinguished	  and	  people	  will	  talk	  about	  you	  (Adv-­‐V16).	  However,	  both	  reputation	  and	  status	  
are	  in	  turn	  frequently	  constituted	  as	  means	  towards	  the	  more	  ultimate	  ends	  of,	  for	  instance,	  
getting	  in	  with	  the	  ‘big	  firms,	  obtaining	  work	  and/or	  reaping	  material	  rewards	  (in	  relation	  to	  
reputation	  see:	  AC-­‐V10;	  Adv-­‐V28;	  Adv-­‐45a;	  Adv-­‐V45b;	  and	  in	  relation	  to	  status	  see:	  AC-­‐V4;	  Adv-­‐
V21;	  Adv-­‐V22b).	  At	  times	  however,	  the	  lecturer’s	  representations	  around	  these	  two	  goods	  
constituted	  them	  as	  ultimate	  goods,	  as	  ends	  in	  themselves.	  Thus	  being	  talked	  about	  by	  other	  
people	  –	  the	  pride	  and	  pleasure	  that	  would	  flow	  from	  being	  ‘well-­‐known’	  –	  is	  presented	  as	  the	  
desirable	  and	  legitimate	  purpose	  of	  actions	  such	  as	  undertaking	  the	  LL.B,	  writing	  the	  admissions	  
examination,	  and	  going	  to	  the	  bar	  (Adv-­‐V18;	  Adv-­‐V42;	  Adv-­‐V51).	  Attaining	  particular	  statuses	  –	  
being	  promoted	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  legal	  hierarchy:	  from	  an	  articled	  clerk	  to	  a	  professional	  
assistant,	  to	  a	  director	  or	  partner	  (Att-­‐V16),	  from	  an	  advocate	  to	  a	  senior	  counsel	  (Adv-­‐V23),	  
and	  from	  a	  senior	  counsel	  to	  a	  judge	  (Adv-­‐V3;	  Adv-­‐V6a;	  Adv-­‐V52)	  were	  all	  presented	  as	  goods	  
desirable	  in	  themselves.	  	  
Other	  external	  goods	  that	  featured	  more	  than	  once	  included	  the	  attainment	  of	  power,	  either	  as	  




opportunity	  to	  specialize	  (Att-­‐V23;	  Adv-­‐V41;	  Adv-­‐V45b).	  In	  a	  number	  of	  instances,	  the	  lecturer	  
represented	  the	  goals	  of	  particular	  actions	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  need	  to	  pass	  examinations.	  Thus	  the	  
articled	  clerk	  undertakes	  all	  kinds	  of	  legal	  work	  –	  not	  so	  that	  he	  or	  she	  will	  be	  offering	  a	  service	  
to	  clients	  –	  but	  ‘so	  that	  you	  can	  pass	  the	  …Law	  Society’s	  admission	  exam’	  (AC-­‐V3,	  see	  also	  Att-­‐
V15	  and	  Adv-­‐V48).	  The	  value	  of	  being	  intellectually	  stimulated	  by	  one’s	  work	  –	  which	  I	  regarded	  
as	  an	  external	  good	  because	  it	  is	  one	  enjoyed	  only	  by	  the	  practitioner	  him	  or	  herself	  –	  was	  
constituted	  as	  such	  in	  both	  an	  inverted	  (expressed	  negatively)	  and	  direct	  (expressed	  positively)	  
guise.	  The	  negative	  constructions	  all	  related	  to	  the	  work	  of	  the	  attorney,	  while	  the	  positive	  
constructions	  related	  to	  the	  work	  of	  the	  advocate.	  Thus	  the	  work	  of	  an	  attorney	  is:	  
LECTURER:	  hard,	  boring,	  slogging	  work.	  It	  is	  administration	  for	  95	  per	  cent.	  You	  are	  not	  going	  to	  
find	  in	  the	  ordinary	  work	  of	  the	  attorney	  great	  intellectual	  challenges	  or	  great	  innovative,	  uh,	  
law	  changing	  challenges	  (Att-­‐V17a)	  ….	  Ordinary	  work	  for	  the	  attorney	  however,	  uh,	  divorces,	  
estates,	  trusts,	  transfer	  of	  property,	  uh,	  general	  attorney’s	  work	  is	  not,	  uh	  very	  challenging.	  It’s	  
not	  intellectually	  very	  challenging.	  It	  is	  routine	  rather	  than	  intellectual	  effort	  (Att-­‐V17b).	  	  
By	  contrast,	  the	  work	  of	  an	  advocate	  ‘is	  more	  intellectually	  stimulating’	  (Adv-­‐V32a).	  It	  is	  
interesting	  that	  relational	  clauses	  were	  most	  frequently	  used	  in	  relation	  to	  this	  external	  good,	  
rather	  than	  others.	  Thus	  the	  attorney	  is	  somebody	  who	  does	  the	  administration	  of	  a	  legal	  case	  
(Att-­‐Q13)	  which	  is	  then	  associated	  with	  statements	  about	  an	  attorney’s	  work	  being	  ‘hard,	  
boring	  slogging	  work’,	  ‘administration	  for	  95	  per	  cent’,	  not	  very	  challenging’	  and	  ‘routine	  rather	  
than	  intellectual	  effort’.	  The	  concentrated	  use	  of	  relational	  clauses	  in	  this	  particular	  extract	  
points,	  possibly,	  to	  the	  primacy	  of	  the	  value	  of	  intellectual	  stimulation	  in	  the	  lecturer’s	  
framework	  of	  understanding	  of	  the	  legal	  profession	  but	  it	  also	  functions	  to	  cement	  these	  
meanings,	  for	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  work	  of	  attorneys	  and	  these	  qualities	  is	  presented	  
as	  clear	  and	  unequivocal.	  
3.1.5	   Summary	  
Articled	  clerks,	  attorneys	  and	  advocates	  were	  all	  represented	  as	  powerful	  social	  actors,	  though	  
to	  a	  lesser	  extent	  than	  the	  lawyer	  role.	  The	  higher	  percentage	  of	  passive	  actions	  can	  be	  
ascribed	  to	  a	  more	  nuanced	  representation	  of	  the	  complex	  relationships	  that	  pertain	  amongst	  




thoroughgoing	  powerful	  or	  powerless	  position,	  all	  were	  represented	  as	  more	  or	  less	  powerful	  
in	  different	  contexts.	  The	  nature	  of	  power	  as	  semiotic	  or	  material	  appeared	  to	  play	  a	  role	  in	  
situating	  these	  roles	  in	  a	  hierarchy	  in	  that	  articled	  clerks	  –	  the	  novices	  in	  the	  profession	  –	  were	  
represented	  as	  equally	  likely	  to	  engage	  in	  semiotic	  as	  material	  action,	  whereas	  semiotic	  forms	  
of	  action	  predominated	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  attorney	  and	  advocate.	  Advocates	  were	  most	  
frequently	  represented	  as	  working	  with	  semiotic	  resources.	  Where	  a	  resource	  could	  be	  framed	  
in	  either	  a	  semiotic	  or	  material	  form	  attorneys	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  represented	  using	  the	  
resource	  in	  its	  material	  form,	  while	  the	  opposite	  was	  true	  of	  the	  advocate.	  The	  sources	  of	  
power	  exercised	  by	  these	  roles	  included	  a	  relationship	  to	  laws,	  but	  the	  role	  of	  language	  –	  which	  
had	  featured	  so	  prominently	  in	  the	  lawyer	  role	  –	  was	  not	  foregrounded.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  
information,	  the	  lecturer	  introduced	  a	  new	  form	  of	  power-­‐as-­‐knowledge	  in	  the	  personal	  
anecdote	  of	  himself	  as	  a	  bumbling	  young	  articled	  clerk,	  unable	  to	  discern	  the	  underlying	  social	  
dynamics	  of	  the	  firm	  in	  which	  he	  was	  serving.	  New	  sources	  of	  power	  –	  such	  as	  reputation	  and	  
qualifications	  –	  were	  introduced.	  Modes	  of	  dress	  (the	  silk	  robe,	  high	  heels,	  silk	  stockings)	  also	  
emerged	  as	  ways	  in	  which	  to	  signify	  or	  express	  power.	  The	  objects	  of	  the	  power	  exercised	  by	  
these	  roles	  tended	  to	  be	  more	  diverse.	  The	  goods	  to	  which	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  articled	  clerk,	  
attorney	  and	  advocate	  were	  directed	  were	  much	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  external	  than	  internal	  with	  
material	  rewards,	  status	  and	  reputation	  (both	  as	  an	  instrumental	  good	  and	  as	  a	  good	  in	  itself)	  
predominating.	  The	  need	  to	  know	  one’s	  ethics	  was	  represented	  instrumentally,	  as	  a	  means	  
toward	  obtaining	  a	  pass	  in	  the	  professional	  examinations.	  As	  regards	  the	  nature	  of	  professional	  
work,	  there	  were	  not	  many	  instances	  in	  which	  these	  roles	  were	  represented	  making	  moral	  
judgments	  in	  relation	  to	  others,	  but	  a	  few	  instances	  in	  which	  they	  were	  represented	  as	  taking	  
action	  that	  was	  wrong	  on	  moral	  grounds.	  	  This	  was	  particularly	  true	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  attorney	  
in	  relation	  to	  trust	  monies.	  The	  nature	  of	  legal	  work	  as	  predominantly	  adversarial	  emerged	  at	  
various	  points	  in	  for	  instance,	  reference	  to	  the	  kinds	  of	  traits	  an	  ideal	  advocate	  should	  possess	  
and	  the	  tendency	  to	  locate	  the	  attorney	  at	  least	  half	  of	  the	  time	  in	  the	  location	  of	  the	  court	  and	  
the	  advocate	  almost	  always	  so.	  The	  negative	  emotional	  tenor	  of	  the	  work	  of	  these	  roles	  was	  
strongly	  affirmed,	  once	  again	  through	  lack	  of	  time	  and	  stressful	  environments.	  However,	  the	  
lecturer	  tended	  to	  name	  the	  negative	  emotional	  content	  of	  the	  work	  more	  explicitly.	  He	  also	  




expectations	  of	  technical	  and	  substantive	  perfection.	  In	  representing	  these	  roles,	  the	  lecturer	  
outlined	  a	  complex	  web	  of	  relationships	  holding	  between	  the	  legal	  professional	  and	  clients,	  but	  
also	  amongst	  legal	  professionals	  themselves.	  The	  activation	  or	  passivation	  of	  action	  played	  a	  
significant	  role	  in	  constituting	  the	  varying	  power	  differentials	  in	  such	  relationships.	  In	  contrast	  
to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  lawyer,	  clients	  were	  backgrounded	  to	  a	  far	  greater	  extent,	  but	  using	  the	  same	  
kinds	  of	  discursive	  resources	  (i.e.	  reference	  to	  clients	  by	  using	  depersonalized	  nouns	  such	  as	  
‘case’	  and	  ‘file’).	  The	  legal	  secretary	  featured	  as	  an	  unexpected	  inclusion	  in	  the	  range	  of	  social	  
actors	  with	  who	  articled	  clerks	  and	  attorneys	  interact.	  There	  was	  a	  much	  clearer	  gender	  
profiling	  of	  the	  profession,	  though	  this	  became	  more	  marked	  as	  one	  ascended	  the	  professional	  
hierarchy:	  While	  articled	  clerks	  and	  attorneys	  were	  equally	  likely	  to	  be	  represented	  as	  male	  or	  
female,	  advocates	  were	  represented	  as	  predominantly	  male.	  The	  class	  profile	  of	  the	  profession	  
emerged	  in	  suggestions	  that	  advocates	  are	  members	  of	  the	  upper	  classes,	  or	  even	  have	  to	  be	  
such	  members	  in	  order	  to	  succeed.	  Interestingly,	  race	  did	  not	  feature	  as	  a	  form	  of	  social	  
categorization	  in	  these	  roles	  at	  all.	  	  
3.2	  	   The	  Judge	  	  
3.2.1	   Social	  action	  	  
Within	  the	  79	  quotations	  relating	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  ‘judge’,	  there	  were	  156	  extracts	  dealing	  
with	  different	  forms	  of	  social	  action.	  Similarly	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  lawyer,	  and	  more	  so	  than	  the	  
roles	  of	  the	  articled	  clerk,	  attorney	  and	  advocate,	  these	  were	  predominantly	  active	  (72%),	  
transactive	  (67%)	  and	  semiotic	  (80%)	  in	  form.	  There	  was	  an	  emphasis	  on	  judges’	  power	  over	  
language	  and	  information	  in	  addition	  to	  laws,	  which	  is	  also	  similar	  to	  the	  lawyer	  role.	  However,	  
unlike	  the	  flow	  of	  power	  in	  the	  lawyer	  role	  (over	  people	  through	  the	  mastery	  of	  laws,	  language	  
and	  information)	  the	  power	  wielded	  by	  judges	  functions	  in	  an	  inverted	  fashion:	  It	  is	  through	  
their	  decisions	  over	  people	  in	  individual	  cases	  that	  they	  wield	  power	  over	  law	  and	  language.	  
Obscured	  in	  this	  stream	  of	  power	  is	  the	  power	  they	  exercise,	  through	  their	  judgments,	  over	  
both	  their	  colleagues	  and	  articled	  clerks,	  attorneys	  and	  advocates.	  	  
It	  is	  helpful	  to	  commence	  the	  reconstruction	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  judge	  with	  the	  representations	  




a	  judge	  ‘sits’	  in	  judgment	  of	  ‘others’	  (J–SA2),	  and	  in	  another,	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  the	  verb	  is	  used	  
is	  material	  –	  a	  judges	  ‘sits	  in	  his	  chambers’	  (J–SA52b),	  but	  in	  all	  other	  instances	  the	  verb	  ‘sit’	  is	  
used	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  implies	  semiotic	  action	  in	  a	  non-­‐transactive	  form.	  Judges	  simply	  ‘sit’	  (J-­‐
SA16a;	  J-­‐SA17a;	  J–SA19b;	  J-­‐SA21a–c;	  J–SA56a;	  J–SA60).	  Sitting	  implies	  assuming	  a	  deliberate	  
position,	  not	  being	  on	  the	  move	  but	  being	  settled	  or	  installed	  in	  a	  particular	  place.	  There	  is	  a	  
solidity	  in	  ‘sitting’,	  an	  implied	  sureness	  of	  self,	  and	  even,	  perhaps,	  superiority,	  which	  is	  
reinforced	  when	  the	  sitting	  is	  done	  ‘in	  judgment’.	  Contrary	  to	  Van	  Leeuwen’s	  observation	  that	  
the	  coding	  of	  social	  action	  in	  a	  non-­‐transactive	  form	  frequently	  indexes	  powerlessness	  (2008;	  
60)	  in	  the	  case	  of	  judges	  who	  ‘sit’	  the	  non-­‐transactive	  form	  of	  their	  action	  actually	  reinforces	  
the	  sense	  of	  their	  power.	  	  	  
The	  role	  played	  by	  judges	  in	  the	  legal	  process	  initially	  seems	  quite	  passive.	  They	  must	  wait	  for	  
cases	  to	  be	  brought	  to	  them,	  or	  appeals	  to	  be	  made	  to	  them	  from	  lower	  courts	  (J-­‐SA28a;	  J-­‐
SA28c;	  J-­‐SA28f).	  Materially,	  they	  wait	  for	  documentation	  and	  files	  to	  be	  brought	  to	  them	  (J-­‐
SA71a;	  J-­‐SA71c).	  Unlike	  the	  emphasis	  placed	  on	  lawyers,	  attorneys	  and	  advocates	  being	  able	  to	  
find,	  read	  and	  interpret	  cases	  and	  legislation,	  judges	  have	  everything	  laid	  out	  before	  them.	  In	  
court,	  they	  are	  ‘confronted	  by	  both	  sides	  represented	  by	  an	  advocate’	  (J-­‐SA21a)	  who	  ‘make	  
sure	  that	  the	  judge	  is	  informed	  of	  every	  single	  possible	  authority	  …	  that	  will	  support	  their	  side	  
of	  the	  case’	  (J-­‐SA21b).	  These	  legal	  authorities	  are	  paramount	  for	  while	  each	  advocate	  also	  
presents	  the	  judge	  with	  their	  version	  of	  the	  facts	  of	  the	  case	  through,	  for	  instance,	  affidavits,	  
their	  arguments	  turn	  on	  persuading	  the	  judge	  to	  decide	  the	  case	  in	  terms	  of	  one	  body	  of	  
authority	  rather	  than	  another	  (J-­‐SA23a).	  Frequently	  there	  will	  be	  authority	  for	  both	  sides	  (J-­‐
SA23a),	  but	  what	  the	  judge	  gains	  is	  ‘the	  advantage	  of	  the	  entire	  scope	  of	  authorities,	  presented	  
by	  the	  two	  advocates’	  (J-­‐SA21c).	  	  
During	  this	  initially	  apparently	  passive	  stage,	  however,	  the	  judge’s	  power	  may	  be	  suddenly	  
unleashed	  if	  the	  laying	  out	  of	  laws	  and	  information	  before	  him	  is	  not	  executed	  with	  absolute	  
correctness.	  This	  was	  most	  clearly	  and	  dramatically	  illustrated	  in	  the	  following	  representation	  
(L22:49:254–269):	  
LECTURER:	  If	  there’s	  a	  spelling	  error	  in	  your	  pleadings,	  oh	  please.	  If	  there’s	  a	  grammatical	  error.	  




technically,	  legally,	  your	  case	  is	  thrown	  out.	  The	  judge	  will	  give	  you	  an	  opportunity.	  He’ll	  say,	  uh,	  
please	  Mr	  [state’s	  student’s	  surname],	  address	  me	  on	  this	  novel	  interpretation	  that	  you	  have	  in	  
clause	  3.	  And	  then	  you	  will	  be	  able	  to	  address	  him	  but	  I	  mean	  if	  you,	  uh	  uh,	  if	  he	  talks	  like	  that	  
you	  know	  you’re	  stuffed.	  You	  can	  just	  as	  well,	  you	  know,	  pack	  up	  and	  say	  ‘I’m	  sorry	  my	  lord,	  um	  
uh,	  I’m	  relatively	  inexperienced	  in	  these	  matters	  and	  uh,	  it	  slipped	  in,	  I	  beg	  your	  lordship’s	  
indulgence	  to	  amend	  it’.	  And	  your	  lordship	  will	  not	  give	  you	  an	  indulgence.	  He	  will	  say,	  well	  the	  
indulgence	  I	  will	  give	  you	  is	  that	  I	  will	  take	  the	  case	  off	  the	  roll	  for	  you	  completely	  and	  then	  you	  
can	  put	  it	  back	  again	  when	  it’s	  correct.	  
What	  is	  perhaps	  most	  noteworthy	  about	  this	  particular	  representation	  is	  the	  massive	  emphasis	  
on	  formal	  correctness.	  What	  matters	  most	  is	  not	  whether	  the	  presentation	  of	  the	  case,	  
correctly	  captures	  the	  substantive	  issues	  experienced	  by	  the	  people	  who	  have	  brought	  the	  case	  
to	  court,	  but	  whether	  the	  documents	  before	  the	  court	  are	  technically	  perfect	  in	  terms	  of	  law	  
and	  language.	  The	  seriousness	  of	  such	  an	  apparently	  trivial	  and	  easily	  remediable	  error	  as	  
referring	  to	  section	  2(1)	  as	  opposed	  to	  section	  1(2)	  is	  expressed,	  in	  part,	  by	  the	  verb	  used	  to	  
capture	  the	  judge’s	  reaction:	  The	  case	  is	  ‘thrown	  out’	  (J-­‐SA71d;	  J-­‐SA72a;	  J-­‐SA72d),	  in	  effect	  
discarding	  the	  hundreds	  of	  hours	  of	  work	  that	  may	  have	  gone	  into	  preparation	  for	  the	  day	  in	  
court	  on	  the	  part	  of	  both	  the	  advocate,	  the	  referring	  attorney	  and	  the	  articled	  clerks	  in	  training	  
(see	  J-­‐SA71c).	  The	  judge’s	  power	  is	  underlined	  by	  the	  representation	  of	  the	  advocate	  ‘begging’	  
his	  ‘indulgence’	  as	  ‘lord’,	  which	  indulgence	  is	  unmercifully	  withheld.	  The	  judge’s	  power	  to	  
throw	  a	  case	  out	  of	  court	  is	  not	  initiated	  with	  sound	  and	  fury,	  but	  with	  a	  chilling	  mildness,	  
affording	  the	  advocate	  an	  opportunity	  to	  address	  him	  on	  the	  ‘novel	  interpretation	  …	  in	  clause	  3’	  
(J-­‐SA72b).	  Like	  a	  cat	  with	  a	  mouse	  the	  judge	  allows	  his	  prey	  an	  apparent	  opportunity	  to	  escape	  
the	  consequences	  of	  his	  power,	  but	  then	  unleashes	  the	  full	  force	  of	  it	  nevertheless	  (J-­‐SA72c).	  	  
After	  hearing	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  case,	  the	  judge’s	  agency	  comes	  to	  the	  fore:	  ‘he	  investigates	  the	  
advocate’s	  sources,	  he	  does	  his	  own	  research,	  he	  comes	  to	  a	  conclusion	  based	  on	  everything	  
that	  was	  laid	  before	  him’	  (J-­‐SA21d)	  –	  the	  ‘judge	  is	  the	  one	  evaluating	  the	  evidence’	  (J-­‐SA40)	  
(note	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  relational	  clause	  here).	  A	  conclusion	  is	  mandatory	  for	  legal	  dispute	  
resolution	  is	  predicated	  on	  the	  need	  to	  bring	  to	  social	  disputes	  to	  finality	  through	  non-­‐violent	  
means.	  The	  judge’s	  conclusion	  and	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  he	  reaches	  that	  conclusion,	  however,	  
involve	  a	  complex	  mix	  of	  powers	  and	  constraints.	  




The	  people	  who,	  if	  they	  had	  the	  resources	  to	  do	  so,	  initially	  approached	  an	  attorney	  and/or	  
advocate	  to	  present	  their	  case	  in	  court,	  or	  who	  otherwise	  represented	  their	  own	  interests.	  Over	  
such	  individuals	  and	  groups,	  judges	  exercise	  far-­‐reaching	  powers.	  They	  decide	  whether	  a	  group	  
of	  sadomasochistic	  homosexuals	  are	  criminals	  or	  not	  (J-­‐SA4);	  whether	  the	  marriage	  of	  two	  
people	  who	  were	  married	  in	  a	  garden	  (and	  not	  a	  house)	  is	  valid	  or	  not	  (J-­‐SA5);	  whether	  a	  
woman	  has	  been	  raped	  or	  not	  (J-­‐SA41);	  whether	  a	  man	  who	  refused	  to	  pay	  maintenance	  
should	  remain	  in	  prison	  or	  not	  (J-­‐SA53);	  whether	  two	  people	  can	  get	  divorced,	  or	  not	  (J-­‐SA69).	  
In	  the	  instances	  where	  the	  lecturer	  foregrounded	  the	  people	  who	  are	  impacted	  by	  the	  judge’s	  
decision,	  the	  decision	  is	  far-­‐reaching	  because	  it	  contributes	  to	  defining	  their	  status	  and	  hence	  
their	  roles;	  i.e.	  whether	  they	  are	  criminals;	  married,	  unmarried	  or	  divorced;	  convict	  or	  free	  
man;	  a	  rape	  survivor	  or	  merely	  a	  woman	  who	  sleeps	  around.	  Judges’	  decisions	  will	  not	  always	  
involve	  status:	  In	  commercial	  disputes	  the	  decision	  will	  impact	  on	  who	  owes	  whom	  a	  sum	  of	  
money;	  in	  contractual	  disputes	  who	  owes	  whom	  an	  obligation,	  and	  so	  on.	  Whilst	  also	  far-­‐
reaching	  the	  impact	  of	  these	  decisions	  is	  arguably	  less	  critical	  for	  the	  definition	  of	  self	  than	  
decisions	  involving	  status.	  It	  is	  interesting,	  therefore,	  that	  the	  lecturer’s	  representations	  relating	  
to	  the	  impact	  of	  judges’	  decisions	  at	  the	  level	  of	  individuals,	  coalesced	  around	  this	  extreme	  
form	  of	  power.	  This	  would	  seem	  to	  create	  a	  more	  dramatic	  and	  vivid	  picture	  of	  judges’	  power	  
over	  individuals,	  than	  more	  mundane	  stories	  about	  sums	  of	  money	  owed	  or	  contractual	  
obligations.	  	  	  
In	  the	  lecturer’s	  representations,	  however,	  the	  extension	  of	  the	  judge’s	  power	  to	  actual,	  
concrete	  individuals	  was	  an	  almost	  tangential	  focus.	  Instead,	  the	  focus	  fell	  on	  the	  relationship	  
between	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  judge	  and	  existing	  law,	  either	  in	  the	  form	  of	  legislation	  or	  older	  
cases.	  The	  judge’s	  conclusion	  or	  decision,	  therefore,	  was	  represented	  as	  being	  more	  about	  the	  
shifting	  web	  of	  legal	  authority:	  How	  judges	  are	  constrained	  by	  existing	  forms	  of	  legal	  authority,	  
but	  empowered	  to	  transform	  or	  even	  discard	  such	  authority.	  	  
Early	  on	  in	  the	  series	  of	  lectures,	  for	  instance,	  the	  lecturer	  made	  it	  clear	  to	  the	  students	  that	  
when	  a	  judge	  sits	  in	  judgment	  on	  a	  matter	  he	  must	  ‘look	  for	  the	  law’	  (J-­‐SA4e).	  The	  judge’s	  
‘personal	  baggage’	  (J-­‐SA4a),	  his	  ‘personal	  subjective	  view’	  (J-­‐SA4b)	  is	  not	  relevant	  to	  the	  act	  of	  




might	  find	  from	  a	  ‘Christian	  point	  of	  view	  or	  from	  a	  decency	  point	  of	  view	  completely	  
abhorrent’	  (J-­‐SA4c)	  must	  be	  set	  aside.	  Instead	  he	  must	  look	  to	  the	  apparent	  objectivity	  of	  
existing	  legal	  ‘authority’,	  which	  could	  be	  legislation	  or	  the	  decisions	  of	  judges	  in	  previous	  cases	  
(‘precedent’).	  These	  forms	  of	  legal	  authority	  serve	  to	  rein	  in	  or	  discipline	  the	  judge,	  preventing	  
the	  apparently	  arbitrary	  and	  potentially	  biased	  decision-­‐making	  that	  would	  result	  if	  the	  judge	  
reached	  his	  conclusion	  on	  purely	  moral	  grounds.	  Thus	  a	  judge	  cannot	  reach	  a	  conclusion	  that	  he	  
is	  unable	  to	  base	  on	  some	  form	  of	  legal	  authority	  and	  he	  cannot	  manufacture	  his	  own	  authority	  
(J-­‐SA22b).	  The	  basis	  of	  his	  power,	  however,	  lies	  in	  being	  able	  to	  maneuver	  within	  and	  make	  
choices	  within	  this	  semantic	  field.	  It	  is	  true	  that	  in	  certain	  instances	  the	  judge	  is	  ‘bound’	  to	  
reach	  the	  conclusion	  a	  previous	  court	  reached	  in	  regard	  to	  a	  similar	  set	  of	  facts	  (J-­‐SA28e).84	  
And,	  the	  lecturer	  emphasizes,	  it	  is	  particularly	  important	  that	  judges	  consider	  and	  make	  
decisions	  that	  are	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  South	  African	  Constitution	  (J-­‐SA11).	  But	  in	  regard	  to	  
legislation,	  the	  judge	  holds	  the	  far-­‐reaching	  power	  to	  ‘interpret’	  the	  legislation	  (J-­‐SA7a;	  J-­‐SA9a;	  
J-­‐SA10a;	  J-­‐SA17a,	  b),	  which	  is	  to	  decide	  upon	  the	  meaning	  of	  that	  legislation	  in	  a	  particular	  
context,	  and	  in	  regard	  to	  precedent,	  the	  power	  to	  decide	  whether	  he	  will	  ‘follow’	  previous	  
decisions	  or	  not	  (J-­‐SA22a;	  J-­‐SA25;	  J-­‐SA27b,	  c;	  J-­‐SA41b;	  J-­‐SA43a,	  b).	  	  
The	  complexities	  of	  a	  judge’s	  power	  are	  most	  evident	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  following	  of	  precedent,	  
which	  the	  lecturer	  attempted	  to	  spell	  out	  in	  J-­‐SA26:	  Assuming	  a	  case	  with	  similar	  facts,	  a	  judge	  
of	  such	  a	  case	  in	  the	  Durban	  High	  Court	  can	  reach	  a	  conclusion	  different	  to	  a	  judge	  in	  the	  
Transvaal	  (now	  Pretoria)	  High	  Court	  ‘and	  say	  for	  these	  reasons,	  very	  good	  reasons	  must	  they	  
be,	  “I’m	  not	  following	  my	  brother	  in	  the	  Transvaal”’	  (J-­‐SA26a).	  At	  a	  later	  stage,	  a	  similar	  case	  
might	  again	  arise	  in	  the	  Durban	  High	  Court.	  The	  judge	  may	  then	  say	  ‘”My	  brother	  in	  the	  
Transvaal	  made	  this	  decision	  in	  1962,	  it	  was	  wrongly	  not	  followed	  by	  my	  brother	  in	  1968	  but	  
now	  in	  1992	  I	  am	  overruling	  him	  and	  I	  am	  following	  the	  Transvaal	  judgment”’	  (J-­‐SA26b).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  judges	  are	  bound	  by	  previous	  decisions	  is	  governed	  by	  the	  rules	  relating	  to	  ‘precedent’.	  In	  
South	  Africa,	  magistrates’	  courts,	  which	  are	  the	  courts	  lower	  on	  the	  legal	  hierarchy,	  are	  always	  bound	  by	  the	  
decisions	  of	  the	  higher	  courts.	  The	  High	  Courts,	  which	  are	  geographically	  based,	  may	  take	  decisions	  on	  the	  same	  
set	  of	  facts	  that	  differ	  –	  thus	  the	  Cape	  High	  Court	  may	  reach	  a	  different	  decision	  on	  a	  similar	  set	  of	  facts	  than	  the	  
Johannesburg	  High	  Court.	  However,	  within	  these	  geographical	  divisions	  if	  a	  case	  is	  decided	  by	  three	  judges,	  the	  
three-­‐judge	  decision	  always	  binds	  the	  decision	  of	  a	  single	  judge.	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  and	  the	  
Constitutional	  Court,	  which	  are	  the	  highest	  courts	  in	  South	  Africa,	  bind	  all	  other	  courts	  –	  which	  means	  that	  their	  




However,	  if	  there	  is	  such	  a	  dispute	  between	  High	  Courts,	  and	  that	  dispute	  is	  really	  damaging	  to	  
legal	  certainty,	  the	  case	  may	  then	  go	  up	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  who	  will	  make	  a	  
decision	  ‘and	  everybody	  is	  bound	  by	  that’	  (J-­‐SA26c;	  J-­‐SA28g).	  	  In	  deciding	  to	  follow,	  or	  not	  to	  
follow	  a	  previous	  decision,	  therefore,	  every	  judge	  exercises	  the	  significant	  power,	  through	  that	  
particular	  decision,	  of	  making	  a	  new	  precedent	  (J-­‐SA26a;	  J-­‐SA27a;	  J-­‐SA28c).	  It	  is	  in	  this	  way	  that	  
judges	  ‘develop’,	  ‘make’	  or	  ‘create’	  law	  (J-­‐SA15;	  J-­‐SA16b;	  J-­‐SA28g).	  However,	  they	  are	  also	  
capable	  of	  ‘striking	  out’	  laws	  (J-­‐SA13)	  and,	  as	  regards	  the	  older	  system	  of	  Roman-­‐Dutch	  law	  on	  
which	  South	  African	  law	  is	  based,	  they	  are	  represented	  as	  ‘demolishing’	  huge	  pieces	  of	  such	  law	  
(J-­‐SA44).	  	  	  
Whilst	  all	  of	  this	  is	  illustrative	  of	  how	  judges’	  powers	  are	  represented	  as	  extending	  over	  a	  
shifting	  web	  of	  ‘legal	  authority’,	  in	  effect	  they	  are	  also	  exercising	  power	  over	  each	  other	  and	  
over	  other	  legal	  professionals.	  This	  power	  is	  most	  concentrated	  at	  the	  upper	  end	  of	  the	  court	  
hierarchy,	  but	  remains	  evident	  throughout	  it.	  Thus,	  the	  highest	  courts,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  
Appeal	  or	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  have	  the	  power	  to	  enhance	  or	  diminish	  the	  reputation	  of	  
their	  colleagues	  in	  the	  High	  Courts	  by	  either	  upholding	  or	  overruling	  their	  decisions.	  In	  similar	  
fashion,	  within	  the	  High	  Court	  judges	  extend	  their	  powers	  over	  the	  decisions	  of	  their	  ‘brothers’	  
in	  the	  same	  or	  different	  divisions	  (see	  the	  paragraph	  above	  in	  addition	  to	  J-­‐SA43b);	  High	  Court	  
judges	  also	  hold	  sway	  over	  the	  decisions	  of	  magistrates	  who	  officiate	  within	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  
their	  courts,	  particularly	  through	  the	  institution	  of	  ‘automatic	  review’85	  (J-­‐SA28a,	  g;	  J-­‐SA51a–c;	  
J-­‐SA52a–b;	  J-­‐SA53a–b;	  J-­‐SA66).	  In	  all	  these	  courts,	  the	  judge’s	  conclusion,	  his	  decision	  to	  decide	  
the	  matter	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  one	  set	  of	  authorities	  rather	  than	  another,	  has	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  
advocates	  and	  attorneys	  who	  prepared	  the	  case,	  for	  the	  judge’s	  conclusion	  determines	  
absolutely	  whether	  they	  win	  or	  lose,	  succeed	  or	  fail.	  At	  one	  point	  the	  lecturer	  hints	  at	  the	  
judge’s	  sense	  of	  power	  over	  advocates	  (and	  by	  implication	  the	  attorneys	  who	  referred	  the	  case	  
to	  them)	  when	  he	  says:	  ‘[D]uring	  his	  judgment	  he	  will	  play.	  He	  will	  say	  “the	  advocate	  for	  the	  
defence”	  or	  “the	  advocate	  for	  the	  respondent	  said	  the	  following.	  I’m	  not	  accepting	  his	  version.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85	  A	  rule	  whereby	  the	  decisions	  of	  magistrates	  with	  less	  than	  seven	  years	  of	  experience	  are	  subject	  to	  automatic	  
review	  by	  a	  High	  Court	  judge	  in	  certain	  instances.	  I	  cover	  the	  lecturer’s	  anecdote	  that	  best	  illustrates	  some	  of	  the	  





I’m	  rejecting	  his	  authority.	  Advocate	  for	  the	  other	  side	  forwarded	  these	  arguments	  and	  I	  find	  
them	  acceptable.	  And	  for	  these	  reasons	  I’m	  going	  to	  follow	  that”’	  (J-­‐SA36b,	  emphasis).	  The	  
telling	  word	  in	  this	  representation	  is	  the	  verb	  ‘play’	  –	  a	  word	  that	  invokes	  the	  metaphor	  of	  a	  cat	  
playing	  with	  a	  mouse	  and	  affirms	  the	  significant	  power	  judges	  wield	  in	  the	  legal	  hierarchy.	  	  
Judges	  not	  only	  wield	  power	  over	  the	  parties	  before	  them,	  their	  colleagues	  and	  other	  legal	  
professionals,	  and	  the	  law	  itself,	  they	  also	  hold	  dominion	  over	  language.	  This	  was	  most	  
dramatically	  represented	  during	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  second	  lecture	  of	  the	  series	  (L2:69ff),	  
where	  the	  lecturer	  presented	  the	  facts	  of	  the	  case	  Ex	  Parte	  Doe	  1987	  (3)	  SA	  829	  (D)	  to	  the	  class.	  
The	  lecturer	  had	  aimed	  to	  illustrate	  to	  the	  class	  how	  ‘ordinary	  language’	  can	  be	  very	  confusing,	  
and	  cause	  ‘enormous	  uncertainty’.	  In	  this	  case	  the	  language	  causing	  the	  confusion	  was	  the	  
preposition	  ‘in’:	  The	  statute	  governing	  marriages	  stated	  that	  a	  marriage	  must	  be	  concluded	  ‘in’	  
a	  house.	  A	  man,	  whose	  marriage	  had	  not	  taken	  place	  ‘in’	  a	  house,	  but	  rather	  in	  a	  garden	  
applied	  to	  have	  his	  marriage	  declared	  null	  and	  void	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  non-­‐compliance	  with	  the	  
marriage	  statute.	  Because	  of	  the	  gravity	  and	  solemnity	  of	  the	  contract	  of	  marriage,	  and	  because	  
strictly	  confining	  the	  meaning	  of	  ‘in’	  to	  ‘inside	  the	  house’	  would	  cause	  tremendous	  uncertainty	  
–	  people	  whose	  marriage	  had	  not	  taken	  place	  in	  a	  house	  would	  then	  be	  uncertain	  whether	  their	  
marriage	  was	  valid	  or	  not	  –	  the	  judge	  chose	  not	  to	  follow	  the	  ‘letter	  of	  the	  law’	  (J-­‐SA6a–b),	  nor	  
the	  meaning	  of	  ‘in’	  in	  the	  Oxford	  English	  Dictionary	  (J-­‐SA6c).	  Instead,	  he	  ‘looked	  beyond’	  the	  
dictionary	  meaning	  of	  the	  word	  (J-­‐SA6d)	  and	  chose	  to	  ‘extend’	  and	  ‘widen’	  (J-­‐SA6d;	  J-­‐SA7b)	  the	  
meaning	  of	  ‘in’	  a	  house	  to	  effectively	  include	  ‘not	  in’	  the	  house,	  to	  an	  ‘open	  space	  outside	  the	  
closed	  space’	  (J-­‐SA6d).86	  	  
In	  this	  particular	  example,	  the	  lecturer	  also	  brought	  to	  the	  fore	  judges’	  power	  over	  what	  might	  
be	  called	  ‘ultimate	  outcomes’:	  That	  through	  their	  decisions	  judges	  are	  capable	  of	  ‘creating	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86	  That	  the	  students	  found	  this	  difficult	  to	  swallow	  is	  indicated	  by	  the	  extended	  questioning	  and	  discussion	  that	  
ensued	  after	  the	  lecturer’s	  initial	  presentation	  of	  this	  case	  (see	  L2:74–119).	  This	  particular	  episode	  is	  
representative	  of	  the	  new	  perspective	  (or	  ‘ideology’,	  Mertz,	  2007)	  on	  language	  which	  students	  are	  required	  to	  take	  
on	  as	  part	  of	  a	  distinct	  legal	  epistemology;	  i.e.	  a	  perspective	  whereby	  language	  is	  connected	  to	  a	  dynamic	  system	  
that	  produces	  and	  sustains	  ‘legal	  authority’,	  such	  that	  language	  is	  no	  longer	  merely	  ‘referential’	  to	  objects	  in	  the	  
world.	  This	  episode	  is	  deserving	  of	  a	  study	  in	  its	  own	  right	  for	  the	  moves	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  students	  to	  suggest	  
alternative	  wordings	  for	  the	  statute	  so	  as	  to	  avoid	  the	  problem	  that	  arose	  in	  Ex	  Parte	  Doe.	  All	  their	  suggestions	  are,	  
however,	  aimed	  at	  preserving	  a	  referentialist	  perspective	  on	  language	  and	  resisting	  the	  new	  perspective	  the	  




certainty’	  (J-­‐SA10c,	  see	  also	  J-­‐SA6a;	  J-­‐SA7b;	  J-­‐SA10b)	  or	  ‘creating	  chaos’	  (J-­‐SA10d).	  They	  are	  also	  
capable	  of	  either	  aligning	  and	  reinforcing	  or	  distancing	  themselves	  from	  other	  sources	  of	  power	  
as	  in	  Oliver	  Schreiner	  who,	  through	  his	  judgments,	  ‘stood	  up’	  against	  the	  apartheid	  regime	  (J-­‐
SA54),	  whilst	  other	  judges	  were	  seen	  as	  ‘co-­‐operating’	  with	  (J-­‐SA55b)	  or	  ‘standing	  quietly	  by	  
while	  the	  apartheid	  government	  ravished	  human	  rights’	  (J-­‐SA57).	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  all	  these	  powers,	  judges	  were	  also	  represented	  as	  having	  authority	  over	  their	  
conditions	  of	  work	  –	  the	  capacity,	  for	  instance,	  to	  undertake	  ‘sabbatical	  work’	  (J-­‐SA14)	  or	  
‘research’	  (J-­‐SA56b),	  to	  ‘retire’	  from	  a	  case	  and	  undertake	  his	  own	  investigation	  (J-­‐SA21c)	  and,	  
operationally,	  to	  rule	  that	  the	  proceedings	  in	  court	  will	  take	  place	  ‘in	  camera’;	  i.e.	  that	  such	  
proceedings	  will	  not	  be	  open	  to	  the	  public	  (J-­‐SA68a–b).	  
The	  forms	  of	  social	  action	  pertaining	  to	  judges	  that	  were	  passive,	  non-­‐transactive	  and/or	  
material	  in	  form	  tended	  to	  cluster	  around	  four	  themes:	  The	  procedure	  of	  appeals	  (J-­‐SA28a,	  d,	  
f);	  the	  process	  of	  being	  appointed	  as	  judge	  (J-­‐SA12;	  J-­‐SA20;	  J-­‐SA30;	  J-­‐SA62b;	  J-­‐SA63b;	  J-­‐SA64;	  J-­‐
SA75;	  J-­‐SA76;	  J-­‐SA77);	  judges’	  vulnerability	  to	  changes	  in	  the	  political	  system	  (J-­‐SA46;	  J-­‐SA47;	  J-­‐
SA48;	  J-­‐SA50;	  J-­‐SA55c,	  e;	  J-­‐SA70b–c);	  and	  the	  resources	  judges	  receive	  for	  doing	  their	  jobs	  (J-­‐
SA74;	  J-­‐SA79).	  As	  the	  first	  of	  these	  themes	  is	  an	  already	  well-­‐known	  feature	  of	  the	  judicial	  
system	  (judges	  are	  passive	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  cases	  are	  brought	  to	  them,	  whether	  as	  a	  court	  of	  
first	  instance	  or	  on	  appeal,	  rather	  than	  them	  being	  able	  to	  go	  and	  find	  cases	  that	  will	  reform	  the	  
law),	  I	  will	  discuss	  only	  the	  second	  and	  third	  of	  these	  themes,	  while	  dealing	  with	  the	  fourth	  in	  
the	  section	  on	  values.	  	  
In	  outlining	  the	  formal	  process	  of	  judicial	  appointments,	  the	  lecturer	  pointed	  to	  the	  central	  role	  
of	  the	  Judicial	  Services	  Commission:87	  The	  JSC	  receives	  the	  names	  of	  judicial	  candidates	  (J-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87	  The	  lecturer’s	  representations	  around	  the	  appointment	  of	  judges	  outline	  the	  formal	  contours	  of	  the	  process,	  but	  
also	  hint	  at	  the	  machinations	  of	  power	  that	  lie	  behind	  it.	  Because	  judges	  exercise	  such	  far-­‐reaching	  powers,	  which,	  
in	  South	  Africa,	  extend	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  ‘striking	  out’	  laws	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  unconstitutionality,	  the	  judicial	  
appointment	  process	  is	  potentially	  a	  very	  controversial	  political	  issue.	  Furthermore,	  in	  South	  Africa	  the	  racial	  
transformation	  of	  the	  judiciary	  looms	  large,	  as	  the	  bench	  was	  overwhelmingly	  white	  during	  the	  apartheid	  years.	  
Since	  judges	  enjoy	  security	  of	  tenure	  as	  an	  important	  feature	  of	  their	  appointment,	  these	  judges	  continued	  to	  
serve	  after	  the	  1994	  elections.	  The	  political	  solution	  regarding	  the	  appointment	  of	  judges	  was	  thrashed	  out	  during	  
the	  negotiations	  that	  preceded	  the	  1994	  elections	  and	  a	  unique	  solution	  –	  whereby	  judges	  would	  be	  appointed	  by	  
a	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  panel	  dubbed	  the	  ‘Judicial	  Services	  Commission’	  (JSC)	  –	  was	  agreed	  to	  and	  subsequently	  




SA75a);	  ‘interviews’	  (J-­‐SA12a,	  c)	  or	  rather	  ‘scrutinizes’	  the	  candidates	  ‘behind	  closed	  doors’	  (J-­‐
SA75c);	  and	  sends	  a	  shortlist	  of	  names	  to	  the	  President	  who	  then	  finally	  decides	  which	  
individuals	  will	  be	  appointed	  (J-­‐SA12d).	  But	  this	  seemingly	  neutral	  and	  objective	  process	  is	  
susceptible	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  power	  struggles	  at	  various	  points.	  	  
The	  first	  power	  struggle,	  and	  possibly	  most	  contentious,	  relates	  to	  which	  names	  are	  forwarded	  
to	  the	  JSC	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  This	  in	  turn	  depends	  on	  being	  asked	  to	  serve	  as	  an	  ‘acting	  judge’	  
and	  ‘proving	  one’s	  self’	  in	  that	  position.	  At	  J-­‐SA75a,	  the	  lecturer	  outlines	  the	  processes	  and	  
actors	  in	  this	  regard,	  as	  follows:	  
LECTURER:	  Judges	  ladies	  and	  gentlemen	  should	  be,	  they	  were	  always	  in	  the	  past,	  the	  best	  senior	  
advocates.	  Uh,	  are	  asked	  to	  act	  as	  judges	  and	  then	  they	  if	  they	  are	  good	  then	  they	  prove	  
themselves	  then	  they	  are	  asked	  by	  the	  Minister	  of	  Justice	  to	  consider	  becoming	  a	  judge.	  Their	  
names	  are	  then	  sent	  to	  the	  Judicial	  Services	  Commission.	  That	  is	  how	  a	  judge	  is	  appointed.	  (J-­‐
SA75a)	  
Whether	  it	  is	  only	  senior	  advocates	  who	  can	  become	  judges	  is	  a	  moot	  point	  in	  South	  Africa,	  
although	  since	  the	  1996	  Constitution	  it	  seems	  to	  be	  generally	  accepted	  that	  judicial	  
appointments	  are	  open	  to	  a	  wider	  pool	  of	  candidates.	  The	  lecturer,	  however,	  seems	  to	  affirm	  
the	  traditional	  norm	  (see	  the	  extract	  above	  as	  well	  as	  J-­‐SA63b).	  He	  also	  links	  judges	  with	  senior	  
advocates	  in	  relational	  clauses	  on	  more	  than	  one	  occasion	  as	  in	  ‘the	  judge	  is	  a	  senior	  advocate	  
of	  twenty-­‐five	  years	  standing’	  (J-­‐Q72)),	  he	  acknowledges	  that	  ‘nowadays	  of	  course	  it’s	  no	  longer	  
compulsory	  that	  you	  must	  be	  a	  senior	  advocate’	  and	  affirms	  that	  attorneys	  and	  even	  academics	  
have	  been	  appointed	  as	  judges	  (J-­‐SA77).	  Interestingly,	  the	  actors	  who	  ask	  senior	  advocates	  (or	  
any	  other	  type	  of	  professional)	  to	  serve	  as	  acting	  judges	  and	  to	  whom	  the	  acting	  judges	  need	  to	  
prove	  themselves	  are,	  in	  one	  instance,	  completely	  backgrounded	  (J-­‐SA75a),	  in	  another	  they	  are	  
simply	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘they’	  (J-­‐SA20)	  and	  in	  another	  the	  lecturer	  allocates	  this	  power	  to	  an	  
incorrectly	  wide	  range	  of	  actors	  –	  ‘the	  council	  the	  bar	  the	  minister	  and	  the	  judicial	  services	  
council’	  (J-­‐SA30).	  In	  fact,	  this	  would	  probably	  be	  a	  decision	  made	  by	  the	  Judge	  President	  in	  each	  
division	  (or	  Chief	  Justice	  in	  the	  Constitutional	  Court)	  and	  the	  actors	  before	  whom	  an	  acting	  
judge	  would	  have	  to	  prove	  himself	  would	  be	  his	  or	  her	  peers	  in	  the	  division.	  The	  lecturer’s	  
backgrounded	  and	  ambiguous	  representations	  here,	  however,	  seem	  to	  correctly	  reflect	  the	  





very	  subtle	  manner	  in	  which	  this	  form	  of	  power	  operates.	  	  
In	  general	  the	  lecturer	  strongly	  negates	  the	  possibility	  of	  magistrates	  being	  promoted	  to	  the	  
High	  Court	  bench,	  even	  though	  their	  work	  is	  perhaps	  most	  closely	  akin	  to	  that	  of	  the	  judge.	  
(The	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  lecturer	  constitutes	  this	  negation	  is	  outlined	  in	  greater	  detail	  in	  the	  
section	  on	  the	  magistrate	  in	  Part	  D	  below.)	  
The	  second	  type	  of	  power	  struggle	  occurs	  between	  judges	  and	  the	  JSC	  itself.88	  The	  lecturer	  
hints	  at	  this	  power	  struggle	  when	  he	  uses	  the	  verb	  ‘scrutinizes’	  to	  capture	  the	  JSC’s	  work	  in	  
relation	  to	  judicial	  candidates	  (J-­‐SA75c),	  and	  then	  reinforces	  this	  by	  adding	  ‘And	  they	  ask	  you	  
everything.	  They	  ask	  you	  about	  your	  personal	  life,	  they	  ask	  you	  about	  your	  political	  views,	  they	  
ask	  you	  about	  your	  sexual	  orientation,	  they	  ask	  you	  about	  your	  health,	  they	  ask	  you	  everything’	  
(J-­‐SA75d).	  Interestingly,	  he	  immediately	  follows	  this	  communication	  up	  with	  a	  representation	  of	  
a	  white	  male	  standing	  up	  to	  the	  JSC	  –	  the	  example	  of	  Judge	  Edwin	  Cameron,	  who	  in	  his	  
interview	  before	  the	  JSC,	  actively	  volunteered	  the	  information	  that	  he	  was	  both	  homosexual	  
and	  HIV-­‐positive	  (J-­‐SA76a–c).	  	  
With	  regard	  to	  the	  third	  theme	  –	  judges’	  vulnerability	  to	  changes	  in	  the	  political	  system,	  to	  ‘a	  
transfer	  of	  power’	  (J-­‐SA55c)	  –	  the	  lecturer	  represented	  judges	  as	  passive	  and	  non-­‐transactive	  in	  
relation	  to	  the	  social	  action	  but	  with	  an	  interesting	  play	  upon	  the	  possible	  material	  versus	  
semiotic	  effects	  of	  such	  vulnerability.	  When	  there	  is	  a	  radical	  change	  in	  the	  political	  
dispensation,	  as	  occurred	  in	  South	  Africa	  during	  the	  early	  1990s,	  the	  power	  lies	  with	  the	  new	  
government	  to	  decide	  what	  should	  be	  done	  with	  sitting	  judges	  who,	  one	  might	  assume,	  are	  
strongly	  imbued	  with	  the	  ideology	  of	  the	  previous	  regime.	  The	  extent	  of	  a	  new	  dispensation’s	  
power	  in	  relation	  to	  sitting	  judges	  is	  cleverly	  captured	  in	  the	  lecturer’s	  play	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  
‘chopping	  off’	  the	  old	  judges’	  heads	  (J-­‐SA46b;	  J-­‐SA70b).	  The	  action	  has	  chilling	  physical	  
connotations,	  conjuring	  up	  images	  of	  the	  guillotine	  and	  perhaps	  its	  use	  in	  contexts	  such	  as	  the	  
French	  Revolution.	  But	  it	  also	  has	  a	  semiotic	  connotation	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  completely	  removing	  a	  
judge’s	  mind	  from	  the	  scene	  by,	  for	  instance,	  dismissing	  or	  retiring	  all	  the	  old	  judges	  (J-­‐SA55c),	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88	  In	  recent	  years	  this	  has	  been	  a	  hugely	  controversial	  topic	  in	  the	  South	  African	  legal	  profession.	  At	  issue	  has	  been	  
the	  invasiveness	  and	  appropriateness	  of	  the	  questions	  put	  to	  judicial	  candidates	  by	  members	  of	  the	  JSC,	  and	  their	  




thereby	  making	  a	  ‘clean	  sweep’	  (J-­‐SA55e).	  In	  his	  representations	  on	  this	  theme,	  the	  lecturer	  
seemed	  to	  adopt	  a	  harmonizing,	  pragmatic	  tone,	  rather	  than	  opting	  for	  representations	  that	  
highlighted	  racial	  tensions.	  For	  instance,	  he	  observed	  that	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  sitting	  judges	  
‘were	  not	  a	  hundred	  percent	  completely	  trusted	  by	  the	  new	  government’,	  there	  was	  a	  
provision	  in	  the	  South	  African	  interim	  Constitution	  providing	  that	  sitting	  judges	  would	  be	  
respected	  and	  retrained	  to	  understand	  the	  Constitution	  (J-­‐SA48).	  Notwithstanding	  the	  
difficulties	  of	  ‘changing	  the	  frame	  of	  reference	  of	  a	  sixty-­‐five	  year	  middle-­‐aged	  man’	  (J-­‐SA46),	  
the	  sitting	  judges	  were	  retrained	  (J-­‐SA48;	  J-­‐SA50).	  He	  also	  referred	  twice	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  
Chief	  Justice	  under	  the	  apartheid	  regime,	  Justice	  Corbett,	  was	  the	  person	  who	  swore	  Nelson	  
Mandela	  into	  office	  (J-­‐SA12g;	  J-­‐SA55d)	  –	  an	  act	  that	  symbolized	  the	  ‘evolutionary’	  nature	  of	  the	  
change	  from	  the	  old	  system	  to	  the	  new.	  In	  alluding	  to	  new	  judges,	  he	  refrained	  from	  any	  form	  
of	  critique	  that	  linked	  race,	  new	  judges	  and	  case	  backlogs	  and	  instead	  mildly	  observed	  that	  it	  
takes	  a	  ‘long	  time’	  to	  train	  a	  judge	  (J-­‐SA47)	  and	  that	  case	  backlogs	  were	  the	  price	  the	  South	  
African	  system	  of	  administration	  of	  justice	  had	  to	  pay	  ‘to	  slowly	  but	  surely	  appoint	  new	  judges’	  
and	  for	  the	  old	  judges	  to	  train	  the	  new	  judges	  (J-­‐SA70c).	  In	  referring	  to	  the	  one	  ‘clean	  sweep’	  
that	  did	  occur	  –	  the	  appointment	  of	  11	  new	  justices	  to	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  (J-­‐SA55e)	  who	  
were	  tasked	  with	  ‘looking	  after’	  the	  Constitution	  (J-­‐SA55a)	  –	  he	  makes	  no	  mention	  of	  the	  
rationale	  of	  race	  in	  their	  appointment	  but	  instead	  states	  that	  they	  were	  all	  appointed	  ‘for	  very	  
specific	  human	  rights	  reasons’	  (J-­‐SA	  62b).	  	  
3.2.2	   Circumstances	  of	  social	  action	  	  
The	  79	  quotations	  related	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  judge	  yielded	  85	  extracts	  dealing	  with	  the	  
circumstances	  of	  social	  action.	  Of	  these,	  25	  related	  to	  the	  resources	  used	  by	  judges,	  33	  to	  the	  
emotional	  context	  of	  judges’	  work,	  and	  27	  to	  the	  locations	  in	  which	  judges	  are	  found.	  This	  set	  
of	  extracts	  generally	  confirmed	  the	  stereotypical	  image	  of	  the	  judge	  as	  the	  cool,	  calm	  and	  
collected	  ‘king’	  of	  the	  courtroom,	  who	  wields	  power	  through	  a	  range	  of	  abstract	  resources.	  	  
Like	  lawyers,	  judges	  were	  represented	  as	  working	  exclusively	  with	  semiotic	  tools,	  such	  as	  
dictionaries	  (J-­‐CSA6),	  different	  forms	  of	  legal	  authority	  (J-­‐CSA16;	  J-­‐CSA22;	  J-­‐CSA23b;	  J-­‐CSA25a);	  




J-­‐CSA26b).	  The	  lecturer	  also	  made	  mention	  of	  the	  specialized	  set	  of	  semiotic	  instruments	  
through	  which	  judges	  act	  when	  deciding	  a	  case,	  such	  as	  the	  use	  of	  ‘discretion’	  (J-­‐CSA7;	  J-­‐
CSA10);	  the	  ‘ratio	  decidendi’,	  being	  the	  reasons	  the	  judge	  provides	  for	  his	  decision	  (J-­‐CSA36;	  J-­‐
CSA39);	  the	  ‘obiter	  dictum’,	  being	  observations	  that	  the	  judge	  makes	  in	  passing	  which	  are	  not,	  
strictly	  speaking,	  necessary	  for	  deciding	  a	  case	  and	  are	  therefore	  not	  binding	  upon	  the	  parties	  
(J-­‐CSA39;	  J-­‐CSA41b;	  J-­‐CSA43);	  the	  ‘order	  of	  the	  court’,	  which	  is	  the	  judge’s	  binding	  instruction	  
to	  the	  parties	  (J-­‐CSA69b);	  the	  ‘mandamus’,	  being	  an	  order	  made	  by	  a	  judge	  compelling	  
someone	  to	  do	  something	  (J-­‐CSA53a);	  the	  ‘sentence’,	  being	  an	  order	  relating	  to	  the	  punishment	  
of	  a	  criminal	  offender	  (J-­‐CSA67b);	  and	  the	  power	  of	  ‘review’	  over	  the	  decisions	  of	  magistrates	  
(as	  well	  as	  government	  officials)	  (J-­‐CSA66).	  It	  is	  interesting	  that	  in	  at	  least	  three	  instances	  –	  the	  
references	  to	  ‘ratio	  decidendi’,	  ‘obiter	  dictum’	  and	  ‘mandamus’	  –	  the	  lecturer	  prefers	  to	  retain	  
the	  Latin	  terms,	  rather	  than	  to	  simply	  use	  the	  more	  mundane	  English	  descriptors.	  The	  Latin	  
terms	  arguably	  better	  convey	  the	  ancient	  links	  between	  the	  contemporary	  South	  African	  
system	  of	  law	  and	  the	  classical	  era	  and	  thereby	  contribute	  to	  the	  mystique	  of	  judges.	  
The	  notion	  of	  time	  as	  a	  resource	  also	  featured	  in	  the	  role	  of	  the	  judge,	  but	  whereas	  lawyers’	  
chronic	  lack	  of	  time	  was	  represented	  as	  a	  seemingly	  unchangeable	  feature	  of	  legal	  professional	  
life,	  judges	  were	  represented	  as	  needing	  –	  and	  obtaining	  –	  the	  time	  required	  to	  do	  their	  jobs	  
properly.	  ‘Justice	  is	  not	  something	  that	  you	  can	  rush	  …	  justice	  is	  not	  something	  that	  uh	  you	  can	  
use	  a	  sausage	  machine	  for.	  …	  [Y]ou	  must	  consider	  the	  cases.	  It	  takes	  time’	  (J-­‐CSA70a,	  note	  also	  
the	  relational	  clauses	  in	  this	  extract).	  To	  the	  students’	  apparent	  surprise,	  the	  lecturer	  confirms	  
that	  courts	  are	  only	  in	  session	  for	  certain	  times	  of	  the	  year	  and	  in	  recess	  for	  other	  times	  and	  
this	  is	  ‘to	  give	  the	  justices	  times	  to	  do	  research.	  And	  write	  the	  judgments.	  And	  um	  to	  come	  up	  
to	  date	  with	  the	  most	  current	  law.	  To	  …	  be	  a	  justice	  in	  South	  Africa,	  to	  be	  a	  judge	  in	  South	  
Africa	  is	  not	  easy.	  Um	  it’s	  a	  very	  dynamic	  environment.	  So	  uh	  besides	  holiday	  they	  need	  time	  
off	  from	  court	  work,	  so	  that	  they	  can	  catch	  up	  with	  their	  research’	  (J-­‐CSA56,	  see	  also	  J-­‐CSA14b).	  
This	  generous	  allotment	  of	  time	  carries	  through	  to	  the	  expectations	  surrounding	  the	  
development	  of	  judges	  as	  professionals:	  ‘A	  judge	  is	  not	  made	  overnight	  …	  it	  takes	  time,	  it	  really	  
takes	  time’	  (J-­‐CSA70b).	  The	  representations	  around	  time	  therefore	  serve	  as	  a	  further	  index	  of	  




In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  extracts	  that	  describe	  the	  emotional	  context	  of	  judges’	  work,	  a	  distinction	  can	  
be	  made	  between	  those	  that	  carry	  messages	  about	  the	  emotional	  life	  of	  judges	  themselves,	  
and	  the	  emotions	  judges	  elicit	  in	  others.	  	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  emotions	  which	  judges	  might	  feel	  themselves,	  the	  representation	  was	  contextual	  
rather	  than	  direct.	  The	  lecturer	  advocates	  that	  one	  must	  be	  ‘very	  comfortable’	  and	  ‘have	  
whatever	  you	  want’	  before	  becoming	  a	  judge	  (J-­‐CSA79).	  This	  together	  with	  his	  representations	  
around	  judges	  having	  time	  for	  sabbaticals	  and	  vacation	  and	  so	  forth	  implies	  that	  judges	  should	  
be	  at	  ease,	  satisfied	  perhaps.	  However,	  being	  a	  judge	  is	  not	  without	  its	  stressful	  dimension.	  This	  
relates	  primarily	  to	  being	  the	  object	  of	  scrutiny,	  most	  notably	  by	  the	  Judicial	  Services	  
Commission	  before	  appointment	  as	  a	  judge	  (J-­‐CSA75b,	  c,	  d)	  but	  also	  in	  relation	  to	  ‘proving’	  
one’s	  self	  for	  purposes	  of	  promotion	  (J-­‐CSA20a;	  J-­‐CSA30;	  J-­‐CSA75a).	  Stressful	  emotions	  could	  
also	  be	  implied	  from	  the	  threats	  posed	  to	  judges	  by	  a	  change	  in	  the	  political	  order	  (J-­‐CSA46);	  
and,	  simply,	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  work	  (J-­‐CSA47;	  J-­‐CSA63;	  J-­‐CSA69a)	  of	  which	  there	  is	  an	  ‘enormous	  
amount’	  (J-­‐CSA70d).	  	  
Apart	  from	  this,	  the	  two	  predominant	  themes	  relating	  to	  the	  emotional	  disposition	  of	  judges	  
themselves	  were,	  firstly,	  representations	  of	  judges	  as	  objective	  and	  rational	  and,	  secondly,	  
representations	  of	  judges	  as	  courageous.	  	  
There	  were	  both	  more	  and	  less	  explicit	  representations	  around	  the	  objectivity	  of	  judges	  but	  
both	  involved	  emotion.	  In	  the	  more	  explicit	  representations,	  which	  occurred	  early	  on	  in	  the	  
series	  of	  lectures,	  the	  judge’s	  capacity	  to	  ‘sit	  in	  judgment	  of	  others	  objectively’	  (J-­‐CSA2),	  
appears	  to	  involve	  a	  capacity	  to	  separate	  out,	  or	  hold	  in	  suspension,	  things	  that	  one	  might	  
‘believe	  on	  a	  spiritual	  level’	  (J-­‐CSA2)	  or	  feel	  very	  strongly	  about	  (J-­‐CSA4a).	  In	  the	  less	  explicit	  
representations,	  the	  objectivity	  and	  rationality	  of	  judges	  was	  placed	  in	  sharper	  relief	  by	  
representing	  the	  people	  with	  whom	  the	  judge	  comes	  into	  contact	  as	  highly	  emotional:	  The	  
female	  rape	  survivor	  (J-­‐CSA41a);	  the	  abused	  child	  (J-­‐CSA68b)	  and	  even	  the	  remorseful	  criminal	  
who	  admits	  ‘Look,	  mea	  culpa,	  I’m	  guilty,	  I’m	  here,	  I’m	  throwing	  myself	  on	  your	  mercy’	  (J-­‐
CSA67c,	  my	  emphasis)	  bring	  complex	  and	  difficult	  emotions	  into	  the	  court	  room.	  The	  judge	  




criminal’s	  plea	  for	  mercy	  into	  ‘consideration’	  (J-­‐CSA67c).	  In	  Halliday’s	  transitivity	  system,	  verbs	  
such	  as	  ‘consider’	  and	  ‘evaluate’	  would	  fall	  into	  the	  category	  of	  ‘cognitive’	  mental	  process	  
clauses	  (Halliday,	  2004:	  208	  –	  210).	  These	  verbs	  represent	  a	  very	  different	  form	  of	  sensing	  to	  
that	  captured	  by	  ‘emotive’	  words	  such	  as	  ‘love’,	  ‘like’,	  ‘abhor’,	  ‘fear’	  and	  so	  on.	  However,	  as	  the	  
lecturer’s	  anecdote	  about	  his	  own	  sentencing	  of	  a	  first-­‐time	  offender	  as	  a	  magistrate	  indicates	  
(this	  anecdote	  is	  covered	  in	  greater	  detail	  in	  the	  section	  on	  the	  magistrate	  below),	  those	  who	  sit	  
in	  judgment	  of	  others	  frequently	  experience	  very	  strong	  emotions.	  These	  aspects	  of	  a	  judge’s	  
work	  however,	  were	  never	  foregrounded	  by	  the	  lecturer.	  As	  opposed	  to	  emotional	  and	  ‘over-­‐
enthusiastic’	  magistrates	  (J-­‐CSA51),	  judges	  were	  always	  represented	  as	  cool	  and	  calm	  (J-­‐
CSA53b).	  	  
The	  other	  theme	  of	  judges’	  emotional	  world	  –	  that	  of	  judges	  acting	  courageously	  –	  emerged	  in	  
comments	  around	  the	  justices	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  not	  shrinking	  away	  from	  declaring	  
gay	  marriages	  valid,	  albeit	  that	  this	  created	  some	  uncertainty	  (J-­‐CSA11),	  in	  the	  representation	  
of	  Judge	  Schreiner	  standing	  up	  to	  the	  apartheid	  regime	  (J-­‐CSA54)	  and,	  probably	  most	  explicitly,	  
in	  the	  anecdote	  of	  Justice	  Cameron’s	  admission	  of	  his	  HIV-­‐positive	  status	  in	  his	  interview	  before	  
the	  Judicial	  Services	  Commission	  (J-­‐CSA76a,	  b).	  	  
The	  emotions	  judges	  were	  represented	  as	  exciting	  in	  others	  tended	  to	  be	  predominantly	  
‘negative’	  emotions.	  Apart	  from	  the	  emotion	  of	  fear,	  which	  comes	  out	  most	  clearly	  in	  
representations	  relating	  to	  the	  advocate	  (see	  the	  section	  on	  the	  articled	  clerk,	  attorney	  and	  
advocate	  above),	  the	  lecturer	  represented	  judges	  as	  causing	  boredom	  for	  ‘they	  talk	  in	  a	  
language	  of	  their	  own	  they	  have	  arguments	  of	  their	  own	  and	  it	  is	  extremely	  long-­‐winded	  (J-­‐
CSA29)	  and	  some	  of	  their	  judgments	  ‘become	  very	  tedious	  (J-­‐CSA33).	  They	  other	  dominant	  
negative	  emotion	  was	  that	  of	  distrust	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  democratic	  government’s	  distrust	  of	  
the	  judges	  of	  the	  apartheid	  era	  (J-­‐CSA55a)	  because	  the	  latter	  were	  seen	  as	  ‘standing	  quietly	  by	  
while	  the	  apartheid	  government	  ravished	  human	  rights’	  (J-­‐CSA57).	  
Judges’	  were	  almost	  exclusively	  located	  in	  the	  physical	  space	  of	  the	  court	  –	  this	  accounted	  for	  
21	  of	  the	  27	  extracts	  relating	  to	  location	  (77%).	  In	  11	  of	  these	  the	  lecturer	  simply	  used	  the	  word	  




CSA72b;	  J-­‐CSA73),	  whilst	  in	  two	  instances	  he	  located	  the	  judge	  more	  specifically,	  by	  referring	  to	  
the	  judge	  sitting	  on	  the	  ‘bench’	  (J-­‐CSA10c)	  or	  being	  in	  his	  ‘chambers’	  (J-­‐CSA52a).	  In	  addition	  to	  
using	  other	  terms	  for	  naming	  courts	  (see	  ‘provincial	  division’	  and	  ‘local	  division	  in	  J-­‐CSA20b;	  J-­‐
CSA21;	  J-­‐CSA60	  or	  the	  ‘appellate	  division’	  in	  J-­‐CSA35)	  he	  referred	  to	  courts	  in	  only	  two	  specific	  
geographic	  areas,	  being	  the	  4	  instances	  he	  spoke	  about	  the	  ‘Cape	  Provincial	  Division’	  (J-­‐CSA27a,	  
b;	  J-­‐CSA31;	  J-­‐CSA32)	  and	  the	  one	  time	  he	  referred	  to	  someone	  being	  a	  judge	  ‘in	  the	  
Witwatersrand’	  (J-­‐CSA78).	  This	  follows	  the	  trend	  of	  the	  curiously	  dislocated	  fashion	  of	  
representing	  legal	  professionals,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  but	  it	  also	  points	  to	  how	  certain	  areas	  of	  
activity	  –	  the	  legal	  centres	  in	  Cape	  Town	  and	  Johannesburg,	  in	  this	  instance	  –	  could	  attain	  a	  
certain	  pre-­‐eminence.	  The	  remaining	  6	  extracts	  specifying	  the	  location	  of	  judges	  placed	  judges	  
in	  5	  different	  types	  of	  space:	  A	  space	  of	  socializing	  and	  recreation	  (J-­‐CSA4b);	  of	  ‘sabbatical	  
work’	  at	  a	  university	  (J-­‐CSA14a);	  of	  ‘workshops’	  with	  other	  stakeholders	  (J-­‐CSA50);	  at	  the	  
‘swearing	  in	  ceremony’	  of	  President	  Mandela	  (J-­‐CSA55b);	  and	  in	  the	  interviewee’s	  chair	  before	  
the	  JSC	  (J-­‐CSA75d;	  J-­‐CSA76c).	  	  
3.2.3	   Social	  actors	  	  
Judges	  	  
Judges	  were	  represented	  as	  overwhelmingly,	  in	  fact	  almost	  exclusively,	  male.	  The	  sources	  of	  
these	  representations	  were	  two-­‐fold:	  Extracts	  in	  which	  pronoun	  usage	  determined	  whether	  the	  
lecturer	  was	  talking	  about	  a	  male	  or	  female	  person,	  and	  nominations.	  There	  were	  26	  extracts	  in	  
which	  the	  judge	  was	  classified	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  gender.	  In	  25	  of	  these	  (96%)	  judges	  were	  
classified	  as	  male	  (J-­‐SAct6,	  7,	  9b,	  10a,	  14b,	  21a,	  22a,	  23a,	  26a,	  27a,	  32,	  33,	  34c,	  35a,	  36a,	  38a,	  
39a,	  41,	  43a,	  46,	  52a,	  53c,	  62b,	  65,	  and	  72),	  and	  in	  the	  only	  other	  extract,	  the	  classification	  was	  
gender	  inclusive	  (J-­‐SAct17).	  Even	  here,	  the	  inclusion	  of	  the	  female	  appears	  to	  be	  an	  
afterthought	  for	  the	  lecturer	  states:	  ‘when	  the	  judge	  sits	  in	  the	  court	  he	  does	  he	  does	  he	  or	  she	  
doesn’t	  decide	  …’.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  lecturer	  first	  mentions	  ‘he’	  and	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  he	  
then	  seems	  to	  stumble	  over	  the	  pronoun	  justifies	  this	  interpretation.	  Within	  this	  group	  of	  26	  
extracts,	  the	  overwhelming	  male	  classification	  of	  judges	  arose	  from	  a	  very	  limited	  range	  of	  




‘his’	  (27	  instances),	  ‘him’	  (9	  instances)	  and	  the	  nouns	  ‘brother’	  (4	  instances)	  and	  ‘guy’	  (1	  
instance).	  	  
As	  with	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  lawyer,	  articled	  clerk,	  attorney	  and	  the	  advocate	  (to	  a	  lesser	  extent,	  at	  
least	  as	  far	  as	  class	  is	  concerned),	  classification	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  race	  and	  class	  was	  far	  subtler.	  
There	  were	  only	  three	  extracts	  within	  the	  79	  judge	  quotations	  pertaining	  to	  racial	  classification	  
(J-­‐SAct12a;	  J-­‐SAct14e	  and	  J-­‐SAct57a)	  and	  2	  pertaining	  to	  class	  (J-­‐SAct53a	  and	  J-­‐SAct79).	  In	  his	  
racial	  classification	  of	  judges,	  the	  lecturer	  hints	  at,	  but	  does	  not	  explore	  the	  racial	  tensions	  
involved	  in	  the	  shift	  from	  the	  old,	  white	  (male)	  judicial	  guard	  to	  a	  bench	  that	  is	  more	  
demographically	  representative.	  The	  unquestioned	  point	  of	  departure	  is	  that	  judges	  of	  the	  
apartheid	  regime	  were	  ‘of	  course	  white’	  (J-­‐SAct57a).	  The	  seemingly	  unquestionable	  meaning	  
that	  flows	  from	  this	  is	  the	  need	  for	  transformation,	  which	  underlies	  the	  lecturer’s	  anecdote	  on	  
the	  ‘slight’	  controversy	  that	  arose	  when	  President	  Mandela	  made	  it	  known	  to	  the	  JSC	  that	  his	  
preference	  for	  the	  post	  of	  chief	  justice	  was	  not	  the	  ‘white	  old	  judge	  from	  the	  old	  dispensation’,	  
Judge	  Hefer,	  but	  rather	  Justice	  Mohamed	  (J-­‐SAct12a).	  This	  move	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  President	  
was	  controversial	  because	  it	  violated	  the	  doctrine	  of	  the	  separation	  of	  powers	  whereby	  
members	  of	  the	  executive	  should	  not	  be	  overly	  involved	  in	  the	  appointment	  of	  judicial	  officers	  
as	  such	  officers	  play	  a	  key	  role	  in	  checking	  the	  executive’s	  powers	  and	  keeping	  it	  within	  the	  
bounds	  of	  a	  human	  rights	  framework.	  The	  lecturer’s	  interesting	  qualification	  of	  this	  controversy	  
as	  ‘slight’	  however,	  represents	  (but	  also	  re-­‐constitutes)	  a	  consensus	  that	  the	  appointment	  of	  a	  
‘white	  old	  judge	  from	  the	  old	  dispensation’	  as	  the	  first	  chief	  justice	  of	  the	  newly	  elected	  
democratic	  regime	  would	  have	  been	  untenable.	  The	  unquestioned	  need	  for	  transformation	  is	  
also	  mirrored	  in	  the	  lecturer’s	  discussion	  around	  ‘old’	  and	  ‘new’	  judges	  at	  J-­‐SAct70b	  and	  c.	  
However,	  further	  than	  this,	  the	  considerable	  racial	  tensions	  involved	  in	  the	  transformation	  of	  
the	  judiciary,	  which	  incorporate	  debates	  around	  the	  appropriate	  skilling	  and	  experience	  of	  
judicial	  candidates	  and	  the	  efficiency	  of	  the	  courts	  amongst	  others,	  did	  not	  feature	  at	  all.89	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89	  Despite	  the	  need	  for,	  and	  carrying	  through	  of	  transformational	  objectives	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  judiciary	  I	  found	  it	  
interesting	  that	  when	  the	  lecturer	  asked	  the	  class	  to	  name	  the	  then	  (and	  still	  current)	  deputy	  chief	  justice	  of	  the	  
Constitutional	  Court,	  Justice	  Dikgang	  Moseneke,	  the	  class	  –	  who	  comprised	  an	  even	  mix	  of	  white	  students	  and	  
students	  of	  colour	  –	  could	  only	  recall	  the	  names	  of	  white,	  male	  judges	  (J-­‐SAct14e),	  as	  is	  evident	  when	  one	  
considers	  quotation	  14	  of	  the	  ‘judge’	  set	  of	  quotations:	  ‘Pius	  Langa,	  you	  should	  all	  know	  this	  ne?	  Who’s	  the	  deputy	  




The	  two	  extracts	  pertaining	  to	  class,	  implied	  that	  judges	  are	  of	  the	  upper	  crust.	  This	  included	  
specific	  reference	  to	  monetary	  wealth	  as	  well	  as	  reference	  to	  the	  more	  implicit	  indicia	  of	  the	  
effects	  of	  wealth,	  such	  as	  having	  a	  good	  education	  and	  speaking	  in	  ‘very	  civilized’	  tones	  (J-­‐
SAct53a).	  More	  explicitly,	  judges’	  positioning	  in	  the	  upper	  classes	  can	  be	  inferred	  from	  the	  fact	  
that	  they	  are	  generally	  appointed	  from	  the	  ranks	  of	  the	  best	  senior	  advocates	  (J-­‐SAct79).	  
Because	  of	  the	  great	  disparity	  between	  the	  advocate’s	  income	  and	  the	  salary	  of	  a	  judge,	  which	  
is	  paid	  by	  the	  State,	  judges	  must	  be	  ‘very	  comfortable’	  and	  become	  a	  judge	  as	  a	  ‘kind	  of	  
retirement’	  (J-­‐SAct79).	  	  
There	  were	  many	  instances	  in	  which	  judges	  were	  specifically	  nominated,	  30	  in	  all,	  comprising	  
reference	  to	  24	  judges	  in	  both	  the	  current	  and	  previous	  regimes	  (see	  table	  2).	  	  
Judge/Justice’s	  
Surname	  
Extract	   Gender	  (M,	  F)	   Race	  (W,	  
NW)	  
Cameron	   J-­‐SAct14c;	  76	  	   M	   W	  
Chaskalson	  	   J-­‐SAct14d;	  50	   M	   W	  
Corbett	   J-­‐SAct12c;	  55b	   M	   W	  
Buchanan	   J-­‐SAct37b	   M	   W	  
De	  Villiers	   J-­‐SAct37c	   M	   W	  
Eloff	  	   J-­‐SAct66	   M	   W	  
Foxcroft	   J-­‐SAct31b;	  34b;	  
53b	  
M	   W	  
Hefer	  	   J-­‐SAct12d	   M	   W	  
Hoexter	   J-­‐SAct59	   M	   W	  
Jones	   J-­‐SAct38b	   M	   W	  
Kentridge	   J-­‐SAct12d	   M	   W	  
King	   J-­‐SAct31a;	  34a	   M	   W	  
Langa	   J-­‐SAct14a	   M	   NW	  
Lewis	   J-­‐SAct78b	   F	   W	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Wits,	  he’s	  doing	  sabbatical	  work,	  he’s	  also	  the	  chancellor	  of	  this	  university	  ….	  [Student:	  Edwin	  Cameron	  I	  think	  it	  is	  
-­‐	  other	  students	  murmur	  their	  disagreement	  or	  assent]	  Ooohh	  Edwin	  is	  the	  chairman	  of	  the	  council,	  who	  is	  the	  
chancellor	  [Student	  6:	  Chaskalson]	  No	  no	  Chaskalson	  is	  long	  retired,	  we	  long	  forget	  about	  Chaskalson.	  Who	  is	  the	  
chancellor	  of	  the	  university	  of	  the	  Witwatersrand?	  [Another	  student	  attempts	  an	  answer	  but	  L	  already	  starts	  
whistling	  incredulously]	  Ladies	  and	  gentlemen,	  I	  am	  going	  to	  kill	  myself	  [class	  laughs]	  I	  give	  you	  a	  hundred	  bucks	  if	  
you	  can	  tell	  me.	  [Student:	  Is	  it	  a	  contract?]	  [Class	  laughs]	  It’s	  a	  verbal	  contract,	  ja	  [more	  students	  laugh]	  [One	  other	  
student	  attempts	  to	  answer]	  Justice?	  What?	  ….Does	  anybody	  know?	  [slight	  pause]	  Have	  you	  ever	  heard	  of	  Justice	  
Dikgang	  Moseneke?	  [cries	  of	  ‘oh’	  from	  class	  and	  chatter]	  Oh	  yes	  of	  course	  Dikgang	  ja	  ja	  ja	  ja	  ja	  [imitates	  class]’	  
There	  is	  not	  enough	  evidence	  to	  draw	  an	  inference	  that	  such	  students	  had	  already	  clothed	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  judge	  
with	  meanings	  of	  white-­‐ness	  and	  male-­‐ness,	  perhaps	  through	  their	  socialization	  pre-­‐law	  school.	  But	  that	  they	  only	  
knew	  the	  names	  of	  white,	  male	  judges	  raises	  the	  question	  whether	  their	  expectations	  around	  the	  identity	  of	  a	  
judge;	  i.e.	  that	  the	  judge	  will	  be	  white	  and	  male,	  mould	  their	  way	  of	  perceiving	  the	  world,	  such	  that	  the	  names	  of	  




Mohammed	   J-­‐SAct12b	   M	   NW	  
Moseneke	   J-­‐SAct14f	   M	   NW	  
Murrans	   J-­‐SAct38c	   M	   W	  
Ogilvie	  Thompson	   J-­‐SAct35c	   M	   W	  
Reitz	   J-­‐SAct37a	   M	   W	  
Roelf	   J-­‐SAct35b	   M	   W	  
Sachs	   J-­‐SAct61a	   M	   W	  
Sackswell	  (sic)	   J-­‐SAct77a	   F	   W	  
Schreiner	   J-­‐SAct54a;	  58a	   M	   W	  
Solomon	   J-­‐SAct45c	   M	   W	  
	  
	  Table	  2:	  Judges	  nominated	  in	  extracts	  pertaining	  to	  the	  ‘judge’	  (M=Male;	  F=Female;	  W=White;	  NW=Non-­‐White).	  
The	  nomination	  of	  judges,	  as	  can	  be	  seen	  from	  the	  table	  above,	  underscored	  the	  predominantly	  
male	  and	  white	  face	  of	  the	  judiciary	  in	  the	  lecturer’s	  representations:	  A	  total	  of	  22	  of	  the	  24	  
nominated	  judges	  were	  male	  (92%);	  whilst	  23	  were	  white	  (88%).	  It	  is	  also	  interesting	  that	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  one	  of	  the	  only	  two	  nominated	  female	  judges	  –	  the	  reference	  to	  Kathy	  ‘Sackswell’	  –	  the	  
lecturer	  was	  unable	  to	  remember	  her	  correct	  surname,	  which	  is	  ‘Satchwell’.	  It	  could	  be	  argued,	  
however,	  that	  students	  who	  simply	  hear	  the	  names	  of	  these	  judges	  do	  not	  have	  the	  contextual	  
knowledge	  to	  associate	  them	  with	  gender	  and	  racial	  categories.	  This	  is	  true,	  but	  in	  numerous	  
instances	  contextual	  references	  in	  the	  text	  would	  have	  alerted	  students	  to	  such	  classification	  
(particularly	  through	  pronoun	  usage).	  Furthermore,	  race	  (and	  even	  ethnicity)	  can	  be	  inferred	  
from	  a	  person’s	  surname.	  Thus	  ‘Mohammed’	  and	  ‘Moseneke’	  are	  both	  immediately	  evident	  as	  
Indian	  and	  African	  surnames.	  	  	  
Apart	  from	  gender,	  racial	  and	  class	  classifications,	  judges	  were	  categorized	  in	  at	  least	  four	  other	  
ways.	  In	  addition	  to	  categorizations	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  employment	  (‘acting’	  as	  opposed	  to	  ‘full	  
judges	  –	  see	  J-­‐SAct30a,	  b)	  ethnicity	  and	  ideology	  (‘English	  liberal’	  as	  opposed	  to	  ‘Afrikaner	  
professional’	  judges	  –	  see	  J-­‐SAct57b)	  which	  were	  associated	  with	  only	  one	  extract	  each,	  judges	  
were	  characterized	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  brilliance,	  intelligence	  and	  even	  eccentricity,	  
characteristics	  which	  went	  together	  in	  making	  judges	  ‘wonderful’	  (J-­‐SAct45a;	  J-­‐SAct54b;	  J-­‐
SAct58b).	  The	  other	  more	  prominent	  form	  of	  categorization	  related	  to	  age:	  Judges	  are	  ‘old’	  (J-­‐






In	  the	  judge	  set	  of	  quotations,	  the	  parties	  who	  appear	  before	  the	  judge	  were	  backgrounded	  (21	  
extracts,	  or	  52,5%)	  slightly	  more	  than	  they	  were	  included	  (19	  extracts,	  or	  47,5%).	  Backgrounded	  
social	  actors	  were	  excluded	  from	  the	  social	  action	  by	  the	  same	  order	  of	  discursive	  resources	  
that	  functioned	  to	  background	  ‘clients’	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  other	  roles	  thus	  far	  considered.	  Thus	  a	  
judge	  must	  decide	  and	  solve	  the	  ‘problem’	  (J-­‐SAct18);	  he	  must	  make	  a	  decision	  on	  a	  set	  of	  
‘facts’	  (J-­‐SAct27a)	  which	  tend	  to	  refer	  to	  legally-­‐recognized	  institutions	  such	  as	  ‘marriage’	  (J-­‐
SAct8;	  J-­‐SAct11a)	  or	  ‘human	  rights’	  (J-­‐SAct57c)	  rather	  than	  the	  parties	  themselves;	  he	  sits	  in	  
judgment	  on	  or	  considers	  the	  ‘matter’	  (J-­‐SAct4a;	  J-­‐SAct4d;	  J-­‐SAct62b)	  and	  hears	  the	  two	  ‘sides’	  	  
(J-­‐SAct36b);	  and	  he	  decides,	  judges,	  considers	  or	  even	  throws	  out	  the	  ‘case’	  (J-­‐SAct21b;	  J-­‐
SAct22b;	  J-­‐SAct23b;	  J-­‐SAct25;	  J-­‐SAct26b;	  J-­‐SAct27b;	  J-­‐SAct35d;	  J-­‐SAct39b;	  J-­‐SAct43a;	  J-­‐SAct43b;	  
J-­‐SAct49;	  J-­‐SAct54c;	  J-­‐SAct70a;	  J-­‐SAct71;	  J-­‐SAct72).	  One	  of	  the	  interesting	  shifts	  that	  the	  use	  of	  
such	  discursive	  resources	  facilitates	  is	  that	  the	  judge	  can	  appear	  as	  the	  author	  or	  creator	  of	  a	  
case.	  Instructing	  his	  students	  to	  read	  a	  particular	  case,	  for	  instance,	  the	  lecturer	  adds	  ‘[i]t	  is	  a	  
case	  by	  the	  wonderful	  and	  very	  eccentric	  and	  very	  learned	  …	  judge	  of	  appeal	  Solomon’	  (J-­‐
SAct45b,	  my	  emphasis).	  The	  emphasis	  in	  this	  particular	  representation	  falls	  fully	  on	  the	  creative	  
power	  of	  the	  judge	  who	  has	  artfully	  woven	  the	  dispute	  before	  him	  into	  recognized	  legal	  
categories.	  	  
Where	  the	  parties	  were	  included	  in	  the	  social	  action,	  in	  a	  couple	  of	  instances	  reference	  to	  them	  
was	  generic	  (see	  the	  reference	  to	  ‘others’	  at	  J-­‐SAct2;	  ‘these	  people’s’	  marriage	  at	  J-­‐SAct10b;	  
and	  ‘parties’	  at	  J-­‐SAct69),	  and	  in	  one	  instance	  it	  was	  personal;	  i.e.	  the	  lecturer	  located	  students	  
in	  the	  position	  of	  being	  a	  party	  before	  a	  judge	  (see	  the	  use	  of	  the	  pronoun	  ‘you’	  at	  J-­‐SAct3).	  In	  
the	  remainder	  of	  instances,	  however,	  the	  lecturer	  included	  specific	  groups	  of	  people	  in	  the	  
social	  action.	  What	  is	  interesting	  is	  that	  at	  least	  three-­‐quarters	  of	  these	  specific	  references	  
pointed	  towards	  groups	  that	  are	  (or	  were	  in	  the	  recent	  past),	  commonly	  regarded	  as	  
marginalized	  in	  society:	  Sadomasochistic	  homosexuals	  (J-­‐SAct4b,	  c)	  or	  homosexuals	  more	  
generally	  (J-­‐SAct11b);	  prisoners	  (J-­‐SAct13b;	  J-­‐SAct53d);	  female	  rape	  victims	  (J-­‐SAct40;	  J-­‐
SAct41b);	  women	  with	  many	  children	  whose	  husbands	  fail	  to	  pay	  maintenance	  (J-­‐SAct52b);	  and	  




presented	  as	  being	  somewhat	  irrational	  and/or	  lacking	  in	  ethical	  motivation	  –	  people	  who	  get	  
married	  in	  submarines	  (J-­‐SAct5a,	  b)	  and	  then	  later	  say	  ‘”Ja,	  but	  we	  also	  got	  married	  in	  strange	  
places	  and	  we	  are	  now	  also	  tired	  of	  our	  spouses	  and	  …	  we	  also	  want	  it	  null	  and	  void’	  (J-­‐SAct10a,	  
b).	  It	  is	  interesting	  that	  the	  included	  parties	  come	  from	  such	  marginalized	  groups	  and	  that	  there	  
is	  not	  a	  single	  inclusion	  of,	  for	  instance,	  powerful	  commercial	  entities	  or	  the	  State	  as	  parties	  
before	  the	  judge.	  Such	  actors	  could	  account	  for	  a	  significant	  proportion	  of	  the	  civil	  work	  before	  
a	  judge.	  Reference	  to	  rape	  victims,	  molested	  children,	  prisoners	  and	  so	  on,	  however,	  places	  the	  
power	  of	  the	  judge	  in	  sharper	  relief.	  	  	  
3.2.4	   Values	  	  
There	  were	  almost	  an	  equivalent	  number	  of	  extracts	  within	  the	  judge	  set	  of	  quotations	  relating	  
to	  evaluations	  of	  judges	  themselves	  (34	  extracts)	  and	  of	  their	  work	  (33	  extracts).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  
the	  latter,	  27	  extracts	  related	  to	  the	  internal	  goods	  (82%)	  and	  six	  to	  the	  external	  goods	  (18%)	  of	  
the	  practice	  respectively.	  	  Similarly	  to	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  lawyer,	  articled	  clerk,	  attorney	  and	  
advocate,	  the	  form	  in	  which	  valuations	  occurred	  was	  mainly	  through	  moral	  evaluation	  (55	  
extracts	  –	  77,5%).	  Another	  16	  extracts	  were	  equally	  divided	  between	  references	  to	  authority	  
and	  purposive	  constructions	  and	  there	  was	  one	  instance	  of	  mythopoesis.	  	  
Unlike	  the	  other	  legal	  professional	  roles	  considered	  thus	  far,	  a	  little	  more	  than	  half	  of	  the	  
valuations	  (19	  extracts,	  or	  55%)	  relating	  to	  judges	  themselves	  were	  positive,	  rather	  than	  
negative.	  The	  most	  prominent	  theme	  emerging	  from	  these	  extracts	  was	  that	  the	  judiciary	  is	  an	  
elite	  meritocracy.	  Judges	  are	  appointed	  from	  the	  select	  class	  of	  the	  ‘best	  senior	  advocates’	  (J-­‐
V75),	  they	  are	  the	  ‘best	  of	  the	  best’	  (J-­‐V63),	  the	  ‘best	  brains	  in	  the	  business	  …	  And	  usually	  they	  
are	  highly	  intelligent	  and	  very	  very	  good	  lawyers’	  (J-­‐V29a,	  see	  also	  J-­‐V20;	  J-­‐V30;	  J-­‐V77).	  A	  
relational	  clause	  explicitly	  links	  the	  courts	  to	  a	  meritocracy:	  ‘A	  court	  is	  um	  uh	  a	  court	  is	  a	  
meritocracy,	  it	  is	  something	  that	  is	  based	  on	  merit,	  it’s	  based	  on	  on	  um	  professionalism’	  (J-­‐V46).	  
At	  other	  points	  the	  word	  ‘judge’	  is	  collocated	  with	  terms	  such	  as	  	  ‘wisdom’	  (J-­‐V42);	  ‘sterling’	  (J-­‐
V57a);	  ‘luminary’	  (J-­‐V66);	  ‘expert’	  and	  ‘knows	  everything’	  (J-­‐V72b).	  At	  a	  few	  points	  the	  
lecturer’s	  esteem	  for	  the	  judge	  elite	  bubbles	  over	  in	  glowing	  praise	  for	  specific	  judges:	  There	  is	  




the	  of	  the	  bright	  lights	  of	  the	  1920	  …	  appellate	  division.	  A	  brilliant,	  brilliant	  jurist’	  (J-­‐V45);	  the	  
‘brilliant’,	  ‘intelligent’	  and	  ‘wonderful’	  Oliver	  Schreiner	  who	  was	  a	  ‘true	  blue	  lawyer	  …	  one	  of	  
the	  greats’	  (J-­‐V54;	  J-­‐V58)	  and	  the	  ‘brilliant’	  Carole	  Lewis’	  (J-­‐V78b).	  The	  last	  of	  these	  extracts	  
provides	  a	  clue	  to	  the	  connotations	  of	  the	  lecturer’s	  use	  of	  ‘brilliant’	  because	  in	  its	  broader	  
context	  he	  makes	  the	  point	  that	  she	  was	  formerly	  an	  academic	  and	  her	  judgments	  are	  ‘better	  
theoretically-­‐founded’	  than	  those	  of	  her	  colleagues	  on	  the	  bench.	  The	  lecturer’s	  high	  esteem	  of	  
things	  academic,	  and	  the	  intellect	  more	  generally,	  also	  comes	  through	  when	  he	  values	  Justice	  
Dikgang	  Moseneke	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  he	  is	  the	  chancellor	  of	  Wits	  University	  (J-­‐V14).	  	  
The	  elite	  status	  of	  judges	  is	  not	  only	  expressly	  described	  in	  these	  terms,	  it	  is	  also	  communicated	  
via	  the	  language	  used	  to	  describe	  the	  courts:	  Judges	  occupy	  the	  ‘higher’	  and	  ‘highest’	  courts	  (J-­‐
V24;	  J-­‐V26a;	  J-­‐V28;	  J-­‐V49),	  while	  magistrates	  occupy	  the	  ‘lower’	  courts.	  The	  higher/lower	  
dichotomy	  used	  to	  describe	  the	  courts	  serves	  to	  reinforce	  the	  hierarchical	  impression	  of	  the	  
legal	  profession.	  	  
In	  four	  instances,	  the	  lecturer’s	  evaluation	  of	  judges	  themselves	  was	  ambiguous.	  Three	  of	  these	  
four	  instances	  related	  to	  judges	  currently	  serving	  on	  either	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  or	  
Constitutional	  Court	  bench.	  In	  all	  three	  cases,	  the	  lecturer	  expressly	  indicated	  a	  basis	  for	  
esteeming	  the	  judge	  and	  then	  subtly	  suggested	  a	  basis	  for	  critique.	  Thus,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Justice	  
Albie	  Sachs	  the	  lecturer	  stated,	  ‘[a]lthough	  he	  practiced	  for	  a	  very	  limited	  matter,	  very	  limited	  
matter	  in	  Mozambique,	  and	  the	  neighbouring	  countries,	  and	  he	  is	  a	  qualified	  lawyer	  um	  he	  is	  
he	  was	  appointed	  because	  of	  his	  role	  in	  the	  struggle,	  because	  of	  the	  sacrifices	  that	  he	  has	  made	  
and	  because	  of	  his	  passion	  for	  human	  rights’	  (J-­‐V62).	  This	  statement,	  while	  valuing	  Justice	  
Sach’s	  commitment	  to	  and	  passion	  for	  human	  rights	  tends	  to	  suggest	  that	  he	  was	  not	  
appointed	  to	  the	  bench	  because	  of	  the	  depth	  of	  his	  expertise	  as	  a	  lawyer	  –	  since	  he	  only	  
practiced	  for	  ‘a	  very	  limited	  matter	  in	  Mozambique.	  Similarly,	  while	  praising	  Justice	  Cameron	  as	  
a	  ‘very	  courageous	  person’	  in	  the	  context	  of	  his	  admitting	  to	  the	  Judicial	  Service	  Commission	  
that	  he	  was	  HIV-­‐positive,	  he	  hints	  at	  questioning	  the	  meaning	  ascribed	  to	  this	  act	  –	  ‘everybody	  
was	  asking	  whether	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  do	  that	  or	  was	  it	  very	  courageous	  to	  do	  it.	  Well	  I	  don’t	  
know	  you	  must	  maar	  decide	  for	  yourself’	  (J-­‐V76).	  And	  Judge	  Hefer	  who	  ‘wasn’t	  a	  bad	  judge,	  he	  




dispensation’	  (J-­‐V12b).	  In	  this	  instance	  the	  qualifiers	  ‘white’	  and	  ‘old’	  convey	  a	  negative	  
valuation.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  lecturer’s	  veiled	  critique	  of	  sitting	  judges,	  his	  valuation	  of	  judges	  
who	  served	  in	  the	  past	  is	  almost	  always	  extremely	  positive,	  as	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  references	  to	  
judges	  Solomon,	  Schreiner	  and	  the	  ‘luminary’	  Judge	  Eloff.	  	  
These	  veiled	  criticisms	  of	  sitting	  judges	  are	  suggestive	  of	  an	  ambiguity	  within	  the	  lecturer	  
toward	  their	  elite	  status.	  His	  enthusiasm	  for	  them	  is	  neither	  whole-­‐hearted	  nor	  unqualified,	  as	  
his	  negative	  evaluations	  evince.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  interesting	  of	  these	  occurred	  through	  the	  
strategic	  use	  of	  wry	  laughter,	  in	  the	  following	  extract:	  	  
LECTURER:	  Uh	  and	  the	  Judicial	  Services	  Committee	  consists	  of	  a	  wide	  spectrum	  of	  people	  
involved	  in	  the	  legal	  world.	  And	  it’s	  a	  huge	  panel	  consisting	  of	  the	  Minister	  of	  Justice,	  other	  law	  
lords	  [laughs	  wryly]	  hmm	  other	  law	  lords,	  other	  justices,	  the	  chief	  justice,	  ummm	  even	  a	  
representative	  from	  the	  magistrates’	  commission.	  
In	  addition	  to	  judges	  being	  devalued	  because	  of	  their	  over-­‐concern	  for	  procedural	  
correctness,90	  and	  their	  failure	  to	  uphold	  human	  rights	  (J-­‐V55;	  J-­‐V57b)	  they	  were	  also	  devalued	  
for	  being	  overly	  verbose	  (J-­‐V29b;	  J-­‐V33);	  they	  ‘cannot	  keep	  [their]	  mouth[s]	  shut’	  about	  things	  
(J-­‐V39b))	  and	  for	  failing	  to	  properly	  develop	  Roman-­‐Dutch	  law.	  Talking	  of	  the	  student’s	  case	  
assignment,	  which	  was	  in	  the	  lecturer’s	  particular	  area	  of	  expertise	  of	  unjustified	  enrichment,	  
he	  points	  out	  that	  it	  was	  a	  split	  decision	  regarding	  whether	  a	  general	  enrichment	  action	  should	  
be	  introduced	  into	  South	  African	  law	  ‘[a]nd	  by	  just	  missing	  it	  with	  one	  judge,	  the	  South	  African	  
legal	  science	  was	  put	  back	  thirty,	  forty	  now	  going	  on	  fifty	  years’	  (J-­‐V35).	  In	  addition	  to	  putting	  
South	  African	  legal	  science	  ‘back’,	  the	  judges	  have	  ‘taken	  out’	  many	  pieces	  of	  Roman	  law.	  The	  
reason,	  the	  lecturer	  suggests,	  is	  that	  ‘they’ve	  [the	  pieces	  of	  Roman-­‐Dutch	  law]	  just	  become	  
anachronistic’,	  but	  he	  then	  follows	  this	  with	  an	  immediate	  ad	  hominen	  argument	  ‘or	  not,	  the	  
judges	  perhaps	  are	  just	  a	  little	  bit	  stupid’	  (J-­‐V44).	  	  
The	  lecturer	  represented	  a	  diverse	  range	  of	  goods	  internal	  to	  judges’	  work.	  These	  included	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90	  This	  is	  a	  tricky	  basis	  for	  devaluation	  because	  in	  other	  contexts	  it	  is	  also	  presented	  as	  an	  internal	  good	  (see	  
paragraph	  below).	  This	  points	  to	  a	  tension	  in	  the	  lecturer’s	  representations	  regarding	  ‘professional	  values’	  such	  as	  
procedural	  correctness,	  and	  lay	  perceptions	  of	  the	  values	  that	  the	  administration	  of	  justice	  should	  deliver,	  such	  as	  
appropriate	  punishment	  for	  those	  who	  break	  the	  law.	  This	  is	  a	  tension	  evident	  in	  the	  data	  that	  is	  left	  unresolved.	  I	  
discuss	  this	  phenomenon	  in	  greater	  detail	  in	  the	  section	  dealing	  with	  the	  magistrate,	  and	  the	  case	  of	  the	  man	  who	  




upholding	  of	  Constitutional	  values	  (J-­‐V11;	  J-­‐V13;	  J-­‐V41;	  J-­‐V48a;	  J-­‐V50),	  the	  importance	  of	  
representing	  society	  on	  the	  bench	  (J-­‐V10d;	  J-­‐V78a),	  the	  value	  of	  acting	  objectively,	  impartially	  
(J-­‐V2;	  J-­‐V4;	  J-­‐V61;	  J-­‐V74)	  and	  rationally	  (J-­‐V26b;	  J-­‐V36;	  J-­‐V39);	  the	  promotion	  of	  legal	  certainty	  
(J-­‐V6a;	  J-­‐V6b;	  J-­‐V7;	  J-­‐V9;	  J-­‐V10a;	  J-­‐V10b;	  J-­‐V10c;	  J-­‐V11;	  J-­‐V26c)	  and	  the	  upholding	  of	  procedural	  
correctness	  (J-­‐V52b;	  J-­‐V53;	  J-­‐V71;	  J-­‐V72).	  The	  most	  prominent	  of	  these	  –	  the	  upholding	  of	  
Constitutional	  values	  and	  the	  promotion	  of	  legal	  certainty	  –	  were	  represented	  as	  existing	  in	  a	  
certain	  degree	  of	  tension.	  On	  the	  one	  hand	  legal	  certainty	  ‘is	  very	  very	  important.	  Your	  society	  
is	  based	  on	  legal	  certainty.	  If	  you	  have	  a	  society	  where	  there’s	  no	  legal	  certainty	  …	  then	  you	  live	  
in	  chaos’	  (J-­‐V6a).	  For	  this	  reason	  a	  judge	  should	  always	  favour	  the	  interpretation	  that	  gives	  the	  
greater	  legal	  certainty’	  (J-­‐V10a),	  the	  change	  that	  will	  result	  in	  the	  ‘minimum	  change	  in	  society’	  
(J-­‐V10c).	  This	  is	  underscored	  with	  an	  if-­‐then	  construction:	  ‘If	  you	  judge	  a	  case	  …	  you	  must	  avoid	  
creating	  chaos’	  (J-­‐SA10d).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  in	  South	  Africa	  the	  Constitution	  has	  a	  specific	  
transformational	  agenda	  that	  requires	  discarding	  certain	  laws	  if	  they	  fail	  to	  meet	  the	  test	  of	  
constitutionality.	  In	  instances	  where	  the	  constitutionality	  of	  a	  law	  is	  at	  stake,	  judges	  are	  
required	  to	  lead	  change	  and	  to	  take	  decisions	  that	  may	  result	  in	  far-­‐reaching	  change.	  Thus	  the	  
lecturer	  represents	  judges	  taking	  decisions	  allowing	  same-­‐sex	  marriages	  to	  take	  place	  (J-­‐V11),	  
disallowing	  forced	  confessions	  (J-­‐V13),	  and	  discarding	  the	  cautionary	  rule	  regarding	  a	  rape	  
victim’s	  evidence	  (J-­‐V41).	  In	  all	  these	  instances,	  the	  Constitution	  legitimates	  the	  social	  change	  –	  
‘the	  Constitution	  is	  an	  overwhelming	  authority.	  So	  you	  can’t	  go	  against	  the	  Constitution’	  (J-­‐
V11).	  It	  thus	  tended	  to	  be	  invoked	  in	  quite	  a	  positivistic	  sense;	  i.e.	  instead	  of	  exploring	  the	  
bases	  of	  the	  values	  enshrined	  in	  the	  Constitution,	  the	  overriding	  value	  involved	  is	  that	  of	  
accepting	  legal	  authority.	  	  
Although	  the	  lecturer	  spoke	  only	  twice	  about	  judges	  being	  the	  representative	  of	  society	  on	  the	  
bench	  in	  one	  instance	  it	  was	  invoked,	  via	  a	  relational	  clause,	  in	  a	  definitional	  sense;	  i.e.	  the	  
judge	  is	  ‘the	  representative	  of	  society	  on	  the	  bench’	  (J-­‐V10d).	  
The	  external	  rewards	  of	  the	  judge	  centred	  around	  two	  themes:	  Material	  rewards	  and	  status.	  
The	  lecturer’s	  representations	  around	  the	  material	  rewards	  judges	  receive	  were	  muted:	  They	  
get	  a	  ‘government	  car’,	  for	  instance	  (J-­‐V74b)	  but	  the	  salary	  they	  receive	  –	  a	  newly-­‐appointed	  




is	  a	  step	  down	  from	  the	  earning	  capacity	  of	  the	  best	  senior	  advocates,	  but	  an	  annual	  salary	  of	  
six	  to	  seven	  hundred	  thousand	  a	  year	  would	  still	  places	  judges	  amongst	  the	  top	  earners	  in	  
South	  African	  society.	  The	  lecturer’s	  representation	  of	  the	  judge’s	  material	  rewards	  thus	  
reinforces	  the	  value	  of	  pursuing	  high	  or	  significant	  material	  rewards.	  	  
All	  the	  other	  extracts	  relating	  to	  external	  goods	  were	  associated	  with	  status	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  
lecturer	  emphasizing	  that	  particular	  judges	  were	  ‘chief	  justices’	  or	  ‘judge	  presidents’,	  i.e.	  those	  
who	  have	  been	  appointed	  to	  the	  highest	  position,	  either	  within	  a	  particular	  division	  or	  in	  South	  
Africa	  as	  a	  whole	  (J-­‐V31;	  J-­‐V32;	  J-­‐V37;	  J-­‐V38).	  The	  lecturer’s	  consistent	  indexing	  of	  this	  fact	  
constituted	  rank	  amongst	  judges	  as	  significant	  and	  therefore	  something	  to	  be	  valued.	  	  
3.2.5	   Summary	  	  
The	  passive	  and	  transactive	  forms	  of	  power	  which	  judges	  initially	  exercise	  in	  hearing	  a	  case	  
belie	  the	  extensive	  range	  of	  powers	  they	  actively	  exercise	  over	  the	  parties	  involved	  in	  a	  dispute	  
and,	  through	  their	  adjudication	  of	  such	  dispute,	  over	  their	  colleagues,	  the	  legal	  professionals	  
involved	  in	  the	  case,	  the	  law	  itself	  and	  ultimate	  outcomes.	  The	  power	  they	  exercise	  over	  the	  
parties	  before	  them	  involves	  much	  more	  than	  a	  resolution	  of	  the	  dispute,	  because	  it	  
simultaneously	  involves	  categorization	  in	  terms	  of	  legal	  categories	  that	  potentially	  carry	  
significant	  losses	  for	  or	  at	  least	  a	  change	  in	  social	  status.	  Their	  power	  over	  the	  legal	  
professionals	  involved	  in	  the	  case	  can	  be	  exercised	  during	  the	  trial	  or	  at	  the	  end	  of	  it.	  The	  
choices	  they	  make	  regarding	  which	  legal	  authorities	  to	  follow	  at	  the	  same	  time	  pick	  winners	  
and	  losers	  from	  amongst	  the	  precedents	  already	  determined	  by	  colleagues	  in	  courts	  of	  the	  
same	  or	  lower	  ranking.	  They	  possess	  both	  a	  constructive	  (creating,	  making,	  developing)	  and	  
destructive	  (demolishing,	  striking	  out)	  power	  over	  law	  that	  encompasses	  extensive	  powers	  to	  
determine	  the	  meaning	  of	  language	  for	  legal	  purposes.	  Judges	  are,	  however,	  vulnerable	  to	  
forms	  of	  power	  exercised	  by	  others,	  both	  from	  within	  and	  outside	  of	  the	  legal	  system.	  With	  
regard	  to	  the	  purposes	  and	  values	  of	  the	  law	  and	  the	  legal	  profession,	  the	  lecturer	  laid	  greater	  
emphasis	  on	  internal	  than	  external	  goods.	  Internal	  goods	  included	  upholding	  constitutional	  
values;	  promoting	  legal	  certainty	  and	  embodying	  objectivity,	  impartiality	  and	  rationality.	  




adversarial	  system	  of	  justice	  was	  inherent	  in	  describing	  the	  social	  action	  of	  the	  judge	  and	  the	  
role	  they	  play	  in	  deciding	  between	  the	  ‘two	  sides’	  that	  are	  presented	  to	  them	  in	  court.	  Judges	  
were	  also	  almost	  always	  located	  within	  the	  physical	  confines	  of	  the	  court.	  Whilst	  great	  
emphasis	  was	  laid	  upon	  judges	  setting	  aside	  both	  their	  emotions	  and	  their	  own	  moral	  positions,	  
in	  the	  legal	  categorizations	  they	  bestow	  on	  the	  parties	  appearing	  before	  them,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  
their	  capacity	  to	  determine	  ultimate	  outcomes	  such	  as	  ‘certainty’	  versus	  ‘chaos’	  judges	  make	  
far-­‐reaching	  moral	  judgments.	  Judges	  were	  also	  depicted	  as	  exciting	  a	  range	  of	  negative	  
emotions	  in	  others.	  Although	  judges	  have	  the	  power	  to	  determine	  the	  circumstances	  of	  their	  
work,	  and	  particularly	  power	  over	  the	  resource	  of	  time,	  they	  may	  be	  stressed	  by	  the	  enormous	  
amount	  of	  work	  they	  face	  daily,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  need	  to	  ‘prove	  themselves’,	  especially	  when	  
serving	  as	  an	  acting	  judge.	  The	  parties	  appearing	  before	  judges	  were	  backgrounded	  more	  often	  
than	  they	  were	  included,	  primarily	  through	  use	  of	  the	  depersonalizing	  nouns	  ‘case’	  and	  
‘matter’.	  When	  social	  actors	  were	  included	  as	  parties,	  they	  tended	  to	  belong	  to	  categories	  that	  
are	  commonly-­‐regarded	  as	  socially	  marginal,	  or	  were	  represented	  as	  irrational	  or	  lacking	  in	  
ethical	  motivation.	  The	  social	  profile	  of	  the	  judiciary	  was	  represented	  as	  almost	  exclusively	  
male.	  A	  few	  classifications	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  race	  were	  evident	  (mostly	  through	  reference	  to	  the	  
‘old,	  white	  judges),	  but	  in	  general	  the	  lecturer	  avoided	  reference	  to	  race	  or	  the	  tensions	  
involved	  in	  the	  transformation	  of	  the	  judiciary.	  There	  were	  also	  a	  couple	  of	  representations	  




4.	   THE	  SHADOW	  CAREER	  PATH	  	  
The	  shadow	  career	  path	  was	  constituted	  by	  ten	  quotations	  (in	  contrast	  to	  the	  preferred	  career	  
path’s	  30)	  and	  was	  comprised	  of	  three	  roles	  (public	  prosecutor,	  state	  advocate,	  magistrate),	  in	  
contrast	  to	  the	  preferred	  career’s	  four	  (articled	  clerk,	  attorney,	  advocate,	  judge).	  Unlike	  the	  
preferred	  career	  path,	  where	  the	  progression	  through	  each	  role	  was	  both	  linear	  and	  essential,	  
the	  shadow	  career	  path	  offered	  an	  alternative:	  Progressing	  as	  either	  public	  prosecutor-­‐state	  
advocate	  or	  as	  public	  prosecutor-­‐magistrate.	  Both	  such	  progressions	  constituted	  careers	  ‘in	  the	  
civil	  service’	  (P-­‐Q3).	  	  A	  slight	  preference	  for	  the	  former	  progression	  over	  the	  latter	  was	  
suggested	  in	  the	  lecturer	  saying	  ‘if	  you	  do	  become	  a	  public	  prosecutor,	  you	  know,	  that	  is	  where	  
you	  want	  to	  end	  up.	  To	  be	  a	  state	  advocate’	  (P-­‐Q5;	  SA-­‐Q4).	  Implicit	  in	  this	  statement	  is	  the	  
knowledge	  that	  whilst	  prosecutors	  work	  exclusively	  in	  the	  magistrates’	  courts,	  state	  advocates	  
work	  in	  the	  high	  courts.	  
The	  role	  of	  the	  public	  prosecutor	  served	  as	  an	  essential	  point	  of	  entry	  for	  both	  progressions	  (P-­‐
Q3).	  Equally	  essential	  was	  promotion	  to	  the	  rank	  of	  ‘senior	  prosecutor’.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  first	  
progression	  (public	  prosecutor-­‐state	  advocate):	  
LECTURER:	  [I]if	  you’re	  a	  senior	  public	  prosecutor,	  the	  director	  of	  public	  prosecutions	  invites	  you	  
for	  a	  interview	  and	  if	  you	  pass	  the	  interview	  then	  uh	  you	  become	  a	  state	  advocate.	  …	  Uh	  and	  
everybody	  wants	  to	  become	  a	  state	  advocate	  but	  you	  can’t	  do	  that	  off	  the	  street.	  You	  must	  first	  
become	  a	  public	  prosecutor.’	  (P-­‐Q4;	  SA-­‐Q1)	  
And	  for	  the	  progression	  public	  prosecutor-­‐magistrate	  ‘[y]ou	  would	  start	  by	  being	  a	  junior	  
prosecutor,	  senior	  prosecutor	  uh	  being	  elevated	  to	  the	  bench	  becoming	  a	  magistrate’	  (M-­‐Q9).	  
Whilst	  the	  lecturer	  said	  nothing	  more	  about	  the	  shift	  from	  being	  a	  senior	  prosecutor	  to	  being	  a	  
magistrate,	  he	  related	  to	  students	  his	  personal	  experience	  of	  being	  interviewed	  for	  the	  position	  
of	  state	  advocate	  (SA-­‐Q3).	  In	  this	  anecdote	  (which	  is	  covered	  more	  extensively	  in	  Part	  F	  below,	  
dealing	  with	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Director	  of	  Public	  Prosecutions),	  the	  lecturer	  advises	  students	  that	  
promotion	  to	  the	  position	  of	  state	  advocate	  depends	  on	  being	  able	  to	  ‘get	  on’	  with	  the	  Director	  
of	  Public	  Prosecutions	  (DPP):	  ‘[S]o	  if	  you	  don’t	  get	  on	  with	  the	  character,	  if	  you	  don’t	  get	  on	  
with	  the	  personality,	  of	  the	  director	  of	  public	  prosecutions,	  then	  then	  it’s	  difficult’	  (SA-­‐Q3).	  




advocate	  (this	  was	  during	  the	  time	  of	  apartheid)	  was	  probably	  due	  to	  his	  taking	  a	  stance	  against	  
a	  push	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  DPP	  to	  show	  his	  true	  political	  colours:	  	  
LECTURER:	  And	  then	  he	  started	  asking	  me	  political	  questions.	  At	  that	  stage	  he	  was	  prosecuting	  
Winnie	  Mandela.	  Um	  and	  he	  started	  asking	  me	  questions	  what	  I	  would	  do	  if	  I	  had	  been	  the	  
attorney-­‐general.	  And	  I	  just	  refused	  to	  answer	  the	  questions,	  I	  said	  ‘sorry	  I	  consider	  those	  
questions	  inappropriate	  and	  I	  don’t,	  I	  can’t	  answer	  them.	  And	  that’s	  a	  political	  decision	  and	  I	  
can’t	  answer	  them.	  Um	  I	  don’t	  want	  to	  seem	  unthankful	  or	  unpleasant	  but	  I	  really	  can’t	  answer	  
…’	  And	  then	  he	  stopped.	  Immediately.	  He	  said	  ‘thank	  you,	  yes	  go	  back	  to	  the	  magistrates’	  court.’	  
(SA-­‐Q3)	  
What	  functions	  most	  powerfully	  in	  this	  representation	  to	  convey	  the	  impression	  that	  the	  
lecturer’s	  political	  beliefs	  functioned	  as	  the	  primary	  ingredient	  in	  his	  failure	  to	  ‘get	  on’	  with	  the	  
DPP,	  and	  the	  true	  basis	  for	  the	  failure	  of	  his	  application	  is	  the	  coding	  of	  the	  DPP’s	  response:	  He	  
stopped	  ‘immediately’	  and	  then	  in	  a	  dismissive	  manner	  relegates	  the	  lecturer	  to	  a	  career	  in	  the	  
magistrates’	  court.	  This	  constitutes	  a	  complicated	  representation	  of	  the	  purposes	  and	  values	  of	  
law	  and	  the	  legal	  profession:	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  lecturer	  is	  presented	  as	  a	  courageous	  and	  
upstanding	  young	  man,	  upholding	  the	  neutrality	  of	  law;	  on	  the	  other,	  it	  paints	  a	  depressing	  
picture	  of	  law’s	  corruption	  –	  as	  an	  instrument	  used	  to	  further	  the	  political	  agenda	  of	  the	  day.	  
Lastly,	  the	  lecturer’s	  representations	  also	  constructed	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  linkage	  between	  the	  roles	  of	  
the	  magistrate	  and	  judge,	  and	  the	  extremely	  exceptional	  circumstances	  that	  must	  prevail	  if	  an	  
individual	  is	  to	  successively	  negotiate	  this	  career	  transition.	  He	  notes	  that	  it	  was	  one	  of	  Dullah	  
Omar’s	  (the	  first	  Minister	  of	  Justice	  in	  South	  Africa’s	  new	  constitutional	  democracy)	  objectives:	  
LECTURER:	  [T]hat	  the	  curriculum	  vitae,	  the	  cursus	  honorum,	  the	  career	  path	  of	  a	  magistrate	  and	  
a	  judge	  would	  eventually	  in	  South	  Africa	  become	  one.	  You	  would	  start	  by	  being	  a	  junior	  
prosecutor,	  senior	  prosecutor	  uh	  being	  elevated	  to	  the	  bench	  becoming	  a	  magistrate,	  senior	  
magistrate,	  regional	  court	  magistrate,	  senior	  court	  magistrate,	  regional	  court	  president	  and	  then	  
be	  invited	  to	  become	  a	  judge	  in	  the	  High	  Court.	  He	  tried	  to	  bridge	  that	  gap.’	  (M-­‐Q9)	  
His	  use	  of	  the	  word	  ‘gap’	  however,	  is	  indicative	  of	  a	  significant	  divide	  between	  these	  two	  roles,	  
which	  he	  then	  reinforces	  by	  counseling	  students	  that	  magistrates	  are	  ‘far	  removed’	  from	  judges	  
(M-­‐Q10;	  MQ11).	  The	  basis	  for	  this	  discrepancy	  in	  the	  status	  of	  magistrates	  and	  judges	  is	  multi-­‐
faceted,	  but	  he	  sums	  it	  up	  in	  this	  particular	  context	  by	  way	  of	  an	  exaggerated	  negative	  




the	  best	  advocates:	  
LECTURER:	  [A]	  magistrate,	  nja,	  is	  just	  trained	  here	  in	  Pretoria	  for	  six	  months	  and	  you	  know	  …	  
Here	  they	  didn’t	  even	  have	  to	  have	  an	  LLB.	  Now	  they	  must	  have	  an	  LLB.	  But	  in	  the	  old	  days	  …	  
just	  a	  public	  service	  diploma	  or	  you	  know	  walking	  past	  a	  few	  law	  books	  would	  have	  sufficed.	  
Um,	  nowadays	  it’s	  more	  formalized.	  But	  magistrates	  and	  judges	  are	  very	  very	  far	  removed.’	  (M-­‐
Q11)	  
He	  does	  however	  show	  that	  the	  progression	  is	  not	  impossible	  by	  relating	  the	  career	  success	  of	  
his	  former	  colleague	  in	  the	  magistrates’	  court	  in	  Cape	  Town,	  Mr	  Andre	  Legransie.	  Mr	  Legransie	  
was	  ‘very	  very	  bright’,	  ‘really	  very	  very	  clever’	  and	  very	  fair	  (M-­‐Q12).	  He	  became	  a	  regional	  
court	  magistrate	  but	  was	  then	  promoted	  to	  the	  High	  Court	  because,	  in	  the	  lecturer’s	  opinion	  
‘[h]e’s	  got	  the	  gravitas	  and	  the	  knowledge	  and	  the	  professionalism	  to	  become	  a	  High	  Court	  
judge’	  (M-­‐Q12).	  Notwithstanding	  this	  example,	  however,	  the	  lecturer	  concludes	  by	  affirming	  
the	  chasm:	  ‘OK	  so	  it	  is	  possible	  …	  but	  the	  run	  of	  the	  mill	  magistrate	  is	  very	  far	  from	  the	  High	  
Court’	  (M-­‐Q12).	  	  	  
4.1	   The	  Public	  Prosecutor	  and	  State	  Advocate	  	  
4.1.1	   Social	  action	  	  
In	  the	  six	  quotations	  relating	  to	  the	  public	  prosecutor	  there	  were	  14	  extracts	  pertaining	  to	  
social	  action,	  and	  five	  in	  the	  three	  quotations	  relating	  to	  the	  state	  advocate	  respectively.	  Both	  
the	  public	  prosecutor	  and	  state	  advocate	  were	  coded	  in	  action	  that	  was	  predominantly	  active	  
(78%	  for	  the	  public	  prosecutor	  and	  80%	  for	  the	  state	  advocate	  respectively).	  The	  public	  
prosecutor’s	  actions	  were	  also	  predominantly	  transactive	  (71%	  or	  10	  of	  the	  14	  extracts)	  and	  
semiotic	  (85%	  or	  12	  of	  the	  14	  extracts).	  The	  social	  actions	  of	  the	  state	  advocate,	  by	  contrast,	  
were	  predominantly	  non-­‐transactive	  (80%)	  and	  material	  (80%).	  While	  the	  representation	  of	  the	  
social	  action	  of	  the	  state	  advocate	  thus	  departs	  significantly	  from	  the	  trend	  evident	  in	  all	  the	  
other	  legal	  professional	  roles,	  not	  much	  turns	  on	  this,	  as	  it	  is	  simply	  a	  reflection	  of	  lack	  of	  data	  
relating	  to	  this	  particular	  role.	  	  
Prosecutors	  were	  most	  commonly	  represented	  as	  engaged	  in	  the	  generic	  action	  of	  




actions,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  terms	  used	  to	  describe	  social	  action	  were	  not	  elaborated,	  the	  
discursive	  resources	  were	  not	  rich	  and	  varied.	  In	  one	  quotation	  however,	  (P-­‐Q2	  –	  the	  lecturer’s	  
extended	  anecdote	  regarding	  his	  prosecution	  of	  a	  man	  accused	  of	  credit	  card	  fraud)	  the	  
lecturer	  broke	  the	  action	  of	  ‘prosecuting’	  down	  into	  more	  specific	  actions:	  ‘Proving’	  a	  case	  (P-­‐
SA2c);	  entering	  into	  plea	  bargains	  (P-­‐SA2e);	  addressing	  the	  accused	  (P-­‐SA2f,	  g);	  ‘putting’	  the	  
charge	  to	  the	  accused	  (P-­‐SA2h);	  and	  asking	  the	  magistrate	  for	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  sentence	  (P-­‐
SA2i).	  In	  all	  these	  representations	  the	  prosecutor	  exercises	  power	  almost	  exclusively	  over	  the	  
accused	  person	  in	  a	  particular	  case.	  They	  are	  never	  represented	  as	  having	  any	  power	  over	  law,	  
language	  or	  information.	  The	  only	  other	  legal	  professionals	  over	  whom	  their	  power	  extends	  are	  
other	  prosecutors	  (P-­‐SA2d;	  P-­‐SA2f)	  and	  the	  magistrate	  (P-­‐SA2i).	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  highly-­‐
charged	  relationship	  that	  emerges	  from	  the	  representation	  of	  advocates	  and	  judges,	  the	  
relationship	  between	  prosecutors	  and	  magistrates	  appears	  to	  be	  more	  relaxed,	  with	  the	  
prosecutor	  confident	  to	  simply	  ‘ask’	  the	  magistrate	  to	  impose	  a	  jail	  sentence	  without	  the	  option	  
of	  a	  fine	  (P-­‐SA2i).	  	  
State	  advocates	  were	  represented	  as	  engaged	  in	  the	  even	  more	  generic	  actions	  of	  ‘doing’	  
(SAdv-­‐SA2a,	  2b;	  SAdv-­‐SA3)	  and	  ‘working’	  (SAdv-­‐2c)	  with	  no	  breakdown	  of	  these	  tasks.	  The	  only	  
instance	  of	  transactive	  social	  action	  extended	  the	  power	  of	  the	  state	  advocate	  over	  ‘civil	  
matters’	  and	  thus	  over	  clients.	  They	  were	  similarly	  never	  represented	  as	  having	  any	  power	  over	  
law,	  language,	  information	  or	  other	  lawyers.	  	  
In	  both	  roles	  there	  were	  no	  relational	  clauses	  or	  if-­‐then	  constructions	  that	  cemented	  the	  
particular	  role	  to	  particular	  associations,	  as	  was	  evident	  in	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  preferred	  career	  
path.	  	  
4.1.2	   Circumstances	  of	  social	  action	  
The	  representation	  of	  resources	  predominated	  in	  both	  roles	  (five	  extracts	  in	  the	  six	  quotations	  
relating	  to	  the	  public	  prosecutor,	  and	  three	  extracts	  in	  the	  three	  quotations	  relating	  to	  the	  state	  
advocate	  respectively).	  There	  was	  otherwise	  no	  representation	  of	  emotion	  or	  location	  in	  the	  
quotations	  relating	  to	  the	  state	  advocate.	  For	  the	  public	  prosecutor	  there	  were	  6	  extracts	  




The	  resources	  of	  the	  public	  prosecutor	  fell	  into	  three	  categories:	  The	  generic	  resource	  of	  
‘evidence’	  or	  various	  types	  of	  evidence	  (such	  as	  the	  credit	  card,	  slip	  and	  bank	  statement	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  a	  case	  of	  credit	  card	  fraud)	  (P-­‐CSA2a,	  c);	  the	  resource	  of	  ‘experience’	  (P-­‐CSA3c;	  P-­‐
CSA4b);	  and	  interestingly,	  the	  magistrate	  herself	  (‘I	  had	  an	  old	  battleaxe	  for	  a	  magistrate’	  –	  P-­‐
CSA1).	  The	  latter	  suggests	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  prosecutor	  and	  the	  magistrate	  is	  
completely	  different	  to	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  advocate	  and	  the	  judge.	  In	  the	  former,	  
there	  are	  various	  hints	  –	  representation	  of	  the	  magistrate	  as	  a	  resource	  for	  instance,	  or	  the	  
references	  to	  ‘my	  court’	  (P-­‐CSA2b,	  d)	  –	  which	  point	  to	  the	  prosecutor	  being	  seen	  as	  more	  
powerful	  than	  the	  magistrate.	  	  
The	  resources	  for	  the	  state	  advocate	  similarly	  included	  ‘experience’	  (SAdv-­‐CSA1;	  S-­‐Adv-­‐CSA3)	  
and	  then	  the	  same	  physical	  resources	  as	  ‘an	  ordinary	  advocate’;	  i.e.	  an	  office	  and	  a	  set	  of	  law	  
reports	  (SAdv-­‐CSA2).	  	  
The	  public	  prosecutor	  was	  located	  exclusively	  in	  the	  spatial	  area	  of	  the	  court	  (P-­‐CSA2b,	  d;	  P-­‐
CSA3a,	  b;	  P-­‐CSA4a)	  and	  specifically,	  a	  ‘dirty,	  dingy	  little	  court’	  (P-­‐CSA2e).	  	  
4.1.3	   Social	  actors	  	  	  
Public	  Prosecutors	  and	  State	  Advocates	  themselves	  	  
The	  classification	  of	  public	  prosecutors	  and	  state	  advocates	  followed	  the	  pattern	  evident	  in	  the	  
other	  roles:	  There	  was	  no	  classification	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  race,	  minimal	  classification	  on	  the	  basis	  
of	  class	  (e.g.	  an	  inference	  that	  can	  be	  made	  from	  a	  statement	  of	  the	  public	  prosecutor’s	  typical	  
salary	  –	  see	  P-­‐V3b),	  and	  where	  gender	  classification	  was	  present	  (generally	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  
pronoun	  usage)	  it	  was	  male	  (P-­‐SAct1b;	  P-­‐SAct2a;	  SAdv-­‐SAct2a).	  	  	  
Accused	  persons	  and	  other	  social	  actors	  	  
There	  were	  11	  extracts	  representing	  social	  actors	  in	  the	  quotations	  relating	  to	  the	  public	  
prosecutors.	  The	  accused	  persons	  over	  whom	  prosecutors	  were	  represented	  as	  holding	  sway	  
were	  just	  as	  likely	  to	  be	  backgrounded	  (6	  extracts)	  as	  they	  were	  to	  be	  included	  (5	  extracts).	  
Backgrounding	  of	  other	  social	  actors	  was	  achieved	  through	  the	  same	  range	  of	  resources	  as	  was	  




(P-­‐SAct2b;	  P-­‐SAct2d;	  P-­‐SAct3a;	  P-­‐SAct4a)	  or	  particular	  legal	  problems	  (such	  as	  ‘credit	  card	  
fraud’	  –	  see	  P-­‐SAct2c).	  In	  the	  one	  instance	  where	  clients	  were	  represented	  in	  the	  quotations	  
relating	  to	  the	  state	  advocate,	  they	  were	  backgrounded	  	  by	  use	  of	  the	  phrase	  ‘civil	  work’	  (SAdv-­‐
SAct2b).	  	  
The	  lecturer’s	  only	  more	  extended	  account	  of	  an	  accused	  person	  in	  the	  prosecutor	  set	  of	  
quotations	  occurred	  in	  the	  anecdote	  relating	  to	  the	  credit	  card	  fraudster.	  This	  particular	  
anecdote	  is	  interesting	  for	  its	  representation	  of	  the	  particular	  accused	  and	  of	  the	  out-­‐workings	  
of	  the	  administration	  of	  justice.	  ‘This	  guy,’	  the	  lecturer	  explained,	  ‘had	  thirty	  offences	  of	  credit	  
card	  fraud	  for	  American	  Express’,	  meaning	  he	  had	  stolen	  an	  American	  Express	  card	  and	  used	  it	  
thirty	  times	  (P-­‐SAct2e).	  Another	  prosecutor	  had	  already	  dealt	  with	  the	  case	  before	  it	  was	  
forwarded	  to	  the	  lecturer’s	  specialized	  credit	  card	  fraud	  court	  (P-­‐SAct2d).	  The	  previous	  
prosecutor	  had	  offered	  the	  accused	  a	  plea-­‐bargain	  which	  in	  essence	  meant	  that	  if	  the	  accused	  
pleaded	  guilty	  he	  would	  only	  be	  charged	  on	  one	  count;	  i.e.	  one	  instance	  of	  using	  the	  card	  
unlawfully	  (P-­‐SAct2e).	  This	  would	  obviate	  the	  need	  for	  a	  more	  lengthy	  criminal	  trial	  as	  well	  as	  
take	  away	  the	  risk	  of	  possibly	  not	  securing	  a	  criminal	  conviction	  (P-­‐V2c).91	  However,	  the	  
lecturer’s	  specialized	  credit	  card	  fraud	  court	  had	  been	  established	  not	  only	  to	  ensure	  ‘uniform’	  
but	  also	  ‘harsh’	  sentences	  for	  this	  type	  of	  crime,	  based	  on	  the	  rationale	  that	  heavier	  sentences	  
would	  have	  a	  deterrent	  effect	  (P-­‐V2b).	  	  When	  the	  matter	  came	  before	  him,	  the	  lecturer	  refused	  
to	  follow	  his	  predecessor’s	  offer	  of	  a	  plea	  bargain	  (P-­‐SAct2f),	  instead	  explaining	  to	  the	  accused:	  	  
LECTURER:	  I	  said	  ‘Look,	  you’re	  now	  in	  a	  new	  court,	  a	  new	  prosecutor,	  the	  previous	  prosecutor	  
said	  that	  you	  could	  plead	  guilty	  and	  we	  will	  only	  sentence	  you	  on	  one	  count.	  That’s	  not	  going	  to	  
happen.	  Um,	  you	  know.	  If	  you	  want	  to	  plead	  guilty	  you’re	  welcome,	  but	  I’m	  going	  to	  charge	  you	  
on	  all	  thirty	  counts.’	  So	  he	  asked:	  ‘Well,	  is	  that	  the	  same	  …	  as	  one	  count?’	  I	  said:	  ‘No	  it’s	  not	  the	  
same,	  you	  know,	  you’re	  found	  guilty	  thirty	  times,	  it’s	  not	  the	  same.’	  Like	  if	  you	  use	  this	  card	  
thirty	  times,	  you’re	  going	  to	  be	  penalized	  thirty	  times.’	  
Whilst	  a	  criminal	  record	  attaches	  to	  an	  individual	  whether	  they	  are	  found	  guilty	  on	  one	  charge	  
or	  thirty,	  the	  commercial	  implications	  differ.	  If	  the	  accused	  were	  to	  only	  be	  charged	  with	  one	  
count	  of	  using	  the	  stolen	  credit	  card	  unlawfully,	  then	  in	  a	  subsequent	  civil	  action	  the	  amount	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91	  The	  underlying,	  implicit	  internal	  good	  in	  this	  offer	  would	  be	  something	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  promoting	  efficiency	  




American	  Express	  could	  claim	  to	  recover	  their	  damages	  would	  be	  limited	  to	  the	  amount	  for	  the	  
one	  count	  on	  which	  the	  accused	  was	  found	  criminally	  liable,	  which	  would	  be	  far	  less	  than	  the	  
damage	  they	  actually	  suffered.	  Aware	  of	  this,	  the	  lecturer	  decides	  to	  charge	  the	  accused	  on	  all	  
thirty	  counts	  (P-­‐SAct2h)	  while	  also	  asking	  the	  magistrate	  to	  impose	  the	  maximum	  sentence	  for	  
all	  thirty	  charges	  (P-­‐SAct2i).	  The	  accused	  is	  represented	  as	  having	  a	  somewhat	  blasé	  response:	  
‘Somehow	  he	  was	  tired	  or	  he	  just	  didn’t	  understand	  what	  I	  said	  and	  …	  he	  said	  “Ag	  ja”	  you	  know,	  
just	  wanted	  to	  finish	  it	  and	  not	  plead	  guilty,	  thinking	  he	  will	  pay	  a	  penalty,	  a	  fine’	  (P-­‐SAct2c).	  To	  
the	  accused	  person’s	  subsequent	  misfortune,	  he	  is	  subsequently	  found	  guilty	  and	  the	  
magistrate	  agrees	  to	  impose	  the	  maximum	  sentence	  –	  one	  year’s	  imprisonment	  without	  the	  
option	  of	  a	  fine	  –	  for	  all	  thirty	  counts,	  meaning	  the	  accused	  went	  to	  jail	  for	  thirty	  years:	  ‘He’s	  
still	  there	  today.	  He’s	  still	  in	  jail,	  unless	  he	  was	  released	  on	  one	  of	  these	  ridiculous	  amnesties,’	  
the	  lecturer	  continues.	  ‘Thirty	  years.	  This	  was	  about	  twenty	  years	  ago.	  So	  he’s	  still	  rotting	  away	  
in	  jail	  somewhere’	  (P-­‐V2d).	  	  
There	  are	  interesting	  parallels	  between	  the	  lecturer’s	  representation	  of	  the	  outworking	  of	  
justice	  in	  this	  particular	  anecdote	  and	  the	  representation	  of	  particular	  accused	  persons	  in	  the	  
role	  of	  the	  magistrate	  below.	  This	  case	  corresponds	  with	  the	  lecturer’s	  representation	  of	  the	  
trial	  of	  the	  upstanding	  bookkeeper,	  where	  the	  sentence	  imposed	  seems	  somewhat	  
disproportionately	  harsh	  to	  the	  wrong	  committed,	  which	  contrasts	  with	  other	  cases	  where	  the	  
accused	  seems	  to	  deserve	  punishment	  but	  escapes	  scot-­‐free.	  This	  seems	  to	  invoke	  a	  sense	  that	  
the	  administration	  of	  justice	  is	  arbitrary.	  	  
4.1.4	   Values	  	  
There	  were	  only	  two	  extracts	  in	  the	  quotations	  relating	  to	  the	  public	  prosecutor	  pertaining	  to	  
public	  prosecutors	  themselves,	  and	  no	  extracts	  of	  this	  nature	  in	  the	  quotations	  relating	  to	  the	  
state	  advocate.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  public	  prosecutor	  there	  were	  three	  extracts	  (37,5%)	  in	  which	  
oblique	  reference	  was	  made	  to	  internal	  goods,	  whilst	  five	  extracts	  related	  to	  external	  goods	  
(62,5%).	  For	  the	  state	  advocate,	  there	  were	  only	  two	  extracts	  relating	  to	  external	  goods.	  
Interestingly,	  purposive	  constructions	  slightly	  dominated	  constructions	  based	  on	  moral	  




Both	  evaluations	  of	  public	  prosecutors	  themselves	  were	  positive	  and	  were	  based	  on	  moral	  
evaluation.	  In	  the	  first,	  the	  lecturer	  reminisces	  on	  one	  of	  the	  ‘glorious’	  cases	  he	  prosecuted	  
whilst	  serving	  as	  a	  specialist	  prosecutor	  (P-­‐V2a).	  The	  second	  evaluation	  uses	  paradox	  to	  achieve	  
its	  effect:	  ‘I	  was	  a	  small	  little	  prosecutor	  in	  a	  dirty,	  dingy	  little	  court	  and	  he	  went	  to	  jail	  for	  thirty	  
years	  which	  is	  longer	  than	  life’	  (P-­‐V2e).	  Thus,	  notwithstanding	  the	  apparent	  insignificance	  of	  the	  
prosecutor	  and	  the	  unimpressive	  surroundings	  in	  which	  he	  operates,	  the	  prosecutor	  was	  able	  
to	  exercise	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  power	  over	  the	  accused	  in	  this	  particular	  case.	  	  
Fleeting	  reference	  to	  the	  internal	  goods	  relevant	  to	  the	  prosecutor	  role	  has	  already	  been	  made	  
in	  the	  outline	  of	  the	  anecdote	  relating	  to	  the	  credit	  card	  fraudster	  above.	  All	  these	  internal	  
goods,	  although	  only	  mentioned	  very	  cursorily	  by	  the	  lecturer,	  involved	  purposive	  
constructions.	  Thus	  specialist	  courts	  were	  established	  to	  ensure	  uniform	  and	  harsh	  sentences	  
and	  to	  prevent	  crime	  (P-­‐V2b);	  plea	  bargains	  are	  entered	  into	  so	  that	  there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  go	  to	  
trial	  (and	  thus	  to	  incur	  the	  expense	  and	  time	  involved)	  (P-­‐V2c);	  and	  plea	  bargains	  are	  not	  
acceptable	  where	  this	  will	  result	  in	  the	  complainant	  being	  unable	  to	  recover	  its	  commercial	  loss	  
(P-­‐V2d).	  Fairness	  to	  the	  complainant,	  as	  well	  as	  efficiency	  and	  effectiveness	  in	  the	  
administration	  of	  justice	  thus	  emerge	  as	  possible	  internal	  goods.	  	  	  
The	  representation	  of	  external	  goods	  in	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  public	  prosecutor	  and	  state	  advocate	  
related	  most	  frequently	  to	  ‘experience’	  (P-­‐V3a;	  P-­‐V4;	  SAdv-­‐V1;	  SAdv-­‐V3).	  The	  rationale	  for	  
entering	  and	  engaging	  with	  these	  roles	  was	  thus	  represented	  entirely	  instrumentally.	  In	  the	  
lecturer’s	  view,	  one	  becomes	  a	  prosecutor	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  court	  experience,	  in	  order	  to	  know	  
‘how	  to	  sit	  and	  stand	  in	  a	  court’	  (P-­‐V3a).	  Moreover,	  if	  one	  cannot	  secure	  articles	  and	  thus	  
commence	  on	  the	  preferred	  career	  track,	  joining	  the	  Department	  of	  Justice	  for	  two	  years	  as	  a	  
prosecutor	  is	  a	  good	  move	  because	  one	  obtains	  this	  experience	  at	  the	  State’s	  expense	  (P-­‐V3a),	  
albeit	  that	  the	  monetary	  rewards	  are	  not	  great	  (P-­‐V3b).	  The	  lecturer	  thus	  appears	  to	  legitimate	  
a	  strategic	  move	  on	  the	  part	  of	  young	  professionals	  that	  essentially	  robs	  the	  State:	  While	  the	  
State	  invests	  in	  the	  training	  of	  young	  prosecutors	  for	  two	  years,	  it	  loses	  their	  expertise	  to	  the	  
preferred	  career	  track	  after	  that	  time.	  This	  in	  turn	  potentially	  incapacitates	  the	  criminal	  justice	  
system.	  Similarly,	  one	  becomes	  a	  state	  advocate	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  experience	  at	  the	  State’s	  




not	  really	  important,	  you	  don’t	  want	  to	  make	  a	  lifelong	  career	  out	  of	  it,	  you	  only	  want	  to,	  you	  
only	  want	  to	  get	  experience’	  (SAdv-­‐V3).	  Although	  he	  does	  follow	  this	  statement	  with	  a	  tag	  –	  
‘Unless	  you	  want	  to	  become	  a	  civil	  servant,	  that’s	  also	  possible,	  there	  are	  lots	  of	  things	  that	  you	  
can	  do’	  –	  it	  is	  clearly	  the	  less-­‐preferred	  option.	  	  
The	  instrumental	  motive	  behind	  becoming	  a	  public	  prosecutor	  is	  similarly	  constituted	  through	  
the	  external	  good	  of	  ‘promotion’:	  ‘[E]verybody	  wants	  to	  become	  a	  state	  advocate	  but	  you	  can’t	  
do	  that	  off	  the	  street.	  You	  must	  first	  become	  a	  public	  prosecutor’	  (P-­‐V4),	  and	  ‘if	  you	  do	  go,	  if	  
you	  do	  become	  a	  public	  prosecutor,	  you	  know,	  that	  is	  where	  you	  want	  to	  end	  up.	  To	  be	  a	  state	  
advocate’	  (P-­‐V5).	  Becoming	  and	  staying	  a	  public	  prosecutor,	  strengthening	  and	  supporting	  the	  
role	  of	  the	  State	  in	  combating	  crime,	  is	  thus	  not	  presented	  as	  a	  valorized	  option.	  	  
The	  external	  good	  of	  intellectual	  stimulation	  –	  which	  threads	  through	  a	  number	  of	  the	  other	  
roles	  in	  the	  lecturer’s	  classroom	  talk	  –	  is	  represented	  as	  a	  reason	  for	  not	  becoming	  a	  public	  
prosecutor,	  for	  at	  one	  point	  the	  lecturer	  holds	  that	  being	  a	  public	  prosecutor	  is	  ‘boring’	  (P-­‐V6).	  	  
4.1.5	   Summary	  	  
The	  role	  of	  the	  public	  prosecutor	  continues	  the	  theme	  of	  the	  active,	  transactive	  and	  semiotic	  
nature	  of	  the	  power	  of	  legal	  professionals.	  While	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state	  advocate	  differs	  
significantly	  in	  terms	  of	  action	  being	  coded	  as	  non-­‐transactive	  and	  material,	  this	  is	  an	  anomaly	  
that	  arises	  from	  the	  small	  amount	  of	  data	  for	  this	  role.	  The	  objects	  over	  which	  the	  power	  of	  
public	  prosecutors	  and	  state	  advocates	  were	  represented	  as	  extending	  are	  significantly	  
restricted	  in	  range	  compared	  to	  the	  other	  roles	  discussed	  thus	  far,	  centering	  predominantly	  on	  
the	  accused	  persons	  in	  a	  case	  and	  a	  limited	  range	  of	  legal	  professionals.	  Whilst	  internal	  goods	  
such	  as	  fairness	  to	  the	  complainant,	  and	  efficiency	  and	  effectiveness	  in	  the	  administration	  of	  
justice	  could	  be	  discerned,	  external	  goods	  predominated.	  A	  new	  form	  of	  external	  good	  –	  
obtaining	  experience	  –	  came	  to	  the	  foreground,	  one	  that	  tended	  to	  position	  both	  roles	  as	  
instrumental	  in	  the	  unfolding	  of	  a	  legal	  career.	  Further,	  the	  anecdote	  relating	  to	  the	  lecturer’s	  
experience	  of	  being	  interviewed	  for	  the	  position	  of	  state	  advocate	  is	  interesting	  for	  placing	  in	  
tension	  the	  pursuit	  of	  neutrality	  and	  objectivity	  through	  the	  law	  and	  the	  use	  of	  law	  to	  advance	  a	  




around	  the	  capacity	  of	  the	  law	  to	  penalize,	  and	  the	  potential	  for	  disproportionately	  harsh	  
sentences	  to	  be	  imposed.	  For	  both	  roles	  very	  little	  data	  was	  available	  on	  the	  circumstances	  of	  
legal	  work.	  As	  regards	  legal	  relationships,	  notable	  was	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  relationship	  
between	  public	  prosecutor	  and	  magistrate	  differed	  from	  the	  relationship	  that	  the	  lecturer	  
represented	  as	  pertaining	  between	  advocates	  and	  judges.	  The	  relationships	  between	  public	  
prosecutors	  and	  state	  advocate	  with	  other	  legal	  professionals	  were	  otherwise	  underdeveloped.	  
The	  parties	  with	  whom	  public	  prosecutors	  and	  state	  advocate	  engage	  were	  backgrounded	  
slightly	  more	  than	  they	  were	  included.	  The	  social	  profiling	  of	  both	  roles	  was	  strongly	  male,	  but	  
with	  no	  classification	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  race	  and	  very	  little	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  class.	  	  
4.2	   The	  Magistrate	  	  	  
4.2.1	   Social	  Action	  	  
There	  were	  63	  extracts	  pertaining	  to	  social	  action	  in	  the	  26	  quotations	  relating	  to	  the	  
magistrate.	  The	  percentage	  of	  active,	  transactive	  and	  semiotic	  forms	  of	  action	  conformed	  to	  
the	  general	  pattern	  evident	  in	  all	  the	  legal	  professional	  roles	  in	  this	  research	  in	  that	  active	  (50	  
extracts	  –	  79%),	  transactive	  (46	  extracts	  –	  73%),	  and	  semiotic	  (42	  extracts	  –	  66%)	  forms	  of	  
action	  predominated.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  judge,	  the	  percentage	  of	  semiotic	  actions	  
(where	  it	  had	  been	  80%	  for	  the	  judge)	  was	  perhaps	  significantly	  less.	  
The	  major	  difference	  between	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  magistrate	  and	  judge,	  however,	  lay	  in	  the	  
objects	  over	  which	  such	  social	  action	  extended.	  Whereas	  judges	  were	  represented	  as	  exercising	  
power	  over	  people	  which	  then	  extended	  to	  extensive	  powers	  over	  law	  and	  language,	  
magistrates	  were	  overwhelmingly	  represented	  as	  only	  exercising	  power	  over	  the	  parties	  in	  a	  
case	  (accounting	  for	  about	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  the	  transactive	  actions)	  and	  this	  is	  where	  their	  power	  
ended.	  In	  relation	  to	  parties,	  magistrates	  were	  represented	  as	  placing	  the	  matter	  on	  the	  roll	  (M-­‐
SA14a)	  or	  directing	  it	  to	  the	  High	  Court	  (M-­‐SA14b;	  M-­‐SA15a);	  as	  hearing	  the	  case	  (M-­‐SA2a;	  M-­‐
SA5a;	  M-­‐SA8f;	  M-­‐SA22b),	  cross-­‐examining	  the	  witness	  (M-­‐SA8h);	  giving	  satisfaction	  in	  the	  case	  
(M-­‐SA2d)	  or	  making	  an	  order	  (M-­‐SA5c).	  The	  weight	  of	  a	  magistrate’s	  power,	  however,	  was	  
represented	  as	  coming	  most	  clearly	  to	  the	  fore	  in	  criminal	  matters.	  The	  magistrate	  must	  decide	  




SA12d;	  M-­‐SA16a);	  and	  what	  sentence	  to	  impose:	  Whether	  a	  fine	  or	  reprimand	  (M-­‐SA16c;	  M-­‐
SA17)	  or	  a	  jail	  term	  	  (M-­‐SA5b,	  SA7b;	  M-­‐SA8k;	  M-­‐SA8p,	  q;	  M-­‐SA16b).	  	  
These	  powers	  are	  far-­‐reaching	  (as	  is	  apparent	  from	  the	  two	  anecdotes	  for	  this	  role	  relating	  to	  
the	  first-­‐time	  offenders	  who	  went	  to	  prison	  for	  failing	  to	  pay	  maintenance	  (M-­‐Q8),	  and	  stealing	  
from	  their	  employer	  respectively	  (M-­‐Q16)),	  but	  they	  are	  represented	  as	  being	  powers	  of	  a	  
lesser	  order	  because	  in	  coming	  to	  a	  decision,	  the	  magistrate	  does	  not	  create	  precedent	  (M-­‐
SA3a).	  This	  is	  to	  say	  that	  magistrates’	  decisions	  are	  only	  binding	  upon	  the	  parties	  before	  them	  
(M-­‐SA1c),	  and	  not	  binding	  upon	  other	  magistrates	  or	  other	  courts	  (M-­‐SA3c;	  M-­‐SA4e).	  
Magistrates	  are	  always	  bound	  by	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  High	  Courts,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  
and	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  (M-­‐SA4a).	  ‘If	  a	  magistrate	  sits	  in	  a	  court	  case,	  …	  [he]	  can’t	  just	  do	  
what	  he	  wants	  to	  do’	  (M-­‐SA4b).	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  judge,	  therefore,	  the	  magistrates	  practices	  
rather	  than	  makes	  or	  creates	  South	  African	  law	  (M-­‐SA4a).	  Whilst	  district	  magistrates’	  courts	  do	  
the	  ‘lion’s	  share’	  of	  the	  work	  (M-­‐SA23),	  in	  the	  lecturer’s	  estimation,	  as	  much	  as	  ‘ninety-­‐eight	  
percent	  of	  all	  legal	  work	  criminal	  and	  civil’	  (M-­‐SA13)	  their	  status	  as	  lower	  courts	  is	  forever	  fixed	  
on	  the	  basis	  that	  they	  have	  no	  authority	  to	  create	  law.	  
There	  were	  two	  other	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  lecturer	  used	  the	  representation	  of	  social	  action	  to	  
mark	  the	  lower	  status	  of	  magistrates’	  courts.	  	  
Firstly,	  through	  the	  process	  of	  appeal,	  a	  magistrate	  may	  have	  his	  decision	  over-­‐ruled	  by	  a	  higher	  
court.	  A	  judge	  may	  ‘decide	  against’	  the	  magistrate	  (M-­‐SA2b)	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  he	  has	  done	  
something	  wrong	  (M-­‐SA6a)	  or	  ‘made	  an	  error’	  (M-­‐SA6a,	  b).	  Here	  the	  emphasis	  fell	  completely	  
on	  the	  magistrates’	  courts	  being	  prone	  to	  error	  with	  no	  balancing	  representation	  to	  the	  effect	  
that	  frequently	  decisions	  in	  the	  magistrates’	  courts	  are	  confirmed	  on	  appeal.	  	  
Secondly,	  their	  lower	  status	  is	  indexed	  by	  the	  institution	  of	  automatic	  review	  whereby	  decisions	  
of	  magistrates	  of	  less	  than	  seven	  years	  experience	  are	  automatically	  reviewed	  by	  a	  judge	  of	  the	  
High	  Court	  if	  the	  magistrate	  imposes	  a	  sentence	  of	  imprisonment	  greater	  than	  three	  months	  
without	  the	  option	  of	  a	  fine.	  This	  was	  vividly	  represented	  in	  the	  lecturer’s	  anecdote	  of	  his	  
personal	  experience	  of	  this	  process	  in	  M-­‐Q8.	  What	  stands	  out	  so	  starkly	  in	  this	  tale	  of	  a	  junior	  




drinking	  and	  spoiling	  his	  eighteen-­‐year-­‐old	  girlfriend	  while	  his	  domestic-­‐worker	  wife	  struggles	  
to	  raise	  his	  four	  children,	  is	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  magistrate’s	  decision	  conforms	  to	  a	  
layman’s	  sense	  of	  justice.	  ‘What	  do	  you	  do	  with	  a	  man	  like	  this?’	  the	  lecturer	  asks	  
hypothetically,	  a	  man	  who	  refuses	  to	  admit	  he	  has	  any	  obligation	  toward	  his	  lawful	  wife	  and	  
children.	  In	  the	  event	  the	  lecturer	  recalls:	  ‘I	  gave	  him	  the	  maximum	  [gestures	  with	  arm	  and	  
elicits	  laughter	  from	  students]	  sentence	  that	  I	  could	  which	  was	  one	  year.	  Twelve	  months.	  I	  gave	  
him	  straight	  twelve	  months	  twelve	  thousand	  rand	  fine	  …	  or	  twelve	  months’	  (M-­‐SA8k).	  As	  a	  
result	  of	  his	  emotional	  involvement	  in	  the	  case,	  however,	  the	  lecturer	  as	  magistrate	  forgets	  
that	  he	  is	  still	  ‘very	  junior’	  and	  that	  the	  decision	  would	  go	  on	  automatic	  review	  to	  a	  judge	  of	  the	  
High	  Court	  (M-­‐SA8l,	  m).	  So	  three	  months	  later,	  on	  a	  Saturday	  evening	  whilst	  hosting	  a	  dinner	  
party	  for	  a	  number	  of	  guests	  the	  lecturer	  is	  phoned	  by	  Judge	  Foxcroft	  and	  called	  to	  task	  for	  
sentencing	  a	  first-­‐time	  offender	  to	  jail.	  Instead	  of	  the	  irresponsible	  husband	  who	  initially	  
appeared	  before	  him,	  it	  is	  the	  lecturer	  who	  is	  in	  ‘big,	  big,	  big	  trouble’	  and	  whose	  name	  appears	  
in	  the	  law	  reports	  as	  the	  magistrate	  who	  sentenced	  a	  first	  offender	  to	  twelve	  months	  in	  prison	  
(M-­‐SA8o).	  The	  lecturer	  maintains	  a	  critical	  distance	  to	  this	  episode,	  however,	  suggesting	  that	  it	  
is	  only	  magistrates	  who	  can	  truly	  see	  the	  parties	  and	  thus	  discern	  what	  is	  just	  in	  the	  
circumstances.	  The	  lecturer	  comments	  that	  a	  judge	  doesn’t	  understand	  seeing	  the	  parties	  –	  
their	  primary	  concern	  centres	  on	  procedural	  correctness	  (M-­‐SA8n).	  	  
As	  a	  reflection,	  perhaps,	  of	  the	  low	  rank	  magistrates	  occupy	  in	  the	  overall	  system	  of	  the	  
administration	  of	  justice	  –	  and	  the	  status	  of	  junior	  magistrates	  in	  particular	  who	  have	  no	  choice	  
in	  being	  ‘assigned’	  to	  a	  particular	  matter	  (M-­‐SA15b)	  –	  it	  is	  interesting	  how	  the	  lecturer	  
represents	  himself	  in	  this	  particular	  episode	  as	  over-­‐exercising	  or	  over-­‐extending	  his	  role	  as	  the	  
adjudicator	  in	  the	  case:	  He	  loses	  his	  temper	  with	  the	  prosecutor	  (M-­‐SA8g),	  takes	  over	  the	  
inquisition	  (M-­‐SA8h),	  shouts	  at	  (M-­‐SA8j)	  and	  ‘let’s	  rip’	  into	  the	  accused	  (M-­‐SA8i).	  	  
Like	  the	  judge,	  there	  were	  a	  number	  of	  (mostly	  non-­‐transactive)	  social	  actions	  that	  employed	  
the	  verb	  ‘sit’.	  Whilst	  at	  least	  two	  of	  these	  were	  employed	  in	  a	  manner	  similar	  to	  the	  judge,	  i.e.	  
in	  the	  more	  semiotic	  sense	  of	  ‘presiding’	  over	  the	  court	  proceedings	  (M-­‐SA21;	  M-­‐SA22a),	  the	  
other	  two	  were	  clearly	  employed	  in	  a	  more	  material	  sense:	  ‘One	  Friday	  afternoon	  I	  was	  sitting	  




lecturer	  relates.	  Whilst	  judges’	  social	  power	  is	  encoded	  in	  the	  non-­‐transactive	  and	  semiotic	  use	  
of	  the	  verb	  ‘sit’	  therefore,	  the	  verb	  that	  more	  appropriately	  describes	  the	  position	  of	  
magistrates	  is	  that	  they	  ‘serve’	  (M-­‐SA8a).	  
Notwithstanding	  all	  these	  representations	  reinforcing	  the	  lower	  order	  status	  of	  magistrates,	  the	  
lecturer	  still	  suggests	  that	  magistrates	  courts	  exercise	  power	  over	  ultimate	  outcomes,	  for	  he	  
remarks	  that	  in	  sitting	  in	  judgment	  of	  the	  pass	  laws	  they	  were	  the	  ‘primary	  movers	  for	  the	  
implementation	  of	  apartheid’	  (M-­‐SA24).	  Though	  he	  does	  not	  draw	  the	  link	  to	  apartheid,	  his	  
comments	  regarding	  the	  extensive	  powers	  of	  the	  chief	  magistrate	  –	  the	  power	  to	  decide	  
whether	  gatherings	  can	  take	  place	  in	  the	  city	  (M-­‐SA18a)	  and	  whether	  a	  march	  can	  take	  place	  
(M-­‐SA18c),	  permissions	  critical	  to	  political	  mobilization	  –	  are	  aligned	  with	  this	  thought.	  	  
4.2.2	   Circumstances	  of	  social	  action	  	  
The	  26	  quotations	  pertaining	  to	  the	  magistrate	  yielded	  13	  extracts	  relating	  to	  resources,	  14	  
related	  to	  emotion,	  and	  14	  extracts	  to	  the	  location	  of	  social	  action.	  
I	  have	  already	  mentioned,	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  articled	  clerk,	  attorney	  and	  advocate	  
above,	  that	  the	  richness	  and	  variety	  of	  resources	  represented	  at	  the	  disposal	  of	  a	  particular	  
type	  of	  social	  actor	  tends	  to	  function	  as	  an	  index	  of	  social	  power.	  The	  relatively	  sparse	  
representation	  of	  resources	  in	  relation	  to	  magistrates	  tends	  to	  confirm	  this	  thesis.	  While	  the	  
lecturer	  did	  represent	  magistrates	  wielding	  significant	  symbolic	  resources	  –	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  
courts’	  jurisdiction	  in	  regard	  to	  civil	  and	  criminal	  matters	  (M-­‐CSA22),	  and	  the	  courts’	  capacity	  to	  
craft	  orders	  imposing	  payment	  of	  a	  specified	  sum	  of	  money	  (in	  civil	  matters),	  or	  a	  fine	  or	  prison	  
sentence	  (in	  criminal	  matters)	  (M-­‐CSA6;	  M-­‐CSA7)	  –	  in	  every	  other	  instance	  involving	  a	  semiotic	  
resource,	  the	  tenor	  of	  the	  representation	  fell	  on	  magistrates	  not	  having	  the	  required	  resources.	  
I	  have	  already	  quoted	  the	  passage	  in	  the	  data	  that	  suggests	  that	  magistrates	  did	  not	  require	  a	  
formal	  qualification	  before	  appointment,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  days	  of	  apartheid,	  since	  ‘walking	  past	  a	  
few	  law	  books	  would	  have	  sufficed’	  (M-­‐CSA11).	  The	  ‘gravitas	  and	  knowledge’	  required	  for	  
promotion	  to	  the	  High	  Court	  were	  represented	  as	  exceptionally	  rare	  qualities	  in	  the	  magistrate	  
population.	  Most	  devastatingly,	  however,	  magistrates	  were	  represented	  as	  lacking	  the	  




The	  lecturer	  also	  outlined	  a	  few	  material	  resources	  at	  the	  disposal	  of	  magistrates,	  such	  as	  a	  
tape	  machine	  (for	  recording	  the	  court	  proceedings	  –	  M-­‐CSA8f),	  and	  a	  diary	  for	  the	  High	  Court	  
(M-­‐CSA14b).	  The	  most	  interesting	  representation	  relating	  to	  material	  resources	  occurred	  in	  
quotation	  15,	  however,	  where	  the	  lecturer	  said:	  
LECTURER:	  .	  	  	  Um	  and	  that’s	  your	  court.	  It’s	  your	  court	  orderly,	  it’s	  your	  interpreter,	  it’s	  your	  
prosecutor,	  it’s	  uh	  …	  the	  whole	  organization	  is	  yours.	  You	  are	  the	  king,	  you	  are	  the	  king	  of	  the	  of	  
the	  dung	  heap.	  (M-­‐CSE15e).	  	  
Notable	  regarding	  this	  representation	  is	  the	  instrumentalization	  and	  possessivation	  of	  court	  
officials:	  They	  ‘belong’	  to	  the	  magistrate,	  the	  court	  is	  his.	  Secondly,	  like	  the	  ‘brief’	  in	  my	  
discussion	  of	  the	  advocate	  above,	  material	  ‘resources’	  are	  invested	  with	  symbolic	  meaning.	  
Here	  however	  the	  meaning	  is	  decidedly	  derogatory.	  While	  the	  magistrate	  may	  be	  king,	  it	  is	  a	  
hollow	  power	  indeed	  because	  the	  whole	  organization	  is	  nothing	  more	  than	  a	  dung	  heap.	  	  
Magistrates	  were	  represented	  as	  having	  a	  number	  of	  work-­‐related	  emotions.	  These	  centred	  on	  
three	  different	  objects:	  Their	  work	  and	  people	  involved	  in	  their	  work,	  the	  parties	  who	  appear	  
before	  them,	  and	  the	  government.	  The	  emotion	  of	  stress	  and	  anxiety,	  which	  featured	  so	  
strongly	  in	  the	  generic	  role	  of	  the	  lawyer	  and	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  articled	  clerk,	  attorney	  and	  
advocate	  featured	  in	  only	  one	  representation	  (M-­‐CSA15a).	  Instead,	  the	  predominant	  emotions	  
of	  magistrates	  towards	  their	  work,	  which	  was	  represented	  both	  directly	  and	  indirectly,	  can	  
perhaps	  be	  characterized	  as	  aversion,	  irritation,	  perhaps	  even	  disgust.	  Regarding	  the	  
matrimonial	  court,	  the	  lecturer	  declares	  ‘I	  had	  to	  serve	  for	  a	  limited	  period	  of	  time	  thank	  
heavens’	  (M-­‐CSA8a)	  and	  he	  even	  goes	  on	  record	  saying	  that	  he	  is	  ‘reluctantly’	  hearing	  the	  case	  
because	  no	  other	  magistrate	  is	  available	  (M-­‐CSA8g).	  During	  the	  proceedings	  he	  is	  irritated	  not	  
only	  with	  the	  client	  (M-­‐CSA8k),	  who	  he	  sees	  as	  trying	  to	  shirk	  his	  responsibilities,	  he	  is	  tired	  and	  
irritated	  with	  his	  colleagues	  sitting	  in	  their	  offices	  doing	  cross-­‐word	  puzzles,	  and	  with	  the	  world	  
for	  producing	  people	  like	  the	  accused	  who	  refuse	  to	  pay	  their	  maintenance	  (M-­‐CSA8k).	  He	  loses	  
his	  temper	  with	  the	  inexperienced	  prosecutor	  (M-­‐CSA8j).	  When	  he	  receives	  a	  phone	  call	  on	  a	  
Saturday	  evening,	  he	  immediately	  presumes	  it	  is	  someone	  requesting	  that	  he	  report	  for	  duty,	  
and	  his	  immediate	  reaction	  is	  irritation	  (M-­‐CSA8o).	  Mrs	  Gradiz,	  the	  old	  ‘battleaxe’	  of	  a	  




are	  understandable	  if	  the	  whole	  organization	  is	  comparable	  to	  a	  ‘dung	  heap’	  (M-­‐CSA15f),	  
further	  evidence	  for	  which	  is	  provided	  in	  the	  following	  extract:	  	  
LECTURER:	  If	  you	  become	  a	  magistrate	  and	  you’re	  so	  unlucky	  to	  get	  this	  court	  that	  I	  talked	  to	  
you	  about,	  the	  transitional	  court,	  the	  the	  directional	  court,	  uh	  that’s	  a	  hideous	  court	  because	  it’s	  
like	  a	  supermarket.	  You	  you	  get	  there	  at	  nine	  o	  clock	  in	  the	  morning	  and	  you	  must	  take	  a	  
decision	  every	  five	  minutes	  and	  all	  you	  get	  is	  the	  worst	  criminals	  in	  Johannesburg	  appearing	  
before	  you	  and	  all	  you	  must	  do	  is	  decide	  which	  court	  they	  must	  go	  to.	  Um	  and	  because	  it’s	  such	  
a	  horrible	  court	  if	  they	  put	  a	  magistrate	  there	  permanently	  he	  will	  go	  mad,	  not	  that	  magistrates	  
are	  not	  mad,	  I	  mean	  they	  are	  all	  mad	  [more	  laughter	  from	  class].	  But	  if	  you	  put	  a	  person	  there	  
permanently	  they	  will,	  I	  mean	  they	  will	  just	  resign	  after	  a	  week,	  I	  mean,	  it’s	  like	  casualty	  …	  uh	  
ward	  in	  Hillbrow.	  (M-­‐CSA15a)	  
Work	  in	  this	  particular	  court	  is	  ‘horrible’	  because	  the	  magistrate	  is	  required	  to	  process	  accused	  
persons	  every	  five	  minutes	  like	  so	  many	  groceries	  through	  the	  check-­‐out	  of	  a	  supermarket.	  The	  
work	  is	  stressful	  –	  like	  the	  casualty	  ward	  in	  Hillbrow	  (a	  notoriously	  crime-­‐ridden	  and	  ‘rough’	  
suburb	  in	  Johannesburg).	  It	  is	  additionally	  demoralizing	  because	  the	  people	  themselves	  are	  the	  
‘worst	  criminals’	  and	  the	  magistrate	  disempowered	  to	  take	  any	  decision	  regarding	  the	  
substance	  of	  their	  crimes.	  The	  lecturer’s	  gloss	  on	  the	  mental	  and	  emotional	  stability	  of	  
magistrates	  –	  ‘they	  are	  all	  mad’	  –	  suggests	  that	  it	  is	  not	  only	  work	  in	  this	  particular	  court	  that	  is	  
so	  trying.92	  Whereas	  the	  lecturer	  as	  magistrate	  records	  his	  empathy	  towards	  the	  mother	  whose	  
husband	  has	  defaulted	  on	  the	  payment	  of	  maintenance	  (M-­‐CSA8i;	  M-­‐CSA8l),	  unsurprisingly,	  
emotions	  expressed	  toward	  accused	  persons	  are	  harsh:	  Mrs	  Gradiz	  shows	  ‘no	  mercy’	  to	  the	  
genteel	  employee	  who	  steals	  R10	  000	  from	  her	  employer	  every	  month	  (M-­‐CSA16c),	  the	  lecturer	  
as	  magistrate	  ‘feels	  wonderful’	  after	  sentencing	  the	  defaulting	  husband	  to	  the	  maximum	  time	  
in	  prison	  and	  thinks	  ‘rot	  in	  hell	  I	  hope	  you	  never	  come	  out’	  (M-­‐CSA8m).	  	  
Negative	  emotions	  also	  featured	  in	  the	  relationship	  between	  magistrates	  and	  the	  new	  
democratic	  government,	  one	  that	  the	  lecturer	  characterized	  as	  being	  one	  of	  ‘animosity	  and	  
mistrust’	  (M-­‐CSA24).	  Taken	  together,	  therefore,	  the	  emotional	  undertones	  of	  being	  a	  
magistrate	  were	  represented	  as	  being	  far	  from	  pleasant	  or	  enjoyable.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92	  A	  number	  of	  years	  ago	  I	  was	  privileged	  to	  monitor	  three	  workshops	  held	  with	  district	  and	  regional	  court	  
magistrates	  at	  various	  locations	  in	  South	  Africa	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  a	  justice	  programme	  run	  by	  the	  University	  of	  
Cape	  Town.	  In	  my	  experience	  the	  toll	  of	  the	  work	  on	  their	  emotional	  well-­‐being	  was	  absolutely	  palpable,	  




In	  all	  but	  one	  instance	  (the	  lecturer’s	  reference	  to	  his	  dinner	  party	  at	  M-­‐CSA8n),	  magistrates	  
were	  located	  within	  the	  precincts	  of	  the	  court	  (M-­‐CSA4;	  M-­‐CSA8c;	  M-­‐CSA16b;	  M-­‐CSA21).	  
Magistrates’	  courts	  were	  generally	  characterized	  as	  the	  ‘lower’	  courts	  (M-­‐CSA1).	  What	  was	  
interesting	  was	  the	  more	  detailed	  spatial	  positioning	  of	  magistrates	  within	  the	  courts	  (e.g.	  
references	  to	  magistrates	  being	  in	  the	  court	  building	  (M-­‐CSA8d)	  or	  in	  their	  offices	  in	  the	  court	  
building	  (M-­‐CSA8e;	  M-­‐CSA15d)),	  or	  within	  specific	  types	  of	  courts.	  Thus	  the	  lecturer	  referred	  to	  
the	  matrimonial	  court	  (M-­‐CSA8b),	  the	  transitional	  or	  directional	  court	  (M-­‐CSA15b),	  and	  court	  
13	  or	  court	  25	  within	  the	  Johannesburg	  magistrates’	  court	  (M-­‐CSA14a;	  M-­‐CSA15c).	  There	  was	  a	  
slight	  geographical	  preference	  for	  Johannesburg	  (M-­‐CSA14a)	  and	  Cape	  Town	  (M-­‐CSA12a).	  
4.2.3	   Social	  actors	  	  
Magistrates	  
The	  by-­‐now	  familiar	  pattern	  of	  gender	  profiling	  through	  pronoun	  usage	  was	  also	  evident	  in	  the	  
role	  of	  the	  magistrate:	  Of	  the	  10	  extracts	  indicating	  the	  gender	  of	  magistrates,	  eight	  indexed	  
magistrates	  as	  male	  (M-­‐SAct4a;	  M-­‐SAct5b;	  M-­‐SAct7a;	  M-­‐SAct12c,	  d,	  f;	  M-­‐SAct18;	  M-­‐SAct19)	  
and	  two	  as	  female	  (M-­‐SAct16c,	  d).	  The	  two	  nominations	  (to	  ‘Andre	  Legransie’	  at	  M-­‐SAct12a	  and	  
‘Mrs	  Gradiz’	  at	  M-­‐SAct16e)	  were	  evenly	  split	  between	  male	  and	  female	  representations.	  The	  
one	  (perhaps	  tenuous)	  representation	  of	  class	  was	  constituted	  by	  the	  lecturer	  relating	  the	  
circumstances	  of	  his	  receiving	  a	  phone	  call	  from	  Judge	  Foxcroft	  regarding	  the	  defaulting	  
maintenance	  accused.	  At	  the	  time	  he	  was	  having	  a	  ‘dinner	  party’	  to	  which	  he	  had	  invited	  ‘lots	  
of	  people’	  –	  ‘ten	  or	  twelve’	  in	  number	  –	  and	  had	  just	  finished	  serving	  them	  their	  ‘first	  course’	  
(M-­‐SAct8l).	  The	  discursive	  markers	  ‘dinner	  party’,	  ‘lots	  of	  people’	  and	  ‘first	  course’	  index	  an	  
upper	  or	  at	  least	  middle-­‐class	  lifestyle,	  suggesting	  that	  even	  though	  magistrates	  are	  kings	  of	  the	  
‘dung	  heap’	  they	  are	  not	  in	  dire	  straits	  financially.	  	  
Racial	  classification	  was	  again	  barely	  evident	  but	  the	  one	  clear	  extract	  in	  this	  regard	  is	  
interesting	  for	  perhaps	  revealing	  why	  this	  was	  so:	  The	  lecturer,	  in	  mentioning	  Mr	  Andre	  
Legransie,	  finds	  it	  necessary	  to	  tag	  on	  the	  comment	  ‘I	  find	  it	  embarrassing	  always	  to	  refer	  to	  
this,	  but	  he	  was	  a	  man	  of	  colour’	  (M-­‐SAct12b).	  This	  is	  a	  curious	  tag	  for	  one	  wonders	  why	  the	  




the	  complex	  nature	  of	  race	  relations	  in	  South	  Africa.	  The	  lecturer	  may	  have	  found	  it	  necessary	  
to	  specifically	  state	  Mr	  Legransie’s	  race	  because	  both	  the	  magistrate’s	  first	  and	  surname	  are	  
most	  commonly	  associated	  as	  Afrikaans	  names,	  and	  would	  thus	  conjure	  up	  a	  picture	  of	  a	  white	  
male.	  His	  admission	  that	  the	  need	  to	  point	  out	  otherwise	  is	  ‘embarrassing’	  is	  potentially	  
double-­‐sided.	  On	  the	  one	  hand	  it	  seems	  to	  speak	  of	  a	  reticence	  within	  him	  to	  notice	  race.	  He	  
wishes	  to	  present	  himself	  as	  a	  person	  who	  is	  interested	  in	  the	  qualities	  (such	  as	  knowledge	  and	  
gravitas)	  that	  distinguish	  one	  in	  the	  professional	  world	  without	  reference	  to	  race.	  Admitting	  the	  
race	  of	  the	  person	  he	  is	  talking	  about	  thus	  goes	  against	  his	  own	  desire	  to	  appear	  to	  be	  ‘colour-­‐
blind’.	  However,	  his	  admission	  of	  the	  embarrassing	  nature	  of	  highlighting	  race	  also	  codes	  a	  
perception	  of	  the	  racial	  biases	  of	  his	  hearers.	  His	  unstated	  assumption	  is	  perhaps	  that	  his	  
hearers’	  first	  assumption	  would	  be	  that	  Mr	  Andre	  Legransie	  was	  white	  and	  male,	  based	  on	  the	  
racial	  and	  ethnic	  associations	  of	  the	  name	  and	  surname,	  coupled	  with	  the	  praise	  heaped	  on	  his	  
professional	  qualities.	  This	  is	  a	  racial	  assumption	  because	  it	  assumes	  that	  those	  who	  are	  highly	  
competent	  are	  ordinarily	  white	  and	  male.	  Correcting	  this	  assumption	  is	  thus	  embarrassing	  
because	  it	  constructs	  the	  hearer	  as	  someone	  holding	  such	  a	  racial	  bias	  and	  positions	  the	  
lecturer	  as	  the	  more	  enlightened	  other.	  
Instances	  of	  categorization	  in	  the	  quotations	  pertaining	  to	  the	  magistrate	  mainly	  revolved	  
around	  the	  distinction	  between	  ‘junior’	  (M-­‐SAct8b,	  j)	  and	  ‘senior’	  (M-­‐SAct9;	  M-­‐SAct15b;	  M-­‐
SAct16a;	  M-­‐SAct22a)	  magistrates.	  This	  (once	  again)	  confirms	  the	  pervasiveness	  of	  the	  weight	  
attached	  to	  hierarchy	  and	  status	  in	  the	  legal	  profession.	  	  
Parties	  	  
In	  contrast	  to	  the	  pattern	  established	  by	  the	  roles	  in	  the	  preferred	  career	  path,	  parties	  
appearing	  before	  magistrates	  were	  included	  (17	  extracts)	  to	  a	  significantly	  greater	  degree	  than	  
they	  were	  excluded	  or	  backgrounded	  (6	  extracts).	  There	  were	  also	  five	  extracts	  in	  which	  the	  
discursive	  resources	  employed	  simultaneously	  included	  and	  backgrounded	  the	  parties.	  This	  
high	  degree	  of	  inclusiveness	  underscores	  the	  chief	  focus	  of	  magistrates:	  The	  parties	  before	  




on	  social	  action	  above;	  i.e.	  as	  extending	  only	  over	  the	  parties	  before	  them	  and	  not	  over	  the	  law	  
or	  the	  language	  of	  the	  law.	  	  
The	  discursive	  resources	  used	  to	  background	  the	  parties	  appearing	  before	  magistrates	  were	  
generally	  no	  different	  from	  those	  used	  in	  the	  roles	  constituting	  the	  preferred	  career	  path.	  	  The	  
most	  frequently	  used	  term	  was	  ‘case’	  (M-­‐SAct5a;	  M-­‐SAct8c,	  d;	  M-­‐SAct15c)	  followed	  by	  the	  
words	  ‘matter’	  (M-­‐SAct17;	  M-­‐SAct22b)	  and	  ‘work’	  (M-­‐SAct23).	  In	  two	  instances	  the	  lecturer	  
excluded	  reference	  to	  the	  parties	  through	  a	  non-­‐transactive	  construction	  of	  the	  social	  action	  –	  
as	  in	  ‘he	  imposes	  a	  fine	  or	  prison	  sentence	  exceeding	  three	  months’	  (M-­‐SAct7b,	  see	  also	  M-­‐
SAct7c).	  The	  only	  new	  method	  of	  discursively	  backgrounding	  social	  actors	  was	  the	  lecturer’s	  
reference	  to	  pass	  laws	  in	  the	  statement	  ‘the	  magistrates	  courts	  were	  those	  courts	  that	  sat	  in	  
judgment	  on	  the	  pass	  laws’	  (M-­‐SAct24).	  In	  this	  instance,	  then,	  social	  actors	  were	  taken	  up	  in	  a	  
reference	  to	  a	  particular	  (and	  notorious)	  type	  of	  law.	  	  
Similarly	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  judge,	  the	  lecturer’s	  inclusion	  of	  social	  actors	  was	  at	  times	  personal	  
in	  the	  sense	  that	  he	  directly	  positioned	  students	  as	  the	  social	  actors	  appearing	  before	  
magistrates	  through	  use	  of	  the	  pronoun	  ‘you’	  (M-­‐SAct2;	  M-­‐SAct5a;	  M-­‐SAct6).	  In	  other	  instances	  
he	  referred	  to	  the	  ‘people’	  appearing	  before	  magistrates:	  The	  ‘people’	  who	  are	  ‘involved	  in	  the	  
case’	  (M-­‐SAct4b),	  who	  ‘don’t	  pay	  their	  maintenance’	  (M-­‐SAct8a),	  and	  who	  ‘rot	  in	  jail’	  (M-­‐
SAct14a).	  Unlike	  the	  role	  of	  the	  judge	  there	  was	  a	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  social	  actors	  as	  ‘lowlifes’	  
–	  the	  magistrates	  deals	  with	  accused	  people,	  prisoners	  (M-­‐SAct14b)	  and	  the	  ‘worst	  criminals	  in	  
Johannesburg’	  (M-­‐SAct15a).	  	  
In	  four	  instances	  there	  were	  more	  extended	  cameos	  of	  the	  social	  actors	  who	  appear	  before	  
magistrates:	  (i)	  The	  man	  who	  refused	  to	  pay	  his	  maintenance	  (M-­‐SAct8c,	  d,	  e,	  g,	  h,	  I,	  m);	  (ii)	  the	  
wife	  of	  the	  man	  who	  refused	  to	  pay	  maintenance	  (M-­‐SAct8f,	  k);	  (iii)	  a	  politician	  in	  the	  Western	  
Cape	  who	  was	  charged	  with	  corruption	  (M-­‐SAct12e);	  and	  (iv)	  a	  bookkeeper	  who	  had	  stolen	  
from	  her	  employer	  (M-­‐SAct16b,	  f).	  In	  all	  four	  instances,	  the	  lecturer	  represents	  the	  social	  actor	  
with	  strongly	  moral	  overtones	  that	  immediately	  tends	  to	  excite	  our	  sympathies	  as	  either	  for	  or	  
against	  them.	  The	  man	  who	  refused	  to	  pay	  his	  maintenance	  is	  ‘one	  of	  those	  typical	  …	  people	  




…	  drinking	  out	  his	  money’	  giving	  the	  rest	  to	  his	  eighteen-­‐year-­‐old	  girlfriend	  (M-­‐SAct8f);	  his	  wife	  
is	  ‘a	  wonderful	  decent	  person,	  with	  four	  children’	  (M-­‐SAct8e),	  a	  ‘domestic	  worker’	  who	  receives	  
a	  ‘pittance’	  for	  an	  income	  and	  still	  tries	  to	  keep	  her	  children	  at	  school	  (M-­‐SAct8f);	  the	  politician	  
is	  an	  ‘absolute	  buffoon’;	  and	  the	  bookkeeper	  is	  a	  ‘single	  mother,	  wonderful	  wonderful	  civilized,	  
first-­‐class	  citizen’	  who	  steals	  R10	  000	  from	  her	  employer	  every	  month	  for	  30	  years	  in	  order	  to	  
put	  her	  children	  through	  university	  (M-­‐SAct16b).	  In	  each	  case	  the	  representations	  tend	  to	  
excite	  an	  intuitive	  moral	  and	  emotional	  response:	  The	  law	  should	  come	  up	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  
wife	  and	  ensure	  that	  every	  measure	  possible	  is	  taken	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  man	  who	  has	  defaulted	  
on	  his	  maintenance	  for	  four	  years	  is	  not	  allowed	  to	  slip	  through	  the	  system	  once	  more;	  the	  
politician	  should	  be	  found	  guilty	  of	  corruption;	  and	  the	  motives	  of	  the	  bookkeeper	  in	  stealing	  
funds	  from	  her	  employer,	  as	  well	  as	  her	  character	  as	  a	  wonderful,	  civilized	  first-­‐class	  citizen,	  
should	  at	  least	  mitigate	  against	  her	  receiving	  too	  harsh	  a	  sentence.	  What	  is	  fascinating	  is	  that	  in	  
all	  four	  instances	  the	  lecturer’s	  representation	  of	  the	  working	  of	  the	  law	  did	  not	  affirm	  the	  
intuitive	  moral	  and	  emotional	  response.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  man	  who	  refused	  to	  pay	  his	  
maintenance,	  as	  already	  described	  above,	  while	  he	  is	  initially	  sentenced	  to	  12-­‐months	  
imprisonment	  this	  decision	  is	  taken	  on	  automatic	  review	  and	  subsequently	  reversed	  because	  as	  
a	  first-­‐time	  offender	  he	  should	  not	  have	  received	  a	  sentence	  that	  (constructively,	  because	  he	  
could	  not	  afford	  the	  fine),	  landed	  him	  in	  jail	  (M-­‐SAct8m).	  The	  politician	  facing	  corruption	  
charges	  is	  found	  not	  guilty	  based	  on	  the	  facts.	  Even	  though	  this	  upsets	  the	  Scorpions	  (the	  
security	  agents	  that	  formulated	  the	  charge),	  the	  magistrate	  staunchly	  maintains	  that	  the	  matter	  
was	  not	  proved	  beyond	  reasonable	  doubt	  (M-­‐SAct12f).	  The	  bookkeeper,	  by	  contrast,	  is	  sent	  to	  
jail	  ‘for	  a	  very,	  very	  long	  time’	  even	  thought	  she	  is	  a	  first-­‐time	  offender.	  Everyone	  is	  shocked	  at	  
the	  verdict	  and	  breaks	  down	  in	  court	  crying,	  saying	  that	  the	  bookkeeper	  will	  go	  for	  
rehabilitation,	  for	  courses	  to	  which	  the	  magistrate	  responds	  ‘yes,	  go	  do	  that	  in	  jail,	  there	  are	  
lots	  of	  wonderful	  courses	  that	  you	  can	  do.	  Go	  stand	  down’	  (M-­‐SAct16f).	  Contrary	  to	  the	  
defaulting	  maintenance	  payer,	  the	  prison	  sentence	  for	  the	  bookkeeper	  –	  also	  a	  first-­‐time	  
offender	  –	  is	  confirmed	  on	  review.	  There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  in	  each	  case	  there	  were	  probably	  
sound	  legal	  reasons	  for	  the	  magistrate	  deciding	  the	  matter	  in	  the	  way	  he	  or	  she	  did.	  The	  
lecturer	  does	  not,	  however,	  make	  these	  explicit,	  or	  if	  they	  are	  mentioned	  they	  are	  not	  




of	  a	  somewhat	  arbitrary,	  unpredictable	  system	  that	  frequently	  supports	  those	  who	  we	  
intuitively	  believe	  it	  should	  be	  defending	  us	  against.	  	  
4.2.4	  	   Values	  	  
There	  were	  36	  extracts	  in	  the	  magistrate	  quotations	  in	  which	  magistrates	  or	  their	  work	  were	  
valued	  or	  devalued.	  In	  this	  instance	  the	  overwhelming	  majority	  of	  extracts	  pertained	  to	  
valuations	  of	  magistrates	  per	  se	  (22	  extracts	  or	  61%),	  with	  10	  and	  4	  extracts	  pertaining	  to	  the	  
internal	  and	  external	  goods	  of	  the	  practice	  respectively.	  Similarly	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  judge,	  
therefore,	  there	  was	  less	  emphasis	  on	  external	  goods.	  Moral	  evaluation	  once	  against	  
constituted	  the	  most	  common	  way	  in	  which	  values	  were	  coded	  (in	  28	  extracts	  or	  77%).	  The	  
remaining	  evaluations	  were	  purposive	  in	  construction.	  	  
The	  majority	  of	  the	  lecturer’s	  evaluations	  of	  magistrates	  themselves	  were	  negative	  (14	  out	  of	  
22	  extracts,	  or	  63%).	  Although	  the	  lecturer	  twice	  remarked	  that	  magistrates	  courts	  are	  ‘very	  
important’	  because	  they	  do	  the	  lion’s	  share	  of	  the	  work	  (M-­‐V13;	  M-­‐V23),	  they	  are	  also	  ‘very	  
neglected’	  (M-­‐V23).	  Why	  this	  should	  be	  so	  appears	  to	  lie	  in	  their	  ‘given’	  status	  as	  ‘lower	  courts’	  
(M-­‐V1),	  which	  is	  in	  turn	  related	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  magistrates	  cannot	  set	  precedent	  –	  their	  
decision	  is	  ‘just’	  binding	  on	  the	  parties	  (M-­‐V2a).	  Additionally,	  there	  is	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  
magistrate’s	  decision	  can	  be	  overruled,	  either	  through	  the	  process	  of	  automatic	  review	  (M-­‐V8f)	  
or	  through	  the	  decision	  being	  appealed.	  In	  the	  passages	  illustrating	  the	  process	  of	  appeal,	  the	  
lecturer	  placed	  a	  strong	  emphasis	  on	  the	  magistrate’s	  decision	  being	  ‘wrong’	  or	  ‘incorrect’	  (M-­‐
V6a),	  or	  the	  magistrate	  making	  an	  ‘error’	  (M-­‐V6b).	  Instead	  of	  simply	  saying	  that	  the	  
magistrate’s	  decision	  could	  then	  be	  overruled,	  the	  lecturer	  remarked	  that	  the	  magistrate’s	  
decision	  is	  then	  ‘worth	  nothing!	  It	  loses	  all	  it’s	  value’	  (M-­‐V2b),	  thus	  stating	  the	  effects	  of	  appeal	  
on	  magistrates’	  courts	  in	  extreme	  terms.	  The	  lower	  status	  of	  magistrates’	  courts	  was	  further	  
constituted	  by	  the	  use	  of	  the	  word	  ‘even’.	  Thus	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  impress	  other	  lawyers	  ‘even’	  in	  
the	  magistrates’	  court	  (M-­‐V25).	  The	  use	  of	  ‘even’	  in	  this	  context	  suggests	  that	  while	  it	  may	  be	  





In	  numerous	  instances,	  the	  lecturer	  compared	  magistrates	  unfavourably	  in	  relation	  to	  judges.	  
Thus	  he	  stated	  that	  ‘even’	  though	  magistrates	  have	  become	  judges	  (M-­‐V26),	  this	  is	  very	  much	  
the	  exception.	  The	  ordinary,	  ‘run-­‐of-­‐the-­‐mill’	  magistrate	  (M-­‐V12d)	  is	  very	  ‘far	  removed’	  from	  
being	  a	  judge	  (M-­‐V10,	  M-­‐V11).	  The	  reasons	  for	  magistrates	  being	  so	  far	  removed	  from	  judges	  
are	  suggested,	  rather	  than	  stated	  explicitly.	  It	  could	  have	  something	  to	  do	  with	  their	  lack	  of	  
knowledge,	  gravitas	  and	  professionalism	  (M-­‐V12a,	  c),	  with	  their	  lack	  of	  training	  (M-­‐V11),	  with	  
their	  lack	  of	  independence	  and	  their	  resultant	  characterization	  as	  ‘civil	  servants’	  and	  
(particularly	  during	  the	  apartheid	  era)	  as	  ‘lackeys’	  of	  the	  government	  (M-­‐V18c;	  M-­‐V24a),	  or	  
with	  the	  conditions	  of	  their	  work	  (M-­‐V15d).	  
I	  found	  it	  interesting	  that,	  comparatively	  speaking,	  there	  were	  a	  fair	  number	  of	  extracts	  
associated	  with	  the	  internal	  goods	  of	  being	  a	  magistrate	  (10	  extracts	  or	  27%	  of	  the	  total	  
number	  of	  extracts	  pertaining	  to	  values).	  These	  extracts	  suggested	  that	  the	  work	  of	  
magistrate’s	  is	  valued	  and	  valuable	  because	  it	  has	  to	  do	  with	  the	  promotion	  of	  human	  rights	  
(M-­‐V8e;	  M-­‐V12b),	  the	  promotion	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  (M-­‐V8c),	  and	  the	  promotion	  of	  fairness	  in	  
the	  administration	  of	  justice	  (M-­‐V8a,	  b,	  d,	  e;	  M-­‐V14a,	  b).	  The	  latter	  is	  interesting	  for	  examining	  
how	  the	  lecturer	  both	  constituted	  and	  positioned	  himself	  in	  relation	  to	  this	  internal	  good.	  In	  the	  
anecdote	  regarding	  the	  man	  who	  refused	  to	  pay	  maintenance	  there	  are	  four	  points	  at	  which	  
the	  lecturer	  hints	  at	  the	  moral	  prescriptions	  under	  which	  he	  was	  functioning	  as	  a	  sitting	  
magistrate.	  Three	  of	  these	  are	  professional	  in	  nature:	  Thus	  he	  indicates	  that	  he	  is	  hearing	  the	  
matter	  ‘because	  otherwise	  this	  man	  will	  stay	  in	  jail	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  weekend’	  (M-­‐V8a);	  he	  
indicates	  his	  knowledge	  of	  the	  rule	  that	  while	  a	  magistrate	  can	  take	  over	  the	  inquisition	  of	  an	  
accused	  in	  a	  maintenance	  matter,	  the	  magistrate	  should	  ‘never’	  cross-­‐examine	  the	  accused	  
from	  the	  bench	  (M-­‐V8b);	  as	  well	  as	  the	  rule	  that	  ‘you	  never	  send	  a	  first	  time	  offender	  to	  jail’	  
(M-­‐V8d).	  All	  of	  these	  prescriptions	  relate	  to	  the	  value	  of	  fairness	  in	  the	  process	  of	  judicial	  
adjudication	  and	  they	  are	  unique	  to	  the	  profession	  of	  law.	  The	  last	  moral	  prescription	  in	  this	  
anecdote,	  however,	  is	  a	  ‘lay’	  in	  character	  –	  an	  intuitive	  moral	  identification	  with	  the	  woman	  of	  
the	  husband	  and	  her	  quest	  to	  raise	  her	  four	  children	  (M-­‐V8e).	  The	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  lecturer	  
relates	  the	  anecdote,	  however,	  seems	  to	  set	  up	  a	  tension	  between	  professional	  and	  lay	  values,	  




desired	  outcome:	  That	  the	  defaulting	  husband	  be	  punished	  for	  his	  actions.	  Thus	  the	  lecturer	  
indicates	  that	  he	  is	  hearing	  the	  matter	  ‘reluctantly’	  and	  it	  is	  clear	  he	  breaks	  the	  rules	  regarding	  
cross-­‐examination	  from	  the	  bench	  and	  the	  sentencing	  of	  a	  first-­‐time	  offender	  to	  a	  jail	  term.	  This	  
tension	  is	  also	  evident	  in	  the	  two	  other	  representations	  relating	  to	  the	  internal	  good	  of	  fairness	  
in	  the	  administration	  of	  justice.	  In	  talking	  of	  the	  rationale	  for	  the	  directional	  or	  transitional	  
court	  the	  lecturer	  first	  states	  ‘In	  order	  not	  to	  let	  the	  people	  rot	  in	  jail,	  you	  bring	  them	  to	  the	  
magistrates’	  court	  to	  what	  we	  call	  a	  directional	  court,	  Court	  13	  in	  Johannesburg’	  (M-­‐V14a,	  my	  
emphasis).	  This	  statement	  is	  directly	  followed	  with	  a	  more	  official,	  sanitized	  statement:	  
LECTURER:	  They’ve	  only	  got	  authority	  to	  send	  it	  to	  the	  High	  Court.	  Why	  do	  they	  do	  this?	  The	  
main	  reason	  is	  so	  that	  the	  prisoners	  or	  the	  accused	  not	  remain	  in	  custody	  until	  the	  High	  Court	  
can	  hear	  them	  in	  five	  or	  eight	  or	  ten	  weeks	  or	  months	  time.	  
While	  the	  lecturer	  is	  thus	  able	  to	  state	  the	  rationale	  in	  official	  terms	  (‘so	  that	  the	  prisoners	  or	  
the	  accused	  not	  remain	  in	  custody	  until	  the	  High	  Court	  can	  hear	  them	  …’)	  the	  statement	  ‘in	  
order	  not	  to	  let	  the	  people	  ‘rot’	  in	  jail	  suggests	  that	  his	  position	  on	  the	  rationale	  is,	  at	  best,	  
ambiguous.	  The	  people	  who	  appear	  before	  the	  directional	  court	  are	  slightly	  dehumanized,	  
associated	  with	  ‘rot’	  and	  ‘rotting’	  and	  jail	  is	  perhaps	  the	  best	  place	  for	  them.	  
Compared	  to	  the	  roles	  constituting	  the	  preferred	  career	  path	  there	  were	  relatively	  few	  
representations	  of	  external	  goods.	  The	  possibility	  of	  promotion	  to	  the	  bench	  (M-­‐V9),	  power	  (M-­‐
V18b;	  M-­‐V19),	  status	  (M-­‐V19)	  and	  control	  over	  work	  circumstances	  (M-­‐V15c)	  were	  mentioned.	  
Notable	  of	  course,	  is	  the	  lack	  of	  any	  representation	  regarding	  the	  monetary	  rewards	  of	  being	  a	  
magistrate.	  	  
4.2.5	   Summary	  	  
Unlike	  the	  judge,	  the	  adjudicator	  in	  the	  preferred	  career	  path,	  the	  magistrate	  ‘practices’	  rather	  
than	  ‘creates’	  or	  ‘develops’	  law.	  Whilst	  the	  actions	  of	  this	  role	  are	  still	  generally	  active	  and	  
transactive,	  they	  are	  less	  semiotic	  in	  nature	  and,	  most	  notably,	  extend	  only	  to	  the	  parties	  in	  a	  
case:	  Magistrates	  have	  no	  power	  to	  create	  precedent	  and	  to	  thereby	  extend	  the	  range	  of	  
influence	  of	  their	  decisions.	  Numerous	  other	  features	  of	  the	  social	  practice	  mark	  the	  inferiority	  




encompass	  promoting	  human	  rights	  and	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  fairness	  in	  the	  administration	  of	  
justice,	  but	  they	  are	  mentioned	  in	  a	  very	  oblique	  fashion.	  The	  purposes	  and	  values	  of	  law	  and	  
the	  legal	  profession	  are	  somewhat	  complicated	  by	  the	  representations	  relating	  to	  particular	  
parties	  who	  appeared	  in	  the	  magistrates’	  courts	  on	  various	  criminal	  charges,	  with	  the	  penalties	  
in	  each	  case	  seemingly	  running	  contrary	  to	  an	  intuitive	  sense	  of	  morality	  and	  justice.	  Of	  all	  the	  
roles	  discussed	  in	  this	  chapter	  thus	  far,	  the	  role	  of	  monetary	  rewards	  is	  least	  prominent.	  The	  
nature	  of	  the	  work	  of	  the	  magistrate	  appears	  at	  many	  times	  to	  be	  trying.	  Exclusively	  adversarial	  
in	  nature,	  it	  is	  frequently	  stressful,	  demoralizing	  and	  routine.	  Magistrates	  appear	  to	  have,	  or	  at	  
least	  to	  develop,	  a	  very	  hardened	  emotional	  response	  to	  the	  parties	  who	  appear	  before	  them,	  
taking	  pleasure	  in	  the	  thought	  of	  a	  convicted	  criminal	  ‘rotting’	  in	  jail.	  While	  the	  parties	  who	  
appear	  before	  magistrates	  were	  included	  to	  a	  far	  greater	  extent	  than	  they	  were	  excluded,	  they	  
tended	  to	  be	  people	  whom	  one	  would	  consider	  to	  have	  low	  levels	  of	  moral	  integrity.	  The	  social	  
profile	  of	  the	  magistrate	  is	  predominantly	  male,	  with	  only	  one	  clear,	  but	  nevertheless	  revealing,	  





5.	   THE	  LEGAL	  ACADEMIC	  
The	  role	  of	  the	  legal	  academic	  was	  constituted	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  other	  roles	  represented	  in	  the	  
lecturer’s	  classroom	  talk	  through	  a	  mere	  four	  quotations.	  The	  most	  outstanding	  aspect	  of	  this	  
positioning	  was	  that	  the	  lecturer	  represented	  the	  legal	  academic	  as	  ‘the	  best	  place	  to	  be	  in	  the	  
legal	  field’,	  ‘the	  best	  profession	  of	  all’	  (LA-­‐Q12;	  LA-­‐Q20).	  This	  was	  underscored	  by	  the	  use	  of	  a	  
relational	  clause.	  Unlike	  some	  of	  the	  other	  roles	  discussed	  thus	  far,	  the	  lecturer	  provided	  no	  
indication	  of	  the	  social	  paths	  one	  follows	  in	  order	  to	  become	  a	  legal	  academic.	  He	  did	  however	  
indicate	  that	  confirmed,	  established	  academics	  have	  the	  alternative	  options	  of	  going	  to	  the	  bar	  
(i.e.	  becoming	  an	  advocate)	  (LA-­‐Q3;	  LA-­‐Q6),	  and	  being	  appointed	  as	  a	  judge	  (LA-­‐Q9),	  thus	  
representing	  alternative	  paths	  to	  becoming	  an	  advocate	  and	  judge	  respectively.	  	  
5.1	   Social	  action	  	  
There	  were	  37	  extracts	  relating	  to	  social	  action	  in	  the	  20	  quotations	  attached	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  
legal	  academic.	  Similarly	  to	  all	  the	  other	  roles	  constituted	  in	  his	  classroom	  talk,	  the	  lecturer	  
represented	  the	  social	  action	  of	  legal	  academics	  as	  predominantly	  active	  (72%	  of	  extracts),	  
transactive	  (64%)	  and	  semiotic	  (72%).	  	  
Legal	  academics	  were	  most	  frequently	  represented	  as	  ‘writing’,	  ‘authoring’,	  or	  ‘publishing’	  
books	  or	  journal	  articles	  (LA-­‐SA1b;	  LA-­‐SA3a;	  LA-­‐SA6a;	  LA-­‐SA7a;	  L-­‐SA8c,	  e;	  LA-­‐SA11;	  LA-­‐SA12b;	  
LA-­‐SA18a).	  This	  aspect	  of	  their	  work	  clearly	  overshadowed	  their	  role	  as	  teachers	  of	  the	  next	  
generation	  of	  lawyers,	  with	  teaching	  only	  receiving	  a	  cursory	  mention	  in	  three	  extracts	  (LA-­‐
SA7b;	  LA-­‐SA12a;	  L-­‐SA15).	  The	  capacity	  to	  produce	  books	  or	  journal	  articles	  simultaneously	  
implies	  a	  mastery	  over	  language	  –	  a	  power	  the	  lecturer	  specifically	  associated	  with	  legal	  
academics	  through	  his	  anecdote	  of	  Dr	  van	  der	  Merwe,	  the	  master	  of	  translation	  (LA-­‐SA1a,	  e,	  h)	  
who	  was	  ‘very,	  very	  good	  with	  languages’	  (LA-­‐SA1h).	  This	  is	  a	  lesser	  power	  compared	  to	  the	  
judge,	  however,	  for	  nowhere	  does	  the	  lecturer	  suggest	  that	  legal	  academics	  have	  power	  to	  
change	  meanings,	  as	  was	  illustrated	  by	  the	  case	  where	  the	  judge	  interpreted	  the	  word	  ‘in’	  to	  
mean	  ‘not	  in’	  (see	  the	  section	  on	  the	  social	  action	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  judge	  above).	  	  
The	  power	  to	  produce	  books	  or	  journal	  articles,	  however,	  is	  an	  incomplete	  power	  and	  serves	  as	  




meaningful	  when	  the	  views	  expressed	  therein	  are	  taken	  into	  consideration	  by	  the	  courts	  (LA-­‐
SA4).	  The	  aspiration	  of	  the	  legal	  academic,	  therefore,	  is	  to	  be	  quoted,	  especially	  by	  the	  courts	  
(LA-­‐SA5;	  LA-­‐SA7c;	  LA-­‐SA8a,	  d).	  A	  legal	  academic	  has	  the	  ‘ability	  to	  change	  the	  law’,	  but	  only	  if	  
‘people	  listen	  to	  you	  …	  people	  follow	  what	  you	  say,	  the	  courts	  quote	  you,	  the	  courts	  follow	  on	  
what	  your	  views	  are’	  (LA-­‐SA12c,	  see	  also	  LA-­‐SA4).	  This	  in	  turn	  rests	  heavily	  on	  one’s	  reputation	  
and	  standing.	  Referring	  to	  Professor	  John	  Dugard,	  the	  lecturer	  states	  (note	  also	  the	  presence	  of	  
if-­‐then	  constructions	  in	  this	  extract):	  	  
LECTURER:	  If	  you	  quote	  John	  Dugard	  on	  an	  international	  issue	  it’s	  more	  likely	  than	  not	  that	  the	  
court	  will	  follow	  what	  John	  Dugard	  said.	  …	  If	  you	  are	  a	  senior	  professor	  with	  an	  international	  
reputation	  then	  the	  courts	  will	  follow	  what	  you	  say.	  And	  if	  you	  are	  a	  junior	  academic,	  not	  
impossible	  that	  the	  courts	  will	  listen	  to	  you,	  but	  it	  is	  very	  unlikely	  that	  the	  courts	  will	  be	  swayed	  
by	  an	  un-­‐	  unheard	  of	  or	  unknown	  academic.	  (LA-­‐SA5,	  see	  also	  LA-­‐SA)	  
Apart	  from	  promotion	  to	  senior	  status	  within	  the	  academy	  (LA-­‐SA16a),	  reputation	  and	  standing	  
would	  seem	  to	  rest	  on	  the	  publication	  of	  ‘standard	  works’	  in	  a	  legal	  field,	  and	  rating	  by	  the	  
National	  Research	  Foundation	  (LA-­‐SA8b).	  	  
Because	  the	  lecturer	  constructs	  the	  meaningfulness	  of	  the	  legal	  academic	  almost	  exclusively	  
around	  this	  capacity	  to	  influence	  changes	  in	  the	  law,	  the	  legal	  academic	  who	  does	  not	  rise	  to	  
this	  status	  is	  threatened	  by	  the	  spectre	  of	  meaninglessness.	  Speaking	  of	  his	  then	  current	  
research	  interest,	  the	  lecturer	  remarks,	  almost	  cynically:	  	  
LECTURER:	  Nobody	  reads	  journal	  articles.	  …	  Um	  the	  only	  people	  reading	  journal	  articles,	  learned	  
journal	  articles,	  are	  the	  thirty	  percent	  of	  academics	  who	  are	  involved	  in	  the	  publishing	  of	  those	  
articles.	  You	  know,	  peer	  review	  and	  editors?	  They	  read	  it,	  but	  uh	  other	  …	  seventy	  percent	  of	  the	  
other	  academics	  never	  read	  it.	  So	  you	  know	  it’s	  a	  you	  know	  it’s	  a	  it’s	  like	  a	  little	  mouse	  in	  one	  of	  
these	  little	  wheels	  but	  nevertheless	  perhaps	  we	  can	  cause	  some	  excitement.	  (LA-­‐Q2)	  
While	  the	  role	  of	  the	  advocate	  is	  haunted	  by	  the	  spectre	  of	  the	  failed	  advocate,	  desperately	  
trying	  to	  conduct	  his	  practice	  from	  the	  library	  steps	  of	  the	  bar	  in	  Sandton,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  legal	  
academic	  is	  haunted	  by	  the	  image	  of	  a	  little	  mouse,	  in	  a	  cage,	  going	  nowhere	  on	  a	  play	  wheel.	  	  
The	  lecturer	  presented	  one	  counter-­‐cultural	  example	  of	  a	  legal	  academic	  ‘presenting’	  his	  views	  
to	  the	  court	  other	  than	  through	  the	  normal	  route	  of	  publication	  –	  that	  of	  Professor	  Dugard’s	  




5.2	   Circumstances	  of	  social	  action	  
The	  majority	  of	  extracts	  pertaining	  to	  the	  circumstances	  of	  social	  action	  of	  the	  legal	  academic	  
were	  related	  to	  location	  (17	  extracts),	  with	  only	  9	  and	  5	  extracts	  relating	  to	  resources	  and	  the	  
representation	  of	  emotions	  respectively.	  The	  representation	  of	  location,	  however,	  offered	  
nothing	  that	  was	  particularly	  surprising	  –	  in	  the	  majority	  of	  instances,	  legal	  academics	  were	  
located	  within	  ‘academia’,	  ‘tertiary	  institutions	  (LA-­‐CSA3b;	  LA-­‐CSA12;	  LA-­‐CSA20)	  or	  particular	  
universities	  	  (LA-­‐CSA1a;	  LA-­‐CSA5a,	  b;	  LA-­‐CSA9;	  LA-­‐CSA11;	  LA-­‐CSA18).	  Somewhat	  strangely,	  the	  
lecturer	  also	  represented	  ‘Justice	  College’	  –	  the	  training	  unit	  for	  state	  prosecutors,	  magistrates	  
and	  others	  attached	  to	  the	  Department	  of	  Justice	  –	  as	  a	  ‘small	  little	  university	  within	  the	  
department	  of	  justice’	  (LA-­‐CSA1j,	  see	  also	  LA-­‐CSA1b,	  d).	  Legal	  academics	  were	  also	  located	  at	  
the	  courts	  (LA-­‐CSA6;	  LA-­‐CSA19b),	  as	  ‘going	  to	  the	  bar’	  (LA-­‐CSA1c),	  and	  as	  being	  able	  to	  work	  
from	  ‘home’	  	  (LA-­‐CSA14b).	  
The	  representation	  of	  resources	  was	  somewhat	  more	  interesting.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  other	  roles	  
represented	  in	  the	  lecturer’s	  classroom	  talk,	  the	  working	  conditions	  of	  the	  legal	  academic	  were	  
represented	  as	  being	  ‘very	  very	  pleasant’	  (LA-­‐CSA14a).	  The	  basis	  for	  this	  evaluation	  was	  
essentially	  five-­‐fold.	  The	  working	  conditions	  are	  pleasant	  because	  one	  as	  has	  ready	  access	  to	  
books	  and	  other	  materials	  (LA-­‐CSA14a;	  LA-­‐CSA16c);	  ready	  access	  to	  computers	  (LA-­‐CSA14a);	  
the	  working	  hours	  are	  not	  fixed	  (LA-­‐CSA14a);	  there	  are	  opportunities	  to	  attend	  international	  
and	  local	  conferences	  (LA-­‐CSA1e);	  LA-­‐CSA14a);	  as	  well	  as	  opportunities	  to	  obtain	  advanced	  
degrees,	  with	  such	  study	  funded	  by	  the	  university	  (LA-­‐CSA14a).	  Each	  of	  these	  resources	  in	  itself	  
codes	  value:	  Such	  working	  conditions	  are	  pleasant	  because	  the	  lecturer	  values	  books,	  flexible	  
working	  hours,	  study	  and,	  perhaps,	  travel	  and	  meeting	  other	  academics.	  Also	  qualifying	  as	  a	  
resource	  is	  the	  ‘rule’	  that	  legal	  academics	  may	  use	  20	  per	  cent	  of	  their	  time	  to	  attend	  to	  their	  
own	  private	  practices	  (LA-­‐CSA19a).	  The	  rationale	  for	  the	  rule	  is	  ostensibly	  to	  allow	  legal	  
academics	  to	  obtain	  court	  experience,	  but	  more	  importantly	  and	  like	  the	  resources	  listed	  
above,	  it	  is	  meant	  to	  ‘sugercoat’	  the	  role	  of	  the	  legal	  academic,	  to	  make	  being	  a	  legal	  academic	  
more	  ‘appetizing’	  (LA-­‐CSA13)	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  reality	  that	  the	  salaries	  are	  much	  less	  than	  what	  




As	  already	  mentioned,	  similarly	  to	  the	  roles	  in	  the	  preferred	  career	  path,	  the	  legal	  academic	  
cannot	  escape	  the	  need	  to	  develop	  a	  good	  reputation	  as	  a	  key	  resource	  to	  success	  (LA-­‐CSA3a;	  
LA-­‐CSA5c;	  LA-­‐CSA8;	  LA-­‐CSA16a).	  
The	  lecturer’s	  representation	  of	  the	  emotions	  that	  stem	  from	  the	  work	  of	  being	  a	  legal	  
academic	  was	  limited	  to	  the	  comment	  that	  there’s	  lots	  of	  ‘jealousy’	  in	  the	  academy	  and,	  
especially	  in	  well-­‐established	  legal	  systems	  where	  it	  is	  ‘difficult	  to	  think	  of	  anything	  novel	  …	  the	  
competition	  is	  fierce’	  (LA-­‐CSA13).	  While	  the	  working	  conditions	  are	  thus	  ‘very	  very	  pleasant’	  the	  
emotional	  ground-­‐tone	  of	  working	  in	  those	  conditions	  is	  apparently	  not.	  Apart	  from	  this,	  in	  his	  
extended	  anecdote	  relating	  to	  Dr	  Van	  der	  Merwe,	  the	  lecturer	  represented	  legal	  academics	  as	  
somewhat	  irrational	  beings	  that	  are	  driven	  by	  emotion	  to	  extreme	  positions.	  Dr	  van	  der	  Merwe	  
‘falls	  in	  love’	  with	  the	  wife	  of	  a	  professor	  at	  UNISA	  (LA-­‐CSA1d),	  an	  emotion	  so	  strong	  that	  he	  
divorces	  his	  wife	  in	  order	  to	  be	  with	  her	  (LA-­‐CSA1h).	  The	  UNISA	  professor	  is	  ‘extremely	  cross’	  
and	  obtains	  a	  court	  order	  to	  restrain	  Dr	  Van	  der	  Merwe	  from	  coming	  close	  to	  his	  wife	  or	  house.	  
However,	  the	  doctor	  ignores	  this	  and	  carries	  on	  with	  his	  affair	  –	  ‘he	  was	  in	  love	  with	  this	  girl’.	  So	  
the	  other	  professor	  has	  him	  arrested	  and	  charged	  with	  contempt	  of	  court	  and	  Dr	  van	  der	  
Merwe	  subsequently	  loses	  his	  job	  as	  a	  professor	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Pretoria	  because	  ‘in	  those	  
days,	  if	  you	  had	  a	  criminal	  charge,	  you	  couldn’t	  be	  a	  professor’	  (LA-­‐CSA1i).	  So	  unlike	  every	  other	  
role	  in	  this	  research,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  legal	  academic	  perhaps	  allows	  for,	  even	  encourages	  an	  
emotional	  life	  that	  can	  be	  lived	  out	  –	  even	  if	  it	  means	  going	  against	  the	  law	  and	  experiencing	  
the	  consequences	  of	  this.	  	  
5.3	   Social	  actors	  	  
For	  the	  role	  of	  the	  legal	  academic,	  it	  was	  only	  necessary	  to	  consider	  legal	  academics	  themselves	  
as	  social	  actors,	  as	  clients	  or	  parties	  played	  no	  role	  in	  the	  constitution	  of	  this	  role.	  There	  were	  
11	  extracts	  relating	  to	  classification	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  gender,	  of	  which	  male	  classifications	  were	  
once	  again	  in	  the	  majority;	  three	  extracts	  related	  to	  classification	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  class;	  and	  
none	  related	  to	  racial	  classification.	  A	  surprisingly	  large	  number	  of	  nominations	  were	  used	  in	  
relation	  to	  this	  role	  (14	  extracts),	  but	  these	  only	  referred	  to	  eight	  academics	  as	  some	  were	  




In	  the	  nine	  extracts	  related	  to	  male	  classification	  (LA-­‐SAct1b,	  c;	  LA-­‐SAct3b;	  LA-­‐SAct4b,	  c;	  LA-­‐
SAct8c;	  LA-­‐SAct11b;	  LA-­‐SAct18b),	  and	  the	  two	  associated	  with	  female	  classification	  (LA-­‐SAct7b;	  
LA-­‐SAct9b)	  the	  gender	  classification	  was	  achieved	  by	  discursive	  resources	  no	  different	  than	  
those	  employed	  for	  all	  the	  roles	  discussed	  thus	  far;	  i.e.	  through	  pronoun	  usage.	  The	  use	  of	  
gender-­‐specific	  pronouns	  was,	  however,	  very	  closely	  linked	  to	  nominations	  in	  the	  text	  (i.e.	  the	  
lecturer	  would	  nominate	  a	  particular	  individual	  and	  then,	  through	  pronoun	  usage,	  indicate	  
whether	  the	  individual	  was	  male	  or	  female).	  This	  means	  that	  when	  the	  lecturer	  spoke	  of	  legal	  
academics	  more	  generally	  there	  was	  a	  tendency	  to	  use	  gender-­‐neutral	  terms.	  Of	  the	  eight	  
nominated	  academics,	  six	  were	  male	  and	  two	  female.	  	  
The	  lecturer’s	  representations	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  legal	  academics	  occupy	  a	  lower	  social	  class	  
than	  other	  legal	  professionals	  since	  practitioners	  ‘earn	  five	  times	  what	  the	  academics	  earn’	  (LA-­‐
SAct19).	  Legal	  academics	  are	  seemingly	  middle	  class	  people.	  They	  ‘can	  make	  a	  pleasant	  living’	  
(LA-­‐SAct17c),	  though	  it	  is	  ‘difficult’	  to	  support	  one’s	  self	  on	  the	  salary,	  writing	  books	  and	  
journals	  (LA-­‐SAct20).	  They	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  afford	  a	  ‘Porsche’	  or	  a	  ‘vintage	  Rolls	  Royce’	  (LA-­‐
SAct17c).	  The	  lecturer,	  however,	  indicates	  his	  preference	  for	  having	  the	  best	  of	  both	  worlds	  
because	  he	  hints	  that	  this	  is	  indeed	  possible	  if	  one	  marries	  ‘a	  very	  successful	  lawyer’	  (LA-­‐
SAct17c).	  An	  if-­‐then	  construction	  relating	  to	  marrying	  a	  successful	  lawyer	  thus	  underlines	  the	  
message	  that	  obtaining	  these	  kinds	  of	  material	  rewards	  is	  not	  possible	  for	  legal	  academics	  per	  
se.	  In	  similar	  vein	  he	  holds	  that	  ‘you	  must	  be	  independently	  wealthy’	  to	  become	  a	  legal	  
academic	  (LA-­‐SAct20).	  	  	  
There	  were	  at	  least	  ten	  forms	  of	  categorization	  in	  the	  quotations	  relating	  to	  the	  legal	  academic,	  
though	  it	  was	  difficult	  to	  discern	  any	  pattern	  among	  these,	  as	  the	  bases	  for	  categorization	  were	  
quite	  different.	  The	  only	  possible	  emergent	  theme	  related	  to	  categorization	  was	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  
being	  confirmed	  or	  established	  (LA-­‐SAct3c),	  being	  a	  ‘full	  professor’	  (LA-­‐SAct17b),	  being	  
internationally-­‐renowned	  (LA-­‐SAct5b),	  one	  of	  the	  ‘big	  guys’	  (LA-­‐SAct7c).	  This	  idea	  of	  being	  
‘established’	  could	  in	  turn	  be	  related	  to	  categorization	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  seniority	  (LA-­‐SAct5d;	  LA-­‐
SAct8d).	  Other	  than	  this	  the	  lecturer	  categorized	  legal	  academic	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  ‘brilliance’	  
(LA-­‐SAct1d),	  their	  ‘eccentricity’	  (LA-­‐SAct1e),	  their	  ethnicity	  (referring	  to	  Afrikaners	  –	  see	  LA-­‐




5.4	   Values	  	  
There	  were	  25	  extracts	  associated	  with	  valuations	  of	  legal	  academics	  themselves	  or	  their	  work	  
and	  the	  overwhelming	  majority	  (21	  extracts	  or	  80%)	  were	  in	  the	  form	  of	  moral	  evaluation.	  The	  
remaining	  20%	  were	  in	  a	  purposive	  form	  and	  were	  evenly	  spread	  between	  the	  constitution	  of	  
internal	  and	  external	  goods.	  	  
Nine	  of	  the	  extracts	  related	  to	  valuations	  of	  legal	  academics	  themselves	  and,	  unlike	  some	  of	  the	  
other	  roles	  discussed	  thus	  far,	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  valuations	  were	  positive	  (LA-­‐V1b;	  LA-­‐V3b;	  LA-­‐
V5a;	  LA-­‐V7a;	  LA-­‐V9;	  LA-­‐V18).	  Two	  ‘negative’	  or	  ‘ambiguous’	  valuations	  were	  difficult	  to	  classify	  
as	  such	  because	  even	  though	  the	  lecturer	  was	  ostensibly	  representing	  a	  particular	  legal	  
academic	  (Dr	  Van	  der	  Merwe)	  in	  a	  negative	  light,	  he	  used	  various	  devices	  to	  distance	  himself	  
from	  the	  evaluation.	  For	  instance,	  he	  used	  intertextuality	  to	  convey	  the	  message	  that	  Dr	  Van	  
der	  Merwe	  was	  fired	  because	  he	  had	  a	  criminal	  conviction:	  ‘the	  university	  fired	  him	  –	  because	  
he	  had	  a	  criminal	  conviction’.	  It	  is	  thus	  the	  university	  that	  makes	  the	  judgment	  call	  on	  the	  
consequences	  of	  his	  criminal	  conviction,	  and	  not	  the	  lecturer	  himself.	  Additionally,	  the	  lecturer	  
frames	  the	  anecdote	  by	  stating	  that	  Dr	  Van	  der	  Merwe	  ‘was	  a	  professor	  at	  the	  University	  of	  
Tukkies	  [Pretoria],	  and	  later	  on,	  because	  he	  was	  very	  naughty	  he	  became	  the	  head	  of	  Justice	  
College’	  (LA-­‐V1a,	  my	  emphasis).	  The	  word	  ‘naughty’	  is	  an	  interesting	  choice	  in	  this	  context	  for	  it	  
tends	  to	  trivialize	  the	  gravity	  of	  Dr	  Van	  der	  Merwe’s	  transgressions	  –	  which	  really	  involved	  
contempt	  of	  court	  and	  thus	  of	  the	  law.	  A	  child	  is	  ‘naughty’	  but	  for	  transgressions	  that	  are	  also	  
usually	  not	  serious.	  This	  –	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  lecturer’s	  more	  strongly	  personally-­‐situated	  
valuation	  of	  the	  UNISA	  professor	  as	  a	  ‘real	  stick	  in	  the	  mud’	  (LA-­‐V1c)	  –	  conveys	  the	  impression	  
that	  these	  negative	  aspects	  of	  Dr	  Van	  der	  Merwe’s	  career	  should	  not	  be	  taken	  all	  that	  seriously	  
and	  were	  far	  outweighed	  by	  the	  consideration,	  for	  instance,	  of	  his	  ‘brilliance’	  (LA-­‐V1b).	  	  
It	  was	  difficult	  to	  discern	  whether	  the	  lecturer’s	  view	  of	  the	  life	  of	  the	  legal	  academic	  as	  the	  
‘best	  profession	  of	  all’	  (LA-­‐V12a;	  see	  also	  LA-­‐V20a)	  was	  based	  on	  a	  consideration	  of	  internal	  or	  
external	  goods.	  More	  clearly	  identifiable	  internal	  goods	  accounted	  for	  seven,	  and	  external	  
goods	  nine	  of	  the	  remaining	  16	  extracts	  pertaining	  to	  value.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  internal	  goods,	  there	  




(academic	  honesty)	  (LA-­‐V10)	  as	  well	  as	  novelty	  and	  originality	  of	  thought	  (LA-­‐V13),	  values	  which	  
the	  lecturer	  held	  were	  both	  very	  difficult	  to	  comply	  with.	  The	  lecturer’s	  admiration	  of	  Dr	  Van	  
der	  Merwe’s	  translations	  –	  from	  Afrikaans	  into	  ‘beautiful	  English	  …	  very	  very	  good	  pure	  English’	  
(LA-­‐V1e)	  is	  perhaps	  also	  reminiscent	  of	  the	  ‘shallow’	  internal	  good	  of	  an	  elegant	  or	  eloquent	  
presentation	  that	  I	  first	  highlighted	  in	  the	  role	  of	  the	  lawyer.	  The	  internal	  good	  most	  strongly	  
associated	  with	  being	  a	  legal	  academic,	  however,	  was	  the	  ability	  to	  change	  the	  law	  (LA-­‐V4;	  LA-­‐
V6;	  LA-­‐V7b;	  LA-­‐V12b).	  This	  was	  represented	  as	  the	  form	  of	  the	  good	  towards	  which	  legal	  
academics	  unquestionably	  aspire:	  To	  be	  quoted	  by	  the	  courts,	  for	  one’s	  views	  ‘through	  a	  
process	  of	  osmosis’	  (LA-­‐V7b)	  to	  become	  the	  views	  of	  the	  legal	  profession.	  This	  good	  emerges	  in	  
its	  most	  stark	  relief	  in	  the	  following	  extract.	  Referring	  to	  Professor	  John	  Dugard,	  the	  lecturer	  
states:	  	  
LECTURER:	  [A]nd	  he	  often	  appeared	  in	  the	  courts	  for	  um	  people	  who	  were	  oppressed	  by	  the	  
apartheid	  system.	  Who	  couldn’t	  afford	  counsel,	  and	  he	  often	  appeared	  as	  pro	  amico	  	  for	  those	  
people	  where	  it	  was	  where	  it	  was	  a	  groundbreaking	  and	  very	  important	  case.	  That’s	  also	  one	  
way	  that	  um	  you	  can	  present	  the	  court	  with	  your	  views.	  
Notable	  about	  this	  abstract	  is	  that	  the	  ultimate	  purpose	  of	  Professor	  Dugard’s	  action	  of	  
appearing	  for	  indigent	  and	  oppressed	  people	  in	  court	  is	  not	  represented	  as	  (a)	  the	  desirability	  
in	  itself	  of	  rendering	  assistance	  to	  such	  groups	  of	  people,	  nor	  even	  (b)	  the	  goal	  of	  opposing	  and	  
fighting	  against	  apartheid,	  but	  as	  presenting	  the	  court	  with	  his	  views.	  In	  his	  own	  mind	  the	  
lecturer	  may	  have	  completed	  the	  value	  chain	  as	  follows:	  By	  presenting	  his	  views	  to	  the	  court	  
Professor	  Dugard	  was	  advocating	  for	  a	  change	  in	  the	  legal	  approach	  to	  the	  interpretation	  of	  
apartheid	  laws	  that	  would	  have	  rendered	  a	  massive	  chink	  in	  the	  apartheid	  armour,	  thus	  
achieving	  objectives	  (a)	  and	  (b).	  However,	  he	  does	  not	  complete	  the	  value	  chain	  for	  the	  
students	  so	  they	  are	  left	  with	  the	  impression	  –	  reinforced	  by	  other	  extracts	  constituting	  the	  
importance	  of	  status	  and	  esteem	  (LA-­‐V2;	  LA-­‐V5b;	  LA-­‐V8;	  LA-­‐V16)	  –	  that	  the	  legal	  academic’s	  
chief	  concern	  is	  with	  being	  known,	  being	  quoted,	  being	  influential	  for	  its	  own	  sake.	  In	  this	  
manner	  the	  internal	  good	  of	  desiring	  to	  change	  the	  law	  becomes	  intermingled	  with	  external	  
goods.	  	  
After	  status	  and	  esteem,	  the	  next-­‐most-­‐frequently	  represented	  external	  good	  was	  monetary	  




legal	  academic	  does	  not	  offer	  handsome	  monetary	  rewards:	  ‘[I]t	  is	  not	  the	  place	  you	  should	  go	  
if	  you	  are	  very	  materialistic.	  Salaries	  are	  very	  humble’	  (LA-­‐V17).	  The	  external	  goods	  
compensating	  for	  this	  deficit	  are	  that	  the	  working	  conditions	  are	  ‘very	  very	  pleasant’	  (LA-­‐V14),	  
and	  more	  so,	  that	  ‘for	  intellectual	  stimulation,	  intellectual	  ability	  ….	  being	  able	  to	  be	  on	  top	  of	  
what	  is	  going	  on	  your	  field,	  there	  is	  no	  better	  place	  …	  to	  be’	  (LA-­‐V20b).	  The	  only	  thorn	  in	  the	  
side	  of	  the	  legal	  academic	  thirsting	  for	  intellectual	  stimulation	  is	  the	  need	  to	  assess	  student’s	  
scripts:	  ‘Unfortunately	  the	  bad	  part	  of	  an	  academic’s	  life	  is	  you	  must	  mark	  scripts,	  that	  is	  really	  
the	  bad	  part	  of	  it	  but	  …	  you	  know	  the	  first	  ten	  is	  fine	  but	  after	  that	  it	  does	  become	  very	  boring’	  
(LA-­‐V15).	  	  
5.5	   Summary	  	  
Similarly	  to	  the	  judge,	  legal	  academics	  possess	  a	  power	  to	  create	  and	  develop	  the	  law,	  though	  
this	  is	  dependent	  upon	  their	  views	  being	  taken	  up	  and	  followed	  by	  the	  courts.	  Even	  the	  success	  
of	  the	  legal	  academic	  is	  thus	  caught	  up	  in	  the	  adversarial	  model	  of	  justice.	  Mastery	  over	  
language	  –	  the	  ability	  to	  author	  books	  and	  articles	  –	  emerges	  as	  a	  key	  capacity	  in	  this	  regard.	  
The	  internal	  good	  of	  changing	  the	  law	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  would	  address	  injustice	  is	  present,	  but	  is	  
mixed	  up	  with	  the	  external	  good	  of	  status	  and	  esteem,	  having	  a	  good	  reputation	  for	  its	  own	  
sake.	  The	  nature	  of	  the	  work	  of	  the	  legal	  academic	  takes	  place	  in	  relatively	  pleasant	  working	  
conditions,	  though	  this	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  prevent	  certain	  negative	  emotions	  such	  as	  jealously	  
from	  flaring	  up.	  Unlike	  the	  other	  roles	  discussed	  in	  this	  chapter,	  there	  is	  less	  of	  an	  expectation	  
that	  legal	  academics	  will	  have	  control	  over	  their	  emotions	  –	  indeed	  a	  certain	  irrationality	  is	  seen	  
as	  a	  marker	  of	  brilliance.	  Emphasis	  on	  the	  difference	  between	  ‘seniors’	  and	  ‘juniors’	  is	  also	  
evident	  in	  this	  role.	  The	  social	  profile	  of	  the	  legal	  academic	  is	  predominantly	  male	  and	  it	  is	  clear	  
that	  they	  occupy	  the	  middle	  classes,	  a	  designation	  they	  can	  circumvent	  by	  marrying	  a	  successful	  




6.	   POLITICAL	  APPOINTMENTS	  –	  THE	  DIRECTOR	  OF	  PUBLIC	  PROSECUTIONS	  
The	  role	  of	  the	  Director	  of	  Public	  Prosecutions	  (DPP)	  was	  constituted	  by	  very	  few	  quotations	  –	  
only	  five	  in	  number.	  The	  career	  option	  of	  a	  DPP	  is	  a	  ‘political’	  one	  because	  it	  depends	  on	  
appointment	  by	  the	  State	  President.	  Even	  though	  the	  appointment	  is	  thus	  political	  in	  this	  sense,	  
in	  another	  sense	  the	  DPP	  should	  be	  a-­‐political	  in	  his	  or	  her	  approach	  to	  prosecuting	  crime.	  This	  
is	  to	  say	  that	  individuals	  or	  entities	  should	  be	  prosecuted	  for	  crimes	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  ensures	  
the	  equality	  of	  everyone	  before	  the	  law	  –	  there	  should	  be	  no	  fear	  or	  favour	  based	  on	  the	  DPP’s	  
political	  allegiances.	  The	  DPP	  should	  stand	  for	  upholding	  the	  rule	  of	  law.93	  	  
The	  lecturer’s	  representation	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  DPP	  came	  to	  the	  fore	  most	  dramatically	  in	  the	  
anecdote	  of	  his	  personal	  interview	  by	  the	  DPP	  for	  the	  post	  of	  state	  advocate	  (DPP-­‐Q5,	  	  I	  have	  
already	  referred	  in	  part	  to	  this	  interview	  in	  the	  section	  outlining	  the	  constitution	  of	  the	  shadow	  
career	  path	  above).	  The	  anecdote	  is	  interesting	  for	  two	  reasons:	  Firstly,	  it	  represents	  the	  figure	  
of	  the	  DPP	  as	  antithetical	  to	  the	  ideals	  of	  equality	  before	  the	  law	  and	  upholding	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  
and	  secondly,	  it	  represents	  the	  lecturer	  –	  as	  a	  young	  public	  prosecutor	  desiring	  to	  become	  a	  
state	  advocate	  –	  as	  responding	  from	  a	  moral	  ground	  which	  upholds	  these	  ideals	  but	  at	  the	  
same	  time	  sacrifices	  his	  desire	  for	  career	  progression.	  	  
The	  lecturer’s	  critical	  evaluation	  of	  the	  DPP	  who	  interviewed	  him	  is	  established	  by	  a	  number	  of	  
techniques.	  Before	  even	  beginning	  the	  anecdote,	  he	  devalues	  the	  role	  of	  the	  DPP	  in	  general	  by	  
speaking	  of	  the	  institution	  of	  ‘a	  little	  character	  called	  the	  Director	  of	  Public	  Prosecutions’	  (DPP-­‐
V3).	  At	  the	  start	  of	  the	  anecdote	  outlining	  the	  interview,	  he	  comments	  that	  the	  DPP	  of	  the	  time	  
(or	  attorney-­‐general	  as	  he	  was	  then	  known)	  was	  ‘a	  very	  very	  obnoxious	  character	  called	  Klaus	  …	  
who	  was	  a	  Prussian	  military	  officer’	  (DPP-­‐V5a).	  He	  then	  proceeds	  to	  describe	  the	  DPP’s	  ‘huge’	  
office	  (being	  the	  room	  in	  which	  the	  interview	  took	  place),	  and	  notices	  that	  room	  is	  filled	  with	  
military	  memorabilia,	  ‘little	  swords	  and	  pictures	  of	  little	  men	  in	  uniform	  and	  rifles	  and	  things’.	  
Once	  again,	  the	  adjective	  ‘little’	  serves	  to	  devalue.	  He	  immediately	  codes	  a	  potentially	  
troublesome	  opposition	  to	  the	  DPP	  by	  detailing	  his	  emotional	  response:	  ‘I	  thought	  that	  this	  is	  
hugely	  inappropriate	  for	  an	  attorney-­‐general	  …	  So	  I	  sat	  down	  and	  I	  looked	  around	  and	  I	  was	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  In	  this	  regard	  the	  Constitution	  states	  that	  national	  legislation	  must	  ensure	  that	  the	  prosecuting	  authority	  




very	  uncomfortable.	  I	  was	  really	  extremely	  uncomfortable.	  Because	  it’s	  very	  important	  you	  
know,	  it’s	  an	  important	  interview’	  (DPP-­‐CSA5a).	  Even	  though	  the	  lecturer	  links	  his	  discomfort	  to	  
the	  importance	  of	  the	  interview	  in	  this	  extract,	  his	  evaluation	  of	  the	  military	  décor	  of	  the	  office	  
as	  ‘hugely	  inappropriate’	  suggests	  an	  alternative	  basis	  for	  such	  discomfort	  and	  one	  which	  links	  
to	  the	  internal	  goods	  that	  could	  be	  associated	  with	  a	  DPP/attorney-­‐general:	  The	  rule	  of	  law.	  
Military	  memorabilia	  –	  which	  stand	  for	  power,	  for	  might	  over	  right	  –	  would	  essentially	  be	  
opposed	  to	  the	  resolution	  of	  disputes	  by	  peaceful,	  legal	  means.	  After	  the	  DPP	  asks	  him	  a	  
number	  of	  technical	  questions,	  and	  as	  noted	  in	  the	  section	  outlining	  the	  constitution	  of	  the	  
shadow	  career	  path	  above,	  he	  begins	  firing	  what	  the	  lecturer	  perceives	  to	  be	  a	  number	  of	  
‘political’	  questions	  relating	  to	  the	  prosecution	  of	  Winnie	  Mandela.	  Ostensibly,	  the	  purpose	  of	  
these	  questions	  was	  to	  gauge	  the	  lecturer’s	  own	  political	  allegiances	  with	  a	  view	  to	  ensuring	  
that	  the	  legal	  professionals	  occupying	  the	  higher	  rank	  of	  state	  advocate	  would	  be	  persons	  that	  
supported	  the	  government	  ideology	  of	  the	  time.	  In	  this	  manner,	  therefore,	  the	  DPP	  was	  
violating	  the	  ideal	  of	  equality	  before	  the	  law.	  The	  ideal	  is	  not	  laid	  waste,	  however,	  for	  it	  is	  left	  to	  
the	  lecturer,	  as	  public	  prosecutor,	  to	  stand	  for	  the	  a-­‐political	  nature	  of	  the	  job	  by	  politely,	  
explicitly	  and	  courageously	  refusing	  to	  answer	  the	  DPP’s	  questions	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  
‘political’	  nature:	  ‘And	  I	  just	  refused	  to	  answer	  the	  questions,	  I	  said	  “sorry	  I	  consider	  those	  
questions	  inappropriate	  and	  I	  don’t,	  I	  can’t	  answer	  them.	  And	  that’s	  a	  political	  decision	  and	  I	  
can’t	  answer	  them.	  Um	  I	  don’t	  want	  to	  seem	  unthankful	  or	  unpleasant	  but	  I	  really	  can’t	  
answer”’	  (DPP-­‐V5c).	  The	  upshot	  is	  that	  the	  DPP	  immediately	  ends	  the	  interview	  with	  a	  ‘thank	  
you,	  yes	  go	  back	  to	  the	  magistrates’	  court’	  (DPP-­‐V5c).	  While	  the	  young	  public	  prosecutor’s	  
career	  aspirations	  lie	  shattered	  he	  leaves	  on	  the	  moral	  high	  ground.	  	  
6.1	   Social	  action	  	  
There	  were	  eight	  extracts	  related	  to	  social	  action	  in	  the	  five	  quotations	  dealing	  with	  the	  DPP	  of	  
which	  seven	  were	  active,	  transactive	  and	  semiotic	  (87,5%	  respectively).	  Arising	  from	  the	  
anecdote	  outlined	  above,	  the	  primary	  object	  of	  the	  DPP’s	  action	  was	  the	  prosecutor.	  This	  is	  
interesting	  because	  the	  norms	  constructed	  around	  the	  position	  of	  the	  DPP	  would	  lead	  one	  to	  
believe	  that	  his	  or	  her	  primary	  role	  should	  be	  related	  more	  to	  ultimate	  outcomes	  –	  the	  




or	  she	  should	  facilitate	  conditions	  in	  which	  prosecutors,	  the	  officials	  who	  represent	  the	  office	  of	  
the	  DPP	  in	  every	  court	  (DPP-­‐SA3),	  can	  function	  independently	  and	  without	  fear	  of	  retribution	  
for	  the	  decisions	  taken	  in	  the	  course	  of	  their	  work.	  The	  lecturer’s	  representation	  however,	  in	  
which	  the	  DPP	  is	  represented	  as	  exercising	  undue	  influence	  on	  a	  prosecutor,	  is	  antithetical	  to	  
these	  norms.	  	  
6.2	   Circumstances	  of	  social	  action	  	  
There	  were	  only	  seven	  extracts	  constituting	  the	  DPP’s	  circumstances	  of	  social	  action.	  All	  of	  the	  
resources	  were	  semiotic	  in	  nature,	  being	  the	  DPP’s	  ‘discretion	  (DPP-­‐CSA1;	  DPP-­‐CSA2)	  and	  his	  or	  
her	  ‘delegation’	  to	  prosecutors,	  indicating	  the	  scope	  of	  their	  power	  to	  prosecute	  (DPP-­‐CSA4).	  
The	  emotions,	  both	  negative,	  were	  evenly	  split	  between	  the	  emotion	  of	  the	  DPP	  (DPP-­‐CSA5b,	  
dislike)	  and	  the	  emotion	  that	  he	  incited	  in	  others	  (DPP-­‐CSA5a,	  nervousness,	  a	  feeling	  of	  
discomfort).	  The	  DPP	  was	  located	  both	  in	  his	  military-­‐memorabilia-­‐filled	  office	  (DPP-­‐CSA5c)	  and	  
in	  the	  court	  (DPP-­‐CSA3).	  
6.3	   Social	  actors	  	  
The	  five	  quotations	  relating	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  DPP	  contained	  12	  extracts	  dealing	  with	  either	  the	  
DPP	  himself	  (nine	  extracts)	  and	  various	  other	  social	  actors	  (three	  extracts).	  The	  only	  instance	  of	  
classification	  present	  was	  based	  on	  gender,	  and	  all	  of	  these	  indexed	  the	  DPP	  as	  male	  based	  on	  
pronoun	  usage	  (DPP-­‐SAct3b;	  DPP-­‐SAct5c;	  DPP-­‐SAct5g)	  or	  nomination	  (DPP-­‐SAct5b;	  DPP-­‐
SAct5f).	  Rounding	  off	  his	  anecdote	  of	  the	  ‘tall’,	  ‘brash’,	  ‘obnoxious’	  Klaus,	  the	  lecturer	  presents	  
the	  students	  with	  a	  counter-­‐cultural	  example:	  Frank	  Kahn	  who,	  although	  not	  a	  ‘pleasant	  guy’	  
was	  at	  least	  intelligent	  and	  someone	  to	  whom	  one	  could	  talk	  (DPP-­‐SAct5h).	  	  All	  the	  other	  social	  
actors	  were	  included	  in	  the	  social	  action	  (DPP-­‐SAct1;	  DPP-­‐SAct2;	  DPP-­‐SAct5e).	  	  
6.4	   Values	  	  
The	  four	  instances	  of	  evaluation	  in	  the	  quotations	  relating	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  DPP	  were	  all	  based	  
on	  moral	  evaluation.	  Two	  involved	  negative	  evaluations	  of	  the	  DPP	  himself	  (DPP-­‐V3;	  DPP-­‐V5a),	  
whilst	  two	  –	  as	  detailed	  in	  the	  introductory	  section	  above	  –	  involved	  oblique	  constructions	  of	  




to	  the	  inappropriateness	  of	  the	  military	  memorabilia	  in	  the	  DPP’s	  office	  –	  DPP-­‐V5b)	  and	  the	  
norm	  that	  the	  DPP	  should	  function	  independently	  of	  political	  structures	  (constituted	  by	  the	  
lecturer	  framing	  the	  DPP’s	  political	  questions	  as	  ‘inappropriate’	  –	  DPP-­‐V5c).	  There	  were	  no	  
representations	  of	  external	  goods	  in	  relation	  to	  this	  particular	  role.	  	  
6.5	   Summary	  	  
There	  small	  number	  of	  quotations	  relating	  to	  this	  role	  makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  reconstruct	  a	  
comprehensive	  narrative.	  The	  most	  significant	  representation	  is	  undoubtedly	  the	  lecturer’s	  
account	  of	  the	  interview	  he	  faced	  with	  an	  apartheid-­‐era	  attorney-­‐general.	  Like	  other	  accounts	  
in	  the	  text,	  this	  story	  paints	  some	  of	  the	  noble	  ideals	  of	  the	  law	  –	  the	  pursuit	  of	  equality	  before	  








DISCUSSION	  OF	  FINDINGS	  	  
1.	   INTRODUCTION	  
My	  point	  of	  departure	  in	  this	  study	  has	  been	  that	  the	  formation	  of	  legal	  professional	  identity	  is	  
a	  process	  that	  is	  pervasive	  and	  implicit,	  a	  process	  of	  socialization	  that	  occurs	  irrespective	  of	  
whether	  professional	  identity	  has	  been	  posited	  as	  a	  particular	  pedagogical	  object	  or	  not.	  	  I	  have	  
put	  forward	  the	  thesis	  that	  representations	  about	  legal	  professionals	  in	  classroom	  talk	  
constitute	  one	  particular	  form	  of	  socialization.	  In	  chapter	  two	  I	  outlined	  a	  theoretical	  model	  for	  
understanding	  the	  significance	  of	  such	  representations	  in	  processes	  of	  identity	  formation,	  
linking	  them	  to	  an	  understanding	  of	  ‘identity	  regulation’	  that	  revolves	  around	  the	  concepts	  of	  
‘role’	  and	  ‘discourse’.	  Through	  an	  iterative	  process	  that	  engaged	  with	  the	  data	  I	  adapted	  a	  
number	  of	  Van	  Leeuwen’s	  (2008)	  semantic	  categories	  (and	  their	  commonly	  associated	  linguistic	  
realizations)	  to	  analyze	  representational	  meanings	  relating	  to	  	  legal	  professionals	  at	  a	  micro-­‐
discursive	  level.	  The	  analysis	  reveals	  the	  discourse	  on	  legal	  professionalism	  that	  emerged	  in	  the	  
particular	  classroom	  of	  my	  study	  and,	  thereby,	  the	  extra-­‐individual	  resources	  regulating	  the	  
formation	  of	  legal	  professional	  identity.	  In	  the	  preceding	  chapter	  I	  presented	  the	  findings	  of	  this	  
analysis,	  organized	  according	  to	  the	  most	  prominent	  roles	  in	  the	  data.	  	  
In	  this	  chapter	  I	  discuss	  the	  findings	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  three	  conceptual	  claims	  identified	  in	  
chapter	  two,	  namely	  that:	  	  
• At	  a	  micro-­‐level	  of	  discourse	  analysis,	  the	  basic	  elements	  of	  social	  practice	  (Van	  
Leeuwen’s	  ‘reduced’	  model)	  and	  their	  associated	  sociosemantic	  categories	  and	  linguistic	  
realizations,	  provide	  a	  useful	  schemata	  for	  understanding	  how	  representations	  function	  
as	  a	  form	  of	  identity	  regulation.	  	  
• A	  micro-­‐discursive	  study	  of	  representations	  of	  legal	  professionals	  in	  classroom	  talk	  
allows	  one	  to	  situate	  the	  representations	  in	  a	  particular	  classroom	  in	  relation	  to	  broader	  




• The	  recontextualization	  of	  the	  legal	  profession	  within	  the	  social	  context	  of	  the	  
classroom	  overlays	  representational	  meanings	  with	  the	  power	  that	  derives	  from	  that	  
context.	  	  
In	  respect	  of	  claim	  one	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  basic	  elements	  of	  social	  practice	  in	  representational	  
meanings	  name	  and	  describe	  the	  social	  practice	  of	  the	  legal	  professional	  both	  directly	  and	  
indirectly.	  This	  is	  to	  say	  that	  the	  representation	  of	  social	  action,	  the	  circumstances	  of	  social	  
action,	  social	  actors	  and	  values	  and	  the	  further	  semantic	  distinctions	  within	  each	  that	  were	  
captured	  in	  the	  codes	  developed	  for	  the	  analysis,	  convey	  deeper,	  more	  implicit	  meanings	  or	  
themes	  relevant	  to	  legal	  professional	  identity.	  In	  this	  regard	  I	  identify	  eight	  primary	  themes	  in	  
section	  2	  below	  that	  emerged	  from	  my	  case	  study	  of	  classroom	  talk	  and	  show	  how	  each	  theme	  
relates	  to	  the	  analytical	  codes	  employed	  to	  unpack	  the	  representation	  of	  each	  element	  of	  social	  
practice.	  	  
In	  respect	  of	  claim	  two	  I	  align	  the	  emergent	  eight	  primary	  themes	  in	  the	  lecturer’s	  classroom	  
talk	  with	  five	  broader	  categories	  –	  the	  nature	  of	  legal	  professional	  power,	  the	  purposes	  of	  law	  
and	  the	  legal	  profession,	  the	  nature	  of	  legal	  professional	  work,	  legal	  relationships,	  and	  the	  
social	  profile	  of	  the	  profession.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  I	  consider	  each	  theme	  in	  relation	  to	  reports	  
and	  statements	  on	  legal	  professionalism,	  in	  particular,	  the	  MacCrate	  and	  ACLEC	  Reports	  and	  
the	  generic	  LL.B	  statement	  as	  well	  as	  the	  literature	  on	  legal	  ethics	  teaching	  introduced	  and	  
discussed	  in	  section	  2.2	  of	  chapter	  one.	  This	  analysis	  shows	  that	  the	  lecturer’s	  classroom	  talk	  
tended	  to	  sustain	  fairly	  traditional	  conceptions	  of	  the	  legal	  profession	  and	  claims	  made	  in	  the	  
literature	  on	  the	  teaching	  of	  legal	  ethics.	  	  
In	  respect	  of	  claim	  three	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  representations	  of	  legal	  professionals	  in	  
classroom	  talk	  –	  as	  extra-­‐individual	  resources	  regulating	  identity	  formation	  –	  is	  enhanced	  by	  the	  







2.	   DISCUSSION	  OF	  CLAIM	  ONE	  	  
One	  of	  the	  questions	  which	  I	  initially	  set	  out	  to	  address	  was	  to	  understand	  how	  representations	  
about	  legal	  professionals	  in	  classroom	  talk	  could	  be	  linked	  to	  processes	  of	  professional	  identity	  
formation	  in	  terms	  of	  fine	  linguistic	  detail.	  In	  chapter	  two	  I	  associated	  representations	  with	  the	  
wide	  variety	  of	  terms	  used	  to	  designate	  the	  extra-­‐individual	  resources	  with	  which	  an	  individual	  
engages	  when	  he	  or	  she	  fashions	  personal	  and	  social	  identifications	  (‘contextual’	  or	  ‘cultural	  
resources,	  ‘cultural	  templates’	  or	  ‘scripts’,	  ‘social	  discourses	  or	  narratives’,	  and	  so	  on).	  I	  also	  
associated	  representations	  with	  the	  representational	  meaning	  potential	  of	  language	  
(Fairclough,	  2003:	  26).	  Fairclough’s	  description	  of	  representational	  meanings	  in	  language	  
suggested	  the	  first	  clear	  way	  in	  which	  representations	  function	  as	  contextual	  or	  cultural	  
resources	  for	  processes	  of	  professional	  identity	  formation:	  They	  name	  and	  describe	  every	  
aspect	  of	  a	  social	  practice	  and	  thereby	  construe	  human	  experience	  (ibid).	  The	  analytical	  codes	  I	  
adapted	  from	  Van	  Leeuwen	  to	  unpack	  the	  elements	  of	  social	  practice,	  (namely,	  social	  action,	  
the	  circumstances	  of	  social	  action	  and	  social	  actors)	  and	  values	  (as	  an	  element	  added	  to	  social	  
practice	  by	  a	  recontextualizing	  context)	  provided	  analytical	  tools	  for	  fleshing	  out	  this	  naming	  
and	  descriptive	  function.	  	  
In	  conducting	  the	  analysis,	  however,	  I	  realized	  that	  while	  the	  analytical	  codes	  I	  employed	  
enabled	  me	  to	  describe	  the	  social	  action,	  circumstances	  of	  social	  action;	  etc	  in	  a	  direct	  way,	  
they	  also	  frequently	  combined	  in	  subtle	  ways	  to	  convey	  deeper,	  more	  implicit	  meanings.	  This	  
became	  evident	  as	  I	  compared	  and	  contrasted	  the	  content	  of	  the	  narratives	  prepared	  for	  each	  
of	  the	  roles	  outlined	  in	  chapter	  five	  using	  the	  technique	  of	  cognitive	  mind-­‐mapping.	  As	  a	  result	  
of	  this	  exercise	  I	  identified	  eight	  primary	  themes	  in	  my	  case	  study	  of	  classroom	  talk,	  as	  follows:	  	  
1. Legal	  professionals	  are	  powerful	  and	  active	  social	  actors	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  fairly	  consistent	  
set	  of	  objects	  including	  the	  possibility	  of	  power	  over	  ultimate	  outcomes;	  	  
2. The	  normative	  frame	  for	  most	  legal	  professional	  roles	  tends	  to	  foreground	  external	  
rather	  than	  internal	  goods	  and	  at	  times	  devalues	  the	  legal	  professional;	  	  
3. Legal	  professional	  work	  is	  framed	  by	  an	  adversarial	  model	  of	  justice;	  	  
4. Despite	  an	  emphasis	  on	  the	  separation	  of	  law,	  morality	  and	  emotion,	  morality	  and	  




5. The	  emotional	  tenor	  of	  the	  legal	  professional	  workplace	  is	  predominantly	  negative;	  	  
6. The	  legal	  profession	  is	  structured	  by	  multiple	  hierarchies	  that	  strongly	  preference	  the	  
private	  over	  the	  public	  dimensions	  of	  legal	  service;	  	  
7. The	  client	  occupies	  a	  complex	  space	  in	  the	  legal	  professional	  world	  that	  is	  at	  the	  same	  
time	  elevated	  and	  backgrounded	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  legal	  professional;	  and	  
8. Gender	  bias	  is	  foregrounded	  and	  prominent	  whilst	  bias	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  race	  and	  class	  is	  
more	  subtly	  embedded.	  
While	  some	  of	  these	  themes	  were	  largely	  associated	  with	  the	  representation	  of	  only	  one	  of	  the	  
elements	  of	  social	  practice,	  others	  emerged	  from	  a	  combination	  of	  the	  elements	  or	  their	  sub-­‐
elements,	  as	  captured	  in	  the	  analytical	  codes.	  In	  this	  section,	  therefore,	  I	  wish	  to	  demonstrate	  
how	  the	  analytical	  codes	  employed	  for	  my	  entry	  level	  of	  analysis	  –	  the	  more	  overt	  focus	  on	  the	  
basic	  elements	  of	  social	  practice	  –	  functioned	  to	  constitute	  these	  underlying	  themes.	  	  
1.	  Legal	  professionals	  are	  powerful	  and	  active	  social	  actors	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  fairly	  consistent	  set	  
of	  objects	  including	  the	  possibility	  of	  power	  over	  ultimate	  outcomes.	  This	  theme	  relates	  to	  	  
whether	  legal	  professionals	  are	  powerful	  or	  not,	  how	  or	  in	  what	  ways	  they	  are	  powerful,	  the	  
objects	  over	  which	  they	  exercise	  power	  and	  the	  contexts	  in	  which	  their	  power	  holds	  sway.	  The	  
analytical	  codes	  distinguishing	  between	  active/passive	  and	  transactive/non-­‐transactive	  social	  
action	  enabled	  me	  to	  determine	  whether	  legal	  professionals	  are	  powerful	  or	  not,	  and	  the	  
objects	  over	  which	  their	  power	  extended,	  while	  the	  distinction	  between	  material/semiotic	  
action	  provided	  insight	  into	  the	  forms	  of	  their	  power.	  The	  latter	  was	  supplemented	  by	  the	  
analytical	  code	  designating	  resources	  because	  the	  analysis	  revealed	  how	  the	  lecturer	  could	  
represent	  a	  particular	  resource	  in	  a	  semiotic	  or	  material	  way.	  For	  example,	  while	  the	  actions	  of	  
the	  attorney	  toward	  the	  law	  were	  more	  often	  oriented	  toward	  the	  law	  as	  a	  physical	  object	  (e.g.	  
a	  set	  of	  law	  reports	  in	  a	  library	  or	  a	  CD-­‐ROM	  containing	  the	  law	  reports	  that	  sits	  on	  a	  desk),	  
advocates	  were	  more	  often	  represented	  as	  acting	  toward	  the	  law	  as	  a	  semiotic	  resource,	  as	  in	  
selecting	  which	  cases	  should	  be	  included	  in	  a	  law	  report	  and	  thus	  determining	  what	  stood	  as	  
the	  law	  over	  time	  (p.	  147).	  I	  did	  not	  develop	  separate	  analytical	  codes	  to	  describe	  the	  objects	  of	  
the	  legal	  professional’s	  power,	  but	  as	  the	  analysis	  proceeded	  law	  themselves,	  language,	  




creating	  order	  or	  chaos	  emerged	  as	  the	  most	  consistent	  objects	  of	  the	  legal	  professional’s	  
power.	  The	  representation	  of	  location,	  lastly,	  functioned	  to	  indicate	  the	  predominant	  social	  
spaces	  in	  which	  legal	  professional	  power	  was	  exercised.	  	  	  
2.	  The	  normative	  frame	  for	  most	  legal	  professional	  roles	  tends	  to	  foreground	  external	  rather	  
than	  internal	  goods	  and	  at	  times	  devalues	  the	  legal	  professional.	  This	  theme	  relates	  to	  the	  
first	  by	  indicating	  the	  purpose	  or	  values	  to	  which	  legal	  professional	  power	  is	  oriented.	  It	  also	  
indicates	  whether,	  and	  the	  bases	  upon	  which,	  the	  legal	  professional	  (as	  well	  as	  others)	  can	  hold	  
him	  or	  herself	  in	  esteem.	  This	  theme	  was	  primarily	  constituted	  by	  the	  analytical	  codes	  
developed	  around	  values.	  The	  purposes	  or	  values	  of	  law	  and	  the	  legal	  profession	  emerged	  from	  
the	  code	  designating	  the	  evaluation	  of	  legal	  professional	  work	  and	  the	  further	  distinction	  
between	  internal	  and	  external	  goods.	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  legal	  professionals	  were	  esteemed	  
(or	  not)	  and	  the	  basis	  thereof	  were	  captured	  by	  the	  analytical	  code	  identifying	  evaluations	  of	  
legal	  professionals	  themselves	  and	  whether	  such	  evaluations	  were	  positive	  or	  negative.	  The	  
analytical	  codes	  that	  distinguished	  between	  the	  form	  in	  which	  the	  value	  was	  captured	  
(purposive,	  moral	  evaluation,	  authority,	  mythopoesis)	  were	  relevant	  in	  determining	  the	  extent	  
to	  which	  statements	  of	  purpose	  or	  value	  were	  explicit	  or	  not.	  Representation	  of	  value	  is,	  
however,	  arguably	  more	  pervasive	  because	  values	  are	  implicated	  in	  the	  representational	  
choices	  associated	  with	  every	  aspect	  of	  the	  social	  practice.	  This	  relates	  to	  what	  Gee	  has	  
identified	  as	  the	  first	  principle	  of	  any	  process	  of	  meaning	  making	  –	  the	  exclusion	  principle.	  
Meaning,	  as	  Gee	  writes,	  is	  always	  a	  matter	  of	  intended	  exclusions	  and	  inclusions	  (contrasts	  and	  
similarities)	  within	  an	  assumed	  semantic	  field:	  It	  involves	  networking	  or	  associating	  certain	  
words	  together	  and	  excluding	  others	  (1996:	  72	  –	  4).	  Each	  inclusion,	  exclusion	  and	  association	  
involves	  a	  value	  choice.	  Thus	  when	  the	  lecturer	  used	  the	  word	  ‘draft’	  to	  describe	  the	  action	  of	  
‘civil	  servants’	  who	  are	  the	  ‘dud’s	  who	  draft	  laws	  ‘poorly’,	  whereas	  elsewhere	  he	  referred	  to	  
lawyers	  ‘developing’	  and	  ‘creating’	  laws	  (p.	  127)	  he	  not	  only	  named	  and	  described	  a	  social	  
action	  but	  imbued	  the	  meaning	  of	  ‘draft’	  with	  a	  value	  inferior	  to	  the	  actions	  of	  ‘developing’	  and	  
‘creating’.	  By	  consistently	  referring	  to	  legal	  professionals	  using	  male	  pronouns	  he	  valued	  the	  
male	  over	  the	  female.	  In	  failing	  to	  articulate	  and	  elaborate	  upon	  the	  internal	  goods	  of	  the	  




Carnegie	  Study	  is	  correct	  in	  claiming	  that	  the	  ethical-­‐social	  apprenticeship	  fundamentally	  
involves	  ‘professional	  ethics’	  and	  ‘wider	  matters	  of	  morality	  and	  character’	  (2007:	  129),	  what	  
this	  research	  shows	  is	  that	  ‘ethical’	  or	  ‘moral’	  choices	  are	  not	  only	  related	  to	  explicit	  discussions	  
of	  ethics	  or	  morality	  (in	  fact	  there	  were	  almost	  no	  explicit	  discussions	  of	  this	  nature	  in	  the	  data),	  
but	  to	  the	  fine-­‐grained	  choices	  lecturers	  make	  when	  they	  represent	  each	  aspect	  of	  the	  social	  
practices	  in	  which	  legal	  professionals	  engage.	  	  
3.	  Legal	  professional	  work	  is	  framed	  by	  an	  adversarial	  model	  of	  justice.	  	  This	  theme,	  and	  the	  
two	  that	  follow,	  extend	  one’s	  understanding	  of	  how	  legal	  professionals	  exercise	  their	  power	  in	  
terms	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  their	  work.	  There	  was	  no	  specific	  discussion	  of	  the	  adversarial	  system	  of	  
justice	  in	  the	  classroom	  I	  studied,	  nor	  any	  explicit	  statement	  that	  associated	  legal	  professionals	  
exclusively	  with	  this	  dispute	  resolution	  model.	  Yet	  the	  assumption	  of	  adversarial	  justice	  as	  a	  
framing	  feature	  of	  legal	  professional	  life	  was	  strongly	  evident.	  This	  emerged,	  firstly,	  from	  the	  
analysis	  of	  social	  action	  in	  cases	  where	  the	  legal	  professional	  was	  actively	  represented	  as	  
engaging	  in	  adversarial	  processes	  of	  justice,	  for	  example,	  the	  lecturer	  representing	  the	  lawyer	  
saying	  to	  the	  ‘other	  side’,	  ‘[w]e	  will	  sue	  you’	  (p.	  129).	  It	  was	  also	  constituted	  in	  situations	  where	  
the	  legal	  professional	  was	  passive	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  social	  action,	  as	  when	  the	  lecturer	  linked	  
the	  success	  of	  the	  legal	  academic	  to	  ‘being	  quoted’	  by	  the	  courts	  (p.	  220).	  It	  emerged	  further	  
from	  the	  types	  of	  resources	  legal	  professionals	  were	  represented	  as	  using,	  such	  as	  the	  ‘brief’	  
carried	  by	  the	  advocate	  to	  court	  (p.	  154)	  as	  well	  as	  through	  locating	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  attorney,	  
advocate,	  judge	  and	  magistrate	  predominantly	  or	  to	  a	  significant	  extent,	  in	  the	  court.	  	  
4.	  Despite	  an	  emphasis	  on	  the	  separation	  of	  law	  and	  morality/emotion,	  morality	  and	  emotion	  
are	  intertwined	  with	  legal	  professional	  work.	  One	  of	  the	  hallmarks	  of	  legal	  reasoning	  is	  that	  it	  
requires	  (or	  ‘forces’	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  more	  critical	  perspective)	  a	  separation	  of	  legal	  and	  moral	  
issues	  as	  well	  as	  a	  distancing	  from	  one’s	  own	  emotions.	  This	  stance	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  
law	  and	  morality/emotion	  emerged	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  social	  action,	  particularly	  where	  the	  
object	  of	  the	  action	  was	  law.	  For	  example,	  in	  deciding	  a	  criminal	  case	  brought	  against	  a	  group	  of	  
sadomasochists,	  the	  judge	  is	  represented	  as	  needing	  to	  separate	  out	  his	  ‘personal	  baggage’	  
from	  a	  particular	  issue	  even	  though	  he	  might	  find	  such	  practices	  ‘abhorrent’.	  This	  is	  




himself	  in	  relation	  to	  an	  existing	  semantic	  field	  of	  legal	  precedent	  (p.	  175).	  The	  need	  to	  
separate	  law	  and	  morality	  also	  emerged	  through	  the	  lecturer’s	  evaluation	  of	  legal	  professionals	  
when	  he	  rather	  sweepingly	  devalued	  all	  ‘natural	  lawyers’	  –	  a	  type	  of	  lawyer	  who	  believes	  that	  
moral	  criteria	  are	  intimately	  bound	  up	  with	  determining	  the	  status	  of	  a	  rule	  or	  principle	  as	  law	  –	  
on	  the	  basis	  that	  through	  the	  ages,	  they	  have	  lacked	  the	  moral	  courage	  to	  advocate	  civil	  
disobedience	  in	  support	  of	  their	  moral	  convictions	  (p.	  137).	  The	  need	  to	  distance	  oneself	  from	  
emotion	  also	  emerged	  through	  the	  coding	  of	  emotion,	  in	  those	  instances	  where	  emphasis	  was	  
laid	  on	  the	  lawyer	  needing	  to	  maintain	  a	  façade	  of	  emotional	  calm	  (p.	  132).	  	  
Other	  analytical	  codes,	  however,	  pointed	  to	  the	  ineluctable	  penetration	  of	  morality	  and	  
emotion	  into	  the	  legal	  professional’s	  work.	  This	  was	  most	  marked	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  social	  
actors.	  In	  cases	  where	  the	  social	  actor	  was	  included	  in	  the	  action,	  and	  particularly	  in	  relation	  to	  
the	  role	  of	  the	  magistrate,	  the	  lecturer’s	  representations	  suggested	  that	  legal	  professionals	  
cannot	  resist	  a	  moral	  categorization	  of	  the	  persons	  with	  whom	  they	  engage	  (p.	  214).	  It	  was	  also	  
evident	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  social	  action	  where	  the	  object	  of	  the	  action	  was	  ultimate	  outcomes.	  
Legal	  professionals	  were	  represented	  as	  having	  the	  capacity	  to	  have	  a	  say	  on	  significant	  moral	  
issues,	  for	  instance,	  to	  either	  support	  or	  speak	  out	  against	  the	  system	  of	  apartheid	  (p.	  178).	  The	  
coding	  of	  emotion,	  finally,	  pointed	  to	  instances	  where	  the	  legal	  professional	  was	  unable	  to	  
control	  an	  emotional	  response.	  This	  occurred,	  most	  notably,	  in	  the	  anecdote	  of	  the	  lecturer	  as	  a	  
magistrate,	  adjudicating	  the	  case	  of	  the	  father	  defaulting	  on	  his	  maintenance	  payments	  (p.	  
207).	  	  
5.	  The	  emotional	  tenor	  of	  the	  legal	  professional	  workplace	  is	  predominantly	  negative.	  This	  
theme	  was	  predominantly	  related	  to	  the	  coding	  of	  emotion	  as	  direct	  or	  indirect	  and	  as	  positive	  
or	  negative.	  However,	  it	  also	  emerged	  from	  the	  coding	  of	  social	  action	  through	  the	  nature	  of	  
the	  verbs	  used	  to	  describe	  relationships	  between	  legal	  professionals	  themselves	  or	  others,	  as	  in	  
the	  advocate	  ‘attacking’	  the	  witness	  (p.	  150),	  or	  the	  articled	  clerk	  being	  ‘shunted	  around’	  by	  
legal	  secretaries	  (p.	  152).	  The	  coding	  of	  social	  action,	  particularly	  the	  identification	  of	  passive	  
forms	  of	  action,	  highlighted	  a	  number	  of	  stressful	  contexts,	  such	  as	  judges	  being	  grilled	  by	  the	  
Judicial	  Services	  Commission	  (p.	  180)	  or	  advocates	  desperately	  waiting	  for	  work	  to	  come	  in	  




profession	  through	  the	  lecturer’s	  evaluations	  of	  legal	  professionals	  themselves,	  which	  tended	  
to	  be	  predominantly	  negative.	  	  
6.	  The	  legal	  profession	  is	  structured	  by	  multiple	  hierarchies	  that	  strongly	  preference	  the	  
private	  over	  the	  public	  dimensions	  of	  legal	  service.	  This	  theme,	  which	  introduces	  the	  broader	  
category	  of	  the	  range	  and	  quality	  of	  relationships	  a	  legal	  professional	  establishes	  and	  maintains	  
through	  his	  or	  her	  forms	  of	  work,	  was	  linked	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  analytical	  codes.	  It	  was	  firstly	  
evident	  in	  the	  coding	  of	  social	  action	  where	  both	  the	  choice	  between	  representing	  action	  as	  
active/passive	  or	  material/semiotic	  played	  a	  part	  in	  establishing	  the	  power	  of	  each	  role	  relative	  
to	  particular	  objects	  and	  relative	  to	  each	  other,	  and	  thus	  in	  constituting	  relationships	  and	  
hierarchy.	  Advocates,	  for	  instance,	  were	  always	  active	  in	  relation	  to	  witnesses	  and	  in	  some	  
instances	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  judge	  but	  they	  were	  almost	  always	  (and	  perhaps	  surprisingly)	  
passive	  in	  relation	  to	  attorneys	  as	  regards	  obtaining	  work	  (pp.	  150-­‐151).	  The	  actions	  of	  articled	  
clerks	  were	  predominantly	  material	  (p.	  146)	  but	  the	  lecturer	  also	  suggested	  that	  once	  they	  have	  
a	  few	  years	  experience	  under	  their	  belts,	  they	  become	  active	  and	  semiotic	  players	  in	  relation	  to	  
legal	  secretaries	  (p.	  152).	  The	  coding	  of	  resources	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  diversity	  and	  range	  of	  
resources	  at	  an	  actor’s	  disposal	  pointed	  to	  a	  higher	  status	  in	  the	  legal	  hierarchy.	  Relative	  to	  the	  
number	  of	  extracts,	  for	  instance,	  the	  advocate	  was	  represented	  as	  acting	  with	  regard	  to	  a	  
disproportionately	  wider	  array	  of	  resources	  than	  the	  articled	  clerk	  or	  attorney	  (p.	  152),	  whereas	  
the	  lower	  status	  of	  magistrates	  was	  in	  part	  constituted	  by	  an	  emphasis	  on	  their	  not	  having	  
resources	  (p.	  208).	  The	  coding	  of	  emotion	  also	  indexed	  hierarchy	  in	  that	  the	  tendency	  to	  
express	  emotion	  or	  the	  difficulties	  involved	  in	  not	  being	  in	  complete	  control	  of	  one’s	  emotions	  
were	  associated	  with	  roles	  lower	  in	  the	  legal	  hierarchy,	  whereas	  the	  disentanglement	  of	  
emotions	  from	  action	  was	  emphasized	  in	  the	  case	  of	  higher-­‐situated	  roles.	  The	  magistrate	  is	  
represented	  as	  ‘losing’	  his	  temper	  and	  ‘letting	  rip’	  into	  the	  accused	  while	  the	  judge	  in	  the	  same	  
anecdote	  is	  cool,	  calm	  and	  collect,	  able	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  requirements	  of	  procedural	  correctness	  
(p.	  207).	  Finally,	  evaluations	  of	  legal	  professionals	  themselves	  and	  of	  legal	  professional	  work	  
played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  constituting	  hierarchy,	  as	  the	  higher	  positions	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  their	  work	  
–	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  advocate	  and	  judge	  –	  were	  generally	  (though	  not	  exclusively)	  evaluated	  in	  a	  




7.	  The	  client	  occupies	  a	  complex	  space	  in	  the	  legal	  professional	  world	  that	  is	  at	  the	  same	  time	  
elevated	  and	  backgrounded	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  legal	  professional.	  This	  theme,	  which	  also	  
relates	  to	  the	  broader	  category	  of	  legal	  relationships,	  emerged	  primarily	  from	  the	  coding	  of	  
social	  actors	  and	  whether	  they	  were	  included	  or	  backgrounded	  in	  the	  action.	  The	  range	  of	  
discursive	  resources	  used	  to	  background	  clients	  allowed	  for	  the	  legal	  professional	  to	  
instrumentalize	  and	  possessivate	  client,	  as	  in	  the	  reference	  to	  clients	  being	  the	  legal	  
professionals’	  ‘bread-­‐and-­‐butter’	  (pp.	  131,	  136,	  155).	  	  
8.	  Gender	  bias	  is	  foregrounded	  and	  prominent	  whilst	  bias	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  race	  and	  class	  is	  
more	  subtly	  embedded.	  The	  last	  theme	  relates	  to	  the	  social	  profile	  of	  the	  profession	  and	  it	  
emerged	  from	  the	  coding	  of	  social	  actors,	  and	  then	  through	  the	  analytical	  sub-­‐categories	  of	  
classification	  (and	  the	  further	  distinctions	  between	  gender,	  race	  and	  class),	  nomination	  and	  
categorization.	  Undertaking	  the	  coding	  for	  gender	  classification	  was	  a	  fairly	  straightforward	  
task	  in	  that	  it	  was	  indexed	  by	  the	  overwhelming	  use	  of	  male	  pronouns	  and	  male	  nominations.	  
However,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  racial	  and	  class	  categorizations	  the	  linguistic	  cues	  that	  pointed	  to	  such	  
classifications	  (such	  as	  classifiers	  in	  the	  nominal	  group)	  were	  largely	  absent.	  The	  very	  few	  racial	  
and	  class	  categorizations	  that	  I	  was	  able	  to	  identify	  were	  therefore	  deeply	  and	  subtly	  
embedded	  in	  contextual	  references,	  as	  in	  the	  lecturer’s	  criticism	  of	  the	  use	  of	  the	  phrase	  ‘what	  
what’	  used	  by	  black	  students	  (p.	  134).	  	  
Figure	  9	  below	  provides	  a	  graphical	  illustration	  of	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  analytical	  codes	  
developed	  around	  the	  model	  of	  social	  practice	  were	  interwoven	  amongst	  the	  eight	  primary	  






Figure	  9:	  Graphical	  illustration	  of	  interweaving	  of	  analytical	  codes	  with	  themes.	  
In	  the	  foregoing	  section	  I	  have	  ascended	  one	  rung	  of	  the	  discursive	  ladder	  by	  explaining	  how	  
the	  discursive	  codes	  functioned	  to	  constitute	  eight	  primary	  themes	  in	  the	  lecturer’s	  classroom	  
talk.	  In	  the	  following	  section	  I	  group	  the	  themes	  into	  five	  broader	  categories,	  namely	  the	  nature	  
of	  legal	  professional	  power	  (theme	  1),	  the	  purposes	  and	  values	  of	  law	  and	  the	  legal	  profession	  
(theme	  2),	  the	  nature	  of	  legal	  work	  (themes	  3,	  4,	  and	  5),	  legal	  relationships	  (themes	  6	  and	  7)	  
and	  the	  social	  profile	  of	  the	  profession	  (theme	  8)	  and	  discuss	  each	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  reports	  and	  
statements	  on	  legal	  professionalism	  and	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  teaching	  of	  legal	  ethics	  
introduced	  in	  section	  2.2	  of	  chapter	  one.	  The	  discussion	  in	  the	  next	  section	  follows	  the	  broader	  





Figure	  10:	  Illustration	  of	  the	  ascending	  levels	  of	  analysis.	  
3.	  	   DISCUSSION	  OF	  CLAIM	  TWO	  	  
The	  purpose	  of	  the	  analysis	  that	  follows	  is	  to	  provide	  some	  broader	  commentary	  on	  the	  
‘horizon	  of	  observation’	  (Little,	  J.W.	  (2003)	  ‘Inside	  teacher	  community:	  Representations	  of	  
classroom	  practice’	  105	  Teacher’s	  College	  Record	  913	  at	  917,	  cited	  in	  Grossman	  (2009)	  2065)	  
that	  the	  lecturer’s	  classroom	  talk	  established.	  It	  is	  limited	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  my	  analysis	  of	  the	  
eight	  emergent	  themes	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  legal	  professionalism	  and	  the	  teaching	  of	  legal	  
ethics	  is	  not	  based	  on	  the	  same	  rigorous	  analytical	  process	  I	  followed	  for	  the	  classroom	  talk.	  
Nevertheless,	  reference	  to	  these	  resources	  in	  their	  broad	  outline	  allows	  me	  to	  make	  some	  
observations	  on	  the	  aspects	  of	  legal	  professionalism	  the	  lecturer	  in	  my	  case	  study	  rendered	  
visible	  and	  which	  he	  obscured	  from	  view,	  at	  the	  same	  time	  pointing	  out	  where	  the	  literature	  
could	  be	  modified	  by	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  what	  happens	  in	  the	  classroom.	  	  
In	  the	  discussion	  which	  follows	  words	  or	  phrases	  from	  the	  data	  are	  at	  times	  quoted	  merely	  to	  
remind	  the	  reader	  of	  the	  content	  of	  the	  example	  to	  which	  I	  am	  referring	  –	  the	  quoted	  material	  




3.1	   Nature	  of	  legal	  professional	  power	  	  
My	  claim	  that	  the	  lecturer’s	  classroom	  talk	  constituted	  legal	  professionals	  as	  powerful	  and	  
active	  social	  actors	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  fairly	  consistent	  set	  of	  objects	  was	  based	  on	  the	  patterning	  
of	  active/passive,	  transactive/non-­‐transactive	  and	  material/semiotic	  social	  action	  across	  the	  
predominant	  legal	  roles.	  The	  percentages	  for	  each	  of	  these	  analytical	  codes,	  which	  I	  presented	  




Figure	  11:	  Percentages	  of	  active,	  transactive	  and	  semiotic	  action	  across	  legal	  professional	  roles.95	  
With	  the	  exception	  of	  semiotic	  action	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  articled	  clerk,	  which	  stands	  at	  slightly	  
below	  fifty	  per	  cent,	  in	  all	  of	  these	  roles	  active,	  transactive	  and	  semiotic	  actions	  are	  greater	  
than	  fifty	  percent.	  The	  patterning	  of	  active,	  transactive	  and	  semiotic	  action	  is	  most	  pronounced	  
in	  the	  generic	  role	  of	  the	  lawyer	  in	  which	  power	  was	  represented	  as	  extending	  over	  law,	  
language	  and	  information	  and,	  thereby,	  over	  people	  and	  ultimate	  outcomes.	  Two	  patterns	  
appear	  to	  separate	  the	  other	  roles:	  The	  first	  is	  where	  semiotic	  action	  is	  pronounced,	  exceeding	  
the	  percentage	  of	  active/passive	  or	  transactive	  actions.	  This	  occurs	  in	  the	  role	  of	  the	  advocate,	  
judge	  and	  legal	  academic,	  and	  the	  second	  is	  where	  semiotic	  action	  is	  the	  least	  pronounced	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94	  The	  manner	  in	  which	  I	  developed	  these	  ‘quasi-­‐statistics’	  is	  described	  in	  section	  3.5.4	  of	  chapter	  three,	  	  
95	  Statistics	  for	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  Public	  Prosecutor,	  State	  Advocate	  and	  Director	  of	  Public	  Prosecutions	  were	  
excluded	  from	  the	  graphs	  in	  this	  chapter	  based	  on	  the	  small	  amount	  of	  data	  available	  for	  each	  role	  with	  a	  


















the	  analytical	  categories,	  which	  occurs	  in	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  articled	  clerk,	  attorney	  and	  
magistrate.	  The	  prominence	  of	  semiotic	  action	  is	  significant	  because	  it	  captures	  a	  power	  that	  is	  
more	  creative	  and	  far-­‐reaching	  than	  material	  forms	  of	  power.	  This	  came	  to	  the	  fore	  most	  
clearly	  in	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  judge	  and	  the	  legal	  academic.	  Judges	  possess	  the	  powers	  to	  
‘interpret’,	  ‘develop’,	  ‘create’	  and	  ‘change’	  the	  law	  and	  even	  to	  ‘strike	  out’	  or	  ‘demolish’	  laws	  
(p.	  176).	  As	  the	  lecturer’s	  discussion	  of	  the	  judge’s	  deliberation	  in	  Ex	  Parte	  Doe	  showed,	  they	  
have	  a	  power	  to	  establish	  the	  legal	  meaning	  of	  particular	  words	  and	  phrases,	  even	  when	  these	  
seem	  to	  be	  at	  variance	  with	  common	  meanings	  (p.	  177).	  Legal	  academics	  exercise	  their	  
potential	  creative	  power	  over	  law	  –	  the	  capacity	  to	  influence	  the	  law	  –	  through	  the	  authoring	  
and	  publishing	  of	  legal	  academic	  works,	  an	  action	  that	  similarly	  implies	  a	  power	  over	  and	  
mastery	  of	  language.	  Their	  semiotic	  power,	  however,	  is	  of	  a	  lower	  order	  because	  they	  are	  
dependent	  upon	  the	  courts	  for	  taking	  up	  their	  views	  (p.	  220).	  The	  advocate,	  while	  not	  ordinarily	  
possessing	  the	  power	  to	  establish	  the	  law	  tended	  to	  be	  represented	  manipulating	  the	  law	  as	  a	  
semiotic	  resource,	  as	  having	  the	  capacity	  to	  ‘see’	  the	  law,	  to	  ‘argue’	  for	  or	  against	  a	  particular	  
position	  on	  the	  law	  (p.	  147).	  Attorneys	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  represented	  relating	  to	  the	  law	  as	  
a	  physical	  resource	  and	  their	  only	  semiotic	  action	  resided	  in	  the	  action	  of	  ‘contravening’	  the	  law	  
(p.	  147).	  The	  greater	  overall	  percentage	  of	  semiotic	  actions	  of	  the	  attorney	  in	  comparison	  to	  
the	  advocate	  which	  Figure	  11	  illustrates	  can	  be	  ascribed	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  attorneys	  were	  
represented	  exercising	  semiotic	  powers	  over	  other	  objects	  (‘building’	  their	  own	  reputations	  for	  
instance,	  ‘referring’	  matters	  to	  and	  ‘briefing’	  advocates,	  or	  ‘practising’	  for	  their	  own	  account).	  
However,	  a	  semiotic	  power	  over	  these	  objects	  appears	  to	  be	  of	  a	  lower	  order	  because	  it	  is	  more	  
restrictive	  in	  its	  scope	  of	  influence	  than	  a	  semiotic	  power	  over	  law	  and	  language.	  Similarly,	  
while	  the	  social	  action	  of	  the	  magistrate	  was	  also	  frequently	  semiotic,	  their	  power	  only	  
extended	  to	  the	  parties	  before	  them.	  Even	  so,	  this	  is	  a	  significant	  power	  because,	  like	  the	  judge,	  
this	  contributes	  to	  defining	  the	  status	  of	  parties	  (pp.	  174,	  205)	  and	  determines,	  in	  criminal	  
cases,	  the	  forms	  and	  length	  of	  punishment	  they	  must	  bear	  (p.	  206).	  Both	  judges	  and	  
magistrates,	  uniquely	  amongst	  all	  the	  roles,	  were	  represented	  as	  determining	  ‘ultimate	  
outcomes’	  such	  as	  the	  capacity	  to	  create	  ‘certainty’	  or	  ‘chaos’	  or	  to	  stand	  up	  to	  or	  co-­‐operate	  




The	  generic	  role	  of	  the	  lawyer	  was	  the	  only	  one	  in	  which	  mastery	  over	  information	  featured	  as	  
a	  significant	  form	  of	  power	  (p.	  128),	  although	  the	  role	  of	  the	  articled	  clerk	  offered	  an	  unusual	  
gloss	  on	  this	  in	  pointing	  to	  the	  need	  for	  young	  legal	  professionals	  to	  also	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  social	  
dynamics	  operative	  in	  the	  law	  firm	  (p.	  148).	  One	  of	  the	  most	  interesting	  findings	  of	  the	  analysis	  
was	  that	  a	  number	  of	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  legal	  professional	  roles	  in	  the	  law	  lecturer’s	  talk	  were	  
oriented	  toward	  other	  legal	  professionals	  –	  this	  dimension	  of	  their	  power	  is	  accommodated	  in	  
section	  3.4.1	  below,	  dealing	  with	  the	  hierarchies	  in	  the	  profession.	  	  	  
The	  flipside	  of	  the	  representation	  of	  power	  in	  Figure	  11	  is	  also	  that	  no	  one	  role	  is	  thoroughly	  
powerful.	  For	  each	  of	  the	  roles	  for	  which	  there	  was	  sufficient	  data,	  the	  lecturer	  exposed	  areas	  
of	  vulnerability.	  For	  the	  lawyer	  role,	  these	  were	  the	  need	  to	  wait	  for	  clients	  to	  come	  off	  the	  
street	  and	  to	  be	  paid	  by	  clients,	  as	  well	  as	  being	  the	  subject	  of	  ‘gossip’	  on	  the	  part	  of	  colleagues	  
(p.	  131).	  The	  first	  of	  these	  resonates	  with	  the	  role	  of	  the	  attorney	  who	  serves	  as	  a	  first	  port	  of	  
call	  for	  members	  of	  the	  public	  seeking	  legal	  services,	  while	  the	  latter	  is	  more	  closely	  associated	  
with	  the	  role	  of	  the	  advocate,	  who	  is	  dependent	  upon	  the	  attorneys	  for	  work,	  and	  thus	  highly	  
susceptible	  to	  evaluations	  of	  their	  performance	  in	  court	  (p.	  153).	  As	  juniors,	  articled	  clerks	  are	  
expected	  to	  be	  at	  the	  beck	  and	  call	  of	  their	  principals	  and	  must	  even	  submit,	  even	  for	  only	  a	  
time,	  to	  the	  power	  exercised	  by	  legal	  secretaries	  (p.	  151).	  Magistrates,	  while	  holding	  sway	  
within	  their	  courts,	  were	  represented	  as	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  oversight	  of	  judges	  through	  the	  
institution	  of	  automatic	  review	  (pp.	  206-­‐7).	  Even	  judges	  are	  not	  all-­‐powerful:	  Their	  decisions	  
may	  be	  taken	  on	  appeal,	  in	  being	  appointed	  as	  a	  judge	  they	  not	  only	  face	  criticism	  and	  
evaluation	  of	  their	  performance	  as	  acting	  judges	  but	  also	  the	  heavy-­‐handed	  scrutiny	  of	  the	  
Judicial	  Services	  Commission,	  and	  they	  are	  vulnerable	  to	  changes	  in	  the	  political	  system	  –	  to	  the	  
possibility	  that	  a	  new	  regime	  will	  ‘chop	  off	  their	  heads’	  (pp.	  180-­‐181).	  	  
The	  horizon	  of	  observation	  that	  the	  lecturer	  established	  was	  thus	  multi-­‐dimensional,	  exposing	  
both	  powers	  and	  vulnerabilities	  and	  pointing	  to	  a	  range	  of	  objects	  through	  and	  in	  relation	  to	  
which	  the	  legal	  professional	  is	  powerful.	  The	  picture	  is	  not	  complete	  however,	  and	  particularly	  
for	  the	  roles	  in	  the	  shadow	  career	  path	  (public	  prosecutor,	  state	  advocate	  and	  magistrate),	  it	  is	  
undeveloped.	  The	  paucity	  of	  terms	  to	  describe	  the	  social	  action	  of	  these	  roles	  (p.	  …)	  engenders	  




these	  legal	  professionals	  use,	  for	  instance,	  the	  rules	  of	  evidence,	  the	  procedures	  of	  the	  court	  
and	  other	  professional	  conventions	  to	  achieve	  authority	  in	  their	  professional	  domains.	  	  
Furthermore,	  and	  linked	  to	  the	  implicit	  and	  patchy	  representation	  of	  internal	  goods,	  it	  is	  not	  
clear	  from	  the	  lecturer’s	  representations	  how	  legal	  professionals	  should	  exercise	  their	  powers	  
in	  order	  to	  achieve	  ultimate	  outcomes	  such	  as	  justice,	  fairness	  and	  morality,	  the	  provision	  of	  
adequate	  legal	  services	  to	  the	  poor,	  the	  competent	  representation	  of	  clients,	  and	  promotion	  of	  
the	  administration	  and	  development	  of	  legal	  institutions	  –	  outcomes	  for	  which	  the	  MacCrate	  
and	  ACLEC	  Reports	  and	  the	  South	  African	  LL.B	  curriculum	  statement	  advocate.	  The	  emphasis	  in	  
these	  reports	  and	  statements	  on	  legal	  analysis,	  reasoning	  and	  research	  (skills	  prioritized	  by	  the	  
MacCrate	  Report	  –	  see	  Sonsteng,	  2008:	  45	  –	  6);	  a	  ‘core’	  knowledge	  of	  the	  general	  principles,	  
nature	  and	  development	  of	  the	  law	  and	  the	  analytical	  and	  conceptual	  skills	  required	  of	  lawyers	  
(ACLEC,	  1996:	  21);	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  analyzing,	  evaluating,	  and	  commenting	  upon	  
fundamental	  legal	  principles,	  statutes,	  cases	  and	  so	  on	  (Generic	  LL.B	  statement,	  see	  for	  instance	  
Exit	  Level	  Outcomes	  1	  and	  3)	  affirm	  the	  lecturer’s	  emphasis	  upon	  the	  legal	  professional’s	  	  
relationship	  to	  law	  as	  one	  of	  the	  key	  modalities	  through	  which	  their	  power	  is	  exercised.	  
However,	  the	  analysis	  shows	  that	  the	  objects	  of	  the	  legal	  professional’s	  power	  are	  multiple	  and	  
there	  is	  therefore	  a	  need	  to	  demonstrate	  how	  a	  lawyer	  acts	  in	  relation	  to	  these	  multiple	  objects	  
in	  order	  to	  promote	  desired	  ultimate	  outcomes.	  This	  assumes	  the	  availability	  of	  discursive	  
resources	  to	  describe	  social	  practices	  that	  lead	  to	  desired	  ultimate	  outcomes	  in	  sufficient	  detail;	  
i.e.	  that	  break	  down	  abstract	  actions	  such	  as	  ‘provision	  of	  adequate	  legal	  services	  to	  the	  poor’	  
into	  more	  material	  social	  actions,	  sufficiently	  framed	  by	  the	  ambiguity	  of	  their	  circumstances,	  
the	  full	  array	  of	  relevant	  social	  actors	  and	  a	  richly-­‐developed	  set	  of	  terms	  capturing	  the	  
appropriate	  values.	  	  
Both	  the	  MacCrate	  and	  ACLEC	  Report	  point	  to	  shifts	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  provision	  of	  legal	  
services,	  most	  notably	  an	  increased	  shift	  to	  non-­‐court	  based	  methods	  of	  dispute	  resolution	  
such	  as	  negotiation,	  mediation	  and	  arbitration	  (ACLEC,	  1996:	  10).	  As	  these	  methods	  and	  the	  
contexts	  in	  which	  they	  operate	  did	  not	  feature	  at	  all	  in	  the	  lecturer’s	  classroom	  talk,	  his	  
representations	  sustained	  a	  more	  traditional	  perception	  of	  the	  locus	  of	  the	  legal	  professional’s	  




professionals	  were	  located	  within	  the	  physical	  confines	  of	  the	  court	  –	  particularly	  the	  advocate,	  
judge	  and	  magistrate	  –	  also	  affirmed	  this.	  	  
Lastly,	  statements	  on	  legal	  professionalism	  detail	  some	  of	  the	  vulnerabilities	  to	  which	  legal	  
professionals	  will	  be	  subject	  in	  the	  21st	  century,	  including	  increased	  globalization	  and	  
competition	  for	  services	  and	  changing	  organizational	  forms	  (see,	  in	  general,	  the	  ACLEC	  Report,	  
(1996:	  15	  –	  17)	  as	  well	  as	  the	  comprehensive	  overviews	  in	  Kronman	  (1993)	  and	  Glendon	  
(1994)).	  To	  a	  certain	  extent,	  the	  lecturer’s	  emphasis,	  for	  instance,	  on	  the	  need	  to	  build	  a	  good	  
reputation,	  pointed	  to	  the	  grim	  reality	  of	  competition	  for	  services.	  However,	  the	  phenomenon	  
of	  changing	  organizational	  forms	  did	  not	  feature	  at	  all	  in	  his	  representations	  which	  seemed	  
strongly	  premised	  on	  and	  thus	  sustaining	  of	  the	  traditional	  structures	  of	  the	  law	  firm	  (for	  
articled	  clerks	  and	  attorneys),	  the	  bar	  (for	  advocates)	  and	  system	  of	  civil	  and	  criminal	  courts	  
(for	  judges,	  magistrates,	  public	  prosecutors,	  state	  advocates	  and	  the	  Director	  of	  Public	  
Prosecutions).	  	  	  
3.2	   The	  purposes	  and	  values	  of	  the	  profession	  	  
The	  predominant	  theme	  identified	  in	  the	  lecturer’s	  classroom	  talk	  in	  this	  regard	  –	  that	  the	  
normative	  frame	  for	  most	  of	  the	  roles	  tends	  to	  foreground	  external	  rather	  than	  internal	  goods	  
and	  at	  times	  devalues	  the	  legal	  professional	  –	  was	  based	  on	  the	  patterning	  of	  internal/external	  
goods	  across	  the	  prominent	  legal	  professional	  roles,	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  legal	  professionals	  
themselves	  were	  either	  evaluated	  positively	  or	  negatively.	  I	  will	  deal	  first	  with	  the	  patterning	  of	  
internal/external	  goods	  and,	  thereafter,	  with	  negative/positive	  evaluations	  of	  legal	  
professionals	  themselves.	  	  
3.2.1	   Foregrounding	  of	  external	  rather	  than	  internal	  goods	  	  
The	  MacCrate	  and	  ACLEC	  Reports	  and	  the	  South	  African	  generic	  LL.B	  statement	  emphasize	  
what	  I	  have	  dubbed	  the	  ‘internal	  goods’	  of	  the	  profession:	  Goods	  that	  are	  central	  to	  
maintaining	  the	  integrity	  and	  meaningfulness	  of	  the	  practice	  which	  can	  be	  enjoyed	  by	  the	  
whole	  community	  who	  participates	  therein	  (MacIntyre,	  1981:	  178).	  These	  include	  promoting	  
justice,	  fairness	  and	  morality,	  enhancing	  the	  capacity	  of	  law	  and	  legal	  institutions	  to	  do	  justice,	  




promoting	  a	  just	  and	  democratic	  society,	  and	  so	  on.	  They	  say	  little,	  however,	  on	  more	  subtle	  
internal	  goods	  such	  as	  procedural	  fairness	  or	  correctness	  and	  how	  these	  might	  intersect	  with	  
values	  such	  as	  justice	  or	  fairness.	  They	  also	  say	  nothing	  about,	  external	  goods	  –	  those	  that	  flow	  
as	  a	  reward	  for	  or	  effect	  of	  the	  practice	  and	  which	  are	  enjoyed	  by	  the	  legal	  professional	  alone	  
(ibid).	  The	  literature	  on	  the	  teaching	  of	  legal	  ethics,	  however,	  suggests	  that	  external	  goods	  
receive	  a	  greater	  emphasis	  than	  internal	  goods	  through	  claims,	  for	  instance,	  that	  lecturers	  
present	  lawyers	  as	  ‘grubby	  money	  seekers’	  (Nicolson,	  2008:	  149)	  or	  as	  people	  who	  are	  only	  
interested	  in	  morality	  insofar	  as	  it	  would	  work	  for	  a	  particular	  client	  or	  case	  (Menkel-­‐Meadow,	  
1991:	  7).	  	  
Figure	  12	  shows	  the	  patterning	  in	  the	  law	  lecturer’s	  classroom	  talk	  of	  the	  representation	  of	  
internal/external	  goods	  across	  the	  most	  prominent	  legal	  professional	  roles.	  	  
	  
Figure	  12:	  Percentages	  of	  internal/external	  goods	  across	  legal	  professional	  roles.	  
For	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  judge,	  magistrate	  and	  lawyer	  internal	  goods	  predominated.	  However,	  for	  all	  
the	  other	  roles	  external	  goods	  were	  overwhelmingly	  pre-­‐eminent.	  This	  was	  most	  notable	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  the	  attorney,	  for	  which	  I	  could	  not	  identify	  a	  single	  representation	  of	  the	  internal	  goods	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The	  internal	  goods	  most	  frequently	  encountered	  included	  order,	  objectivity,	  rationality,	  logic,	  
thoroughness	  and	  certainty	  (pp.	  138,	  193),	  followed	  by	  the	  importance	  of	  upholding	  
constitutional	  values	  (p.	  193).	  There	  were	  a	  few,	  oblique	  references	  to	  fairness,	  efficiency	  and	  
effectiveness	  in	  the	  administration	  of	  justice	  (pp.	  203,	  216),	  democracy	  (through	  the	  judge	  
representing	  society	  on	  the	  bench	  –	  p.	  193),	  and	  respect	  for	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  (p.	  216).	  The	  
difficulty	  with	  the	  representation	  of	  these	  internal	  goods,	  across	  all	  the	  roles,	  was	  that	  they	  
were	  almost	  all	  presented	  in	  the	  form	  of	  moral	  evaluation	  –	  encoding	  value	  through	  the	  use	  of	  
morally	  loaded	  adjectives,	  adverbs	  and	  other	  evaluative	  forms.	  The	  lecturer	  did	  not	  explicitly	  
link	  these	  goods	  to	  the	  standards	  of	  excellence	  or	  the	  history	  of	  the	  practice	  and,	  in	  certain	  
cases,	  he	  even	  undermined	  these	  goods	  by	  presenting	  them	  as	  antithetical	  to	  a	  ‘lay’	  perception	  
of	  justice.	  The	  clearest	  example	  of	  this	  occurred	  in	  the	  role	  of	  the	  magistrate	  where	  a	  standard	  
of	  excellence	  –	  the	  magistrate,	  for	  instance,	  not	  taking	  over	  the	  prosecution,	  was	  not	  linked	  to	  
the	  internal	  good	  of	  objectivity	  and	  fairness	  and	  was	  implicitly	  justified	  by	  being	  presented	  as	  
an	  understandable	  response	  to	  the	  accused’s	  dismal	  attitude	  (p.	  207).	  	  
The	  most	  frequently	  represented	  external	  good,	  by	  a	  fairly	  good	  margin,	  was	  material	  reward	  
(pp.	  138,	  168).	  Talk	  about	  money	  featured	  in	  almost	  all	  the	  predominant	  legal	  professional	  
roles,	  even	  for	  roles	  specifically	  identified	  as	  not	  facilitating	  the	  attainment	  of	  this	  particular	  
good	  such	  as	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  judge	  (p.	  194)	  and	  legal	  academic	  (p.	  226).	  In	  both	  these	  instances,	  
the	  lecturer	  offered	  a	  way	  of	  getting	  around	  the	  somewhat	  problematic	  fact	  that	  the	  material	  
rewards	  are	  of	  middle-­‐class	  standards:	  Before	  becoming	  a	  judge,	  a	  senior	  advocate	  must	  ensure	  
he	  already	  has	  all	  that	  he	  needs,	  for	  the	  legal	  academic,	  he	  should	  be	  independently	  wealthy	  or	  
perhaps	  marry	  a	  successful	  lawyer.	  The	  preoccupation	  with	  money	  in	  the	  lecturer’s	  classroom	  
talk	  resonates	  with	  Kronman’s	  candid	  observations	  of	  the	  legal	  profession	  in	  the	  United	  States	  
of	  America.	  During	  the	  1960s’,	  Kronman	  observes,	  lawyers	  working	  in	  large	  firms	  did	  not	  see	  
their	  work	  in	  purely	  instrumental	  terms	  –	  as	  simply	  a	  means	  to	  make	  money.	  Rather,	  the	  
culture	  of	  large-­‐firm	  practice	  encouraged	  the	  different	  view	  that	  ‘the	  work	  of	  lawyers	  is	  also	  
inherently	  rewarding	  and	  offers	  satisfactions	  that	  make	  the	  doing	  of	  it	  valuable	  for	  its	  own	  sake’	  
(1993:	  294).	  By	  contrast,	  the	  big-­‐firm	  culture	  had	  by	  the	  1990s	  shifted	  to	  not	  only	  tolerating	  ‘a	  




generation	  ago’	  but	  to	  actively	  encouraging	  lawyers	  ‘to	  be	  more	  and	  more	  exclusively	  
preoccupied	  with	  it’	  (ibid:	  295).	  While	  comparative	  sociological	  data	  on	  the	  legal	  profession	  in	  
South	  Africa	  is	  not	  available,	  the	  prominence	  accorded	  to	  material	  rewards	  in	  the	  lecturer’s	  
classroom	  talk	  suggests	  the	  possible	  starting	  point	  of	  such	  a	  preoccupation.	  	  
Apart	  from	  material	  reward,	  reputation	  (pp.	  168);	  status	  (pp.	  168,	  194,	  226);	  success,	  elitism,	  
distinction	  and	  specialization	  (pp.	  139,	  168)	  featured	  more	  than	  once	  across	  the	  dominant	  legal	  
professional	  roles.	  One	  of	  the	  more	  surprising	  external	  goods	  identified	  in	  the	  lecturer’s	  
classroom	  talk	  was	  that	  of	  ‘experience’	  (p.	  203),	  which	  arose	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  
public	  prosecutor	  and	  the	  state	  advocate.	  This	  external	  good	  allowed	  for	  both	  these	  roles	  to	  be	  
constructed	  in	  purely	  instrumental	  terms,	  as	  the	  means	  to	  switch	  from	  the	  shadow	  to	  the	  
preferred	  career	  path.	  	  
The	  external	  good	  of	  intellectual	  stimulation,	  associated	  with	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  advocate	  and	  the	  
legal	  academic	  (pp.	  168,	  226)	  and	  specifically	  disassociated	  from	  the	  work	  of	  the	  attorney	  and	  
public	  prosecutor	  (pp.	  169,	  204),	  could	  be	  related	  to	  the	  value	  of	  ‘continuous	  professional	  
development’	  captured	  in	  the	  MacCrate	  Report’s	  reference	  to	  the	  values	  of	  ‘seeking	  out	  and	  
taking	  advantage	  of	  opportunities	  to	  increase	  knowledge	  and	  improve	  skills’,	  and	  ‘selecting	  and	  
maintaining	  employment	  that	  would	  allow	  for	  development	  as	  a	  professional	  and	  the	  pursuit	  of	  
professional	  and	  personal	  goals’	  (American	  Bar	  Association,	  1992:	  Chapter	  5).	  However,	  the	  
lecturer’s	  invocation	  of	  this	  good	  had	  a	  decidedly	  academic	  tone	  to	  it,	  which	  prompted	  me	  to	  
regard	  it	  more	  as	  an	  effect	  of	  the	  recontextualization	  of	  the	  practice	  of	  law	  in	  an	  academic	  
context	  than	  advocacy	  for	  continuous	  professional	  development.	  	  
In	  conclusion,	  therefore,	  the	  standards	  of	  excellence	  of	  the	  practice	  and	  the	  goods	  that	  emerge	  
as	  a	  result	  thereof	  were	  faint	  and	  scattered	  points	  of	  light	  in	  an	  horizon	  of	  observation	  
otherwise	  strongly	  imbued	  with	  the	  gaudy	  colours	  of	  alluring	  but	  ultimately	  shallow	  contingent	  
goods.	  The	  patterning	  of	  internal/external	  goods	  –	  both	  in	  substance	  and	  form	  –	  appeared	  to	  
sustain	  claims	  made	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  teaching	  of	  legal	  ethics	  that	  external	  goods	  tend	  to	  
be	  foregrounded,	  although	  the	  analysis	  pointed	  to	  the	  diversity	  of	  such	  goods	  in	  addition	  to	  




3.2.2	   Devaluation	  of	  legal	  professionals	  themselves	  	  
Positive	  and	  negative	  evaluations	  of	  legal	  professionals	  support	  the	  normative	  framework	  
guiding	  the	  purposes	  of	  law	  and	  the	  legal	  profession.	  Positive	  evaluations	  assume	  that	  legal	  
professionals	  are	  aligned	  with	  such	  purposes	  and	  are	  making	  a	  positive	  contribution	  to	  society,	  
whilst	  negative	  evaluations	  assume	  the	  converse.	  Within	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  teaching	  of	  legal	  
ethics,	  it	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  negative	  evaluations	  of	  legal	  professionals	  predominate	  and	  
play	  a	  role	  in	  fostering	  an	  attitude	  of	  cynicism	  among	  students	  (Nicolson,	  2008:	  149).	  	  
There	  were	  relatively	  few	  evaluations	  of	  legal	  professionals	  themselves	  apart	  from	  the	  roles	  of	  
the	  judge,	  magistrate	  and	  possibly	  legal	  academic.	  There	  were	  no	  evaluations	  at	  all	  of	  articled	  
clerks,	  three	  of	  the	  attorney	  and	  six	  evaluations	  of	  the	  advocate	  respectively.96	  Figure	  13	  
presents	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  legal	  professional	  roles	  themselves	  were	  evaluated	  positively	  or	  
negatively	  in	  the	  lecturer’s	  classroom	  talk.97	  
	  
Figure	  13:	  Percentages	  of	  negative/positive	  or	  ambiguous	  evaluations	  across	  legal	  professional	  roles.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96	  As	  regards	  the	  roles	  which	  are	  not	  included	  in	  the	  graphs,	  there	  were	  no	  extracts	  dealing	  with	  the	  evaluation	  of	  
state	  advocates	  themselves,	  two	  extracts	  of	  this	  nature	  for	  the	  public	  prosecutor	  (both	  positive),	  and	  two	  for	  the	  
Director	  of	  Public	  Prosecutions	  (both	  negative).	  	  
97	  Graph	  6.3	  excludes	  the	  role	  of	  the	  articled	  clerk	  as	  there	  were	  no	  extracts	  containing	  a	  positive	  or	  negative	  	  

















Figure	  13	  indicates	  a	  predominance	  of	  positive	  evaluations	  in	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  judge,	  legal	  
academic	  and	  attorney.	  Judges	  were	  positively	  evaluated	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  wisdom,	  their	  
brilliance	  (being	  the	  ‘best	  brains	  in	  the	  business’)	  and,	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent,	  a	  commitment	  to	  
human	  rights	  (pp.	  190–191).	  Yet	  they	  were	  also	  devalued	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  being	  long-­‐winded	  and	  
confusing	  (p.	  192).	  Legal	  academics	  were	  also	  valued	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  intellectual	  capacities	  
but	  here,	  as	  was	  the	  case	  with	  the	  attorney,	  the	  lecturer’s	  evaluation	  of	  specific	  individuals	  (Dr	  
Van	  der	  Merwe,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  legal	  academic;	  and	  Michael	  Dale	  and	  Deneys	  Reitz	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  the	  attorney)	  played	  a	  significant	  part	  in	  increasing	  the	  number	  of	  positive	  evaluations.	  
The	  negative	  evaluations	  in	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  advocate,	  magistrate	  and	  (significantly	  so)	  in	  the	  
generic	  role	  of	  the	  lawyer	  suggest	  a	  difficult	  professional	  environment	  in	  which	  one	  is	  subjected	  
to	  evaluation	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  negative	  grounds,	  including	  a	  charge	  that	  one	  is	  ‘quick,	  clever	  and	  
wrong’	  (p.	  133),	  lacking	  in	  moral	  courage	  (p.	  137)	  prone	  to	  making	  errors	  (p.	  206);	  and	  lacking	  
knowledge,	  gravitas	  and	  professionalism	  (p.	  216).	  However	  at	  least	  some	  of	  the	  evaluations	  
seem	  more	  related	  to	  the	  recontextualizing	  work	  of	  the	  lecturer	  as	  an	  academic,	  because	  he	  
devalued	  legal	  professionals	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  they	  are	  stupid	  in	  the	  context	  of	  his	  personal	  
specialization,	  Roman	  law	  (p.	  192).	  	  
Throughout	  the	  roles	  there	  were	  moments	  where	  the	  lecturer	  modeled	  a	  cynical	  attitude	  
toward	  legal	  professionals	  that	  could	  serve	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  development	  of	  cynicism	  in	  
students.	  These	  included,	  for	  instance,	  his	  depiction	  of	  attorneys	  unable	  to	  keep	  their	  hands	  off	  
trust	  monies	  (p.	  165),	  reference	  to	  magistrates	  as	  kings	  of	  the	  dung	  heap	  (p.	  209),	  his	  attitude	  
toward	  sitting	  judges	  (which	  evinced	  a	  veiled	  sarcasm	  –	  see	  p.	  191),	  his	  depiction	  of	  the	  political	  
contamination	  of	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Director	  of	  Public	  Prosecutions	  (p.	  227–8);	  and	  his	  cynical	  
view	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  legal	  research,	  comparing	  it	  to	  a	  mouse	  going	  round	  in	  a	  little	  wheel	  (p.	  
220).	  Overall,	  therefore,	  the	  horizon	  of	  observation	  was	  haunted	  somewhat	  by	  negative	  lawyer	  
stereotypes.	  	  
3.3	   The	  nature	  of	  legal	  work	  	  
The	  lecturer’s	  representation	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  legal	  work	  has	  already	  been	  foreshadowed	  and	  in	  




action	  extended.	  The	  three	  themes	  discussed	  in	  this	  section	  relate	  instead	  to	  broad-­‐ranging	  
qualitative	  features	  of	  legal	  work,	  specifically,	  that	  legal	  professional	  work	  is	  framed	  by	  an	  
adversarial	  model	  of	  justice;	  that	  morality	  and	  emotion	  are	  intertwined	  with	  legal	  professional	  
work	  despite	  advocacy	  to	  the	  contrary;	  and	  that	  the	  emotional	  tenor	  of	  the	  legal	  professional	  
workplace	  is	  predominantly	  negative.	  	  
3.3.1	   An	  adversarial	  model	  of	  justice	  frames	  legal	  professional	  work	  
Schechter	  has	  claimed	  that	  law	  schools	  in	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America	  emphasize	  litigation	  as	  a	  
method	  of	  conflict	  resolution	  to	  such	  an	  extent	  that	  students	  have	  a	  ‘reflex	  reaction’	  to	  file	  a	  
lawsuit	  whenever	  they	  are	  consulted	  by	  a	  client	  (1996:	  373).	  More	  commonly,	  commentators	  
have	  argued	  that	  the	  legal	  classroom	  fosters	  ‘adversariness,	  argumentativeness	  and	  zealotry’	  
(Menkel-­‐Meadow,	  1991:	  7)	  –	  qualities	  that	  resonate	  with	  the	  adversarial	  model	  of	  justice	  
prevalent	  in	  most	  common	  law	  jurisdictions,	  including	  South	  Africa.	  Mertz’	  empirical	  study	  on	  
the	  common	  legal	  epistemology	  in	  law	  schools	  in	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America	  has	  provided	  a	  
more	  nuanced	  understanding	  of	  how	  an	  adversarial	  model	  of	  justice	  is	  subtly	  perpetuated	  in	  
this	  particular	  jurisdiction;	  i.e.	  by	  conveying,	  uncritically,	  the	  message	  that	  justice	  is	  best	  served	  
by	  this	  particular	  model,	  together	  with	  the	  assumption	  that	  it	  is	  a	  form	  of	  reasoning	  to	  which	  
social	  conflicts	  of	  any	  kind	  can	  be	  fitted.	  The	  outworking	  of	  justice	  in	  an	  adversarial	  system	  
involves,	  moreover,	  ‘combative	  verbal	  dueling’	  between	  opposing	  sides	  (2007:	  4).	  Statements	  
on	  legal	  professionalism,	  however,	  do	  not	  accord	  a	  special	  emphasis	  to	  litigation.	  As	  noted	  
above,	  both	  the	  MacCrate	  and	  ACLEC	  Reports	  point	  to	  the	  need	  for	  legal	  professionals	  to	  
diversify	  the	  forms	  of	  work	  and	  contexts	  in	  which	  they	  engage	  including	  non-­‐court	  based	  forms	  
of	  dispute	  resolution.	  	  
The	  adversarial	  nature	  of	  legal	  professional	  work	  appeared	  first	  in	  the	  role	  of	  the	  lawyer	  in	  the	  
lecturer’s	  explanation	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  term	  ‘without	  prejudice’.	  The	  lawyer	  in	  the	  
lecturer’s	  representation	  engages	  with	  ‘the	  other	  side’	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  threat	  to	  sue,	  even	  
though	  the	  focus	  initially	  is	  on	  negotiation	  and	  discussion	  (p.	  129).	  It	  also	  surfaced	  in	  the	  verbs	  
used	  to	  describe	  processes	  of	  verbal	  dueling:	  The	  need	  for	  the	  lawyer	  to	  ‘argue’,	  ‘convince’	  and	  




primarily	  because	  attorneys	  ordinarily	  engage	  advocates	  to	  undertake	  courtroom	  litigation.	  
Attorneys	  were,	  however,	  represented	  in	  the	  action	  of	  undertaking	  the	  ‘backroom	  work’	  –	  
driving	  around,	  getting	  statements	  together,	  organizing	  files,	  and	  so	  on	  –	  required	  in	  order	  to	  
provide	  the	  advocate	  with	  a	  decent	  file	  that	  he	  can	  work	  from	  (p.	  149).	  It	  was	  however,	  strongly	  
evident	  in	  the	  role	  of	  the	  advocate	  for	  whom,	  the	  lecturer	  advocated,	  a	  trait	  essential	  for	  
success	  is	  a	  taste	  for	  ‘intellectual	  violence’	  (p.	  156),	  as	  manifested	  in	  ‘arguing’	  for	  or	  against	  
cases	  (p.	  147);	  and	  ‘confronting’	  the	  judge	  with	  their	  side	  of	  the	  argument	  (p.	  151).	  The	  mere	  
presence	  of	  judges	  and	  magistrates	  in	  the	  lecturer’s	  representations	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  both	  
emerged	  as	  prominent	  roles,	  sustains	  the	  model	  of	  an	  adversarial	  system	  of	  justice,	  for	  they	  are	  
undoubtedly	  the	  kingpins	  of	  court-­‐based	  dispute	  resolution.	  The	  lecturer	  represented	  each	  as	  
engaging	  in	  actions	  typical	  of	  litigation:	  Listening	  to	  and	  being	  confronted	  ‘by	  both	  sides’	  (p.	  
172)	  and	  deciding	  who	  wins	  or	  loses	  the	  case	  (pp.	  174,	  206).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  public	  
prosecutor,	  the	  lecturer’s	  combative	  attitude	  toward	  the	  accused	  charged	  with	  credit	  card	  
fraud	  is	  suggestive	  of	  an	  adversarial	  approach	  that	  goes	  beyond	  problem-­‐solving	  (p.	  201).	  Even	  
the	  role	  of	  the	  legal	  academic	  was	  linked	  to	  the	  social	  context	  of	  litigation,	  via	  the	  need	  to	  be	  
quoted	  by	  the	  courts	  (p.	  220).	  The	  location	  of	  legal	  professionals	  within	  the	  physical	  space	  of	  
the	  court	  also	  strongly	  emphasized	  the	  social	  context	  and	  importance	  of	  adversarial	  litigation.	  
While	  there	  was	  some	  diversity	  in	  the	  representation	  of	  the	  work	  places	  of	  the	  articled	  clerk	  
and	  attorney	  (p.	  159),	  the	  workplace	  of	  the	  lawyer	  (p.	  133),	  advocate	  (p.	  159),	  judge	  (p.	  185),	  
and	  magistrate	  (p.	  211)	  was	  overwhelmingly	  constituted	  as	  the	  court.	  	  
Whilst	  the	  lecturer’s	  representations	  did	  not	  seem	  to	  approach	  the	  extremes	  suggested	  by	  the	  
North	  American	  literature,	  the	  horizon	  of	  observation	  established	  did	  point	  to	  the	  adversarial	  
model	  of	  justice	  as	  a	  key	  framing	  feature	  of	  legal	  professional	  work	  –	  a	  representation	  that	  was	  
strengthened	  by	  the	  absence	  of	  alternative	  models	  of	  dispute	  resolution.	  
3.3.2	   Legal	  professional	  work	  is	  intertwined	  with	  morality	  and	  emotion	  	  	  
The	  separation	  of	  the	  legal	  issue	  in	  a	  case	  from	  the	  various	  moral	  arguments	  which	  may	  be	  
presented	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  a	  solution,	  and	  the	  emotional	  distancing	  from	  the	  case	  required	  




party	  are	  regarded	  as	  key	  features	  of	  legal	  reasoning	  and	  legal	  professionalism	  (Cownie,	  2003:	  
159;	  Nicolson,	  2008:	  148).	  In	  this	  section	  I	  will	  deal	  firstly	  with	  the	  separation	  between	  law	  and	  
morality	  and	  then	  with	  the	  emotional	  distancing	  supposedly	  characteristic	  of	  legal	  professional	  
work.	  	  
Law	  and	  morality	  	  
In	  her	  empirical	  study	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  legal	  reasoning	  in	  eight	  classrooms	  in	  the	  United	  States	  
of	  America,	  Mertz	  found	  that	  it	  typically	  involved	  identifying	  and	  understanding	  the	  applicable	  
legal	  authorities,	  articulating	  the	  social	  dispute	  in	  the	  categories	  and	  language	  derived	  from	  
these	  authorities,	  and	  ignoring	  details	  of	  the	  context	  to	  which	  people	  would	  attach	  significance	  
on	  social	  or	  moral	  grounds	  	  (2007:	  4).	  She	  observed,	  however,	  that	  law	  lecturers	  also	  discussed	  
the	  social	  or	  policy	  implications	  of	  court	  cases,	  and	  the	  motivation	  of	  social	  actors	  (ibid:	  65).	  
While	  law	  lecturers	  policed	  the	  aspects	  of	  classroom	  talk	  that	  constituted	  the	  main	  parameters	  
of	  legal	  reasoning	  very	  closely,	  she	  found	  that	  discussion	  of	  social	  or	  policy	  factors	  paradoxically	  
allowed	  for	  a	  rather	  free	  association	  of	  social	  and	  moral	  issues	  with	  the	  core	  legal	  disputes	  
through	  the	  telling	  of	  anecdotal,	  speculative	  or	  even	  hypothetical	  stories	  (ibid).	  Thus	  students	  
were	  taught	  that	  any	  social	  conflict	  can	  be	  rearticulated	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  narrow	  categories	  of	  a	  
legal	  reading,	  whilst,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  discussions	  of	  macro-­‐	  or	  micro-­‐level	  social	  processes	  
that	  frame	  the	  conflict	  permit	  legal	  readers	  ‘to	  speculate	  on	  almost	  any	  social	  or	  moral	  aspect	  
of	  the	  situation	  involved’	  (ibid:	  83).	  Others	  have	  claimed,	  however,	  that	  law	  lecturers	  abstain	  
from	  pronouncing	  upon	  the	  relative	  merits	  of	  the	  possible	  moral	  positions	  which	  could	  be	  
adopted	  in	  a	  situation	  (Cownie,	  2003:	  159)	  and	  almost	  habitually	  defer	  to	  formally	  legitimate	  
kinds	  of	  legal	  authority;	  i.e.	  the	  various	  sources	  of	  law	  applicable	  within	  a	  particular	  jurisdiction	  
(Chapman,	  2002:	  68;	  Kennedy,	  1982:	  594;	  Nicolson,	  2008:	  149;	  Webb,	  1998:	  137).	  	  
Statements	  on	  legal	  professionalism,	  however,	  appear	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  legal	  professional	  
work	  encompasses	  a	  moral	  dimension.	  The	  second	  of	  the	  MacCrate	  Report’s	  fundamental	  
values,	  for	  instance,	  requires	  the	  legal	  professional	  to	  ‘promote’	  morality	  in	  his	  or	  her	  practice	  
(American	  Bar	  Association,	  1992:	  Chapter	  5).	  The	  ACLEC	  Report	  noted	  –	  in	  its	  cursory	  statement	  




knowledge’,	  being	  an	  appreciation	  of	  the	  law’s	  social,	  economic,	  political,	  philosophical,	  moral	  
and	  cultural	  contexts	  (1996:	  para	  2.4).	  	  
In	  this	  study	  I	  did	  not	  intend	  to	  focus	  on	  whether	  these	  features	  of	  legal	  reasoning	  were	  present	  
in	  the	  classroom	  of	  my	  study98	  apart	  from	  the	  representation	  of	  legal	  professionals;	  i.e.	  I	  was	  
interested	  in	  determining	  whether	  the	  legal	  professionals	  in	  the	  lecturer’s	  classroom	  talk	  were	  
represented	  as	  separating	  law	  from	  morality,	  or	  whether	  morality	  featured	  as	  an	  inevitable	  
dimension	  of	  their	  work.	  In	  effect,	  I	  found	  evidence	  for	  both	  of	  these	  themes.	  	  	  
The	  need	  for	  the	  legal	  professional	  to	  separate	  law	  and	  morality	  was	  implicit,	  firstly,	  in	  the	  
emphasis	  the	  lecturer	  placed	  on	  seeking	  the	  law	  on	  a	  particular	  issue	  and	  knowing	  how	  to	  work	  
with	  legal	  authorities	  (see,	  for	  example,	  pp.	  127,	  147).	  This	  was	  most	  pronounced	  in	  the	  generic	  
role	  of	  the	  lawyer,	  the	  attorney	  and	  the	  advocate.	  The	  judge,	  in	  turn,	  was	  strongly	  represented	  
as	  operating	  within	  a	  web	  of	  legal	  precedent.	  While	  his	  capacity	  to	  move	  within	  this	  semantic	  
field	  was	  not	  completely	  constrained,	  legal	  authority	  serves	  to	  rein	  him	  in	  and	  discipline	  him	  (p.	  
175).	  At	  one	  point,	  however,	  the	  lecturer	  stated	  the	  judge’s	  need	  to	  separate	  law	  and	  morality	  
in	  explicit	  terms:	  The	  judge	  must	  ‘look	  for	  the	  law’	  and	  set	  aside	  his	  ‘personal	  baggage’	  (p.	  175).	  
The	  separation	  of	  law	  from	  moral	  issues	  was	  also	  affirmed	  by	  the	  lecturer’s	  sweeping	  
devaluation	  of	  natural	  lawyers,	  who	  believe	  that	  moral	  criteria	  are	  intimately	  bound	  up	  with	  
determining	  the	  status	  of	  a	  rule	  or	  principle	  as	  law	  (p.	  137).	  
In	  a	  number	  of	  other	  representations,	  however,	  the	  lecturer	  pointed	  to	  the	  presence	  of,	  or	  at	  
least	  the	  need	  for,	  undeniable	  moral	  sensitivities.	  While	  this	  was	  not	  strongly	  evident	  in	  the	  
other	  legal	  professional	  roles	  and,	  in	  particular,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  judge,	  the	  parties	  appearing	  
before	  magistrates	  were	  represented	  with	  strong	  positive	  or	  negative	  moral	  overtones:	  They	  
included	  the	  ‘bugger’	  who	  was	  ‘lounging	  around	  …	  drinking	  out	  his	  money’	  and	  giving	  the	  rest	  
to	  his	  eighteen-­‐year-­‐old	  girlfriend,	  versus	  the	  domestic	  worker	  who	  was	  a	  ‘wonderful	  decent	  
person’;	  the	  corrupt	  politician;	  and	  the	  ‘civilized,	  first-­‐class’	  bookkeeper	  who	  steals	  from	  her	  
employer	  to	  finance	  her	  children’s	  education	  (p.	  214).	  	  These	  representations	  suggest	  that	  it	  is	  
magistrates	  themselves	  who	  cannot	  resist	  a	  moral	  categorization	  of	  the	  persons	  with	  whom	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98	  The	  very	  first	  lecture	  in	  the	  series	  –	  which	  explicitly	  focused	  on	  the	  separation	  of	  law	  from	  morality	  by	  way	  of	  a	  




they	  engage.	  However,	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  law	  to	  affirm	  the	  lecturer’s	  representation	  of	  an	  
intuitive	  moral	  evaluation	  of	  the	  parties	  in	  each	  case	  transmits	  a	  complicated	  message:	  On	  the	  
one	  hand	  it	  affirms	  the	  need	  to	  separate	  law	  and	  morality,	  on	  the	  other	  it	  presents	  the	  
outworking	  of	  the	  law	  as	  potentially	  arbitrary	  or	  unfair	  (p.	  215).	  	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  moral	  categorization	  of	  parties,	  in	  a	  few	  instances	  legal	  professionals	  were	  
represented	  as	  being	  able	  to	  speak	  with	  a	  powerful	  moral	  voice	  on	  particular	  issues:	  The	  
morality	  of	  mixed	  relationships,	  the	  trustworthiness	  of	  women	  as	  regards	  monetary	  issues,	  the	  
societal	  response	  to	  sodomy,	  and	  so	  on	  (pp.	  130,	  175).	  Most	  importantly	  for	  a	  South	  African	  
context,	  they	  were	  represented	  as	  having	  had	  the	  capacity	  to	  either	  support	  or	  speak	  out	  
against	  the	  system	  of	  apartheid	  (pp.	  178,	  184,	  185).	  This	  points	  to	  the	  moral	  effects	  or	  
significance	  of	  the	  work	  of	  the	  law,	  an	  aspect	  of	  legal	  professional	  work	  that	  involves	  a	  fusion,	  
rather	  than	  a	  separation	  of	  law	  and	  morality.	  	  
Finally,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  attorney,	  the	  lecturer	  emphasized	  the	  apparently	  pervasive	  lack	  of	  
morality	  in	  their	  handling	  of	  trust	  monies	  (p.	  149).	  
The	  horizon	  of	  observation	  thus	  exhibited	  a	  contradiction:	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  advocacy	  to	  
separate	  law	  from	  morality,	  but	  on	  the	  other	  a	  depiction	  of	  legal	  professionals	  who	  cannot	  
avoid	  making	  moral	  judgments	  in	  or	  considering	  the	  moral	  effects	  of	  their	  work.	  Similarly,	  they	  
cannot	  avoid	  the	  need	  for	  moral	  conduct	  in	  their	  own	  practice.	  These	  issues	  were	  not,	  however,	  
explored	  in	  any	  great	  depth.	  	  
Law	  and	  emotion	  	  
As	  regards	  the	  need	  to	  maintain	  an	  emotional	  distance	  from	  professional	  work,	  the	  lecturer	  
espoused	  the	  norm	  of	  emotional	  disentanglement	  directly	  and	  explicitly	  in	  both	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  
judge	  and	  the	  magistrate.	  It	  was	  evident,	  firstly,	  in	  his	  strongly	  worded	  statement	  regarding	  
judges	  leaving	  behind	  their	  ‘personal	  baggage’	  when	  sitting	  in	  judgment.	  What	  was	  particularly	  
interesting	  about	  this	  extract	  was	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  a	  moral	  stance	  on	  sodomy	  was	  
expressed	  by	  way	  of	  a	  fairly	  extreme	  emotional	  reaction	  –	  the	  judge	  finding	  sodomy	  ‘abhorrent’	  




both	  a	  moral	  and	  an	  emotional	  response.	  The	  lecturer’s	  subsequent	  anecdote	  of	  his	  experience	  
as	  a	  magistrate	  sitting	  in	  judgment	  of	  a	  man	  who	  refused	  to	  pay	  his	  maintenance	  illustrated	  
both	  the	  difficulty	  of	  emotional	  distancing	  and	  the	  perils	  of	  allowing	  your	  emotions	  to	  hold	  
sway	  (p.	  207).	  	  
Apart	  from	  these	  two	  direct	  instances,	  in	  a	  number	  of	  other	  representations	  legal	  professionals	  
were	  represented	  as	  needing	  to	  function	  with	  a	  façade	  of	  emotional	  calm	  in	  situations	  where	  
tempers	  typically	  may	  have	  flared	  and	  conflict	  ensued.	  Examples	  here	  include	  the	  manner	  in	  
which	  the	  advocate	  is	  represented	  as	  responding	  to	  the	  judge	  who	  threatens	  to	  throw	  his	  case	  
out	  of	  court	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  technical	  error	  	  (p.	  151);	  and	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  magistrate	  
changes	  his	  tone	  from	  one	  of	  irritation	  to	  submission	  when	  he	  is	  called	  by	  Judge	  Foxcroft	  on	  a	  
Saturday	  evening	  (p.	  207).	  The	  only	  legal	  professional	  who	  is	  at	  liberty	  to	  allow	  his	  emotions	  
free	  reign	  is	  apparently	  the	  legal	  academic,	  as	  manifested	  in	  the	  lecturer’s	  anecdote	  regarding	  
the	  love	  triangle	  in	  which	  Dr	  Van	  der	  Merwe	  became	  entangled	  (p.	  222).	  	  
The	  lecturer’s	  representations	  relating	  to	  the	  emotional	  content	  of	  legal	  professional	  work	  thus	  
tended	  to	  affirm	  the	  norm	  of	  emotional	  separation	  and	  distancing.	  	  
3.3.3	   The	  legal	  professional	  workplace	  has	  a	  predominantly	  negative	  emotional	  tenor	   	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  need	  to	  promote	  emotional	  distancing	  from	  an	  issue,	  commentators	  have	  
argued	  that	  the	  ‘psychic	  malaise’	  in	  which	  the	  legal	  profession	  is	  apparently	  mired	  (or	  at	  least,	  
legal	  professionals	  in	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America)	  –	  based	  on	  findings	  that	  levels	  of	  
depression,	  alcoholism	  and	  drug	  dependency	  amongst	  lawyers	  were	  almost	  double	  that	  of	  the	  
population	  as	  a	  whole	  –	  has	  its	  roots	  in	  traits	  that	  are	  developed	  during	  the	  law	  school	  years	  
(Goodrich,	  2000:	  148).	  Law	  school,	  it	  is	  claimed,	  fosters	  a	  competitive	  culture,	  producing	  
lawyers	  who	  are	  arrogant,	  confrontational,	  controlling,	  unfeeling,	  rude	  and	  ruthless	  (Menkel-­‐
Meadow,	  1991:	  7;	  Nicolson,	  2008:	  149;	  Schechter,	  1996:	  374,	  379,	  389;	  Webb:	  1996:	  274).	  	  	  
Once	  again,	  the	  question	  was	  not	  so	  much	  whether	  these	  attitudes	  and	  traits	  were	  being	  
fostered	  in	  law	  students,	  but	  whether	  they	  were	  exhibited	  in	  the	  legal	  professionals	  that	  




Both	  direct	  and	  indirect	  representations	  of	  the	  emotional	  tenor	  of	  legal	  professional	  work	  in	  
fact	  strongly	  sustained	  this	  theme.	  Directly	  expressed	  negative	  emotions	  predominated	  across	  
all	  of	  the	  predominant	  legal	  professional	  roles.	  They	  included	  the	  emotions	  of	  fear,	  hatred	  and	  
terror	  (p.	  159);	  boredom	  and	  distrust	  (pp.	  184-­‐185);	  aversion,	  irritation,	  disgust	  and	  anger	  (p.	  
209);	  jealousy	  (p.	  222);	  and	  nervousness	  and	  discomfort	  (p.	  229).	  These	  alone	  painted	  a	  fairly	  
grim	  picture	  of	  life	  in	  the	  law	  but	  they	  were	  affirmed	  by	  a	  variety	  of	  indirect	  representations.	  
Foremost	  among	  these	  was	  the	  positioning	  of	  legal	  professionals	  in	  situations	  that	  would	  
commonly	  be	  regarded	  as	  ‘stressful’.	  In	  the	  preferred	  career	  path,	  they	  are	  present	  from	  the	  
start:	  The	  young	  articled	  clerk	  must	  find	  articles	  and	  face	  being	  ‘vetted’	  in	  a	  formal	  interview	  to	  
determine	  whether	  he	  or	  she	  is	  a	  ‘fit	  and	  proper	  person’	  (p.	  142-­‐143).	  Having	  secured	  these	  
they	  must	  hit	  the	  ground	  running	  and	  begin	  earning	  fees	  even	  though	  they	  do	  not	  yet	  know	  the	  
ropes	  (p.	  157).	  While	  the	  advocate	  enjoys	  the	  freedom	  of	  working	  on	  his	  own,	  he	  waits	  in	  silent	  
desperation	  for	  attorneys	  to	  bring	  him	  work	  (p.	  144).	  Almost	  all	  the	  roles	  are	  represented	  as	  
having	  too	  much	  work	  for	  the	  time	  available	  in	  which	  to	  complete	  it.	  As	  a	  result	  they	  need	  to	  
work	  extraordinarily	  hard.	  The	  articled	  clerk	  needs	  to	  put	  in	  18	  hours	  a	  day	  to	  clear	  the	  
‘mountain	  of	  files’	  on	  his	  desk,	  the	  attorney	  must	  ‘work	  like	  a	  dog’,	  the	  advocate	  must	  make	  do	  
with	  4	  hours	  sleep	  a	  night	  (p.	  157).	  The	  stress	  of	  the	  situation	  is	  heightened	  by	  the	  need	  for	  
technical	  perfection	  –	  the	  stakes	  are	  high	  for	  articled	  clerks,	  attorneys	  and	  advocates	  because	  if	  
the	  file	  they	  place	  before	  the	  judge	  is	  not	  technically	  perfect	  they	  risk	  their	  case	  being	  thrown	  
out	  of	  court	  (p.	  173).	  Even	  if	  the	  file	  is	  perfect	  they	  need	  to	  be	  ready	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  
unexpected	  in	  a	  trial:	  The	  lawyer,	  for	  instance,	  needs	  to	  look	  ‘very	  hastily’	  for	  an	  authority	  in	  
court	  in	  order	  to	  respond	  to	  a	  challenge	  from	  the	  judge	  and	  to	  ‘think	  on	  his	  feet’	  (p.	  132).	  The	  
lecturer	  justifies	  the	  stresses	  of	  these	  environment,	  however,	  by	  holding	  that	  legal	  
professionals	  are	  people	  who	  ‘thrive’	  on	  nervous	  tension	  (p.	  158).	  While	  the	  judge	  does	  not	  
face	  these	  kinds	  of	  stressors	  –	  they,	  for	  instance,	  whilst	  still	  facing	  a	  large	  workload	  and	  
legitimately	  claim	  the	  time	  in	  which	  to	  complete	  it	  –	  they	  too	  must	  deal	  with	  stressful	  situations	  
such	  as	  being	  ‘scrutinized’	  as	  a	  potential	  candidate	  for	  the	  judiciary,	  by	  the	  Judicial	  Services	  
Commission,	  proving	  themselves	  for	  purposes	  of	  promotion,	  and	  dealing	  with	  changes	  in	  the	  




career	  path	  –	  the	  magistrate,	  for	  instance,	  must	  process	  a	  criminal	  every	  five	  minutes	  in	  the	  
directional	  court,	  a	  situation	  comparable	  to	  the	  casualty	  ward	  in	  Hillbrow	  (p.	  210).	  	  
The	  harsh	  nature	  of	  the	  legal	  professional	  world	  also	  emerged	  in	  other	  ways.	  Advocates	  ‘attack’	  
and	  ‘chip	  away’	  at	  witnesses	  (p.	  150),	  attorneys	  ‘shunt’	  their	  legal	  secretaries	  around	  (p.	  152),	  
advocates	  use	  their	  friends	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  ‘fat	  briefs’	  (p.	  155).	  Judges	  show	  no	  mercy	  in	  
refusing	  to	  condone	  a	  technical	  error	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  advocate	  (p.	  173).	  The	  ‘old	  battleaxe’	  of	  
a	  magistrate	  refuses	  to	  allow	  for	  any	  mitigation	  of	  sentence	  in	  the	  woman	  who	  stole	  from	  her	  
employer	  (p.	  210).	  Magistrates	  feel	  good	  about	  the	  accused	  people	  whom	  they	  sentence	  
‘rotting’	  in	  jail	  (pp.	  210.	  213,	  217).	  All	  of	  these	  representations	  are	  indicative	  of	  a	  professional	  
world	  in	  which	  people	  and	  relationships	  do	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  highly	  valued.	  They	  appear	  to	  run	  
counter	  to	  the	  calls	  for	  ‘respect’	  and	  ‘tolerance	  (generic	  LL.B	  statement,	  see	  Exit	  Level	  Outcome	  
6	  and	  9).	  	  	  
This	  overview	  thus	  tends	  to	  affirm	  claims	  in	  the	  literature	  of	  the	  legal	  professional	  world	  being	  
represented	  in	  the	  classroom	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  is	  harsh,	  stressful	  and	  antagonistic.	  The	  horizon	  
of	  observation	  established	  by	  the	  lecturer	  however,	  also	  hinted	  at	  the	  reasons	  for	  the	  negative	  
emotional	  tenor	  of	  the	  professional	  environment.	  	  
3.4	   Legal	  relationships	  	  
The	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  lecturer’s	  representations	  fleshed	  out	  the	  complex	  web	  of	  relationships	  
in	  the	  legal	  profession	  was	  a	  surprising	  finding	  in	  the	  analysis.	  This	  web	  encompassed	  
relationships	  amongst	  legal	  professionals	  themselves,	  and	  relationships	  with	  clients	  and	  parties.	  
This	  section	  discusses	  the	  multiple	  hierarchies	  that	  appear	  to	  govern	  the	  former,	  before	  turning	  
to	  the	  rather	  ambiguous	  space	  occupied	  by	  clients	  and	  parties.	  	  	  
3.4.1	   The	  legal	  profession	  is	  structured	  by	  multiple	  hierarchies	  	  
In	  his	  famous	  article	  ‘Legal	  education	  and	  the	  reproduction	  of	  hierarchy’,	  Duncan	  Kennedy	  put	  
forward	  the	  strong	  claim	  that	  ‘legal	  education	  causes	  legal	  hierarchy’	  (1982:	  607).	  He	  linked	  the	  
characterization	  of	  legal	  education	  as	  a	  reproducer	  of	  hierarchy	  to	  a	  number	  of	  features	  of	  the	  
law	  school	  experience,	  including	  the	  inculcation	  of	  a	  set	  of	  attitudes	  toward	  the	  economy,	  




reinforce	  the	  importance	  of	  hierarchy,	  and	  the	  ‘realities	  of	  professional	  life’	  that	  students	  
encounter	  in	  their	  second	  and	  third	  years	  as	  they	  begin	  to	  search	  for	  employment	  (according	  to	  
the	  system	  in	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America	  –	  ibid:	  595	  –	  607).	  Kennedy	  alludes	  to	  the	  
construction	  of	  a	  broad	  hierarchy	  of	  work	  with,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  preferred	  option	  of	  ‘jobs	  
in	  the	  hierarchy	  of	  the	  bar’	  (which	  encompasses,	  in	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America,99	  work	  at	  
large	  and	  prestigious	  firms),	  against	  the	  less-­‐preferred	  and	  subtly	  denigrated	  possibility	  of	  ‘work	  
outside	  the	  established	  system’	  –	  legal	  services	  for	  the	  poor	  and	  neighbourhood	  law	  practice	  
(ibid:	  601	  –	  2).	  He	  also	  alludes	  to	  internal	  hierarchies	  within	  the	  established	  system,	  the	  
‘hierarchical	  life’	  of	  the	  bar,	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  which	  is	  coded	  ‘into	  the	  smallest	  details	  of	  
personal	  style,	  daily	  routine,	  gesture,	  tone	  of	  voice,	  facial	  expression,	  a	  plethora	  of	  little	  p’s	  and	  
q’s	  for	  everyone	  to	  mind’	  (ibid:	  602).	  He	  notes	  how	  the	  teacher/student	  relationship	  in	  
particular	  models	  subsequent	  relations	  between	  junior	  associates	  and	  senior	  partners	  and	  
between	  lawyers	  and	  judges	  (ibid:	  604)	  through	  a	  variety	  of	  interactional	  moves	  that	  ensure	  
deference	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  student	  toward	  the	  teacher	  (ibid).	  	  
Others	  have	  affirmed	  that	  the	  law	  school	  experience	  constructs	  a	  hierarchy	  of	  work	  whereby	  
students	  are	  discouraged	  from	  pursuing	  career	  options	  in	  the	  public	  services	  as	  opposed	  to	  
private	  practice,	  from	  providing	  access	  to	  justice	  for	  the	  poor	  and	  from	  providing	  pro	  bono	  legal	  
services	  (Erlanger	  &	  Klegon,	  1978	  –	  9,	  1996;	  Granfield,	  1992;	  Schechter,	  1996:	  384).	  This	  flies	  in	  
the	  face	  of	  both	  the	  MacCrate	  and	  ACLEC	  reports	  which	  affirm	  that	  the	  profession	  has	  a	  
responsibility	  to	  ensure	  that	  adequate	  legal	  services	  are	  provided	  to	  those	  who	  cannot	  afford	  to	  
pay	  for	  them	  and	  to	  ensure	  that	  justice,	  fairness	  and	  morality	  are	  promoted	  in	  their	  practice	  
(American	  Bar	  Association,	  1992:	  Chapter	  5;	  ACLEC,	  1996:	  para	  2.4).	  However,	  there	  has	  been	  
very	  little	  commentary,	  if	  any,	  on	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  classroom	  experience	  constructs	  the	  
internal	  hierarchies	  of	  the	  legal	  profession.	  	  
My	  analysis	  of	  classroom	  representations	  of	  legal	  professionals	  affirmed	  the	  private/public	  
hierarchy	  as	  a	  broad	  structuring	  principle	  for	  the	  legal	  profession	  in	  general.	  The	  manner	  in	  
which	  this	  achieved	  was	  a	  less	  a	  case	  of	  actively	  discouraging	  the	  provision	  of	  legal	  services	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99	  In	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America	  there	  is	  only	  a	  single	  bar	  and	  thus	  no	  distinction	  between	  attorneys	  who	  work	  in	  




the	  poor,	  and	  more	  a	  case	  of	  bestowing	  far	  greater	  attention	  to	  the	  private	  career	  path	  and	  its	  
promise	  of	  commercial	  success.	  As	  indicated	  in	  chapter	  five	  this	  could	  be	  seen	  in	  purely	  
quantitative	  terms:	  Thirty	  quotations	  to	  constitute	  the	  private	  career	  path	  (p.	  141)	  as	  opposed	  
to	  a	  mere	  ten	  constituting	  the	  ‘shadow’	  career	  path	  of	  work	  in	  the	  public	  service	  (p.	  196).	  
Questions	  of	  access	  to	  justice	  and	  the	  provision	  of	  pro	  bono	  legal	  services	  simply	  didn’t	  feature	  
in	  the	  lecturer’s	  classroom	  talk	  at	  all.	  They	  were	  thus	  rendered	  insignificant	  through	  their	  
absence.	  Together	  with	  the	  factor	  of	  emphasis,	  the	  private	  was	  privileged	  over	  the	  public	  by	  
way	  of	  three	  additional	  discursive	  strategies.	  The	  first	  consisted	  in	  direct	  devaluations	  of	  the	  
people	  who	  work	  in	  the	  public	  service,	  as	  when	  the	  lecturer	  remarked	  that	  ‘the	  bright	  lawyers	  
are	  in	  private	  practice.	  And	  only	  the	  duds	  go	  into	  civil	  service	  and	  they	  draft	  laws’	  –	  p.	  127);	  or	  
the	  places	  in	  which	  public	  service	  work	  occurs,	  as	  when	  he	  compared	  the	  lower	  courts	  (where	  
those	  who	  pursue	  a	  career	  in	  the	  public	  service	  will	  predominantly	  function)	  to	  a	  ‘dung	  heap’	  
(p.	  209).	  The	  second	  related	  to	  his	  framing	  of	  the	  value	  of	  pursuing	  a	  career	  in	  the	  public	  service	  
in	  purely	  instrumental	  terms,	  as	  a	  means	  of	  gaining	  experience	  to	  enter	  the	  private	  part	  of	  the	  
profession	  at	  a	  later	  stage	  (p.	  203).	  Thirdly,	  the	  lecturer	  actively	  positioned	  students’	  probable	  
point	  of	  entry	  into	  the	  profession	  as	  an	  entry	  into	  the	  private	  part	  of	  the	  profession	  (p.	  141).	  	  
The	  internal	  hierarchies	  within	  both	  the	  preferred	  and	  shadow	  career	  paths	  constituted	  a	  major	  
focus	  in	  the	  law	  lecturer’s	  talk.	  Within	  both	  paths	  there	  was	  a	  clear	  progression	  of	  roles	  that	  
moved	  from	  a	  lower	  to	  a	  higher	  status	  (pp.	  141-­‐142;	  196).	  Even	  more	  surprising	  was	  the	  range	  
of	  semantic	  moves	  through	  which	  such	  internal	  hierarchies	  were	  constructed.	  The	  coding	  of	  
action	  as	  active	  or	  passive	  functioned	  to	  establish	  internal	  hierarchy	  only	  to	  a	  certain	  extent:	  
Apart	  from	  the	  initial	  actions	  of	  seeking	  employment,	  for	  instance,	  articled	  clerks	  were	  almost	  
always	  passive	  in	  relation	  to	  attorneys	  (p.	  151).	  However,	  advocates	  –	  who	  occupy	  a	  higher	  
rung	  in	  the	  preferred	  career	  path	  –	  were	  represented	  as	  passive	  in	  relation	  to	  attorneys	  as	  
regards	  obtaining	  work	  (p.	  150).	  The	  coding	  of	  action	  as	  semiotic/material	  tended	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  
better	  indicator	  of	  internal	  hierarchies	  as	  in,	  for	  example,	  the	  distinction	  drawn	  between	  
‘drafting’	  (done	  by	  civil	  servants)	  and	  ‘creating’	  law	  (done	  by	  the	  bright	  lawyers	  who	  become	  
advocates	  and	  then	  judges)	  (p.	  127);	  the	  progressively	  more	  semiotic	  actions	  of	  articled	  clerks,	  




advocate’s	  actions	  toward	  clients	  (p.	  147).	  Roles	  higher	  in	  the	  legal	  professional	  world	  were	  
represented	  as	  exercising	  power	  over	  a	  far	  greater	  range	  of	  resources	  than	  the	  counterparts	  
lower	  down	  (pp.	  152,182).	  	  Whilst	  positions	  in	  the	  lower	  echelons	  tended	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  
emotion	  (p.	  152),	  the	  highest	  roles	  –	  the	  advocate	  and	  the	  judge	  (and	  the	  lawyer	  to	  the	  extent	  
that	  the	  representations	  in	  this	  regard	  invoke	  the	  role	  of	  the	  judge)	  were	  represented	  as	  acting,	  
or	  at	  least	  needing	  to	  act,	  with	  cool,	  unemotional	  calm	  (pp.	  132,	  184).	  The	  legal	  professional’s	  
relationship	  to	  time	  (pp.	  132,	  157,	  182),	  their	  ability	  to	  influence	  their	  conditions	  of	  work	  (p.	  
178)	  and	  the	  use	  of	  seniority	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  categorization	  (pp.	  155,	  163)	  also	  mirrored	  the	  
constructed	  hierarchy	  of	  the	  legal	  profession	  in	  the	  lecturer’s	  classroom	  talk.	  	  
In	  addition,	  therefore,	  to	  a	  horizon	  of	  observation	  that	  was	  strongly	  bifurcated	  into	  the	  public	  
and	  the	  private,	  the	  lecturer’s	  classroom	  talk	  reproduced	  a	  perception	  of	  the	  legal	  profession	  as	  
being	  structured	  by	  fairly	  rigid,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  subtle	  and	  possibly	  even	  unspoken,	  
conventions	  that	  determine	  ‘seniors’	  and	  ‘juniors’.	  
3.4.2	   The	  client	  is	  simultaneously	  elevated	  and	  backgrounded	  
According	  to	  the	  various	  statements	  on	  legal	  professionalism	  outlined	  in	  chapter	  one,	  clients	  
should	  occupy	  a	  prominent	  position	  in	  the	  legal	  professional	  world.	  The	  MacCrate	  Report	  posits	  
the	  competent	  representation	  of	  clients	  as	  part	  of	  its	  first	  fundamental	  value.	  Indeed	  the	  legal	  
profession	  is	  defined	  as	  one	  ‘dedicated	  to	  the	  service	  of	  clients’	  (American	  Bar	  Association,	  
1992:	  Chapter	  5).	  Bringing	  in	  another	  dimension,	  the	  ACLEC	  Report	  identifies	  representing	  
clients	  without	  fear	  or	  favour	  as	  one	  of	  its	  six	  legal	  values	  (ACLEC,	  1996:	  para	  2.4).	  	  The	  generic	  
LL.B	  statement	  in	  turn	  refers	  to	  the	  need	  for	  young	  lawyers	  to	  be	  ‘responsible’,	  ‘respectful’	  and	  
‘effective’	  –	  traits	  which	  are	  all	  of	  direct	  application	  in	  the	  lawyer-­‐client	  relationship.	  As	  already	  
noted	  above,	  however,	  the	  literature	  speaks	  of	  legal	  education	  producing	  young	  lawyers	  who	  
are	  arrogant,	  confrontational,	  controlling,	  unfeeling	  and	  rude	  (Menkel-­‐Meadow,	  1991:	  7;	  
Schechter,	  1996:	  374,	  379;	  Webb:	  1996:	  274)	  which,	  if	  true	  would	  have	  a	  detrimental	  effect	  on	  
the	  integrity	  and	  value	  of	  a	  legal	  professional’s	  relationship	  with	  his	  or	  her	  clients.	  	  
My	  research	  cast	  this	  issue	  in	  a	  somewhat	  different,	  more	  nuanced	  light.	  To	  begin	  with,	  the	  




actors	  showed,	  clients	  only	  really	  featured	  in	  relationship	  to	  the	  generic	  role	  of	  the	  lawyer	  and	  
the	  roles	  of	  the	  articled	  clerk	  and	  the	  attorney.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  judge	  and	  the	  magistrate,	  the	  
‘client’	  becomes	  a	  party	  who	  appears	  before	  the	  adjudicator.	  The	  change	  in	  category	  could	  
involve	  the	  need	  for	  a	  different	  range	  of	  ethical	  prescriptions	  (hinted	  at	  in	  the	  lecturer’s	  
anecdote	  regarding	  the	  man	  who	  refused	  to	  pay	  maintenance;	  i.e.	  that	  it	  was	  not	  proper	  to	  
examine	  him	  from	  the	  bench	  –	  p.	  216).	  Moreover,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  advocate,	  the	  ‘clients’	  are	  
really	  the	  attorneys,	  and	  this	  constitutes	  one	  of	  the	  many	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  actual	  clients,	  the	  
people	  embroiled	  in	  a	  particular	  type	  of	  dispute,	  are	  backgrounded.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  public	  
prosecutor,	  the	  client	  is	  also	  the	  State	  and	  broader	  civil	  society	  who	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  the	  
effective	  prosecution	  of	  criminal	  offences.	  I	  also	  found	  it	  notable	  that	  one	  particular	  kind	  of	  
client,	  namely	  commercial	  entities	  –	  likely	  to	  feature	  extensively	  in	  at	  least	  civil	  claims,	  did	  not	  
feature	  at	  all	  in	  the	  lecturer’s	  classroom	  talk	  (p.	  190).	  In	  the	  ensuing	  discussion,	  however,	  I	  will	  
use	  the	  term	  ‘clients’	  to	  refer	  primarily	  to	  the	  private	  individuals	  who	  seek	  the	  legal	  services	  of	  
an	  advocate/attorney,	  or	  who	  appear	  as	  parties	  before	  judges/magistrates.	  	  
The	  treatment	  of	  clients	  was	  slightly	  different	  between	  the	  preferred	  and	  shadow	  career	  paths.	  
Two	  somewhat	  contradictory	  themes	  predominated	  in	  the	  preferred	  career	  path:	  The	  
backgrounding	  of	  clients	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  positioning	  of	  clients	  as	  one’s	  ‘bread-­‐and-­‐
butter’	  on	  the	  other.	  Across	  all	  the	  roles	  constituting	  the	  preferred	  career	  path	  clients	  and	  
parties	  were	  backgrounded	  in	  the	  social	  action.	  I	  highlighted,	  at	  numerous	  points,	  the	  range	  of	  
discursive	  resources	  by	  which	  this	  was	  achieved	  (pp.	  135-­‐136,	  164,	  189,	  213).	  Generally	  
speaking,	  from	  ‘people’	  they	  become	  identified	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  main	  categories	  of	  legal	  doctrine	  
(‘a	  divorce’	  or	  a	  ‘rape’)	  to	  the	  more	  generic	  appellations	  of	  the	  ‘case’	  or	  the	  ‘matter’	  with	  which	  
the	  legal	  professional	  has	  to	  deal.	  These	  discursive	  moves	  functioned	  to	  remove	  the	  client	  from	  
the	  social	  action	  with	  the	  emphasis	  then	  shifting	  to	  the	  legal	  professional’s	  relationship	  to	  law,	  
language	  and	  other	  legal	  professionals.	  The	  progressive	  distanciation	  of	  the	  client	  in	  the	  
lecturer’s	  classroom	  talk	  would	  thus	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  conducive	  to	  constructing	  the	  client	  as	  an	  
object	  of	  service,	  as	  the	  statements	  on	  legal	  professionalism	  require.	  The	  metaphorical	  
representation	  of	  the	  client	  as	  the	  legal	  professional’s	  ‘bread-­‐and-­‐butter’	  that	  peppers	  the	  




manner	  in	  which	  this	  metaphor	  is	  used	  conjures	  up	  more	  of	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  legal	  professional	  
needing	  to	  be	  ‘fed’	  by,	  rather	  than	  standing	  in	  a	  position	  of	  service	  towards	  the	  client.	  	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  shadow	  career	  path,	  the	  parties	  being	  prosecuted	  by	  the	  public	  prosecutor	  in	  
proceedings	  presided	  over	  by	  the	  magistrate	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  foregrounded	  than	  
backgrounded	  (pp.	  201,	  213).	  This	  is	  understandable	  if	  one	  recalls	  that	  the	  primary	  objects	  over	  
which	  roles	  in	  the	  shadow	  career	  path	  exercise	  power	  are	  the	  parties	  in	  a	  case,	  rather	  than	  law	  
and	  language.	  The	  ‘ruthless’	  manner	  in	  which	  public	  prosecutors	  and	  magistrates	  deal	  with	  the	  
parties	  before	  them	  has	  already	  been	  mentioned	  in	  a	  foregoing	  section.	  A	  weak	  sense	  of	  service	  
–	  less	  towards	  the	  State	  but	  more	  towards	  the	  victims	  of	  criminal	  behavior	  –	  was	  manifested	  in	  
the	  empathy	  expressed	  by	  the	  magistrate	  toward	  the	  women	  whose	  husband	  refused	  to	  pay	  
maintenance	  (p.	  214)	  and	  in	  the	  public	  prosecutor’s	  awareness	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  
manner	  in	  which	  he	  prosecuted	  the	  credit	  card	  fraudster	  and	  the	  ability	  of	  American	  Express	  to	  
recover	  damages	  in	  a	  subsequent	  civil	  claim	  (p.	  201).	  
The	  lecturer’s	  representations	  in	  this	  regard,	  therefore,	  did	  not	  situate	  the	  client	  in	  a	  central	  
position	  in	  the	  horizon	  of	  observation.	  	  
3.5	   The	  social	  profile	  of	  the	  profession	  	  
Both	  the	  MacCrate	  and	  the	  ACLEC	  Reports	  emphasize	  the	  importance	  of	  ridding	  the	  legal	  
profession	  of	  bias	  and	  promoting	  equality	  of	  opportunity.	  While	  the	  MacCrate	  Report	  refers	  
specifically	  to	  bias	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  race,	  religion,	  ethnic	  origin,	  gender,	  sexual	  orientation	  or	  
disability	  (American	  Bar	  Association,	  1992:	  Chapter	  5),	  the	  dominant	  conception	  in	  commentary	  
upon	  the	  legal	  profession	  holds	  out	  gender	  (male),	  race	  (white)	  and	  class	  (middle-­‐	  to	  upper-­‐
class)	  to	  be	  predominant	  forms	  of	  bias	  (Kennedy,	  1982:	  605;	  Kronman,	  1993:	  292;	  Sommerlad,	  
2007).	  Writing	  in	  the	  early	  1980s	  Kennedy	  observed	  that	  teachers	  were	  overwhelmingly	  white,	  
male	  and	  middle-­‐class	  and	  that	  over	  time	  a	  white,	  male,	  middle-­‐class	  tone	  assimilates	  and	  
predominates	  over	  other	  voices	  (female,	  black	  and	  poor)	  that	  also	  constitute	  the	  student	  
population.100	  Writing	  in	  the	  early	  1990s,	  however,	  Kronman	  noted	  how	  the	  demographics	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100	  Describing	  the	  process	  of	  assimilation,	  Kennedy	  writes:	  ‘Its	  not	  that	  the	  teacher	  punishes	  you	  if	  you	  use	  slang	  or	  
wear	  clothes	  or	  give	  examples	  or	  voice	  opinions	  that	  identify	  you	  as	  different,	  though	  that	  might	  happen.	  You	  are	  




the	  legal	  profession	  in	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America	  had	  become	  more	  diversified	  with	  at	  least	  
greater	  numbers	  of	  women	  and	  students	  from	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  socioeconomic	  backgrounds	  
entering	  the	  profession	  (1992:	  293).	  This	  trend	  is	  affirmed	  in	  the	  ACLEC	  Report	  (ACLEC,	  1996:	  
16).	  	  
As	  regards	  the	  social	  profile	  of	  the	  profession,	  my	  focus	  was	  to	  determine	  whether	  male,	  white	  
and	  middle-­‐	  to	  upper-­‐class	  classifications	  predominated	  in	  the	  lecturer’s	  representations	  of	  
legal	  professionals.	  I	  also	  took	  note	  of	  instances	  where	  the	  lecturer	  related	  these	  classifications	  
to	  students	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  could	  be	  viewed	  as	  enforcing	  a	  male,	  white,	  middle-­‐class	  ethos.	  
Although	  the	  lecturer	  himself,	  as	  detailed	  in	  chapter	  3,	  was	  white,	  male	  and	  (as	  he	  intimated	  at	  
various	  points	  during	  the	  course)	  probably	  of	  the	  upper	  class,	  this	  was	  not	  the	  norm	  for	  the	  
lecturers	  in	  the	  course	  as	  a	  whole,	  at	  least	  as	  regards	  gender	  and	  race.	  In	  the	  year	  in	  which	  the	  
course	  was	  presented	  the	  lecturer	  was	  the	  only	  male	  amongst	  six	  lecturers	  and	  one	  of	  two	  
whites,	  the	  remaining	  lecturers	  being	  female	  and	  black	  or	  asian.	  	  	  
As	  Figure	  14	  below	  indicates	  classification	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  gender	  overwhelming	  foregrounded	  
the	  male	  across	  all	  legal	  professional	  roles.101	  Nominations	  in	  the	  text	  generally	  followed	  a	  
similar	  pattern.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
discourse	  that	  everyone	  identifies	  as	  lawyerlike.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  indirect	  pressure	  for	  conformity	  is	  intense’	  
(1982:	  605).	  He	  also	  notes	  how	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  students	  at	  the	  brunt	  of	  racist,	  sexist	  or	  otherwise	  discriminatory	  
treatment	  will	  do	  anything	  about	  it	  in	  class	  (ibid).	  
101	  There	  were	  also	  no	  female	  classifications	  in	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  public	  prosecutor,	  state	  advocate	  and	  Director	  of	  





Figure	  14:	  Percentages	  of	  male	  versus	  female	  categorizations	  across	  legal	  professional	  roles.	  
While	  male	  and	  female	  classifications	  were	  on	  a	  par	  for	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  articled	  clerk	  and	  
attorney	  (the	  lower	  echelons	  of	  the	  preferred	  career	  path),	  female	  classifications	  were	  
disproportionately	  lower	  for	  all	  other	  roles.	  Interestingly,	  given	  the	  statistics	  set	  out	  in	  footnote	  
20	  above	  this	  is	  an	  accurate	  reflection	  of	  the	  constitution	  of	  the	  advocates’	  profession	  and	  the	  
judiciary.	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  underrepresentation	  of	  women	  in	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  advocate,	  judge,	  lawyer,	  
legal	  academic	  and	  magistrate	  there	  were	  a	  few	  noticeable	  instances	  of	  female	  stereotyping	  in	  
the	  data,	  both	  occurring	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  advocate.	  These	  included	  the	  lecturer’s	  
advocacy	  regarding	  ‘power	  dressing’	  (pp.	  155-­‐156)	  and	  his	  comments	  regarding	  the	  
stereotypical	  female	  advocate	  (p.	  161).	  In	  contrast	  there	  were	  no	  stereotypical	  sketches	  of	  male	  
advocates	  or	  other	  male	  legal	  professionals.	  	  
There	  were	  a	  few	  instances	  where	  the	  lecturer	  applied	  gender	  classifications	  to	  students	  
directly:	  For	  instance	  his	  reference	  to	  Student	  1	  as	  ‘a	  beautiful	  girl	  from	  Scotland’	  whose	  
physical	  beauty	  is	  ‘not	  going	  to	  help’	  in	  being	  a	  successful	  lawyer	  (p.	  143).	  At	  another	  point,	  the	  
application	  of	  gender	  categories	  is	  once	  again	  centred	  on	  physical	  appearance	  when	  the	  
lecturer	  speaking	  as	  if	  in	  the	  voice	  of	  the	  client	  disparages	  a	  student	  for	  wearing	  a	  pink	  Oxford	  














boundary	  of	  the	  extra-­‐	  and	  the	  intra-­‐discursive	  by	  associating	  extra-­‐discursive	  constructions	  of	  
role	  with	  concrete	  individuals	  –	  that	  Kennedy’s	  observation	  of	  an	  ‘assimilation’	  of	  students	  to	  a	  
male	  (and	  possibly	  white	  and	  middle-­‐class,	  depending	  on	  the	  content	  of	  the	  representation)	  
ethos	  takes	  place.	  In	  all	  instances	  the	  students	  who	  were	  at	  the	  ‘brunt’	  of	  this	  sexist	  treatment	  
as	  well	  as	  the	  other	  students	  in	  the	  class	  treated	  these	  remarks	  as	  if	  they	  were	  a	  ‘humorous’	  
way	  of	  bringing	  across	  a	  point	  and	  did	  not	  challenge	  the	  lecturer’s	  representations	  in	  any	  way.	  	  
Across	  all	  the	  legal	  professional	  roles,	  classifications	  based	  on	  race	  and	  class	  were	  either	  not	  
evident,	  or	  were	  thickly	  veiled	  by	  the	  need	  to	  understand	  the	  context.	  This	  included	  the	  
lecturer’s	  admonition	  of	  black	  students’	  use	  of	  the	  phrase	  ‘what	  what’	  (p.	  134)	  as	  regards	  racial	  
classification;102	  and	  his	  references	  to	  annual	  salaries	  and	  material	  resources	  at	  the	  disposal	  of	  
attorneys,	  advocates	  (p.	  162),	  and	  judges	  (p.	  187)	  as	  regards	  classification	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  class.	  
The	  role	  of	  the	  magistrate	  presented	  interesting	  examples	  of	  both	  race	  and	  class	  classification:	  
The	  complex	  nature	  of	  racial	  relations	  in	  South	  Africa	  was,	  as	  explained	  in	  chapter	  five,	  were	  
subtly	  coded	  in	  the	  lecturer’s	  anecdote	  regarding	  the	  magistrate	  Mr	  Andre	  Legransie	  whereby	  
he	  noted	  his	  ‘embarrassment’	  in	  needing	  to	  point	  out	  that	  Mr	  Legransie	  is	  a	  person	  of	  colour	  (p.	  
212).	  While	  the	  lecturer’s	  reference	  to	  throwing	  a	  dinner	  party	  whilst	  a	  magistrate	  situates	  this	  
role	  in	  at	  least	  the	  echelons	  of	  the	  middle	  class,	  his	  emphasis	  on	  the	  ‘lowlifes’	  who	  appear	  
before	  magistrates	  associates	  this	  role	  with	  the	  lower	  classes	  (p.	  213).	  	  
What	  these	  classifications	  in	  respect	  of	  race	  and	  class	  have	  in	  common	  is	  that	  they	  are	  
extremely	  implicit.	  At	  no	  point	  was	  there	  an	  explicit	  discussion	  or	  even	  reference	  to	  these	  forms	  
of	  bias	  in	  the	  legal	  profession	  even	  though,	  as	  the	  statistics	  in	  footnote	  20	  indicate,	  racial	  
discrimination	  is	  a	  very	  real	  issue	  –	  at	  the	  very	  least	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  attorneys’	  and	  advocates’	  
professions.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102	  One	  of	  the	  most	  fascinating	  inputs	  regarding	  the	  role	  of	  language	  in	  racial	  discrimination	  was	  the	  ‘Report	  on	  
Racism	  in	  the	  Cape	  Provincial	  Division’	  compiled	  by	  the	  contentious	  Judge	  Hlophe	  in	  2005.	  One	  of	  the	  instances	  of	  
racism	  reported	  on	  in	  this	  document	  concerned	  a	  white,	  male	  judge	  correcting	  the	  grammar	  of	  a	  circular	  compiled	  
in	  English	  by	  a	  black	  African	  official	  in	  the	  Department	  of	  Justice.	  The	  judge	  had	  written	  on	  the	  circular:	  ‘Corrected	  
so	  as	  to	  render	  intelligible’.	  The	  circular	  had	  been	  sent	  around	  by	  Judge	  Hlophe	  who	  was	  Judge	  President	  of	  the	  
Cape	  Provincial	  Division	  of	  the	  time.	  The	  regarded	  the	  white	  male	  judge’s	  corrections	  as	  insulting	  in	  the	  extreme	  





3.6	   Summary	  	  
Looking	  at	  the	  pattern	  of	  the	  lecturer’s	  representations	  relating	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  legal	  
professional	  power,	  the	  purposes	  and	  values	  of	  law	  and	  the	  legal	  profession,	  the	  nature	  of	  legal	  
work,	  legal	  relationships	  and	  the	  social	  profile	  of	  the	  profession,	  it	  appears	  that	  the	  horizon	  of	  
observation	  established	  tends	  toward	  claims	  made	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  teaching	  of	  legal	  
ethics:	  The	  lecturer	  affirms	  the	  power	  of	  legal	  professionals	  and	  the	  centrality	  of	  law	  and	  legal	  
rules	  in	  the	  exercise	  thereof;	  tends	  to	  foreground	  external	  rather	  than	  internal	  goods;	  tends	  to	  
devalue	  legal	  professionals;	  affirms	  the	  adversarial	  model	  of	  dispute	  resolution	  as	  a	  framing	  
feature	  of	  legal	  professional	  work,	  the	  separation	  of	  moral	  and	  legal	  issues,	  and	  the	  need	  to	  
emotionally	  distance	  one’s	  self	  from	  the	  issues	  in	  a	  case;	  reproduces	  the	  hierarchy	  between	  
private	  and	  public	  forms	  of	  work;	  fails	  to	  affirm	  the	  centrality	  of	  the	  client;	  and	  reproduces	  the	  
gendered	  social	  profile	  of	  the	  profession	  while	  failing	  to	  address	  racial	  and	  class	  discrimination.	  
This	  is	  not	  surprising	  since,	  as	  I	  pointed	  out	  in	  chapter	  three,	  the	  lecturer	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  an	  
illustrative	  case	  based	  on	  the	  views	  he	  expressed	  toward	  the	  legal	  profession	  in	  his	  interview.	  
This	  summary,	  however,	  belies	  the	  subtlety	  and	  the	  complexity	  of	  his	  representations.	  The	  
range	  of	  objects,	  for	  instance,	  over	  which	  legal	  professionals	  exercise	  power,	  the	  range	  of	  
available	  internal	  and	  external	  goods,	  the	  difficulties	  associated	  with	  separating	  morality	  and	  
emotion	  from	  one’s	  engagement	  with	  a	  case,	  and	  the	  intricacies	  of	  the	  hierarchies	  that	  pertain	  
among	  and	  within	  the	  various	  legal	  professional	  roles.	  	  
4.	   DISCUSSION	  OF	  CLAIM	  THREE	  	  
In	  chapter	  two	  I	  referred	  to	  Van	  Leeuwen’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  recontextualization	  of	  social	  
practices	  which	  occurs	  when	  a	  social	  practice	  shifts	  from	  one	  context	  to	  another.	  This	  entails	  
transformations	  of	  various	  kinds,	  in	  particular,	  substitutions,	  deletions,	  rearrangements,	  
repetitions,	  and	  the	  addition	  of	  reactions,	  purposes,	  legitimations	  and	  evaluations	  (2008:	  17	  –	  
21).	  In	  the	  final	  part	  of	  this	  chapter	  I	  briefly	  consider	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  particular	  
classroom	  I	  studied	  as	  a	  recontextualizing	  space	  for	  the	  social	  practices	  of	  the	  legal	  profession.	  
Central	  to	  this	  discussion	  is	  the	  understanding	  that	  discourse	  is	  both	  determined	  by,	  and	  




either	  sustain	  or	  transform	  them.	  The	  variables	  that	  determine	  this	  are	  probably	  extensive	  and	  
cannot	  be	  canvassed	  here.	  In	  this	  section	  I	  consider	  only	  two:	  The	  outworking	  of	  the	  lecturer’s	  
authority	  in	  the	  classroom	  in	  terms	  of	  discursive	  choice,	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  lecturer’s	  
representations	  constructed	  agency.	  
4.1	   Lecturer	  authority	  and	  discursive	  choice	  
The	  lecturer	  occupied	  a	  position	  of	  authority	  in	  the	  classroom	  not	  only	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  
conventions	  that	  apply	  between	  lecturers	  and	  students	  in	  a	  tertiary	  setting	  but	  also	  because	  he	  
was	  white	  and	  male.	  In	  addition,	  however,	  the	  lecturer’s	  personality,	  physical	  appearance	  and	  
movements	  within	  the	  classroom	  supported	  such	  institutional	  authority.	  He	  is	  a	  large	  man,	  who	  
speaks	  fairly	  loudly	  and	  eloquently.	  During	  most	  of	  the	  lectures	  he	  positioned	  himself	  behind	  
the	  lecturn	  much	  like	  a	  judge	  behind	  his	  desk	  on	  the	  bench.	  His	  pedagogical	  framing	  of	  each	  
lecture	  was	  very	  strong.	  He	  appeared	  to	  gain	  the	  students’	  respect,	  particularly	  when	  he	  spoke	  
of	  his	  experience	  in	  practice.	  These	  features,	  in	  themselves,	  bestowed	  his	  representations	  of	  
legal	  professionals	  with	  authority	  and	  an	  enhanced	  significance.	  The	  first-­‐year	  students,	  
possibly	  because	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  authority	  that	  he	  exercised,	  but	  also	  because	  they	  had	  no	  
alternative	  experience	  on	  which	  to	  base	  an	  argument,	  never	  challenged	  or	  questioned	  any	  of	  
the	  representations	  he	  made	  –	  even	  when	  these	  were	  arguably	  sexist	  as	  in	  the	  instances	  of	  the	  
female	  stereotyping	  of	  advocates.	  His	  position	  of	  authority	  thus	  afforded	  him	  a	  fairly	  broad	  
discretion	  to	  effect	  the	  transformations	  recognized	  by	  Van	  Leeuwen	  –	  he	  was	  free	  to	  add,	  
substitute,	  rearrange,	  evaluate	  and	  legitimate	  –	  to	  present	  a	  version	  of	  the	  social	  practice	  of	  
legal	  professionals	  as	  ‘truth’.	  His	  representations	  might	  have	  been	  considerably	  more	  qualified	  
if,	  for	  instance,	  the	  students	  in	  his	  class	  had	  already	  had	  some	  experience	  of	  legal	  practice.	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  discursive	  choices	  the	  lecturer	  could	  make	  regarding	  the	  content	  of	  the	  social	  
practice,	  his	  authority	  also	  enabled	  him	  to	  freely	  position	  students	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  
representations	  he	  was	  making,	  and	  to	  cement	  the	  meanings	  he	  was	  constructing	  with	  varying	  
levels	  of	  certainty.	  	  
The	  lecturer’s	  positioning	  of	  students	  was	  effected	  through	  his	  use	  of	  the	  pronouns	  ‘you’	  and	  




‘We	  know	  how	  to	  read	  a	  court	  case.	  We	  know	  how	  to	  read	  a	  contract.	  We	  know	  the	  mysteries	  
behind	  the	  legal	  texts’	  (p.	  128)	  he	  positioned	  the	  students	  alongside	  himself	  as	  a	  member	  of	  the	  
elite	  ‘monopoly’	  that	  is	  the	  legal	  profession.	  In	  saying:	  ‘Let	  us	  talk	  about	  the	  legal	  profession	  
now	  shortly	  ladies	  and	  gentlemen.	  It’s	  something	  that	  fascinates	  you	  …	  and	  …	  let	  us	  start	  …	  not	  
at	  the	  top	  but	  …	  at	  the	  part	  of	  the	  profession	  which	  would	  probably	  be	  ….	  Where	  you’re	  going	  
to	  enter	  the	  profession’	  (p.	  141)	  he	  not	  only	  positioned	  them	  in	  relation	  to	  entry	  into	  the	  
preferred	  career	  path	  but	  also	  assumed	  and	  constructed	  their	  desire	  to	  do	  so.	  When	  he	  stated:	  
‘if	  you	  are	  opening	  litigation	  …’	  he	  positioned	  the	  students	  in	  a	  hypothetical	  future	  legal	  
professional	  role	  that,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  functioned	  to	  assure	  them	  that	  this	  would	  occur	  (p.	  
129).	  However,	  unlike	  Cramton	  who	  claimed	  that	  students	  are	  invariably	  positioned	  as	  
advocates	  in	  legal	  classroom	  talk	  (1977:	  256),	  and	  even	  Mertz	  who	  found	  that	  students	  were	  
predominantly	  positioned	  in	  the	  role	  of	  the	  lawyer	  through	  the	  technique	  of	  ‘footing’	  (2007:	  
105),	  the	  lecturer	  I	  studied	  positioned	  students	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  roles.	  In	  relation	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  
judge,	  for	  instance,	  he	  positioned	  the	  students	  in	  the	  role	  of	  an	  accused	  who	  has	  been	  found	  
guilty	  and	  wishes	  to	  appeal	  against	  the	  decision	  (p.	  74).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  magistrate	  he	  
positioned	  students	  both	  as	  a	  party	  to	  a	  civil	  case	  (‘If	  your	  dispute	  is	  less	  than	  R100	  000	  or	  more	  
…	  then	  you	  go	  to	  the	  magistrate’s	  court	  and	  the	  magistrate’s	  court	  hears	  your	  case’	  (p.	  205),	  
and	  a	  criminal	  matter	  (‘the	  magistrate	  will	  decide	  whether	  you’re	  going	  to	  be	  released	  on	  bail,	  
or	  whether	  you’re	  going	  to	  be	  kept	  in	  prison’	  –	  M-­‐SAct5a,	  p.	  206).	  The	  lecturer’s	  authority	  to	  
position	  the	  students	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  representations	  he	  was	  making	  thus	  formed	  part	  of	  the	  
discursive	  choice	  he	  exercised	  in	  the	  classroom.	  	  
The	  lecturer’s	  representations	  also	  functioned	  to	  cement	  representational	  meanings	  with	  
varying	  levels	  of	  certainty.	  As	  highlighted	  at	  varying	  points	  in	  chapter	  five,	  the	  two	  linguistic	  
constructions	  I	  found	  to	  be	  particularly	  powerful	  in	  this	  regard	  were	  the	  use	  of	  relational	  
clauses	  and	  what	  I	  have	  termed	  ‘if-­‐then’	  constructions.	  As	  explained	  in	  chapter	  four,	  relational	  
clauses	  are	  one	  of	  six	  ‘process	  types’	  in	  Halliday’s	  transitivity	  system	  (2004:	  170)	  and	  they	  
function	  primarily	  to	  classify	  the	  world	  by	  relating	  one	  experience/object	  to	  another.	  They	  
therefore	  seem	  to	  have	  a	  particularly	  powerful	  role	  to	  play	  in	  constructing	  reality.	  ‘If-­‐then’	  




semantic	  relationship	  to	  one	  another	  (Fairclough,	  2003:	  89).	  In	  these	  constructions	  the	  clause	  
containing	  the	  condition	  codes	  an	  implicit	  assumption	  about	  what	  exists,	  or	  the	  way	  the	  world	  
simply	  ‘is’	  (ibid:	  55).	  They	  similarly	  function,	  therefore,	  	  to	  cement	  meanings.	  	  
Mindful	  then	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  work	  such	  constructions	  can	  do,	  it	  was	  interesting	  to	  determine	  the	  
contents	  to	  which	  they	  were	  applied;	  i.e.	  which	  aspects	  of	  legal	  professional	  life	  were	  in	  a	  sense	  
privileged	  and	  cemented	  with	  greater	  emphasis	  through	  the	  use	  of	  these	  constructions.	  
Beginning	  with	  relational	  clauses,	  the	  lecturer	  used	  these	  to	  define	  the	  abstract	  entities	  of	  law	  
(‘Law	  is	  an	  elitist	  or	  exclusive	  profession	  (p.	  127))	  and	  justice	  (‘Justice	  is	  not	  something	  that	  you	  
can	  rush	  …	  justice	  is	  not	  something	  that	  uh	  you	  can	  use	  a	  sausage	  machine	  for’	  (p.	  182).	  They	  
were	  also	  used	  to	  define	  various	  professional	  roles	  (an	  advocate	  is	  ‘the	  person	  who	  appears	  in	  
court’	  (p.	  160);	  a	  judge	  ‘is	  the	  one	  evaluating	  the	  evidence’	  (p.	  174)	  or	  ‘the	  representative	  of	  
society	  on	  the	  bench’	  (p.	  193)	  or	  the	  kind	  of	  work	  undertaken	  by	  various	  professionals	  (‘That	  is	  
what	  lawyers	  do.	  They	  argue	  to	  convince	  you’	  (p.	  136).	  In	  these	  instances,	  the	  definitions	  were	  
linked	  to	  particular	  social	  actions.	  Roles,	  and	  the	  work	  undertaken	  by	  various	  roles	  were	  also	  
linked	  to	  evaluations	  as	  when	  then	  lecturer	  remarked:	  ‘there’s	  nothing	  worse	  than	  a	  
professional	  typist	  …	  There	  is	  nothing,	  nothing	  worse’	  and	  ‘they	  are	  absolute	  terrors’	  (p.	  165;	  ‘a	  
court	  is	  a	  meritocracy,	  it	  is	  something	  that	  is	  based	  on	  merit,	  it’s	  based	  on	  on	  um	  
professionalism’	  (p.	  190);	  being	  an	  advocate	  ‘is	  only	  for	  the	  very	  best,	  reserved	  for	  the	  very	  best	  
lawyers	  (p.	  166),	  amongst	  others.	  This	  kind	  of	  relational	  clause	  requires	  a	  cautious	  approach	  
because	  it	  is	  less	  objectively	  based	  in	  the	  social	  practice	  and	  more	  sensitive	  to	  the	  
recontextualizations	  that	  occur	  when	  a	  social	  practice	  is	  represented	  within	  another.	  Situating	  
an	  evaluation	  within	  a	  relational	  clause	  seems	  to	  bestow	  that	  evaluation	  with	  a	  greater	  force	  
than	  if	  it	  were	  embedded	  in	  the	  text	  in	  other	  ways	  (e.g.	  through	  adjectives	  or	  adverbs).	  	  
If-­‐then	  constructions	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  also	  posit	  a	  condition	  for	  a	  certain	  state	  of	  being	  or	  
situation	  that	  is	  presented	  as	  inevitable	  or	  obligatory.	  So	  when	  the	  lecturer	  says	  ‘If	  you’re	  a	  
lawyer,	  you	  must	  never	  do	  anything	  if	  you	  are	  in	  a	  bad	  mood	  or	  if	  you	  are	  emotionally	  unstable’	  
(p.	  132)	  it	  cements	  emotional	  disentanglement	  from	  a	  legal	  dispute	  with	  a	  heightened	  force.	  Or	  
when	  he	  remarks	  that	  ‘if	  you	  are	  at	  the	  bar	  …	  you	  rely	  one	  hundred	  percent	  on	  the	  side-­‐bar’	  (p.	  




particular	  solidity.	  In	  other	  cases,	  however,	  ‘if-­‐then’	  constructions	  seem	  to	  code	  an	  inevitable	  
consequence,	  as	  when	  he	  states	  that	  ‘if	  you	  go	  directly	  from	  university	  to	  the	  bar	  you’re	  going	  
to	  sit	  in	  an	  office	  somewhere	  here	  in	  Johannesburg	  and	  wait	  for	  your	  telephone	  to	  ring	  and	  it’s	  
never	  going	  to	  ring	  …’	  (p.	  143)	  or	  ‘if	  you	  enter	  into	  a	  law	  firm	  as	  an	  articled	  clerk	  you	  are	  a	  
threat	  to	  everybody’	  (p.	  151).	  These	  kinds	  of	  statements	  construct	  the	  world	  in	  a	  fairly	  rigid	  
way,	  not	  allowing	  for	  the	  possibility	  that	  different	  people	  might	  have	  different	  experiences	  of	  
the	  same	  situation.	  	  
In	  certain	  places	  the	  lecturer	  used	  if-­‐then	  constructions	  and	  relational	  clauses	  in	  close	  proximity	  
to	  one	  another,	  as	  when	  he	  said	  ‘you	  know	  that	  is	  …	  what	  makes	  you	  a	  lawyer.	  If	  you	  don’t	  read	  
court	  cases	  you’re	  not	  a	  lawyer’	  (p.	  126)	  or	  ‘if	  you	  are	  going	  to	  become	  a	  lawyer	  you	  must	  be	  
informed	  in	  our	  society	  …	  A	  lawyer	  in	  society	  is	  somebody	  who’s	  informed’	  (p.	  128)	  or	  legal	  
certainty	  ‘is	  very	  very	  important.	  Your	  society	  is	  based	  on	  legal	  certainty.	  If	  you	  have	  a	  society	  
where	  there’s	  no	  legal	  certainty	  …	  then	  you	  live	  in	  chaos’	  (p.	  193).	  The	  combination	  of	  these	  
constructions	  conveys	  an	  even	  more	  powerful	  impression	  that	  ‘this	  is	  the	  way	  the	  world	  is’.	  	  
4.2	   Agency	  
Speaking	  out	  against	  the	  occlusion	  of	  agency	  in	  studies	  of	  corporate	  influences	  on	  individual	  
lawyers	  Kuhn	  argues	  that	  portraying	  institutionalized	  discourses	  as	  driving	  subjectivity	  risks	  
erasing	  the	  active,	  choice-­‐making	  subject	  (2009:	  682).	  He	  notes	  how	  contemporary	  identity	  
research	  shows	  that	  subjects	  are	  ‘interpellated	  products	  of	  social	  institutions	  who	  
simultaneously	  exercise	  agency,	  constrained	  though	  it	  may	  be’	  (ibid).	  This	  is	  completely	  in	  line	  
with	  the	  position	  adopted	  in	  this	  research	  and	  outlined	  in	  chapter	  two;	  i.e.	  that	  personal	  and	  
social	  identifications	  emerge	  from	  the	  complex	  interactions	  of	  identity	  regulation	  and	  identity	  
work,	  with	  the	  latter	  concept	  affirming	  that	  agency	  is	  indeed	  operative	  in	  processes	  of	  identity	  
formation.	  While	  Kuhn	  and	  others	  have	  studied	  agency	  by	  squarely	  focusing	  on	  the	  ‘active	  
choice-­‐making	  subject’	  my	  emphasis	  in	  this	  research	  was	  slightly	  different.	  I	  wished	  to	  
understand	  how	  representations	  could	  be	  made	  to	  either	  open	  up	  or	  close	  the	  possibilities	  of	  
construing	  a	  particular	  aspect	  of	  the	  world	  differently.	  For	  example,	  in	  my	  outline	  of	  the	  




becoming	  either	  an	  attorney	  or	  an	  advocate	  in	  terms	  that	  highlighted	  the	  agency	  of	  the	  
potential	  incumbent.	  You	  started	  by	  studying	  for	  the	  LL.B	  degree,	  finding	  a	  principal	  or	  pupil	  
master,	  making	  an	  appointment	  with	  this	  person	  and	  so	  on	  (p.	  142).	  The	  positioning	  of	  the	  
incumbent	  as	  active	  in	  these	  actions	  tends	  to	  affirm	  their	  initiative	  and	  control	  over	  the	  
process.	  A	  shift	  towards	  passive	  action	  then	  takes	  place	  –	  as	  illustrated	  in	  the	  lecturer’s	  
construction	  of	  the	  social	  actions	  of	  the	  articled	  clerk	  who	  is	  given	  articles,	  is	  trained,	  is	  rotated	  
amongst	  the	  various	  branches	  of	  the	  firm,	  is	  admitted,	  and	  so	  on.	  The	  passive	  positioning	  of	  the	  
social	  actors	  in	  the	  lecturer’s	  representations	  implies	  a	  lack	  of	  social	  power,	  that	  one’s	  fate	  is	  
dependent	  upon	  the	  decisions	  and	  actions	  of	  others.	  Similarly,	  in	  the	  progression	  from	  being	  an	  
advocate	  to	  a	  judge,	  the	  predominance	  of	  passive	  constructions	  in	  the	  data	  carries	  with	  it	  the	  
message	  that	  potential	  judges	  are	  vulnerable	  and	  have	  far	  less	  control	  over	  the	  process,	  
compared	  to	  the	  considerable	  powers	  they	  wield	  in	  the	  adjudicatory	  process.	  What	  this	  
potentially	  indexes	  is	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  representation	  of	  a	  social	  actor	  as	  active,	  
and	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  recipients	  of	  such	  representation	  then	  identify	  with	  being	  active	  and	  
able	  to	  make	  choices,	  with	  being	  in	  control	  of	  their	  own	  destiny.	  	  
The	  coding	  of	  action	  as	  active	  or	  passive,	  however,	  would	  not	  in	  itself	  be	  conclusive	  as	  to	  the	  
effects	  of	  a	  representation	  on	  agency	  and	  one	  would	  need	  to	  have	  regard	  to	  other	  semantic	  
moves	  in	  the	  text.	  The	  most	  striking	  instance	  of	  this	  in	  the	  representations	  constituting	  the	  
preferred	  career	  path	  was	  the	  lecturer’s	  multi-­‐dimensional	  closure	  of	  the	  option	  of	  becoming	  
an	  advocate	  straight	  out	  of	  university:	  He	  points	  to	  the	  practice	  of	  attorneys	  referring	  work	  to	  
advocates	  but	  then	  immediately	  invokes	  the	  critical	  resource	  of	  ‘reputation’;	  he	  invokes	  
depressing	  images	  of	  the	  failed	  advocate;	  he	  evaluates	  the	  action	  of	  going	  straight	  to	  the	  bar	  
from	  university	  as	  foolish;	  he	  invokes	  the	  real-­‐life	  successful	  example	  in	  the	  anecdote	  of	  his	  
former	  student	  and	  he	  affirms	  the	  practice	  of	  referral	  between	  attorneys	  and	  advocates	  via	  
relational	  clauses	  on	  two	  occasions	  (pp.	  143-­‐145).	  	  Cumulatively,	  these	  strategies	  seem	  to	  
restrict	  the	  agency	  of	  one	  who	  perhaps	  thought	  they	  could	  apply	  to	  the	  bar	  straight	  after	  their	  
studies.	  	  
I	  also	  took	  note	  of	  instances	  where	  the	  lecturer’s	  representations	  constructed	  the	  qualifications	  




allowed	  for	  action,	  or	  simply	  had	  to	  be	  accepted	  as	  a	  given.	  So,	  for	  instance,	  when	  the	  lecturer	  
states	  that	  ‘if	  you	  don’t	  read	  court	  cases	  you’re	  not	  a	  lawyer’	  (p.	  126),	  or	  ‘if	  you	  are	  going	  to	  
become	  a	  lawyer	  you	  must	  be	  informed	  in	  our	  society’	  (p.	  128)	  he	  posits	  reading	  court	  cases	  
and	  ensuring	  one	  is	  informed	  as	  essential	  to	  becoming	  a	  lawyer.	  Both	  these	  actions	  allow	  for	  a	  
fairly	  extensive	  degree	  of	  agency	  –	  reading	  a	  court	  case	  or	  a	  newspaper	  or	  professional	  journals	  
are	  things	  that	  one	  can	  choose	  to	  do	  and	  over	  which	  one	  can	  exercise	  control.	  Similarly	  
knowing	  the	  internal	  politics	  of	  the	  legal	  firm	  (p.	  148);	  being	  willing	  to	  work	  ’18	  hours	  a	  day’	  (p.	  
148);	  knowing	  attorneys	  and	  befriending	  in-­‐house	  counsel	  (p.	  155);	  and	  dressing	  the	  part	  (p.	  
156)	  allow	  for	  agency.	  By	  contrast,	  when	  the	  lecturer	  remarks	  ‘if	  you	  are	  not	  good	  with	  
languages,	  if	  you	  are	  not	  good	  with	  words,	  understanding	  words,	  writing	  words,	  speaking	  
words,	  then	  the	  legal	  profession	  is	  going	  to	  be	  very	  hostile	  …’	  (p.	  127)	  or	  ‘if	  you’re	  a	  lawyer,	  you	  
must	  never	  do	  anything	  if	  …	  you	  are	  emotionally	  unstable’	  (p.	  132)	  –	  he	  defines	  disqualifications	  
to	  the	  practice	  over	  which	  agency	  would	  seemingly	  have	  little	  effect.	  The	  difference	  lies	  in	  the	  
object	  of	  the	  qualification/criteria:	  In	  the	  first	  set,	  the	  object	  is	  an	  action	  –	  reading	  court	  cases,	  
or	  being	  informed,	  and	  so	  on.	  In	  the	  second	  the	  object	  is	  a	  trait,	  capacity	  or	  resource	  –	  all	  of	  
which	  are	  seemingly	  more	  resistant	  to	  change.	  	  
4.3	   Summary	  
In	  this	  chapter	  I	  have	  discussed	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  analysis	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  three	  claims	  
derived	  from	  the	  conceptual	  frame	  outlined	  in	  chapter	  two.	  In	  respect	  of	  the	  first	  claim	  I	  have	  
demonstrated	  how	  a	  micro-­‐discursive	  analysis	  that	  utilizes	  the	  basic	  elements	  of	  social	  practice	  
as	  a	  point	  of	  entry	  can	  be	  useful	  for	  a	  greater	  understanding	  of	  the	  role	  of	  representations	  in	  
identity	  regulation.	  This	  was	  undertaken	  by	  demonstrating	  how	  the	  analytical	  codes	  developed	  
around	  the	  model	  of	  social	  practice	  were	  interwoven	  amongst	  the	  eight	  primary	  themes	  
identified	  in	  the	  lecturer’s	  talk.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  second	  claim,	  I	  situated	  each	  of	  the	  eight	  
themes	  in	  relation	  to	  broader	  discourses	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  legal	  professionalism	  and	  the	  
teaching	  of	  legal	  ethics.	  In	  doing	  so	  I	  found	  that	  the	  lecturer’s	  representations	  were	  more	  
closely	  aligned	  with	  claims	  made	  in	  the	  latter,	  rather	  than	  the	  former.	  Finally,	  in	  respect	  of	  
claim	  three,	  and	  noting	  the	  institutional	  and	  personal	  authority	  the	  lecturer	  exercised	  in	  the	  




students	  in	  relation	  to	  his	  representations,	  and	  to	  construct	  or	  occlude	  agency	  in	  the	  process	  of	  








In	  this	  chapter	  I	  return	  full	  circle	  –	  to	  the	  key	  research	  questions	  that	  guided	  the	  study	  and	  the	  
motivation	  that	  inaugurated	  the	  research	  journey.	  I	  turn	  thereafter	  to	  some	  of	  the	  teaching	  and	  
learning,	  policy	  and	  research	  implications	  of	  the	  research.	  	  
7.1	   Conclusions	  
For	  ease	  of	  reference,	  the	  four	  key	  research	  questions	  that	  guided	  this	  research	  were	  as	  
follows:	  
(a)	  	   What	  conceptual	  resources	  exist	  for	  theorizing	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  
representation	  of	  legal	  professionals	  in	  classroom	  talk	  and	  the	  formation	  of	  legal	  
professional	  identity?	  	  
(b)	   Which	  methodological	  approach	  would	  best	  elucidate	  the	  content	  and	  form	  of	  
representations	  about	  legal	  professionals	  in	  classroom	  talk?	  	  
(c)	  	   How	  were	  legal	  professionals	  actually	  represented	  in	  the	  classroom	  of	  the	  study?	  How	  
did	  language	  function	  to	  constitute	  these	  representations?	  	  
(d)	   How	  did	  the	  lecturer’s	  representations	  relate	  to	  broader	  discourses	  on	  legal	  
professionalism	  and	  the	  teaching	  of	  legal	  ethics?	  i.e.	  what	  ‘horizon	  of	  observation’	  did	  
the	  lecturer’s	  representations	  establish?	  
Chapter	  five	  as	  well	  as	  sections	  1	  and	  3	  of	  chapter	  six	  set	  out	  my	  detailed	  response	  to	  the	  third	  
of	  these	  questions,	  while	  section	  2,	  chapter	  six	  responds	  in	  similar	  vein	  to	  the	  fourth.	  Whilst	  
interesting	  (and	  at	  times	  downright	  entertaining),	  the	  actual	  content	  of	  the	  lecturer’s	  
representations	  of	  each	  of	  the	  legal	  professional	  roles	  is	  the	  least	  significant	  aspect	  of	  this	  
analysis.	  More	  important	  was,	  firstly,	  being	  able	  to	  show	  the	  explicit	  and	  implicit	  linkages	  




identified	  as	  central	  to	  the	  lecturer’s	  discourse	  on	  legal	  professionals,	  and	  the	  five	  broader	  
categories	  (nature	  of	  professional	  power,	  purposes	  and	  values	  of	  the	  legal	  profession,	  nature	  of	  
legal	  work,	  legal	  relationships,	  and	  social	  profile	  of	  the	  profession)	  which	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  
pillars	  of	  this	  type	  of	  discourse.	  It	  is	  these	  linkages	  that	  constitute	  the	  more	  enduring	  value	  of	  
the	  research	  –	  the	  awareness,	  for	  instance	  that	  the	  representation	  of	  social	  action	  functions	  not	  
only	  to	  name	  and	  describe	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  practice,	  but	  also	  codes	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  power	  
exercised	  by	  legal	  professionals,	  the	  hierarchies	  obtaining	  amongst	  them,	  and	  the	  nature	  and	  
emotional	  tenor	  of	  the	  work;	  that	  gender	  classification	  is	  predominantly	  a	  function	  of	  pronoun	  
usage	  and	  nomination;	  or	  that	  legal	  professional	  values	  are	  not	  predominantly	  imparted	  
through	  explicit	  discussion	  but	  rather	  through	  the	  subtle	  choices	  involved	  in	  the	  terms	  used	  to	  
name	  every	  aspect	  of	  the	  practice	  as	  well	  as	  the	  adjectives,	  adverbs	  and	  adjectival/adverbial	  
phrases	  used	  to	  qualify	  such	  aspects.	  	  
Secondly,	  that	  I	  was	  able	  to	  produce	  such	  a	  rich	  narrative	  from	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  basic	  elements	  
of	  the	  social	  practice	  is	  in	  itself	  an	  important	  finding.	  It	  points	  to	  the	  value	  of	  this	  hitherto	  
neglected	  aspect	  of	  classroom	  talk	  and	  suggests,	  importantly,	  that	  the	  tight	  coupling	  of	  
professional	  identity	  formation	  with	  the	  explicit	  teaching	  of	  ‘ethics’	  or	  ‘professional	  
responsibility’	  courses	  is	  misguided.	  Teaching	  and	  learning	  that	  goes	  toward	  professional	  
identity	  formation	  is	  indeed	  pervasive	  and	  occurs	  whenever	  the	  lecturer	  imparts	  a	  
representation	  of	  the	  profession	  –	  which	  probably	  happens	  in	  every	  single	  course	  taught	  during	  
the	  course	  of	  a	  legal	  education	  programme.	  	  
Regarding	  the	  first	  research	  question,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  there	  is	  a	  great	  variety	  of	  conceptual	  
resources	  from	  which	  to	  choose	  across	  a	  range	  of	  disciplines.	  The	  concepts	  of	  ‘identity	  work’	  
and	  ‘identity	  regulation’,	  however,	  fitted	  my	  purpose	  well	  in	  that	  they	  enabled	  me	  to	  
conceptualize	  distinct	  but	  inter-­‐related	  processes,	  both	  of	  which	  are	  critical	  to	  identity	  
formation.	  My	  research	  is	  essentially	  an	  elaboration	  and	  exploration	  of	  the	  identity	  regulation	  
concept	  in	  the	  form	  that	  it	  takes	  through	  language	  use.	  As	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  two,	  ‘role’	  and	  
‘discourse’	  served	  as	  the	  primary	  conceptual	  vehicles	  to	  effect	  this	  elaboration.	  In	  line	  with	  the	  
reformulated	  concept	  of	  ‘role’	  put	  forward	  by	  Simpson	  and	  Carroll	  (2008)	  whereby	  it	  is	  shorn	  of	  




positions)	  and	  re-­‐characterized	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  ‘flux	  ontology’	  (ibid:	  31),	  I	  have	  demonstrated	  how	  
each	  of	  the	  main	  legal	  professional	  roles	  in	  the	  lecturer’s	  classroom	  talk	  was	  discursively	  
constructed.	  I	  found	  roles	  to	  be	  points	  of	  attraction	  and	  coherence	  in	  synthesizing	  a	  narrative	  
on	  the	  representation	  of	  legal	  professionals	  in	  classroom	  talk.	  
It	  was	  the	  understanding	  of	  discourse	  employed	  in	  critical	  discourse	  analytical	  studies,	  
however,	  that	  served	  to	  deepen	  my	  understanding	  of	  identity	  regulation	  the	  most.	  Thus,	  
realizing	  the	  multi-­‐functionality	  of	  language	  –	  the	  distinction	  between	  representational,	  
interactional	  and	  identificational	  meanings	  –	  enabled	  me	  to	  understand	  that	  identity	  regulation	  
through	  discourse	  is	  multi-­‐faceted,	  occurring	  at	  least	  through	  both	  representational	  and	  
interactional	  meanings	  (with	  identificational	  meanings	  being	  the	  resources	  speakers	  use	  to	  
position	  themselves	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  other	  two	  types).	  This	  phenomenon	  was	  briefly	  illustrated	  
in	  section	  2	  of	  chapter	  four	  where	  I	  used	  a	  short	  extract	  to	  show	  how	  different	  roles	  were	  
simultaneously	  being	  constructed	  in	  one	  text.	  	  
As	  I	  have	  made	  clear	  at	  various	  points,	  however,	  the	  focus	  of	  my	  research	  was	  on	  
representational	  meanings	  which	  are	  associated	  with	  identity	  regulation	  in	  decontextualized	  
practices	  (see	  the	  distinction	  between	  contextualized	  and	  decontextualized	  practices	  
introduced	  in	  section	  3	  of	  chapter	  two).	  What	  my	  engagement	  with	  Van	  Leeuwen’s	  research	  
showed	  is	  that	  the	  practice	  is	  never	  simply	  ‘decontextualized’,	  it	  is	  always	  recontexualized,	  
there	  are	  substitutions,	  alterations,	  additions	  and	  so	  on	  as	  one	  practice	  is	  represented	  within	  
the	  context	  of	  another	  as	  when	  the	  social	  practices	  of	  various	  kinds	  of	  legal	  professional	  are	  
represented	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  university	  classroom.	  This	  implies	  at	  least	  a	  potential	  for	  the	  
progressive	  reworking	  and	  reshaping	  of	  a	  practice	  –	  the	  outworking	  of	  the	  power	  of	  discourse	  
to	  both	  represent	  but	  also	  to	  influence	  social	  reality.	  	  
In	  response	  to	  the	  second	  research	  question,	  I	  have	  set	  out	  my	  reasons	  for	  using	  CDA	  as	  the	  
methodological	  approach	  that	  would	  best	  elucidate	  the	  content	  and	  form	  of	  representations	  
about	  legal	  professionals	  in	  classroom	  talk	  in	  section	  4.2	  of	  chapter	  two	  above.	  In	  short,	  CDA	  
provided	  me	  with	  an	  understanding	  of	  discourse	  as	  tightly	  coupled	  and	  articulated	  with	  other	  




the	  text.	  Van	  Leeuwen’s	  work	  on	  representational	  meanings	  and	  especially	  his	  grounding	  of	  the	  
analysis	  of	  those	  meanings	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  various	  elements	  of	  social	  practice	  was	  an	  invaluable	  
aid	  in	  my	  analysis	  and	  subsequent	  synthesis	  of	  the	  representation	  of	  various	  legal	  professional	  
roles	  and	  their	  social	  practices.	  However,	  his	  extensive	  range	  of	  semantic	  and	  linguistic	  
categories	  was	  too	  complicated	  for	  undertaking	  an	  analysis	  of	  such	  an	  extended	  body	  of	  text	  
and	  it	  was	  necessary	  for	  me	  to	  work	  with	  what	  I	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  ‘basic’	  elements	  of	  social	  
practice.	  The	  codes	  I	  developed	  from	  the	  work	  of	  Martin	  and	  Rose	  (for	  the	  representation	  of	  
emotion)	  and	  MacIntyre	  (for	  the	  representation	  of	  internal	  and	  external	  goods)	  fitted	  well	  with	  
Van	  Leeuwen’s	  scheme.	  The	  limited	  range	  of	  categories	  I	  employed	  in	  my	  internal	  language	  of	  
description	  nevertheless	  enabled	  me	  to	  construct	  a	  rich	  narrative	  for	  each	  of	  the	  main	  roles.	  	  
Critical	  discourse	  analysis	  was	  appropriate	  as	  a	  methodological	  approach	  also	  because	  it	  
recognizes	  that	  discourse	  can	  have	  major	  ideological	  effects	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  everyday	  beliefs	  
which	  often	  appear	  disguised	  as	  conceptual	  metaphors	  and	  analogies	  (Wodak	  &	  Meyer,	  2009:	  
8).	  	  What	  my	  research	  suggests	  is	  that	  ideologies	  are	  not	  only	  imparted	  through	  conceptual	  
metaphors	  and	  analogies,	  but	  also	  simply	  through	  the	  way	  in	  which	  people,	  actions	  and	  things	  
are	  named	  or	  circumstances	  are	  described.	  The	  thought	  with	  which	  I	  am	  left	  after	  conducting	  
this	  analysis	  is	  that	  when	  students	  take	  up	  a	  manner	  of	  speaking	  about	  legal	  professionals	  they	  
in	  effect	  take	  on	  a	  particular	  view	  of	  the	  legal	  professional	  world.	  In	  the	  classroom	  of	  my	  study	  
this	  view	  was	  implicit	  because	  the	  lecturer	  did	  not	  present	  his	  views	  on	  the	  legal	  profession	  in	  a	  
critical	  light,	  or	  allow	  for	  or	  structure	  discussion	  but	  more	  importantly	  because	  the	  
representations	  themselves	  were	  scattered	  and	  diffused.	  	  
Returning	  to	  the	  motivation	  that	  set	  the	  research	  journey	  in	  motion,	  I	  have	  now	  attained	  a	  
greater	  understanding	  of	  my	  own	  agency	  and	  potency	  as	  this	  bears	  upon	  the	  discursive	  
construction	  of	  the	  social	  practices	  of	  the	  legal	  professional	  in	  the	  classroom.	  It	  has	  made	  me,	  
however,	  more	  convinced	  than	  ever	  of	  the	  need	  for	  teachers	  of	  the	  law	  to	  be	  cognizant	  of	  the	  
full	  range	  of	  social	  practices	  in	  the	  legal	  profession	  into	  which	  students	  will	  find	  their	  way	  in	  
order	  to	  ensure	  that	  representations	  of	  the	  legal	  profession	  in	  the	  classroom	  context	  are	  both	  






7.2	   Implications	  
7.2.1	   Implications	  for	  teaching	  and	  learning	  	  
	  One	  of	  the	  major	  implications	  of	  this	  study	  is	  that	  the	  understanding	  and	  use	  of	  
representations	  of	  legal	  professionals	  in	  the	  classroom	  is	  underdeveloped	  and	  that	  such	  
representations	  may	  play	  a	  far	  more	  important	  role	  in	  the	  development	  of	  legal	  professional	  
identity	  than	  has	  heretofore	  been	  assumed.	  For	  lecturers	  of	  law	  in	  tertiary	  education	  this	  
should	  entail	  expanding	  the	  existing	  focus	  on	  the	  nature	  and	  form	  of	  particular	  pedagogical	  
interventions	  aimed	  at	  instilling	  and	  shaping	  legal	  professional	  identity	  –	  the	  ‘continuum	  of	  
pedagogies’,	  for	  instance	  identified	  by	  the	  Carnegie	  study	  (Sullivan	  et	  al,	  2007:	  147)	  –	  to	  
focusing	  on	  classroom	  talk	  as	  a	  source	  of	  discourse	  on	  legal	  professionalism	  that	  contributes	  to	  
‘shaping	  their	  students’	  values,	  habits	  of	  mind,	  perceptions,	  and	  interpretations	  of	  the	  legal	  
world,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  understanding	  of	  their	  roles	  and	  responsibilities	  as	  lawyers	  and	  the	  
criteria	  by	  which	  they	  define	  and	  evaluate	  professional	  success’	  (ibid:	  139).	  Because	  of	  the	  
subtle	  and	  pervasive	  nature	  of	  representations	  on	  legal	  professionals	  in	  classroom	  talk,	  the	  
manner	  in	  which	  they	  ‘slip	  in’	  or	  become	  intertwined	  with	  teaching	  on	  other	  substantive	  areas	  
of	  law	  (but	  not	  eschewing	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  legal	  profession	  may	  also	  be	  a	  substantive	  
topic	  on	  its	  own),	  the	  first	  responsibility	  of	  university	  law	  lecturers	  that	  flows	  from	  this	  study	  is	  
to	  become	  aware	  of	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  such	  representations	  feature	  in	  their	  classroom	  talk.	  
The	  analytical	  method	  adopted	  for	  this	  study	  may	  be	  considered	  helpful	  toward	  this	  end.	  Law	  
lecturers	  need	  not	  undertake	  a	  full-­‐scale	  critical	  discourse	  analysis	  of	  their	  lectures	  as	  I	  have	  
done	  here,	  and	  indeed	  time	  and	  resource	  constraints	  militate	  against	  this.	  However,	  by	  paying	  
heed	  to	  this	  study	  they	  may	  better	  understand	  how	  social	  action,	  the	  circumstances	  of	  social	  
action,	  social	  actors	  and	  values	  are	  coded	  in	  classroom	  talk	  and	  how	  these	  elements,	  in	  turn,	  
function	  to	  construct	  the	  nature	  of	  legal	  professional	  power,	  the	  purposes	  and	  values	  of	  the	  
profession	  and	  so	  on.	  Following	  awareness,	  the	  second	  responsibility	  is	  to	  utilize	  such	  




statements	  on	  legal	  professionalism.	  The	  area	  in	  which	  this	  would	  probably	  make	  the	  most	  
dramatic	  difference	  would	  be	  in	  the	  representation	  of	  the	  internal	  goods	  of	  the	  profession	  
which,	  I	  would	  argue,	  require	  a	  far	  more	  explicit	  and	  careful	  focus.	  However,	  as	  I	  have	  shown	  
the	  representation	  of	  every	  aspect	  of	  the	  social	  practice	  of	  the	  legal	  professional	  implies	  a	  
discursive	  value	  choice	  that	  would	  need	  to	  cohere	  with	  the	  representation	  of	  internal	  goods.	  As	  
outlined	  in	  the	  section	  on	  implications	  for	  legal	  research	  below,	  the	  strategic	  use	  of	  
representations	  of	  legal	  professionals	  in	  classroom	  talk	  needs	  additionally	  to	  go	  hand-­‐in-­‐glove	  
with	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  nature	  and	  forms	  of	  legal	  professionalism	  in	  South	  Africa.	  	  
For	  law	  students,	  the	  key	  implication	  of	  this	  study	  is	  an	  awareness	  of	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  
representations	  of	  legal	  professionals	  in	  classroom	  talk	  function	  in	  their	  own	  processes	  of	  
identity	  work.	  With	  such	  understanding	  they	  might	  be	  better	  situated	  to	  critically	  engage	  with	  
the	  representations	  being	  put	  forward	  in	  the	  classroom	  context	  and	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  they	  
are	  positioned	  in	  relation	  thereto,	  even	  where	  they	  lack	  sufficient	  practical	  experience	  to	  offer	  
alternative	  representations.	  	  
7.2.2	   Policy	  implications	  	  
The	  implications	  of	  this	  study	  for	  the	  policy	  leaders	  of	  legal	  education	  –	  the	  deans	  and	  heads	  of	  
school	  of	  law,	  working	  collaboratively	  with	  the	  organized	  profession	  –	  are	  at	  least	  two-­‐fold.	  
Firstly,	  deans	  and	  heads	  of	  schools	  of	  law	  may	  initiate	  more	  systematic	  surveys	  of	  the	  nature	  
and	  extent	  of	  representation	  of	  legal	  professionals	  taking	  place	  in	  the	  classrooms	  of	  their	  
schools.	  They	  would,	  in	  this	  way,	  become	  more	  aware	  of	  the	  pervading	  ethos	  on	  legal	  
professionalism	  being	  communicated	  in	  their	  institutions	  of	  learning,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  possibility	  of	  
areas	  of	  incoherence	  and	  inconsistency.	  Such	  surveys	  may	  be	  done	  for	  particular	  courses	  or	  
through	  a	  strategic	  selection	  of	  courses	  throughout	  the	  course	  of	  study	  of	  a	  legal	  degree.	  In	  
order	  to	  plumb	  the	  depth	  and	  richness	  of	  such	  representations	  surveys	  should	  be	  based	  on	  a	  
qualitative,	  discursive	  approach	  in	  line	  with	  the	  method	  adopted	  for	  this	  study.	  This	  clearly	  has	  
resource	  implications	  in	  terms	  of	  funding,	  human	  capital	  and	  time	  but	  Mertz’	  work	  –	  in	  which	  
the	  contracts	  classes	  in	  eight	  law	  schools	  in	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America	  were	  recorded	  and	  




Secondly,	  deans	  and	  heads	  of	  schools	  of	  law	  could	  collaborate	  with	  the	  organized	  legal	  
profession	  to	  provide	  opportunities	  for	  university	  teachers	  of	  law	  to	  obtain	  greater	  exposure	  to	  
the	  social	  practice	  of	  different	  legal	  professional	  roles.	  This	  may	  take	  various	  forms,	  including	  
the	  possibility	  of	  ethnographically-­‐oriented	  research,	  limited	  internships	  or	  the	  use	  of	  
sabbatical	  time	  spent	  working	  in	  the	  different	  branches	  of	  the	  legal	  profession,	  and	  staff	  
exchanges.	  These	  suggestions	  are	  premised	  on	  my	  personal	  experience	  and	  awareness	  that	  
university	  teachers	  of	  law	  may	  have	  no	  experience	  in	  the	  social	  practices	  of	  law	  at	  all.	  One	  of	  
the	  implications	  of	  this	  study	  is	  that	  this	  could	  impact	  on	  the	  comprehensiveness	  and	  
authenticity	  of	  their	  representations	  of	  legal	  professionalism	  within	  the	  classroom,	  which	  in	  
turn	  impacts	  upon	  the	  identity	  work	  taking	  place	  within	  the	  student.	  The	  interventions	  I	  
propose	  would	  allow	  university	  teachers	  of	  law	  –	  who	  do	  not	  necessarily	  have	  a	  desire	  to	  be	  in	  
practice	  on	  a	  permanent	  basis	  –	  to	  experience	  and	  assimilate	  different	  models	  of	  the	  social	  
practices	  of	  law	  and	  then	  bring	  that	  richness	  back	  into	  their	  classrooms.	  In	  referring	  to	  
collaboration	  with	  the	  ‘organized	  profession’	  I	  have	  in	  mind	  an	  expanded	  conception	  of	  
associations	  which	  cover	  both	  the	  private	  and	  public	  spheres	  of	  the	  profession;	  i.e.	  associations	  
of	  public	  prosecutors	  and	  magistrates	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  Law	  Society	  of	  South	  Africa	  and	  the	  
General	  Bar	  Council.	  Through	  such	  relationships,	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  institutional	  crevices	  
that	  would	  allow	  university	  teachers	  of	  law	  to	  experience	  both	  public	  and	  private	  practice,	  the	  
hierarchy	  of	  private	  over	  public	  work	  –	  the	  preferred	  over	  the	  shadow	  career	  path	  –	  may	  be	  
transformed,	  so	  that	  a	  more	  diverse	  range	  of	  career	  options	  can	  be	  presented	  to	  students.	  	  
7.2.3	   Research	  implications	  	  
At	  least	  three	  areas	  of	  further	  research	  flow	  from	  this	  study.	  The	  first,	  already	  mentioned,	  is	  for	  
more	  systematic	  surveys	  of	  representations	  of	  legal	  professionals	  in	  classroom	  talk	  to	  be	  
conducted	  within	  and	  across	  law	  schools.	  This	  would	  allow	  for	  more	  generalizable	  claims	  
regarding	  the	  nature	  and	  extent	  of	  such	  representations	  to	  be	  made.	  	  
The	  second	  area	  of	  research	  is	  to	  examine	  classroom	  representations	  of	  legal	  professionals	  in	  
terms	  of	  the	  counterpart	  of	  identity	  regulation	  –	  being	  the	  identity	  work	  undertaken	  by	  




research	  may	  take	  a	  variety	  of	  forms,	  including	  longitudinal	  studies	  involving	  focus	  groups,	  
interviews	  and	  student	  journaling	  or	  ethnographically-­‐oriented	  research	  aimed	  at	  
understanding	  the	  contexts	  in	  which	  students	  talk	  amongst	  themselves	  about	  their	  future	  
career	  options	  in	  the	  law.	  Such	  research	  may	  of	  course	  be	  discursively	  oriented	  or	  involve	  less	  
text-­‐focused	  forms	  of	  content	  analysis.	  	  
Finally,	  in	  order	  to	  gauge	  and	  guide	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  the	  representations	  of	  legal	  
professionals	  in	  classroom	  talk,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  develop	  a	  richer	  research	  literature	  on	  the	  
nature	  of	  legal	  professionalism	  in	  South	  Africa.	  	  The	  challenges	  facing	  the	  legal	  profession	  and	  
the	  organizational	  and	  cultural	  forms	  that	  it	  assumes	  are	  not	  necessarily	  the	  same	  as	  those	  put	  
forward	  in	  documents	  such	  as	  the	  MacCrate	  and	  ACLEC	  Reports.	  The	  transformational	  agenda	  
of	  legal	  professionalism	  in	  South	  Africa	  should	  be	  informed	  by	  an	  accurate	  understanding	  of	  the	  
diversity	  of	  forms	  of	  legal	  practice	  and	  associated	  models	  of	  professionalism	  that	  already	  exist.	  
In	  this	  way	  the	  nature	  and	  depth	  in	  which	  significant	  cross-­‐cutting	  challenges	  (such	  as	  the	  
comprehensive	  articulation	  of	  the	  internal	  goods	  of	  the	  profession;	  racial,	  gender	  and	  class	  
discrimination;	  client-­‐centredness	  and	  responsiveness;	  and	  access	  to	  legal	  justice	  for	  the	  poor)	  
manifest	  in	  different	  forms	  of	  legal	  social	  practice	  can	  be	  better	  understood	  and	  represented	  in	  
classroom	  talk.	  This	  may	  establish	  the	  conditions	  of	  possibility	  for	  the	  next	  generation	  of	  legal	  






APPENDIX	  1:	  ANALYSIS	  OF	  GENERIC	  LL.B	  STATEMENT	  
Element	  	   Content	  (Source	  in	  parentheses)	  
Social	  role	  of	  
lawyers	  
A	  lawyer:	  
• Analyzes:	  Fundamental	  legal	  concepts,	  principles,	  theories	  and	  their	  
relationship	  to	  values	  critically	  (ELO1);	  the	  law	  (SSO1.2);	  current	  and	  
controversial	  legal	  issues	  (SSO1.3);	  the	  relationship	  between	  law	  and	  
society	  (SSO1.4);	  statutes	  and	  cases	  (SSO2.2);	  
• Evaluates:	  information	  (ELO	  3);	  legal	  material	  (SSO3.2);	  different	  
solutions	  to	  a	  problem	  (SSO5.3)	  
• Comments	  upon	  the	  law	  (SSO1.2);	  current	  and	  controversial	  legal	  issues	  
(SSO1.3);	  the	  relationship	  between	  law	  and	  society	  (SSO1.4)	  
• Conducts:	  research	  (SSO2.1)	  
• Uses:	  electronic	  databases	  (SSO2.2);	  library	  and	  internet	  facilities	  
(SSO3.1),	  (SSO7.2);	  word-­‐processing	  software	  (SSO7.3)	  
• Collects	  and	  organizes:	  information	  (ELO3);	  legal	  material	  (SSO3.2)	  
• Communicates:	  in	  a	  legal	  environment	  (ELO4);	  within	  a	  group	  (SSO6.1);	  
the	  deliberations	  of	  group	  work	  effectively	  (SSO6.3);	  using	  email	  (SSO7.1)	  
• Argues:	  different	  points	  of	  view	  coherently	  and	  persuasively	  (SSO4.1)	  
• Takes	  and	  records	  instructions	  (SSO4.2)	  
• Counsels:	  clients	  (SSO4.2)	  
• Drafts:	  relevant	  legal	  documents	  (SSO4.3)	  
• Solves:	  complex	  and	  diverse	  legal	  problems	  (ELO5),	  (ELO10)	  	  
• Works	  effectively:	  with	  colleagues	  and	  other	  roleplayers	  in	  the	  legal	  
process	  (ELO6);	  with	  members	  of	  other	  professions	  or	  disciplines	  
(SSO6.4)	  
• Manages	  and	  organizes	  his	  life	  and	  professional	  activities	  in	  the	  legal	  
field	  (ELO8)	  
• Participates	  as	  a	  responsible	  citizen:	  in	  the	  promotion	  of	  a	  just	  society	  
(ELO9);	  in	  legal	  development	  at	  a	  local,	  provincial,	  national,	  regional	  and	  
international	  sphere	  (SSO9.6)	  
Purposes	  of	  law	  or	  
lawyers	  	  
• To	  sustain	  the	  development	  of	  a	  just	  and	  democratic	  society	  based	  on	  
the	  rule	  of	  law	  (R),	  (EL09)	  
• To	  solve	  legal	  problems	  (ELO5),	  (ELO10)	  	  
• To	  address	  past	  and	  current	  injustices	  (R)	  
• To	  participate	  in	  promoting	  the	  administration	  of	  justice	  (P)	  
• To	  participate	  in	  the	  development	  of	  legal	  institutions	  in	  South	  African	  
society	  (P)	  
• To	  balance	  competing	  interests	  (ELO9)	  
• To	  promote	  constitutional	  principles	  and	  values	  (ELO9)	  	  
Attitudes	   • Responsible	  (P),	  (ELO2),	  (ELO3),	  (ELO5),	  (ELO8),	  (ELO9),	  (ELO10)	  	  
• Critical	  (ELO1),	  (ELO5),	  (ELO10)	  	  




• Respectful	  (ELO6),	  (ELO9)	  	  
• Tolerant	  (ELO6),	  (ELO9)	  	  
• Entrepreneurial	  (ELO11)	  	  
• Confident	  (ELO11)	  	  
Ethical	  standards	  	   • ‘Requisite’	  ethical	  standards	  (P)	  
• Can	  act	  ‘responsibly	  and	  ethically	  as	  researcher	  and	  scholar’	  (ELO2)	  
• Can	  act	  responsibly	  and	  ethically	  ‘with	  due	  regard	  for	  applicable	  
conventions	  (SSO3.3)	  
• ‘The	  learner	  has	  acquired	  ethical	  standards	  and	  values	  to	  guide	  and	  
assist	  him	  or	  her	  to	  organize	  their	  life	  and	  professional	  conduct’	  (SSO8.4)	  
Values	  	   • Criticism	  (ELO1),	  (ELO3),	  (SSO5.3),	  (ELO10)	  
• Principles	  in	  the	  constitutional	  Bill	  of	  Rights	  (R),	  (ELO9)	  
• Justice	  (R),	  (P)	  
• Creativity	  (SSO5.3),	  (ELO10)	  
• Respect	  (ELO6),	  (ELO9)	  	  
• Accepting	  responsibility	  (ELO9),	  (ELO10)	  
• Democratic	  values	  (R),	  (P)	  
• Rule	  of	  law	  (R),	  (P)	  
• Sustainability	  (R)	  
• Lifelong	  personal	  intellectual	  growth	  (P)	  
• Effectiveness	  (ELO3)	  	  
• Authority	  (SSO5.2)	  
• Innovation	  (SSO5.3)	  
• Tolerance	  (ELO9)	  	  



















APPENDIX	  3:	  DATE	  AND	  MAIN	  TOPIC	  OF	  EACH	  LECTURE	  
No.	  	   Date	  	   Topic	  	  
1	   12-­‐Feb-­‐08	   Two	  schools	  of	  legal	  thought	  -­‐	  Natural	  law	  and	  positivism	  
2	   14-­‐Feb-­‐08	   Legal	  certainty	  
3	   19-­‐Feb-­‐08	   History	  of	  South	  African	  law	  
4	   21-­‐Feb-­‐08	   Sources	  of	  South	  African	  Law	  -­‐	  Legislation	  
5	   21-­‐Feb-­‐08	   Sources	  of	  South	  African	  Law	  -­‐	  Legislation	  contd	  
6	   26-­‐Feb-­‐08	   How	  to	  work	  with	  a	  statute	  
7	   28-­‐Feb-­‐08	   How	  to	  cite	  legislation,	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  common	  law,	  
interpretation	  of	  statutes	  
8	   28-­‐Feb-­‐08	   Interpretation	  of	  statutes	  
9	   04-­‐Mar-­‐08	   Interpretation	  of	  statutes	  contd	  
10	   06-­‐Mar-­‐08	   Presumptions	  of	  statutory	  interpretation	  -­‐	  Precedent	  -­‐	  Court	  
system	  
11	   11-­‐Mar-­‐08	   Court	  system	  contd	  -­‐	  How	  to	  read	  a	  judgment	  
12	   13-­‐Mar-­‐08	   Discussion	  of	  assignment	  -­‐	  Abbreviations	  used	  in	  court	  -­‐	  Case	  
summaries	  by	  students	  
13	   13-­‐Mar-­‐08	   Case	  summaries	  by	  students	  contd	  
14	   18-­‐Mar-­‐08	   The	  common	  law	  
15	   01-­‐Apr-­‐08	   The	  old	  authorities	  
16	   03-­‐Apr-­‐08	   The	  legal	  classification	  system	  
17	   03-­‐Apr-­‐08	   The	  legal	  classification	  system	  contd	  
18	   08-­‐Apr-­‐08	   Jurisdiction	  of	  the	  courts	  
19	   10-­‐Apr-­‐08	   Jurisdiction	  of	  the	  courts	  contd	  
20	   10-­‐Apr-­‐08	   Jurisdiction	  of	  the	  courts	  contd	  
21	   15-­‐Apr-­‐08	   Jurisdiction	  of	  mag	  courts	  contd	  -­‐	  Legal	  profession	  (advocates)	  







APPENDIX	  4A:	  QUOTATIONS	  –	  LAWYER	  




In	  other	  words,	  if	  you’re	  a	  natural	  lawyer,	  you	  must	  have	  a	  system	  -­‐	  somewhere	  -­‐	  against	  which	  
you	  can	  test	  your	  positive	  law,	  your	  man-­‐made	  law,	  the	  laws	  on	  earth.	  Man-­‐made,	  woman-­‐
made,	  person-­‐made	  law.	  	  
 
Quotation	  2	  	  
L1:62	  -­‐	  66 
062	   LECTURER:	  The	  law	  of	  nature,	  natural	  law	  [crosses	  floor]	  is	  one	  of	  the	  schools	  of	  thought	  
that	  equates	  morality	  with	  law.	  You	  remember	  last	  week	  you	  were	  all	  very	  worried	  
about	  that	  now	  this	  week	  you	  don’t	  remember	  it	  [pauses	  with	  hand	  raised	  in	  front	  of	  
students].	  OK	  What	  is	  wrong	  with	  equating	  morality	  with	  law?	  Now	  I’ve	  led	  you	  up	  to	  
the	  up	  to	  the	  water	  you	  must	  be	  able	  to	  get	  this	  one.	  Why	  is	  there	  such	  a	  huge	  hue	  and	  
outcry	  against	  equating	  morality	  and	  law?	  [S2	  raises	  hand]	  No	  no	  somebody	  else.	  Yes?	  	  
063	   STUDENT	  7:	  Morals	  differ	  according	  to	  the	  people.	  	  
064	   LECTURER:	  No	  but	  you	  must	  put	  it	  like	  a	  lawyer	  now	  that’s	  not	  …	  
065	   STUDENT	  7:	  Each	  person	  has	  their	  own	  set	  of	  morals	  and	  principles	  ….	  
066	   LECTURER:	  Yes	  yes	  that’s	  what	  you	  said	  and	  now	  you’re	  just	  putting	  it	  in	  other	  lay	  terms,	  
I	  want	  you	  to	  talk	  like	  a	  lawyer.	  What	  does	  that	  mean?	  You	  are	  hundred	  percent	  right.	  




L1:67	  -­‐	  69 
067	   LECTURER:	  OK	  the	  second	  great	  problem	  with	  the	  natural	  law	  school	  is,	  and	  this	  is	  
slightly	  more	  complicated,	  I’m	  only	  going	  to	  mention	  it	  don’t	  break	  your	  heads	  about	  it,	  
natural	  lawyers	  can	  never	  take	  the	  step	  of	  saying	  -­‐	  I’ll	  rephrase	  this	  so	  that	  you	  can	  write	  
it	  down	  -­‐	  natural	  lawyers	  can	  never,	  they	  haven’t	  got	  the	  moral	  courage	  to	  say,	  ‘if	  a	  law	  
is	  unjust,	  you	  as	  a	  just	  citizen	  have	  got	  the	  right	  not	  to	  obey	  it.’	  Must	  I	  say	  that	  again?	  
OK.	  Natural	  lawyers,	  no	  natural	  lawyer	  has	  ever	  admitted	  that	  you	  can	  use	  force	  or	  
revolution	  to	  overthrow	  a	  government	  that	  makes	  unjust	  laws.	  	  
068	   Look,	  if	  you	  are	  really	  a	  natural	  lawyer	  then	  the	  logical	  consequences	  of	  unjust	  laws	  -­‐	  
bad	  laws	  -­‐	  is	  that	  if	  this	  law,	  take	  for	  instance	  the	  apartheid	  laws,	  if	  this	  law	  that	  says	  ‘a	  
black	  man	  cannot	  fall	  in	  love	  with	  a	  white	  woman’	  that	  these	  are	  the	  laws	  of	  the	  
apartheid,	  you	  may	  not	  remember	  it	  but	  um	  but	  I	  remember	  it	  very	  well,	  that	  is	  a	  law	  




says,	  the	  Christian	  God,	  it	  is	  against	  all	  religions	  its	  is	  against	  everything	  that	  it	  natural	  
and	  that	  is	  logical.	  You	  cannot	  tell	  people	  that	  they	  may	  not	  fall	  in	  love	  because	  of	  the	  
colour	  or	  their	  skin.	  This	  is	  what	  the	  apartheid	  government	  did.	  So	  you	  have	  a	  bad	  law.	  
You	  have	  a	  law	  that	  is	  not	  in	  rhythm	  with	  the	  higher	  set	  of	  laws.	  So	  what	  do	  you	  expect	  
a	  natural	  lawyer	  to	  do?	  I	  expect	  a	  natural	  lawyer	  to	  say	  ‘sorry,	  is	  not	  in	  accordance	  to	  
the	  higher	  law.	  It	  is	  an	  unjust	  law	  and	  therefore	  the	  citizens	  that	  is	  oppressed	  by	  this	  law	  
have	  the	  right	  to	  disobey	  that	  law.	  Did	  they	  do	  it?	  [Pauses]	  	  
069	   No.	  St	  Augustine,	  both	  St	  Augustine	  and	  Thomas	  Aquinas	  said	  [pause]	  ‘Order	  is	  more	  
important	  than	  justice’.	  Order	  is	  more	  important	  than	  justice.	  And	  therefore,	  you	  do	  not	  
as	  of	  right,	  as	  a	  citizen,	  have	  the	  right	  to	  disobey	  an	  unjust	  law.	  What	  do	  you	  have,	  
according	  to	  these	  church	  fathers?	  You	  have	  the	  right	  to	  ask	  the	  church	  fathers	  to	  
decide	  whether	  this	  law	  is	  just	  or	  unjust	  and	  then	  take	  the	  steps	  that	  they	  may,	  that	  




But	  the	  very	  first	  thing	  that	  we	  work	  with	  as	  lawyers,	  the	  very	  first	  thing	  that	  can	  create	  




07	   What	  we	  are	  going	  to	  do	  today	  however,	  if	  there	  are	  no	  further	  questions	  on	  the	  
previous	  work,	  um,	  what	  we	  are	  going	  to	  do	  today,	  after	  we’ve	  done	  the	  philosophy	  and	  
the	  history	  of	  law,	  is	  we’re	  going	  to	  start	  doing	  the	  nitty-­‐gritty.	  You	  are	  um	  you	  are	  um	  
candidate	  lawyers,	  you	  all	  want	  to	  become	  lawyers	  or	  hopefully	  all	  want	  to	  become	  
lawyers	  of	  some	  kind.	  Um	  and	  if	  you’re	  a	  lawyer	  you	  must	  know	  the	  tools	  of	  the	  trade.	  
There	  are	  certain	  things	  uh	  that	  you	  must	  know	  and	  certain	  things	  uh	  that	  you	  must	  be	  
able	  to	  do.	  Uh	  its	  uh	  its	  like	  uh	  a	  doctor	  must	  be	  able	  to	  work	  with	  the	  human	  body.	  You	  
must	  be	  able	  to	  know	  how	  to	  handle	  a	  scalpel,	  even	  if	  you	  want	  to	  become	  uh	  a	  h	  
psychiatrist	  which	  is	  also	  a	  kind	  of	  a	  doctor,	  you	  must	  still	  go	  through	  the	  training	  of	  
using	  a	  scalpel,	  you	  must	  be	  able	  to	  dissect	  the	  human	  body,	  you	  must	  know	  the	  
nervous	  system,	  you	  must	  know,	  um	  all	  the	  technical	  things	  about	  the	  human	  body.	  
Lawyer,	  its	  exactly	  the	  same	  thing,	  you	  have	  to	  gain	  certain	  uh	  specialist	  knowledge	  
about	  certain	  specialist	  things	  so	  that	  when	  people	  come	  to	  you	  and	  ask	  for	  legal	  advice	  
that,	  you	  wouldn’t	  necessarily	  know	  everything	  immediately	  but	  the	  important	  thing	  is	  
you	  will	  know	  where	  to	  go	  and	  find	  it.	  Uh	  no	  lawyer	  can	  say	  that	  he	  knows	  the	  law,	  the	  
law	  is	  very	  difficult,	  um,	  very	  difficult	  mistress	  and	  nobody	  can	  claim	  to	  know	  everything	  
that	  there	  is	  to	  know	  about	  the	  law.	  It	  is	  a	  vast	  field,	  but	  what	  you	  must	  know	  is	  you	  
must	  know	  where	  to	  find	  the	  information,	  and	  this	  is	  what	  this	  course	  is	  all	  about,	  is	  to	  








like	  if	  you’re	  a	  doctor	  you	  must	  read	  up	  on	  the	  drugs.	  You	  must	  know	  what	  drugs	  to	  prescribe,	  




080	   Um.	  So.	  Its	  just	  like	  that.	  That	  is	  how	  they	  make	  laws.	  Its,	  you	  know,	  they	  put	  lot	  of	  /	  
they	  have	  -­‐	  I	  must	  be	  careful	  what	  I’m	  saying	  now,	  this	  is	  just	  a	  joke,	  I’m	  not	  serious	  but	  
um.	  They	  take	  the	  worst	  people.	  They	  make	  them	  MPs.	  They	  make	  them	  members	  of	  
Parliament	  [class	  giggles].	  You	  know	  if	  a	  lawyer	  is	  a	  failure,	  a	  dismal	  failure,	  the	  only	  
thing	  that	  tha	  remains	  open	  to	  him	  is	  to	  become	  a	  politician.	  They	  take	  these	  people	  
now	  that	  can	  succeed	  at	  nothing	  else	  but	  sitting	  there	  and	  and	  making	  noises,	  And	  then	  
they	  bombard	  them	  with	  absolute,	  hopelessly	  drafted	  legislation,	  and	  then	  they	  expect	  
these	  two	  things	  to	  come	  out	  on	  the	  other	  side	  with	  something	  coherent.	  Uh	  and	  
strangely	  enough	  it	  does,	  you	  know,	  our	  laws	  are	  not	  great,	  our	  laws	  are	  not	  drafted	  
with	  any	  kind	  of	  elegance,	  ours	  laws	  are	  very	  poorly	  drafted	  in	  this	  country.	  And	  this	  was	  
true	  of	  the	  apartheid	  years	  and	  its	  now	  true	  of	  the	  new	  government,	  so	  its	  not	  a	  
criticism	  against	  the	  new	  government.	  But	  in	  South	  Africa	  we	  don’t	  make	  good	  laws,	  
they’re	  drafted	  by	  civil	  servants	  …	  so	  …	  your	  bright	  lawyers	  are	  in	  private	  practice.	  And	  
only	  the	  duds	  go	  into	  civil	  service	  and	  they	  draft	  laws.	  So	  what	  do	  you	  expect.	  	  
 
Quotation	  8	  
L5:44	  -­‐	  47	   
044	   STUDENT	  15:	  Government	  Gaz	  /	  Government	  Gazette	  what	  what	  ....	  
045	   LECTURER:	  The	  what	  what	  what	  government	  what	  is	  the	  government	  what	  is	  this	  thing	  
Government	  Gazette	  You	  can’t	  talk	  like	  that	  like	  a	  lawyer	  you	  can’t	  use	  ‘what	  what’,	  its	  
not	  legal	  phraseology	  ….	  
046	   STUDENT	  15:	  It’s	  a	  document	  keeps	  the	  [gestures	  with	  hands]	  Act	  and	  ..	  
047	   LECTURER:	  OK	  I	  don’t	  understand	  what	  you’re	  saying	  …	  Anybody	  else?	  Where	  are	  the	  
signed	  Acts	  kept?	  Yes?	  	  
 
Quotation	  9	  
L5:58	  -­‐	  9	   
058	   LECTURER:	  Pius	  Langa,	  you	  should	  all	  know	  this	  ne?	  Who’s	  the	  deputy	  chief	  justice	  
(sshhh	  sshhh)	  Who’s	  the	  deputy	  chief	  justice,	  he’s	  on	  sabbatical	  at	  Wits	  now	  …	  he’s	  
sitting	  here	  in	  Wits,	  he’s	  doing	  sabbatical	  work,	  he’s	  also	  the	  chancellor	  of	  this	  university	  
….[Student:	  Edwin	  Cameron	  I	  think	  it	  is	  -­‐	  other	  students	  murmur	  their	  disagreement	  or	  
assent]	  Ooohh	  Edwin	  is	  the	  chairman	  of	  the	  council,	  who	  is	  the	  chancellor	  [Student	  6:	  
Chaskalson]	  No	  no	  Chaskalson	  is	  long	  retired,	  we	  long	  forget	  about	  Chaskalson.	  Who	  is	  
the	  chancellor	  of	  the	  university	  of	  the	  Witwatersrand?	  [Another	  student	  attempts	  an	  
answer	  but	  L	  already	  starts	  whistling	  incredulously]	  Ladies	  and	  gentlemen,	  I	  am	  going	  to	  
kill	  myself	  [class	  laughs]	  I	  give	  you	  a	  hundred	  bucks	  if	  you	  can	  tell	  me.	  [Student:	  Is	  it	  a	  
contract?]	  [Class	  laughs]	  It’s	  a	  verbal	  contract,	  ja	  [more	  students	  laugh]	  [One	  other	  
student	  attempts	  to	  answer]	  Justice?	  What?	  ….Does	  anybody	  know?	  [slight	  pause]	  Have	  




yes	  of	  course	  Dikgang	  ja	  ja	  ja	  ja	  ja	  [imitates	  class]	  	  
059	   You	  must	  know	  these	  things	  ladies	  and	  gentlemen,	  if	  you	  are	  going	  to	  become	  a	  lawyer	  
you	  must	  be	  informed	  if	  our	  so-­‐ciety,	  in	  your	  comm-­‐unity	  and	  if	  he’s	  the	  chancellor	  of	  
your	  uni-­‐versity	  …	  you	  are	  going	  to	  run	  into	  trouble,	  you	  must	  know	  this,	  ladies	  and	  
gentleman,	  I’m	  making	  a	  joke	  about	  this	  now	  because	  its-­‐a	  hot	  and	  it’s	  a	  long	  lecture	  but	  
please	  don’t	  underestimate	  what	  I’m	  saying:	  A	  lawyer	  in	  society	  is	  somebody	  who’s	  
informed.	  People	  come	  to	  you	  /	  and	  they	  pay	  you	  a	  thousand	  to	  three	  thousand	  rand	  an	  
hour,	  to	  get	  advice	  from	  you	  because	  you	  know.	  And	  if	  you	  don’t	  know	  what’s	  going	  on	  
in	  your	  immediate	  vicinity	  you’re	  not	  going	  to	  make	  it.	  Please	  you	  must	  read	  your	  law	  
reports	  every	  year/	  month,	  	  you	  must	  read	  your	  newspaper	  every	  day,	  you	  must	  know	  a	  
a	  read	  the	  professional	  journal	  every	  uh	  month	  or	  every	  week	  two	  weeks	  when	  it	  comes	  
out,	  you	  must	  know	  what’s	  going	  on	  in	  the	  university	  in	  the	  bar	  in	  the	  side-­‐bar,	  you	  
must	  know	  things.	  You	  must	  know	  which	  cases	  are	  before	  the	  courts,	  you	  must	  know	  
who	  are	  the	  most	  important	  movers	  and	  shakers	  in	  the	  country	  [gestures	  ‘no’	  with	  his	  
hand	  before	  the	  class].	  That’s	  your	  work,	  I’m	  sorry,	  that’s	  the	  that’s	  the	  that’s	  the	  um	  
course	  that	  you’ve	  chosen	  uh	  and	  if	  you’re	  not	  going	  to	  do	  it	  um	  you’re	  not	  going	  to	  be	  a	  




022	   Um	  today	  we	  are	  going	  to	  do	  um	  [setting	  up	  transparency	  on	  OHP]	  we	  are	  only	  going	  to	  
do	  the	  uh	  um	  legislation	  statutes.	  We	  are	  only	  going	  to	  look	  at	  that	  so	  that	  so	  have	  a	  
very	  clear	  idea	  of	  what	  a	  statute	  uh	  is.	  Now	  I	  asked	  you	  last	  time	  when	  we	  looked	  at	  the	  
mechanics	  of	  legislation	  how	  legislation	  is	  made,	  how	  it	  goes	  through	  different	  readings,	  
and	  how	  it	  is	  eventually	  signed	  by	  the	  President	  and	  it	  is	  lodged	  in	  the	  office	  of	  the	  Chief	  
Justice.	  Do	  you	  remember	  that?	  [Some	  students	  answer	  ‘yes’]	  Yes	  ok,	  those	  are	  all	  
important	  things.	  You	  must	  know	  those	  things.	  Um	  you	  know	  you	  work	  with	  laws	  you	  
must	  know	  as	  much	  as	  possible	  about	  laws	  um	  uh	  that	  you	  can.	  You	  must	  not	  um	  you	  
mustn’t	  have	  any	  uncertainty	  about	  legislation.	  Legislation	  and	  cases	  uh	  the	  the	  	  the	  
court	  cases	  um	  those	  are	  the	  things	  that	  you	  are	  going	  to	  earn	  your	  money	  with	  one	  
day.	  Those	  are	  the	  things	  those	  are	  the	  tools	  of	  your	  trade,	  you	  must	  know	  what’s	  going	  




112	   LECTURER:	  Tell	  everybody	  what	  you	  did,	  now,	  step	  for	  step.	  Knowledge	  ladies	  and	  
gentlemen	  if	  you’re	  a	  lawyer	  is	  not	  very	  valuable.	  If	  you	  can’t	  share	  that	  knowledge,	  if	  
you	  can’t	  convince	  somebody	  else,	  of	  your	  point	  of	  view,	  you	  can’t	  tell	  somebody	  what	  
you	  did,	  its	  useless.	  Its	  dead	  gold	  in	  the	  safe.	  Its	  not	  in	  anybody’s	  interest,	  its	  not,	  its	  not	  
worth	  anything.	  It	  is	  very	  important	  that	  you	  project	  yourself,	  that	  you	  convince	  people,	  
that	  you	  tell	  them	  step	  by	  step	  what	  you	  did.	  OK	  …	  
 
Quotation	  12	  




151	   LECTURER:	  Um	  then	  there’s	  the	  um	  uh	  statutes	  um	  uh	  related	  to	  Sundays	  and	  public	  
holidays,	  Prohibition	  of	  the	  Exhibition	  of	  Films	  on	  Sundays	  and	  Public	  Holidays	  Act	  16	  of	  
77	  what	  is	  that?	  What	  is	  that?	  The	  Prohibition	  of	  the	  Exhibition	  of	  Films	  on	  Sundays	  and	  
Public	  Holidays	  Act	  comma	  number	  sixteen	  of	  1977.	  Yes?	  	  
152	   STUDENT:	  Is	  that	  not	  the	  full	  title?	  
153	   LECTURER:	  No,	  its	  not	  called	  the	  full	  title,	  but	  you	  are	  very	  close.	  It	  is	  the	  ….	  
154	   STUDENT:	  Long	  title.	  	  
155	   LECTURER:	  Long	  title.	  It	  is	  the	  long	  title.	  It	  sounds	  funny	  but	  uh	  lawyers	  are	  like	  /	  you	  





The	  common	  law	  is	  the	  law	  created	  by	  the	  jurists.	  By	  the	  lawyers.	  In	  England	  it	  is	  the	  judges,	  




[Judge]	  [Lawyer]	  	  
Thank	  you.	  Thank	  you.	  Very	  clever.	  Very	  very	  clever.	  When	  the	  courts,	  not	  the	  laws	  like	  Mr	  …	  
said,	  when	  the	  courts,	  the	  judges,	  when	  they	  sit,	  and	  they	  decide	  law	  cases,	  what	  do	  they	  use?	  
They	  use	  legislation	  and	  they	  use	  the	  common	  law.	  They	  use	  other	  cases.	  Why	  do	  they	  do	  this?	  
They	  develop	  our	  common	  law.	  The	  judges,	  since	  1910	  when	  we	  had	  uh	  a	  united	  uh	  appellate	  




OK,	  ladies	  and	  gentlemen.	  This	  is	  exactly	  the	  kind	  of	  thing	  that	  will	  be	  expected	  of	  you	  as	  a	  
lawyer.	  This	  is	  one	  word.	  Common	  law.	  And	  I	  have	  now	  in	  fif-­‐fifteen	  minutes,	  I	  don’t	  know	  how	  
long,	  given	  you	  at	  least	  five	  or	  six	  distinct	  different	  meanings	  of	  that	  one	  word.	  And	  it	  would	  be	  
expected	  of	  you	  as	  a	  lawyer	  one	  day	  to	  read	  a	  sentence	  and	  from	  that	  sentence	  to	  deduct	  what	  




Many	  constitutional	  lawyers	  will	  say	  that.	  Many	  constitution	  lawyers	  will	  say	  that,	  you	  know,	  
‘forget	  about	  the	  bloody	  Roman-­‐Dutch	  law,	  that	  is	  old	  news,	  look	  at	  the	  Constitution	  if	  you	  




What	  it	  does	  mean	  is,	  Hugo	  de	  Groot	  in	  the	  16th	  century	  -­‐	  Hugo	  de	  Groot	  was	  a	  great	  Dutch	  
lawyer	  -­‐	  Hugo	  de	  Groot	  in	  the	  16th	  century	  said,	  in	  one	  of	  his	  books,	  you	  can’t	  trust	  with	  money	  
a	  woman	  that	  is	  not	  a	  public	  uh	  a	  ‘umbaarkoopvrou’,	  um	  if	  a	  female	  is	  not	  a	  public	  merchant	  




was	  the	  going	  concept	  in	  the	  16th	  century.	  Women	  who	  are	  not	  trained	  in	  mercantile	  things,	  
women	  who	  are	  not	  trained	  in	  business,	  must	  not	  be	  allowed,	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  law,	  to	  work	  with	  
money.	  That	  is	  what	  Hugo	  de	  Groot	  said.	  And	  that	  is	  one	  of	  his	  major	  uh	  uh	  pieces	  of	  writing	  in	  
his	  [states	  title	  of	  one	  of	  De	  Groot’s	  works].	  So	  that	  is	  an	  old	  authority.	  Can	  we	  use	  that	  as	  part	  
of	  our	  common	  law?	  No!	  Of	  course	  not.	  What	  will	  stop	  us?	  Section	  forty-­‐nine	  two	  will	  stop	  use	  
because	  it	  says	  yes,	  look	  at	  the	  Roman-­‐Dutch	  law,	  but	  if	  you	  get	  an	  absurdity	  such	  as	  this	  then	  




Ladies	  and	  gentlemen,	  we	  as	  lawyers,	  when	  you	  become	  a	  lawyer	  …	  one	  day,	  the	  tools	  that	  you	  
are	  going	  to	  use	  in	  your	  trade	  will	  be	  books,	  dictionaries	  and,	  most	  of	  all,	  words.	  If	  you	  are	  not	  
good	  with	  languages,	  if	  you	  are	  not	  good	  with	  words,	  understanding	  words,	  writing	  words,	  
speaking	  words,	  then	  the	  legal	  profession	  is	  going	  to	  be	  very	  hostile.	  A	  very	  hostile	  environment	  
for	  you.	  You	  must	  be	  literate,	  you	  must	  be	  able	  to	  understand	  words	  in	  their	  very	  very	  difficult	  




Let	  use	  start	  this	  lecture	  by	  saying	  that	  every	  communication	  between	  two	  human	  beings,	  
every	  communication,	  whether	  you	  say	  ‘I	  love	  you’	  or	  whether	  you	  say	  ‘I	  will,	  I	  will	  put	  the	  
cheque	  in	  the	  post	  or	  uh	  I	  will	  see	  you	  next	  week’,	  every	  communication	  is	  virtually	  flawed.	  
Communication	  between	  two	  subjects	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  difficult	  things	  to	  overcome,	  and	  in	  
part	  the	  role	  of	  the	  lawyer	  is	  to	  identify	  legal	  arguments,	  legal	  concepts	  where	  
misunderstanding	  took	  place	  between	  two	  parties,	  whether	  it	  is	  in	  a	  divorce	  proceeding,	  
whether	  it	  is	  in	  a	  contract,	  whether	  it	  is	  in	  a	  will,	  whether	  it	  is	  in	  a	  [pauses	  slightly],	  partnership	  
agreement,	  it	  doesn’t	  matter.	  The	  function	  and	  role	  of	  the	  lawyer	  is	  essentially	  to	  solve	  








And	  you	  need	  to	  broaden	  your	  horizon	  when	  you	  are	  a	  lawyer.	  Because	  what	  lawyers	  do	  is	  they	  
sit	  in	  their	  office	  and	  they	  wait	  for	  people	  to	  come	  off	  their	  /	  to	  come	  off	  the	  street	  to	  bring	  
their	  problems	  to	  them.	  And	  it	  can	  be	  anything.	  It	  can	  be	  from	  the	  theft	  of	  an	  artwork	  to	  a	  




The	  point	  is	  in	  South	  Africa,	  if	  the,	  if	  the	  meat	  is	  landed	  in	  South	  Africa	  as	  processed	  meat,	  as	  
processed	  meat,	  the	  tax,	  the	  import	  tax	  is	  extremely	  high,	  why?	  Now	  you	  see	  if	  you	  can	  work	  









And	  read	  the	  instructions	  very	  carefully,	  um	  that	  is	  something	  that	  lawyers	  don’t	  always	  do	  um	  
they	  don’t	  read	  their	  instructions	  carefully,	  their	  …	  quick,	  clever,	  and	  wrong	  is	  what	  my	  wife	  
always	  says.	  If	  you’re	  a,	  if	  you	  receive	  an	  instruction,	  that’s	  your	  bread	  and	  butter.	  That	  is	  your	  
profession.	  Go	  and	  sit	  down,	  read	  the	  instruction.	  Take	  it	  in,	  read	  it	  again,	  make	  sure	  you	  know	  
what	  the	  client	  wants.	  Um	  you	  know,	  there’s	  no	  rush	  whatsoever.	  We	  are	  not	  working	  with	  the	  
lives	  of	  other	  people,	  you	  are	  not	  a	  paediatrician	  or	  a	  a	  cardiac	  surgeon,	  nobody’s	  going	  to	  die,	  
I’ve	  never	  seen	  anybody	  die	  in	  a	  law	  office.	  Um	  so	  there’s	  no	  urgency,	  although	  I	  might	  be	  
saying	  something	  to	  the	  contrary	  -­‐	  sit,	  relax	  see	  that	  you	  know	  what	  is	  going	  on.	  And	  you	  don’t	  




Because	  its	  something	  that	  you	  should	  know	  as	  a	  practicing	  lawyer.	  I	  mean	  you	  should	  know	  




And	  its	  not	  always	  clever,	  if	  you’re	  a	  practicing	  lawyer	  it	  might	  be	  clever	  just	  to	  keep	  them	  like	  
this.	  Because	  sometimes	  you	  must	  take	  them	  to	  court,	  and	  then	  you	  must	  take	  your	  whole	  
library	  to	  court.	  You	  now	  …	  it’s	  sometimes	  much	  better	  just	  to	  have	  uh	  uh	  the	  book	  um	  and	  




060	   [clears	  throat]	  But	  of	  course	  the	  ideal	  would	  be	  if	  you,	  if	  you	  could	  speak	  Afrikaans	  [class	  
laughs	  and	  he	  imitates	  them,	  laughing	  feebly]	  It	  is	  a	  beautiful	  language	  despite	  all	  the	  …	  
OK	  ladies	  and	  gentlemen,	  number	  seven	  there,	  the	  headnote,	  typed	  in	  italics.	  Please	  
don’t	  read	  that	  before	  you	  read	  the	  case.	  And,	  more	  importantly,	  don’t	  think	  by	  reading	  
that	  that	  you	  don’t	  have	  to	  read	  the	  case.	  Students,	  I	  don’t	  know	  why,	  but	  students	  are	  
lazy	  to	  read	  the	  case.	  The	  cases.	  Um.	  [shrugs	  shoulders	  in	  despair]	  I	  don’t	  understand	  it.	  
You	  know	  that	  is	  that	  is	  what	  makes	  you	  a	  lawyer.	  If	  you	  don’t	  read	  court	  cases	  you’re	  
now	  a	  lawyer.	  You	  know	  then	  you	  must	  go	  and	  start	  or	  study	  dramatic	  arts	  or	  
something.	  But	  you	  must	  read	  your	  court	  cases.	  And	  you	  must	  read	  them	  in	  full.	  	  
 
Quotation	  27	  
L11:63	  -­‐	  4	  	  	  	  
063	   And	  although	  it	  is	  very	  beneficial	  for	  you	  to	  read	  the	  headnote	  before	  you	  read	  the	  case	  
because	  then	  you	  get	  a	  very	  good	  idea	  of	  what’s	  happening	  in	  the	  case,	  a	  kind	  of	  a	  
pocket	  version	  of	  the	  case,	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  headnote	  ladies	  and	  gentlemen	  is	  not	  for	  




African	  Law	  Reports,	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  headnote	  is	  only	  for	  the	  practitioners.	  It	  is	  made	  for	  
the	  practitioners.	  If	  you	  sit	  in	  court	  and	  you	  are	  looking	  very	  very	  hastily	  for	  some	  
authority	  then	  you	  haven’t	  got	  time,	  in	  court,	  if	  the	  judge	  asks	  you	  ‘Please	  address	  me	  
on	  the	  following	  point’,	  you	  haven’t	  got	  the	  time	  to	  read	  the	  whole	  case.	  But	  you	  may	  
have	  time	  to	  read	  the	  headnote.	  And	  then,	  if	  you’re	  a	  good	  lawyer,	  you	  may	  be	  able	  to	  
argue	  on	  …	  argue	  on	  that.	  	  
064	   Please	  don’t	  think	  that	  the	  headnote	  is	  there	  for	  you	  as	  a	  student	  to	  summarize	  the	  
case.	  That	  is	  not	  true.	  The	  only	  time	  when	  you	  have	  time	  to	  read	  a	  case	  in	  peace	  and	  
quiet	  is	  when	  you’re	  at	  university.	  So	  enjoy	  and	  do	  it,	  don’t	  not	  read	  your	  cases.	  OK.	  	  
 
Quotation	  28	  
L11:	  43	  -­‐	  4	  	  	  
043	   But	  we’re	  going	  to	  use	  this	  case	  just	  to	  show	  you	  the	  structure	  of	  a	  case.	  The	  skeleton	  of	  
a	  case.	  It	  is	  sometimes	  good	  to	  know	  what	  all	  these	  little	  figures	  um	  and	  things	  are	  for.	  
You	  must	  reme	  -­‐	  remember	  that	  the	  beginning	  of	  your	  profession,	  or	  one	  of	  the	  
beginnings	  of	  your	  profession	  as	  you	  now	  know	  if	  you’re	  doing	  Roman	  law,	  the	  
profession	  started	  with	  the	  priests	  in	  Rome,	  who	  had	  the	  monopoly	  not	  only	  of	  the	  lex	  
sanctiones,	  knowledge	  of	  the	  Roman	  law,	  also	  the	  calendar.	  You	  all	  know	  what	  I’m	  
talking	  about.	  Those	  people	  who	  are	  with	  me	  will	  know	  what	  I’m	  talking	  about	  but	  I	  
don’t	  know	  if	  other	  lectures	  are	  teaching	  this.	  	  
044	   So	  the	  legal	  profession	  ladies	  and	  gentlemen,	  this	  profession	  that	  you	  so	  eagerly	  want	  to	  
enter,	  the	  legal	  profession	  started	  with	  a	  monopoly.	  It	  started	  with	  a	  mystery.	  It	  started	  
in	  a	  temple.	  It	  wo/	  it	  sta	  it	  it	  you	  would	  bring	  your	  case	  to	  the	  temple	  to	  the	  priests	  to	  
find	  out	  whether	  you	  had	  an	  action	  and	  whether	  there	  was	  a	  good	  day	  on	  which	  you	  
could	  bring	  your	  action.	  So	  the	  legal	  profession	  generally	  is	  always	  surrounded	  by	  um	  
things	  that	  make	  it	  mon-­‐monopolistic	  or	  elitist.	  Uh	  I	  know	  that’s	  a	  swear	  word	  and	  its	  
not	  a	  good	  word	  to	  use	  in	  a	  democratic	  institution	  like	  Wits	  but	  a	  university’s	  also	  an	  
elitist	  institution	  although	  they	  don’t	  want	  to	  agree	  with	  it.	  But	  law	  is	  an	  elitist	  or	  an	  
exclusive	  profession.	  And	  it	  is	  exclusive	  because	  we	  almost	  have	  our	  own	  language,	  in	  
the	  old	  days	  people	  used	  Latin,	  but	  we	  almost	  have	  our	  own	  language.	  And	  we	  have	  all	  
these	  specialized	  tools.	  We	  know	  how	  to	  read	  a	  court	  case.	  We	  know	  how	  to	  read	  a	  
contract.	  We	  know	  the	  mysteries	  behind	  the	  legal	  texts.	  And	  that	  is	  that	  is	  that	  is	  the	  
origin	  um	  of	  the	  of	  the	  legal	  profession.	  Don’t	  don’t	  expect	  now	  if	  you	  go	  for	  your	  
articles	  you	  know	  that	  you’re	  going	  to	  be	  initiated	  in	  temple	  [hands	  become	  very	  
flowery	  at	  this	  point]	  with	  smoke	  and	  whatever	  [class	  laughs]	  that’s	  not	  going	  to	  happen	  
unfortunately.	  But	  it	  is	  a	  profession	  and	  in	  a	  profession	  you	  are	  dis	  you	  are	  distinguished	  
from	  other	  people	  because	  you	  you’ve	  got	  specialized	  knowledge	  and	  this	  is	  one	  of	  
them.	  You	  need	  you	  need	  …	  [break	  in	  recording].	  	  
 
Quotation	  29	  
L12:28	  -­‐	  31	  	  
028	   STUDENT	  8:	  And	  then	  before	  the	  times,	  I	  mean	  back	  in	  the	  day,	  how	  did	  lawyers	  go	  
about	  sorting	  it	  out?	  




030	   STUDENT	  8:	  Finding	  the	  cases.	  	  
031	   LECTURER:	  ….	  noter	  uppers.	  And	  you	  had	  indexes.	  And	  they	  did	  the	  same	  thing	  but	  just	  
in	  hard	  copy.	  And	  you	  still	  have	  them,	  noter	  uppers	  and	  indexes	  in	  the	  in	  the	  uh	  uh	  in	  
the	  library	  and	  you	  can	  find	  any	  topic	  uh	  and	  all	  the	  cases	  that	  are	  decided	  on	  that	  topic.	  
In	  the	  noter	  upper	  or	  or	  the	  index.	  If	  you	  you	  know	  that’s	  uh	  ub	  not	  the	  in	  that	  sense	  
legal	  research	  is	  not	  difficult.	  If	  you	  know	  what	  you’re	  looking	  for,	  you	  know,	  either	  




005	   And	  it’s	  a	  very	  good,	  it’s	  a	  very	  good	  exercise	  for	  for	  law	  students	  to	  go	  to	  a	  play	  like	  that	  
so	  that	  you	  can	  sharpen	  your	  wits.	  Because	  what	  happens,	  in	  a	  funny	  way,	  what	  
happens	  in	  Stoppard,	  what	  happens	  in	  the	  theatre	  is	  what’s	  going	  to	  happen	  one	  day	  in	  
court.	  Um	  you	  know.	  Yes,	  preparation	  is	  everything	  regardless	  of	  the	  details	  and	  you	  
can’t	  be	  a	  good	  lawyer	  if	  you	  don’t	  prepare.	  But	  the	  good	  lawyer	  is	  distinguished	  from	  
the	  exceptional	  lawyer	  in	  the	  areas	  where	  you	  are	  not	  prepared.	  And	  that’s	  -­‐	  and	  I’m	  
going	  to	  say	  now	  a	  controversial	  thing,	  I	  don’t	  know	  if	  I	  should	  say	  this	  -­‐	  um,	  let’s	  
neutralize	  it	  and	  say	  some	  people	  are	  better	  lawyers	  than	  others	  because	  they	  can	  think	  
on	  their	  feet.	  Because	  they’ve	  got	  the	  mental	  capacity	  to	  be	  not	  just	  witty	  but	  to	  be	  
intelligent	  in	  responding	  to	  a	  challenge	  which	  you’ve	  not	  prepare	  for.	  That	  is	  the	  that	  is	  




033	   LECTURER:	  …	  Uh	  and	  people	  must	  you	  know	  there’s	  one	  thing	  that	  a	  lawyer	  can’t	  resist	  
and	  that	  is	  gossip.	  And	  the	  whole	  profession	  is	  built,	  in	  a	  positive	  and	  a	  negative	  sense	  
on	  gossip.	  Um	  its	  not	  negative	  gossip	  but	  people	  because	  its	  such	  a	  small	  profession	  




But	  what	  they	  did	  do	  -­‐	  the	  Scandanavian	  people	  are	  very	  good	  at	  exhibiting	  things,	  what	  they	  
did	  do	  is	  they	  showed	  the	  whole	  classification.	  The	  whole	  classification	  that	  he	  did	  and	  it	  is	  
absolutely	  magnificent	  because	  it	  is	  so	  simple.	  It	  is	  so	  absolutely	  basic	  and	  simple.	  Uh	  and	  it	  





LECTURER:	  Absolutely!	  That’s	  what	  that	  is	  why	  I	  made	  the	  whole	  thing	  about	  Lineus	  and	  about	  
how	  arbitrary	  everything	  is.	  But,	  you	  know,	  don’t	  put	  international	  law	  under	  the	  law	  of	  
property	  and	  not	  you	  know	  and	  not	  telling	  me	  why.	  You	  must/	  that’s	  why	  you’re	  a	  lawyer.	  That	  







001	   LECTURER:	  In	  this	  short	  lecture	  we’re	  going	  to	  try	  and	  look	  at	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  
courts.	  Now	  this	  is	  the	  kind	  of	  information	  uh	  that	  I	  don’t	  think	  one	  should	  be	  teaching	  
at	  a	  university.	  Um	  it’s	  the	  information	  that	  you	  should	  be	  getting	  in	  your	  articles.	  But	  
um	  there	  is	  space	  in	  this	  curriculum	  now	  so	  we’re	  doing	  it	  here.	  But	  please	  beware,	  this	  
is	  not	  real	  knowledge.	  Um	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  courts,	  the	  theoretical	  part	  as	  I’m	  going	  to	  
tell	  you	  today,	  that	  is	  of	  course	  real	  knowledge	  and	  that	  you	  must	  keep	  the	  theoretical	  
stuff	  you	  must	  always	  uh	  uh	  have	  to	  answer	  any	  question.	  So	  this	  theoretical	  part	  is	  fine.	  
But	  as	  soon	  as	  we	  come	  to	  the	  factual	  part,	  ladies	  and	  gentlemen,	  as	  soon	  as	  we	  come	  
to	  ‘how	  much	  can	  this	  court	  fine	  a	  person	  on	  each	  du-­‐uh-­‐uh	  count,	  that	  is	  factual.	  And	  
although	  I’m	  going	  to	  give	  you	  the	  figures	  today,	  and	  I’m	  going	  to	  ask	  you	  the	  figures	  in	  
the	  exam,	  um	  it	  changes.	  It	  is	  just	  a	  flick	  of	  the	  pen	  of	  the	  Minister	  of	  Justice	  and	  the	  
jurisdiction	  of	  the	  magistrates’	  courts	  go	  up.	  Not	  so	  much	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  
or	  Constitutional	  Court	  or	  High	  Courts	  but	  that	  can	  also	  change.	  So	  please,	  this	  is	  not	  um	  
this	  is	  not	  cast	  in	  stone,	  it	  can	  change.	  Very	  recently	  two	  or	  three	  years	  ago	  the	  uh	  small	  
claims	  court	  changed	  from	  R3000	  to	  R7000.	  It	  was	  a	  huge	  leap	  and	  the	  magistrates’	  
courts	  and	  uh	  regional	  courts	  also	  changed.	  And	  ubuhubuhubu	  substantial	  changes	  so	  
you	  must	  know	  these	  things	  of	  course,	  if	  you	  want	  to	  be	  a	  lawyer	  that’s	  just	  the	  kind	  of	  




LECTURER:	  Um	  that’s	  uh	  yes,	  the	  more	  elegant	  way	  to	  put	  that,	  the	  more	  lawyerly	  way	  to	  put	  
that	  is	  to	  say	  that	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  has	  got	  criminal	  and	  civil	  jurisdiction.	  Not	  not	  all	  




Now	  why	  does	  the	  magistrates’	  courts	  not	  have	  constitutional	  jurisdiction.	  Can	  somebody	  think	  
and	  tell	  me?	  It’s	  a	  kind	  of	  a	  lawyerly	  question	  that	  you	  ought	  to	  be	  starting	  to	  can	  answer	  by	  
this	  stage.	  [silence	  for	  about	  3	  seconds]	  Why	  would	  you	  say	  the	  magistrates’	  court	  does	  not	  




Now	  one	  thing	  that	  you	  can	  learn	  from	  this	  uh	  embarrassing	  episode	  uh	  is	  that	  you	  must	  never,	  
if	  you’re	  a	  lawyer,	  you	  must	  never	  do	  anything	  if	  you	  are	  um	  in	  a	  bad	  mood	  or	  if	  you	  are	  




LECTURER:	  Custos	  custodius	  …	  What	  does	  that	  mean?	  	  Custos	  custodies.	  Oi	  oi	  oi.	  ...	  what	  does	  
custos	  custodies	  mean?	  These	  are	  the	  words	  you	  are	  going	  to	  use	  when	  you’re	  a	  lawyer	  to	  






L22:1	  -­‐	  18	   
001	   LECTURER:	  	  A	  lawyer	  -­‐	  no	  you	  mustn’t	  put	  it	  on.	  
002	   STUDENT	  3:	  Oh,	  I’ve	  already	  put	  it	  on	  …	  	  
003	   LECTURER:	  If	  you’re	  a	  lawyer	  then	  things	  have	  a	  legal	  meaning.	  This	  is	  a	  legal	  
commercial	  legal	  uh	  journal	  with	  a	  name	  ‘Without	  Prejudice’.	  What,	  what	  does	  that	  
mean?	  Yes?	  	  
004	   STUDENT	  12:	  [Inaudible]	  
005	   LECTURER:	  Yes,	  that’s	  good	  that’s	  good.	  That’s	  good,	  no	  no	  no	  no	  no	  no	  um	  I’m	  hesitant	  
to	  allow	  you	  to	  go	  on	  because	  I	  can	  see	  you’re	  going	  to	  say	  something	  wrong.	  	  
006	   STUDENT	  12:	  [laughs]	  OK.	  	  
007	   LECTURER:	  A	  minor,	  if	  he	  enters	  into	  a	  contract,	  he	  might	  be	  prejudiced.	  Ne?	  Because	  
he	  hasn’t	  got	  full	  capacity	  to	  act.	  Now	  that’s	  a	  legal	  answer.	  That’s	  a	  nice	  answer.	  But	  
that’s	  still	  not	  the	  truth	  ne?	  What	  is	  ‘without	  prejudice’?	  Oooo	  …	  Yes?	  
008	   STUDENT	  8:	  Without	  imposing	  your	  own	  opinions	  or	  views.	  	  
009	   LECTURER:	  Yes,	  but	  I	  mean	  why	  would	  they	  call	  their	  magazine	  ‘Without	  Prejudice’?	  
010	   STUDENT	  8:	  Because	  they’re	  putting	  it	  down	  as	  it	  is	  they’re	  not	  putting	  in	  their	  own	  
thoughts	  or	  comments	  …	  	  
011	   LECTURER:	  OK,	  from	  a	  journalistic	  point	  of	  view	  that’s	  right.	  But	  we’re	  not	  journalists	  ne,	  
thank	  …	  heavens.	  Yes	  because	  you	  know	  journalists	  are	  …	  boring.	  Yes?	  	  
012	   STUDENT	  9:	  I	  suppose	  in	  the	  broader	  sense	  it	  means	  [inaudible]	  to	  anyone.	  	  
013	   LECTURER:	  Yes,	  but	  now	  how	  /	  you’re	  hundred	  percent	  right.	  Where	  did	  you	  get	  that?	  
014	   STUDENT	  9:	  Prejudice	  means	  ‘harm’.	  	  
015	   LECTURER:	  Where	  did	  you	  get	  that?	  What	  is	  your	  authority	  for	  that?	  
016	   STUDENT	  9:	  [inaudible]	  
017	   LECTURER:	  Yes	  yes	  yes!	  [laughter]	  Yes!	  The	  dictionary.	  Ladies	  and	  gentlemen	  did	  we	  not	  
do	  interpretation	  of	  statutes?	  The	  first	  way,	  the	  functional	  approach,	  the	  first	  thing	  that	  
you	  do,	  is	  you	  look	  at	  the	  dictionary	  meaning.	  OK,	  so	  now	  you’ve	  got	  the	  dictionary	  
meaning:	  Without	  harm	  to	  anybody.	  You’ve	  got	  the	  dictionary	  meaning.	  That’s	  	  very	  
good	  um	  uh	  dictionary	  meaning.	  But,	  in	  law,	  it	  means	  something	  else.	  Do	  you	  know	  this	  
or	  not?	  Must	  I	  tell	  you.	  You	  don’t	  know	  what	  I’m	  talking	  about	  ne?	  	  
018	   Ladies	  and	  gentlemen	  if	  you	  are	  opening	  litigation,	  you	  know	  what	  litigation	  is?	  When	  
you	  are	  starting	  in	  the	  first	  phase	  of	  litigation,	  in	  other	  words	  exchanging	  documents.	  If	  
you	  are	  just	  feeling	  the	  water,	  if	  you	  exchange	  your	  first	  documents,	  before	  you	  start	  
exchanging	  pleadings,	  you	  are	  writing	  to	  the	  other	  side	  and	  you	  say:	  ‘Look’,	  according	  to	  
my	  client,	  this	  is	  what	  happened.	  My	  client	  says	  this	  is	  what	  happened.	  Um	  …	  if	  this	  is	  
true,	  we	  are	  going	  to	  sue	  you.	  Um	  …	  if	  you	  want	  to,	  if	  you	  want	  to	  negotiate,	  if	  you	  want	  
to	  talk,	  you	  know,	  lets	  do	  so.’	  Your	  first	  opening.	  That	  letter,	  gets	  a	  stamp	  [bangs	  fist	  on	  
lecturn]:	  ‘Without	  prejudice.’	  Without	  any	  harm,	  nobody	  is	  bound	  by	  what	  you	  say	  in	  
that	  letter.	  Its	  without	  prejudice.	  You	  are	  reserving	  your	  rights.	  Did	  you	  know	  that?	  No?	  
oh	  dear.	  OK.	  Um	  you	  must	  know	  that.	  But	  you’ll	  probably	  pick	  that	  up	  in	  articles,	  ne?	  But	  








070	   LECTURER:	  No	  no	  no	  I	  would	  always	  recommend	  European	  languages.	  For	  a	  lawyer,	  
languages	  is	  like	  the	  secret.	  If	  you	  don’t	  /	  if	  you’re	  not	  good	  at	  languages	  you	  will	  never	  
be	  a	  good	  lawyer.	  And	  that’s	  why,	  in	  the	  apartheid	  days	  unfortunately	  they	  prescribed	  
that	  you	  must	  have	  English,	  Afrikaans	  and	  Latin.	  And	  I	  would	  say	  English,	  Afrikaans,	  Latin	  
plus	  a	  European	  language.	  And	  an	  African	  language.	  Yes	  say	  Afrikaans	  and	  or	  any	  other	  
African	  language.	  English	  at	  a	  first-­‐year	  level,	  Latin	  at	  a	  first-­‐year	  level	  and	  a	  European	  
language	  at	  a	  first	  year	  level.	  Otherwise	  you	  can’t	  become	  a	  lawyer.	  Um	  and	  then	  they	  
must	  gear	  the	  languages	  towards	  the	  lawyers.	  They	  mustn’t	  you	  know	  they	  mustn’t	  give	  
you	  um	  Goethe	  to	  translate	  in	  German	  or	  Moliere	  in	  French,	  they	  must	  give	  you	  legal	  




026	   LECTURER:	  Look,	  journal	  articles	  in	  law	  is	  mostly	  reserved	  for	  academics.	  Um	  people	  in	  
practice	  don’t	  have	  time	  to	  write	  journal	  articles.	  They’ve	  got	  time	  to	  write	  these	  short	  
little	  superficial	  things.	  Um	  in	  the	  De	  Rebus	  and	  in	  Without	  Prejudice.	  But	  they	  haven’t	  
got	  time	  to	  go	  and	  do	  thorough	  research	  like	  we	  have,	  the	  academics.	  So,	  journal	  
articles,	  serious	  journal	  articles,	  are	  mostly	  academics	  writing	  them.	  Perhaps	  a	  judge	  
here	  and	  there.	  Perhaps	  a	  very	  very	  academically-­‐oriented	  practitioner,	  but	  very	  rarely.	  








APPENDIX	  4B:	  QUOTATIONS	  –	  ARTICLED	  CLERK	  
N	  =	  11	  
 
Quotation	  1	  
L11:	  51	   
LECTURER:	  You	  are	  never	  going	  to	  have	  anything	  to	  do	  with	  the	  file	  number	  unless	  you’re	  going	  to	  be	  
an	  articled	  articled	  clerk	  and	  you	  must	  run	  around	  and	  go	  and	  find	  the	  file	  and	  go	  and	  lodge	  some	  
documents	  in	  the	  file	  but	  that	  you’ll	  still	  discover.	  
 
Quotation	  2	  
L15:	  69	   
LECTURER:	  Believe	  me	  I	  don’t	  know	  how	  people	  how	  people	  survive	  you	  know	  if	  you	  start	  off	  with	  a	  
with	  a	  articled	  clerk’s	  salary	  I	  don’t	  know	  how	  you	  survive	  without	  credit.	  Because	  its	  just	  impossible.	  
And	  now	  its	  going	  to	  be	  impossible	  to	  get	  credit.	  Uh	  so	  it	  is	  difficult.	  	  
 
Quotation	  3	  
L21:	  47	   
[Articled	  clerk]	  [Attorney]	  	  
LECTURER:	  After	  you’ve	  passed	  your	  LLB	  exam	  and	  obtained	  your	  LLB	  degree	  either	  post-­‐	  or	  
undergraduate,	  you	  must	  find	  a	  principal.	  In	  other	  words	  somebody	  that	  you	  know	  and	  that	  you	  trust	  
that	  will	  be	  willing	  to	  train	  you	  in	  the	  legal	  profession.	  If	  you’ve	  found	  such	  a	  person,	  you	  make	  an	  
appointment	  and	  you	  go	  see	  such	  a	  person	  and	  you	  request	  him	  or	  her,	  uh,	  to	  consider	  you	  for	  articles	  
of	  clerkship.	  Articles	  of	  clerkship	  is	  an	  old	  hangover	  of	  the	  medieval	  training	  of	  jurists.	  It	  is	  where	  you	  
are	  trained	  by,	  uh,	  in-­‐service	  training.	  It	  is	  for	  two	  years.	  You	  enter	  a	  contract	  for	  two	  years.	  The	  
contract	  may	  be	  ceded,	  but	  it	  is	  frowned	  upon,	  it	  is	  not	  something	  you	  must	  try	  and	  do.	  And	  during	  this	  
two	  years	  you	  get	  a	  smallish	  salary,	  you	  are,	  you	  are	  salaried	  and	  you	  do,	  um,	  all	  kinds	  of	  legal	  work	  so	  
that	  you	  can	  pass	  the	  Society,	  uh,	  the	  Law	  Society’s	  admission	  exam.	  	  
 
Quotation	  4	  
L21:	  65	   
[Articled	  clerk]	  [Legal	  secretary]	  	  
If	  you	  enter	  into	  a	  law	  firm	  as	  an	  articled	  clerk	  you	  are	  a	  threat	  to	  everybody.	  You	  are	  a	  threat	  to	  
everybody	  and	  you	  don’t	  know	  that.	  And	  the	  people	  who	  are	  most	  threatened	  by	  you	  are	  of	  course	  the	  
…	  office	  personnel	  that’s	  been	  there	  for	  years	  and	  years	  and	  who,	  uh,	  has	  got	  a	  vested	  interest	  in	  the	  
firm	  and	  all	  they	  see	  is	  this	  young	  upstart’s	  coming	  from	  university	  and	  within	  two	  or	  three	  or	  four	  or	  
five	  years	  they	  become	  partners	  and	  then,	  you	  know,	  they	  start	  earning	  more	  than	  they	  do	  and	  they	  
start	  shunting	  them	  around.	  So	  they’ve	  got	  a	  window	  of	  two,	  three	  years	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  they,	  that	  
they	  use	  their	  seniority	  to	  make	  life	  difficult	  for	  you.	  My	  mother	  always	  said,	  there’s	  nothing,	  nothing	  
worse,	  and	  I	  hope	  I’m	  not	  offending	  somebody	  here	  but	  it	  is	  true,	  I	  mean	  as	  my	  personal	  experience	  




nothing	  worse.	  They	  always	  have	  personal	  problems,	  they	  never	  have	  enough	  money,	  they	  always	  
want	  to	  borrow	  money	  and	  they	  are	  absolute	  terrors.	  	  
 
Quotation	  5	  
L21:	  66	  -­‐	  70	   
[Articled	  clerk]	  [Legal	  secretary]	  	  
066	  	   LECTURER:	  I	  can	  remember	  the	  first	  time	  wha,	  uh,	  when	  I	  did	  my	  articles	  at	  [Ahmed	  and	  Achoo]	  
and	  we	  rotated	  on	  a	  six	  month	  basis	  so	  you	  would	  have	  a	  general	  six	  months	  -­‐	  uh	  it’s	  a	  very	  
large	  firm	  so	  you’re	  trained	  in	  the	  whole	  firm	  and	  then	  the	  next	  six	  months	  you	  are	  posted	  out	  
in	  various	  branches,	  uh	  various	  branches	  of	  the	  firm.	  And	  my	  principal	  was	  a	  trade	  mark	  agent	  
so	  I	  was	  automatically	  placed	  in	  the	  trade	  mark	  department.	  Um,	  which	  is	  fine,	  you	  know,	  I	  was	  
interested	  in	  trademarks	  and	  its	  fine,	  but	  the	  trademark’s	  section	  is	  one	  of	  the	  biggest	  earners	  
in	  the	  company,	  uh,	  and	  therefore	  it	  is	  …	  uh,	  you	  have	  far	  more	  infrastructure	  than	  in	  the	  rest	  
of	  the	  company	  because	  it	  was	  the	  great	  fee	  …	  uh.	  So	  if	  you	  come,	  if	  you	  arrive	  as	  a	  qualified	  
candidate	  attorney	  you	  get	  your	  own	  secretary,	  your	  own	  desk,	  your	  own	  office,	  your	  own	  files,	  
everything.	  First	  day	  (slams	  hand	  on	  lecturn)	  you	  get	  everything	  you	  are,	  you	  start	  you	  get	  your	  
own	  number	  that	  you	  can	  charge	  fees	  you	  get	  everything	  because	  they	  haven’t	  got	  time	  not	  to	  
give	  it	  to	  you.	  You	  must	  start	  earning	  now.	  You	  must	  start	  doing	  trademarks.	  	  
067	   And	  there	  I	  got	  a	  corner	  office,	  a	  beautiful	  large	  office	  with	  an	  inter-­‐leading	  door	  to	  my	  
secretary’s	  office	  and	  there	  was	  my	  secretary	  sitting	  in	  the	  corner.	  And	  she	  was	  enormous.	  She	  
was	  really,	  you	  know,	  she	  was	  an	  enormous	  person	  and	  she	  had,	  uh,	  make-­‐up,	  you	  know,	  false	  
eyelashes	  and	  dark	  dark	  makeup.	  And	  I	  thought,	  well	  this	  is	  wonderful,	  she	  is	  going	  to	  help	  me	  
to	  do	  this	  trade,	  these	  trademarks.	  And	  she	  also	  said,	  ‘Well	  now	  we’re	  going	  to	  work	  together	  
and	  uh	  you	  must	  just	  listen	  what	  I	  say	  and	  then	  you’ll	  be	  very	  successful’.	  	  
068	   And	  of	  course	  I	  didn’t	  you	  know,	  I	  had	  to	  learn,	  you	  know,	  you	  know	  if	  I	  wanted	  to	  learn	  
something	  I	  went	  to	  the	  partner	  and	  I	  said	  how	  do	  you,	  how	  do	  you	  redeem	  a	  trademark	  in	  
Papua	  New	  Guinea?	  And	  I	  didn’t	  know	  that	  I	  should	  have	  asked	  her	  first	  and	  if	  she	  says	  I	  don’t	  
know	  or	  I	  haven’t	  got	  the	  book	  here	  then	  go	  to	  the	  manager	  or	  the	  partner	  to	  find	  out.	  I	  didn’t	  
know	  that	  I	  was	  just	  working	  18	  hours	  a	  day	  trying	  to	  get	  these	  mountains	  of	  files	  out	  of	  my	  
office.	  	  
069	   And	  of	  course,	  uh,	  you	  know,	  I	  irritated	  the	  living	  daylights	  out	  of	  her	  because	  I	  didn’t	  ask	  her	  
anything.	  Uh,	  because	  I	  was	  afraid	  of	  her	  I	  must	  admit.	  I	  was	  really	  afraid	  of	  her	  and	  then	  
instead	  of	  getting	  off	  on	  the	  right	  foot	  she	  then	  decided	  she	  would	  boycott	  me.	  And	  everything	  
I	  did,	  uh,	  she	  sabotaged.	  You	  know.	  She	  would	  take	  a	  file,	  every	  file	  that	  I	  did	  and	  she	  would	  
listen	  to	  my	  dictation.	  If	  I	  made	  an	  error	  she	  would	  take	  my	  dictation	  to	  the	  senior	  partner	  and	  
said	  ‘You’re	  going	  to	  lose	  money	  here	  this	  man	  doesn’t	  know	  what	  he’s	  doing’.	  And	  I	  didn’t	  
know	  what	  I	  was	  doing,	  I	  was	  there	  for	  my	  fourth	  day	  or,	  you	  know,	  for	  a	  month.	  
070	   So	  it	  was	  an	  absolute	  nightmare,	  I,	  uh,	  I	  cannot	  tell	  you,	  it	  was	  an	  absolute	  nightmare.	  So	  
please,	  if	  you	  go	  to,	  if	  you	  go	  to	  a	  firm	  of	  attorneys	  see	  to	  it	  that	  you	  get	  on	  with	  the	  secretaries,	  
because	  they	  can	  make	  your	  life	  an	  absolute	  misery.	  Um,	  and	  don’t,	  you	  know,	  its	  only	  two	  
years,	  you	  know,	  just	  count	  out	  them	  and	  just	  say	  yes	  sir	  no	  sir	  or	  whatever	  you	  say.	  We	  
eventually	  got	  to	  that	  stage	  and	  then	  we	  became	  very	  good	  friends	  and	  everything	  went	  very	  
hunky	  dory	  but	  it	  took	  us	  three,	  four,	  five	  months	  before	  we	  could	  get	  there	  and	  by	  that	  stage	  




and	  the	  whole	  legal,	  the	  whole	  legal	  profession	  is	  built	  on	  reputation.	  
 
Quotation	  6	  
L21:	  48	   
LECTURER:	  Hmm	  …	  now	  there’re	  lots	  of	  configurations	  to	  be	  trained,	  uh,	  for	  this,	  um	  exam,	  um,	  
nowadays	  there	  is	  the	  law,	  uh,	  School	  of	  Legal	  Practice	  where	  you	  can	  go	  for	  two	  years	  and	  get	  one	  
year	  remission	  of	  articles.	  Two	  years	  full-­‐time.	  And	  after	  that	  you	  write,	  uh,	  you	  write	  the	  articles,	  uh	  
you	  write	  the	  exam	  and	  you’re	  admitted	  as	  an	  attorney.	  Um,	  there	  are	  also	  short	  courses	  which	  of	  
course,	  you	  know,	  I	  recommend	  you	  to	  attend.	  There’s	  a	  six-­‐month	  course	  and	  for	  people	  who	  really	  
don’t	  need	  any	  further	  training	  there’s	  a	  four-­‐week,	  uh,	  exam	  preparation	  course.	  So	  its	  either	  two	  
year’s	  full-­‐time,	  six	  months’	  crash	  course	  or	  just	  a	  four	  week,	  uh,	  exam	  preparation.	  Then	  you	  write	  the	  
admissions	  exam	  and	  when	  you	  pass	  the	  admissions	  exam	  you	  are	  admitted	  in	  court	  as	  an	  attorney.	  	  
 
Quotation	  7	  
L21:	  50	   
LECTURER:	  you	  will	  be	  invited	  once	  you	  have	  been	  given	  articles,	  you	  will	  be	  invited	  to	  an	  interview	  
with	  one	  of	  the	  leading	  lights	  of	  the	  Law	  Society,	  uh,	  and	  you	  will	  have	  to	  convince	  him,	  or	  he	  will	  have	  
to	  be	  convinced	  that	  to	  join,	  to	  eventually	  join	  the	  profession.	  Um,	  in	  other	  words	  its	  	  a	  formal	  
interview,	  uh,	  where	  they	  will	  ask	  you	  ethical	  questions	  and	  they	  will	  ask	  you	  where	  you	  come	  from,	  




L21:	  64	   
LECTURER:	  You	  really	  do,	  um,	  my	  dearly-­‐departed	  mother	  was	  an	  attorney	  and	  when	  I,	  when	  I	  wanted	  
to	  study	  law	  I	  worked	  in	  her	  firm	  during	  the	  vacs,	  um,	  and	  you	  know,	  I	  was	  a	  sweet	  little	  boy	  and	  very	  
nice	  personality	  and	  everybody	  loved	  me	  and	  I	  thought	  well	  this	  is	  what	  legal	  practice	  is	  going	  to	  be	  
like.	  But,	  um,	  I	  discovered	  that	  its	  not.	  Um,	  and	  if	  you	  enter	  a	  law	  firm	  you	  will	  discover	  this	  within	  a	  
year	  or	  so.	  	  
 
Quotation	  9	  	  
L22:	  22	  -­‐	  3	   
022	   LECTURER:	  Yes,	  Taryn	  Sefton.	  She	  lectured	  Roman	  Law	  here	  last	  year	  uh	  she	  was	  one	  of	  my	  
Roman	  Law	  students.	  She	  became	  a	  tutor,	  she	  qualified,	  and	  now	  she’s	  at	  uh	  candidate	  
attorney	  at	  [Bower	  and	  Gowar]	  and	  part-­‐time	  attorney	  at	  University	  of	  the	  Witwatersrand.	  Hi	  
[addressed	  to	  two	  students	  coming	  in	  late].	  This	  ladies	  and	  gentlemen	  -­‐	  she	  wrote	  a	  small	  little	  
note	  -­‐	  I	  mean,	  one,	  two,	  three,	  four	  [referring	  to	  paragraphs	  in	  the	  magazine].	  How	  long	  can	  it	  
take	  you	  to	  write	  that?	  But	  she	  took	  the	  trouble,	  she	  did	  the	  research,	  its	  on	  some	  difficult	  
subject,	  prescription	  and	  the	  limits	  placed	  on	  access	  to	  the	  courts.	  It’s	  a	  difficult	  topic,	  some	  of	  
the	  people	  would	  like	  to	  know.	  And	  she	  wrote	  a	  short	  note.	  And	  what	  now?	  All	  of	  a	  sudden,	  her	  
picture’s	  here.	  OK	  it	  helps	  that	  she’s	  an	  attractive	  Jewish	  lady,	  obviously.	  But	  the	  fact	  is	  anybody	  
that	  opens	  this,	  and	  this	  is	  the	  whole	  legal	  profession	  reads	  this	  article.	  When	  they	  have	  a	  
problem,	  they’re	  going	  to	  call	  her.	  They’re	  going	  to	  say,	  ‘Look	  you	  wrote	  an	  article	  on	  this,	  uh	  
you	  obviously	  know	  what’s	  going	  on,	  can	  you	  can	  you	  help	  me?’	  And	  that	  is,	  ladies	  and	  




023	   If	  she’s	  going	  to	  the	  bar,	  she’s	  now	  a	  candidate	  attorney,	  she’s	  working	  to	  qualify,	  she	  qualifies	  
at	  the	  end	  of	  this	  year.	  If	  she	  then	  stays	  on	  another	  year	  or	  so	  at	  [Bower	  and	  Gowar],	  big	  firm,	  
lots	  of	  contacts,	  she	  then	  goes	  to	  the	  bar,	  everybody	  knows	  that	  she’s	  an	  authority	  on	  
prescription.	  And	  that	  -­‐	  that’s	  how	  you	  get	  people	  to	  phone	  you.	  That’s	  how	  you	  get	  people	  to	  
phone	  you.	  That’s	  how	  the	  legal	  profession	  works,	  ladies	  and	  gentlemen,	  that	  is	  unfortunately	  
how	  it	  works.	  	  
 
Quotation	  10	  	  
L22:	  82	  -­‐	  4	   
082	  	   LECTURER:	  Um	  um	  you	  know,	  will	  you	  be	  able	  to	  do	  the	  work?	  Will	  you	  be	  a	  will	  you	  be	  a	  asset	  
for	  them	  or	  will	  you	  be	  a	  liability?	  Do	  you	  understand	  law?	  Are	  you	  clever?	  Your	  marks,	  they	  
look	  at	  your	  marks.	  Will	  you	  be	  you	  know	  have	  you	  got	  any	  previous	  experience?	  Um	  things	  like	  
that.	  	  
083	   STUDENT	  1:	  …	  and	  extracurricular	  activities?	  
084	  	   LECTURER:	  Yes	  yes	  volunteer	  have	  you	  been	  a	  volunteer	  for	  something,	  have	  you	  taught	  other	  
people.	  Have	  you,	  you	  know,	  what	  kind	  of	  person	  are	  you?	  Do	  you	  care	  for	  your	  environment?	  Are	  you	  
involved	  in	  community?	  Those	  things	  are	  all	  important.	  They’re	  also	  important	  to	  get	  articles	  but	  vac	  
work	  is	  not	  so	  difficult	  to	  get.	  Um	  don’t	  you	  know,	  if	  you	  get	  reasonably	  good	  marks	  you	  will	  get	  in	  with	  
one	  of	  the	  big	  firms.	  	  
 
Quotation	  11	  
L22:	  67	  -­‐	  8	   
067	   LECTURER:	  Um,	  my,	  my	  wife,	  um,	  I	  met	  my	  wife	  when	  she	  was	  in	  the	  publishing	  industry.	  Um	  
and	  she	  was,	  she	  was	  making	  lots	  of	  money	  she	  was	  a	  very	  capable	  person.	  And	  she	  landed	  up	  
in	  the	  publishing	  industry	  because	  she	  studied	  up	  to	  her	  Master’s	  degree	  in	  South	  Africa	  and	  
then	  she	  went	  overseas	  and	  she	  got	  her	  PhD	  in,	  uh,	  in	  languages,	  in	  French	  from	  the	  Sorbonne	  
in	  France.	  Now,	  that’s	  not,	  that’s	  very	  impressive,	  I	  mean	  that’s	  why	  I	  fell	  in	  love	  with	  her	  
because	  she	  is	  so	  clever.	  Um,	  and	  um,	  and	  she,	  its	  not	  uuuh,	  I	  can	  tell	  you,	  in	  the	  days,	  this	  was	  
in	  the	  high	  days	  of	  apartheid,	  uh,	  to	  get	  a	  bursary,	  to	  go	  to	  Paris,	  to	  stay	  there	  for	  four	  years,	  to	  
do	  a	  PhD	  in	  French,	  uh,	  on	  French	  literature	  mmmm	  I	  don’t	  think,	  you	  know,	  not	  a	  lot	  of	  people	  
can	  do	  that.	  That’s	  very	  impressive,	  that	  is	  very	  impressive.	  So	  she	  came	  back	  when,	  with	  her	  
PhD	  from	  the	  Sorbonne,	  and	  the	  only	  job	  that	  she	  could	  get	  was,	  uh,	  teaching	  immigrant	  
children,	  French	  immigrant	  children	  English	  at	  a	  secondary	  school.	  That’s	  the	  only	  job	  she	  could	  
get.	  And	  she	  did	  that	  for	  a	  couple	  of	  months	  and	  that	  was	  not	  very	  stimulating	  so	  she	  started	  
doing	  translating	  and	  from	  translating	  she	  landed	  up	  in	  the	  publishing	  world	  and	  she	  became	  a	  
publishing,	  uh,	  executive.	  And	  then,	  she	  was	  doing	  publishing,	  she	  was	  doing	  books	  for	  the	  the	  
company	  that	  I	  was	  working	  for	  and	  that	  was	  where	  I	  met	  her,	  and,	  after	  I	  got	  to	  know	  her	  I	  said	  
but	  why	  are	  you	  in	  publishing	  with	  a	  PhD	  in	  in	  in	  languages.	  Why	  are	  you	  not,	  you	  know,	  doing	  
something	  in	  languages.	  And	  she	  said	  no	  she’s	  done	  with	  languages.	  She’s	  very	  happy	  where	  
she	  is.	  So	  I	  got	  to	  know	  her	  much	  better	  and	  I	  said,	  ‘but	  you	  are	  not	  a	  teacher’	  and	  she’s	  not,	  
she’s	  really	  not	  a	  teacher,	  although,	  perhaps,	  if	  she	  really	  wants	  to	  do	  it,	  but	  she’s	  not	  a	  teacher	  
she’s	  a	  good	  lawyer.	  I	  said	  why	  don’t	  you	  go	  and	  study	  LLB	  after	  uh	  uh	  at	  RAU	  after	  hours.	  	  
068	   So	  she	  did	  that	  and	  she	  got	  her	  LLB	  cum	  laude	  and	  she	  started	  working	  for	  [Smith,	  Brown	  and	  




she	  did,	  uh	  articles	  with	  [Smith,	  Brown	  and	  Mngomezulu]	  and	  she	  didn’t	  like	  [them]	  because	  at	  
that	  stage,	  I	  don’t	  know	  if	  they	  still	  are	  and	  I	  shouldn’t	  say	  this,	  they	  were	  very	  chauvinistic,	  you	  
know,	  it	  s	  very	  boy’s	  orientated	  firm.	  Its	  better	  now	  but,	  you	  know,	  they	  don’t	  think	  that	  girls	  
can	  really	  become	  partners.	  They’ve	  changed	  now	  I	  think	  they’ve	  got	  one	  female	  partner,	  out	  of	  
85	  and	  she	  clashed	  with	  the	  senior	  partner,	  you	  know,	  he	  came	  to	  her	  and	  said,	  um,	  you	  
probably	  want	  to	  become	  um	  uh	  an	  partner	  now	  but	  uh	  and	  you’ve	  you’re	  on	  your	  way	  you	  will	  
become	  a	  partner	  but	  its	  our	  discretion	  and	  it	  will	  cause	  a	  lot	  of	  unhappiness	  in	  the	  firm	  if	  we	  
make	  you	  a	  partner	  now	  because	  other	  people	  came	  with	  you	  cannot	  be	  made	  partner	  and	  
they	  will	  feel	  that	  we	  are	  um	  putting	  you	  to	  an	  advantage	  and	  she	  said	  take	  your	  partnership	  








APPENDIX	  4C:	  QUOTATIONS	  –	  ATTORNEY	  




LECTURER:	  If	  you	  go	  into	  uh,	  if	  you	  go	  to	  do	  your	  articles	  one	  day,	  ladies	  and	  gentlemen	  and	  
you	  go	  to	  a	  commercial	  firm	  to	  do	  your	  commercial	  articles,	  you	  do	  it	  in	  a	  commercial	  
department	  of	  a	  commercial	  firm,	  once	  you’ve	  finished	  and	  you’ve	  qualified	  as	  an	  attorney	  
that’s	  the	  only	  way	  you	  can	  transfer	  to	  England	  or	  to	  another	  part	  of	  the	  Commonwealth.	  They	  
will	  immediately	  take	  you,	  even	  with	  a	  South	  African	  LLB,	  because	  you’ve	  got	  a	  practical	  
training	  in	  commercial	  law	  which	  is	  the	  same	  the	  world	  over.	  So	  the	  only	  way	  in	  which	  you	  can	  
transfer,	  in	  South	  Africa,	  over	  the	  law	  degree	  is	  commercial	  law.	  And	  the	  reason	  is	  the	  
commercial	  law	  is	  English	  law	  so	  anywhere	  in	  the	  Commonwealth	  you	  can	  go.	  Australia	  [in	  
mock	  Australian	  accent]	  if	  you	  want	  to	  sit	  every	  evening	  and	  sift	  your	  garbage	  in	  ten	  different	  
bags,	  then	  you	  can	  go	  to	  Australia.	  If	  you	  want	  to	  go	  to	  England	  and	  you	  want	  to	  live	  with	  those	  
hideous	  people	  then	  you	  can	  go	  there.	  They’ll	  make	  you..	  they’ll	  not	  make	  you	  a	  partner,	  they’ll	  
make	  you	  an	  associate,	  they’ll	  pay	  you	  nothing,	  and	  you’ll	  work	  like	  a	  dog.	  For	  the	  rest	  of	  your	  
life.	  You’ll	  never	  become	  a	  partner.	  That’s	  what	  the	  English	  are	  like.	  And	  America	  [in	  mock	  
American	  accent]	  perhaps	  you	  can	  go	  there.	  I	  don’t	  know	  why	  you	  want	  to	  go	  there	  you’ll	  
probably	  also	  work,	  you	  know,	  24	  hours	  a	  day.	   
 
Quotation	  2 
L6:	  47	   
LECTURER:	  Who	  is	  it?	  OK	  maroon	  in	  colour.	  Ladies	  and	  gentlemen	  it	  might	  seem	  like	  a	  very	  
stupid	  trivial	  detail	  um	  but	  if	  you	  are	  looking	  for	  a	  piece	  of	  legislation	  and	  you’re	  in	  a	  hurry	  and	  
its	  not	  the	  law	  library	  uh	  where	  you	  now	  know,	  hopefully	  all	  of	  you	  now	  know	  where	  the	  
Butterworths	  and	  the	  Jutas	  um	  uh	  statutes	  are.	  Go	  to	  a	  um	  uh	  uh	  client’s	  library	  or	  you	  go	  into	  
another	  attorney’s	  library	  you	  must	  immediately	  be	  able	  to	  go	  to	  the	  Butterworths.	  Um	  you	  
know,	  its	  no	  use	  you	  falling	  around	  there	  saying	  ‘um	  we	  oh	  we	  oh	  where	  will	  I	  find	  the	  ….’	  You	  
must	  know.	  What’s	  going	  on.	  	  
 
Quotation	  3	  
L6:	  140	   
LECTURER:	  No	  I	  thought	  you	  could	  give	  us	  a	  lecture	  on	  electronic	  resources.	  Ladies	  and	  
gentlemen	  the	  electronic	  resources	  um	  in	  South	  Africa	  is	  very	  very	  very	  good.	  Virtually	  every	  
journal	  article,	  virtually	  -­‐	  not	  virtually	  -­‐	  every	  single	  reported	  case,	  every	  um	  uh	  uh	  uh	  legal	  new	  
piece	  of	  legislation	  be	  it	  from	  the	  from	  the	  Parliament	  in	  Cape	  Town	  or	  from	  provincial,	  is	  on	  
electronic	  resources.	  So	  uh	  in	  the	  old	  days	  if	  you	  had	  to	  set	  up	  shop	  as	  a	  one-­‐man	  uh	  attorney,	  




cost	  you	  something	  like	  fifty	  to	  eighty	  thousand	  bucks,	  depending	  on	  whether	  they’re	  bound	  or	  
not.	  You	  had	  to	  buy	  all	  the	  statutes.	  You	  had	  to	  get	  a	  librarian	  to	  put	  the	  statutes	  up	  to	  date,	  
well	  you	  still	  need	  that.	  Nowadays,	  if	  you	  know	  what	  you’re	  doing,	  you	  need	  a	  pile	  of	  CDs	  and	  
you	  can	  start	  your	  practice.	  You	  can	  really	  start	  practicing	  with	  a	  pile	  of	  CDs,	  you	  know.	  Not	  
taking	  up	  more	  than	  five	  square	  inches	  on	  your	  desk.	  	  
 
Quotation	  4	  
L11:	  44	  	  
LECTURER:	  It’s	  a	  case	  about	  the	  attorney’s	  misconduct	  and	  it	  is	  a	  very	  interesting	  case	  because	  
it’s	  a	  it’s	  a	  its	  almost	  a	  grey	  area.	  It	  is	  an	  attorney	  that	  um	  uh	  was	  a	  trustee,	  he	  received	  monies	  
in	  his	  trust	  account	  um	  and	  he	  uh	  had	  various	  other	  accounts	  that	  would	  pay	  in	  and	  um	  and	  its	  
was	  um	  it	  was	  a	  a	  housing	  project,	  and	  people	  paid	  monies	  in	  and	  he	  then	  -­‐	  we	  don’t	  know	  
whether	  he	  ran	  into	  a	  cash	  flow	  problem,	  but	  he	  used	  his	  trust	  account,	  where	  a	  huge	  sum	  of	  
money	  was	  deposited	  for	  the	  uh	  complex.	  He	  used	  that	  trust	  account	  to	  make	  personal	  loans	  to	  
his	  family.	  Uh	  -­‐	  he	  paid	  it	  back	  immediately,	  you	  know,	  when	  it	  was	  discovered,	  he	  had	  the	  
money	  to	  pay	  the	  the	  the	  shortcoming	  shortcoming	  back,	  uh	  but	  the	  question	  is,	  you	  know,	  can	  
you	  do	  that?	  	  
 
Quotation	  5	  
L11:	  82	   
LECTURER:	  In	  any	  case,	  the	  final	  thing	  that	  I	  want	  to	  say	  is	  the	  attorneys	  and	  the	  attorneys	  of	  
record	  are	  written	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  case.	  Now	  for	  you	  its	  not	  important	  but	  if	  you’re	  one	  day	  
an	  attorney	  then	  that’s	  that	  used	  to	  be	  the	  only	  advertising	  allowed	  in	  my	  days	  is	  the	  
appearance	  of	  their	  names	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  the	  case.	  Um	  you	  know	  and	  then	  you	  can	  uh	  you	  
can	  discover	  uh	  who	  was	  the	  attorney.	  	  
 
Quotation	  6	  
L13:	  151	   
LECTURER:	  Yes	  …	  the	  the	  attorney	  that	  stole	  the	  money	  from	  the	  trust	  account.	  	  
 
Quotation	  7	  
L16:	  33	   
[Advocate]	  [Attorney]	  	  
LECTURER:	  Well,	  uh	  you	  know,	  it’s	  a	  difficult	  question.	  Its	  like,	  you	  know,	  it	  really	  is	  a	  difficult	  
question.	  Because	  if	  you	  are	  at	  the	  bar	  uh	  uh	  and	  when	  I	  say	  at	  the	  bar	  it	  means	  if	  you’re	  an	  
advocate,	  you	  rely	  one	  hundred	  percent	  on	  the	  um	  side-­‐bar,	  and	  those	  are	  the	  attorneys	  to	  
send	  you	  briefs,	  to	  send	  you	  um	  to	  send	  you	  work.	  So	  if	  you	  go	  directly	  from	  university	  to	  the	  
bar	  you’re	  going	  to	  sit	  in	  an	  office	  somewhere	  here	  in	  Johannesburg	  and	  wait	  for	  your	  
telephone	  to	  ring	  and	  its	  never	  going	  to	  ring.	  Because	  nobody	  knows	  about	  you.	  So	  in	  that	  
sense	  it	  is	  much	  much	  better	  to	  go,	  do	  your	  articles,	  build	  up	  your	  contacts	  as	  they	  say,	  during	  
your	  articles	  you	  know	  get	  to	  know	  as	  many	  lawyers	  uh	  many	  attorneys	  as	  possible	  um	  see	  that	  
you	  know	  the	  attorneys	  in	  your	  firm	  uh	  very	  very	  well	  so	  that	  at	  least	  they	  will	  brief	  you	  when	  
you’re	  an	  advocate,	  and	  you	  must	  also	  be	  um	  you	  must	  have	  a	  very	  good	  reputation.	  Now	  if	  
you’re	  straight	  through	  your	  LLB	  by	  you	  know	  getting	  60	  or	  68%	  you	  know	  that’s	  not	  good	  




must	  talk	  about	  you.	  Um	  and	  then	  you	  know	  you	  must	  get	  a	  distinction	  in	  your	  in	  your	  
admissions	  exam	  for	  the	  bar	  or	  for	  the	  um	  uh	  attorneys’	  profession.	  	  
 
Quotation	  8	  	  
L16:	  34	   
[Advocate]	  [Attorney]	  	  
LECTURER:	  Um	  to	  give	  you	  an	  example	  we	  had	  a	  colleague	  here	  who	  was	  a	  very	  good	  lecturer	  
and	  he	  was	  a	  student	  of	  mine	  he	  was	  a	  very	  good	  student	  but	  irritating	  student,	  he	  asked	  very	  
piercing	  and	  um	  tenacious	  questions,	  you	  know,	  he	  wouldn’t	  let	  go.	  You	  know	  if	  you	  didn’t	  
answer	  the	  question	  he’d	  come	  to	  you	  afterwards	  and	  say	  ‘look	  you	  didn’t	  answer	  the	  question,	  
I	  want	  the	  answer’.	  Uh	  so	  he	  was	  a	  difficult	  student	  but	  a	  very	  good	  student.	  And	  he	  became	  a	  
lecturer	  here	  and	  he	  was	  a	  very	  good	  lecturer	  and	  he	  wrote	  a	  book	  and	  decided	  to	  go	  to	  the	  
bar.	  He	  wrote	  his	  exam,	  he	  passed	  his	  exam	  with	  flying	  colours,	  and	  because	  um	  um	  my	  wife	  is	  
an	  attorney,	  and	  I	  mix	  with	  lots	  of	  attorneys,	  uh	  within	  three	  or	  four	  months	  everybody	  was	  




LECTURER:	  But	  that’s	  what	  I	  say,	  people	  are	  all	  talking	  about	  one	  another.	  And	  people	  are	  all	  
talking	  about	  whether	  you	  are	  good	  or	  not	  at	  the	  bar.	  So	  the	  attorneys	  know,	  when	  they’ve	  got	  




LECTURER:	  Denys	  Reitz.	  [STUDENT	  3:	  Denys	  Reitz]	  He	  was	  the	  Minister	  of	  Justice.	  He	  was	  um	  uh	  
a	  politician.	  He	  was	  a	  -­‐	  has	  everybody	  got	  one	  [referring	  to	  books	  he	  has	  been	  	  handing	  out]	  -­‐	  he	  
was	  um	  he	  was	  an	  attorney,	  he	  started	  the	  firm	  Denys	  Reitz	  which	  is	  one	  of	  the	  great	  firms	  in	  
Johannesburg	  today.	  Um	  he	  was	  also	  a	  boer.	  And	  not	  a	  boor	  as	  in	  um	  an	  uncouthed	  and	  
unwashed	  man.	  He	  was	  a	  farmer.	  He	  wrote	  a	  trilogy	  of	  books	  um	  um	  called	  Outspan.	  Um	  I	  can’t	  
remember	  the	  all	  three	  books,	  can	  somebody	  remember	  the	  three	  books?	  The	  one	  is	  Outspan,	  
the	  one	  is	  On	  Commando	  and	  the	  other	  one	  is	  …	  I	  can’t	  remember.	  But	  he	  wrote	  a	  trilogy	  of	  
books,	  so	  he	  was	  an	  intellectual,	  he	  wrote	  books.	  Uh	  uh	  and	  he	  was	  a	  friend	  of	  General	  Smuts.	  
Um	  uh	  he	  did	  a	  lot	  for,	  both	  his	  work	  in	  Parliament	  and	  as	  a	  Minister	  of	  Justice,	  	  he	  did	  a	  lot	  for	  
labour	  relations	  in	  South	  Africa.	  Specialized	  labour	  relations	  and	  that	  is	  why	  Denys	  Reitz	  still	  
today	  is	  a	  major	  player	  in	  labour	  law.	  Um	  and	  it	  was	  a	  very	  impressive	  very	  impressive	  man.	  He	  
was	  an	  Afrikaner,	  um	  uh	  but	  he	  was	  taken	  up	  by	  the	  English	  establishment.	  You	  	  have	  these	  
rare	  Afrikaners	  that	  becomes	  part	  of	  the	  English	  establishment	  or	  the	  liberal	  establishment	  and	  
then	  they	  become	  stars	  in	  that	  establishment.	  Like	  like	  Jan	  Hofmeyr,	  uh	  like	  Bram	  Fischer.	  
Those	  were	  all	  Afrikaans	  speaking	  people	  that	  became	  very	  prominent	  um	  lawyers.	  Um	  so	  he’s	  
a	  he’s	  a	  he’s	  a	  very	  very	  impressive	  character.	  	  
 
Quotation	  11	  
L20:	  6	   
LECTURER:	  Now	  Denys	  Reitz	  wrote	  creatively,	  wrote	  three	  books.	  	  He	  was,	  ok,	  he	  was	  a	  




politician.	  Well,	  perhaps	  not	  anybody.	  I’m	  very	  skeptical	  about	  politicians	  you	  know.	  They	  
always	  say,	  if	  you	  can’t	  do	  law	  then	  do	  politics,	  you	  know,	  there’s	  always	  a	  back	  door.	  But	  OK	  
that’s	  very	  cynical	  and	  there	  are	  good	  politicians.	  And	  Denys	  Reitz	  was	  one	  of	  the	  good	  
politicians.	  But	  he	  was	  a	  Minister	  of	  Justice	  in	  the	  Smuts	  cabinet.	  And	  he	  started	  one	  of	  the	  
major	  law	  firms	  in	  South	  Africa.	  Its	  amazing	  how	  some	  people	  just	  have	  an	  aptitude	  to	  to	  do	  all	  
these	  things.	  I	  mean,	  some	  of	  my	  colleagues	  …	  I	  can’t	  even	  get	  around	  organizing	  my	  own	  day.	  
You	  know	  I	  can’t/	  leave	  alone	  writing	  a	  PhD	  and	  writing	  a	  textbook	  and	  writing	  articles	  and	  
serving	  on	  all	  the	  academic	  committees	  and	  being	  an	  editor.	  But	  some	  people	  can	  do	  it	  and	  
other	  people,	  you	  know,	  we’re	  not	  all	  equal.	  That	  is	  unfortunately	  true.	  Its	  very	  cruel	  but	  it	  is	  
true.	  Um,	  so	  that’s	  Denys	  Reitz.	  	  
 
Quotation	  12	  
L21:	  44	   
[Advocate]	  [Attorney] 
LECTURER:	  Let	  us	  talk	  about	  the	  legal	  profession	  now	  shortly	  ladies	  and	  gentlemen.	  Its	  
something	  that	  fascinates	  you,	  um,	  and,	  uh,	  let	  us	  start,	  uh,	  not	  at	  the	  top	  but,	  um	  at	  the	  part	  of	  
the	  profession	  which	  would	  probably	  be,	  uh,	  the	  part	  where	  you’re	  going	  to	  enter	  the	  
profession.	  South	  Africa’s	  got	  a	  divided	  bar,	  we’ve	  got	  a	  bar,	  um,	  where	  we	  have,	  um	  advocates,	  
and	  I	  will	  come	  to	  the	  advocates	  just	  now.	  And	  then	  we’ve	  got	  what	  we	  call	  a	  side-­‐bar,	  Uh,	  and	  
in	  the	  side-­‐bar	  we	  have	  the	  attorneys.	  	  
 
Quotation	  13	  
L21:	  45	   
LECTURER:	  Now	  attorneys,	  um,	  are	  people	  who	  work	  in	  partnerships	  or	  in	  incorporated	  
companies,	  in	  other	  words	  they	  work	  in	  teams,	  they	  sit	  in	  big	  large	  buildings	  or	  in	  derelict	  old	  
renovated	  houses,	  um	  but	  they	  have	  a	  whole	  office	  structure.	  An	  attorney	  is	  somebody	  who	  
works	  in	  co-­‐operation	  with	  other	  lawyers	  to	  do	  the	  administration	  of	  a	  legal	  case.	  Um,	  an	  
attorney	  is	  the	  place	  of	  the,	  uh,	  the	  first	  contact	  for	  the	  man	  on	  the	  street.	  If	  you	  go,	  if	  you’re	  
looking	  for	  legal	  advice	  you,	  what	  you	  most	  probably	  do	  is	  you	  look	  for	  an	  attorney	  first.	  You	  
cannot	  go	  to	  an	  advocate	  directly.	  The	  attorney	  must	  refer	  you	  to	  an	  advocate	  or	  the	  attorney	  
appoints	  an	  advocate	  on	  your	  behalf.	  
 
Quotation	  14	  
L21:	  46	   
LECTURER:	  OK,	  to	  become	  an	  attorney	  you	  need	  to	  study	  for	  the	  LLB	  degree,	  either	  the	  4-­‐year	  
LLB	  or	  the	  LLB	  that	  you	  are	  doing,	  an	  undergraduate	  course	  plus	  then	  the	  postgraduate	  LLB	  
which	  is	  preferable.	  Which	  is	  preferable	  and	  the	  profession,	  um,	  uh,	  has	  very	  clearly	  indicated	  
that	  they	  prefer	  the	  5-­‐year	  LLB,	  uh,	  alternatively	  an	  LLM,	  a	  4-­‐year	  LLB	  followed	  by	  one	  year	  
postgraduate	  study,	  um,	  specializing	  in	  some	  field	  of	  the	  law,	  uh,	  with	  an	  LLM.	  Which	  makes	  it	  
five	  years.	  	  
 
Quotation	  15	  
L21:	  47	  	  
[Articled	  clerk]	  [Attorney] 




undergraduate,	  you	  must	  find	  a	  principal.	  In	  other	  words	  somebody	  that	  you	  know	  and	  that	  you	  
trust	  that	  will	  be	  willing	  to	  train	  you	  in	  the	  legal	  profession.	  If	  you’ve	  found	  such	  a	  person,	  you	  
make	  an	  appointment	  and	  you	  go	  see	  such	  a	  person	  and	  you	  request	  him	  or	  her,	  uh,	  to	  
consider	  you	  for	  articles	  of	  clerkship.	  Articles	  of	  clerkship	  is	  an	  old	  hangover	  of	  the	  medieval	  
training	  of	  jurists.	  It	  is	  where	  you	  are	  trained	  by,	  uh,	  in-­‐service	  training.	  It	  is	  for	  two	  years.	  You	  
enter	  a	  contract	  for	  two	  years.	  The	  contract	  may	  be	  ceded,	  but	  it	  is	  frowned	  upon,	  it	  is	  not	  
something	  you	  must	  try	  and	  do.	  And	  during	  this	  two	  years	  you	  get	  a	  smallish	  salary,	  you	  are,	  
you	  are	  salaried	  and	  you	  do,	  um,	  all	  kinds	  of	  legal	  work	  so	  that	  you	  can	  pass	  the	  Society,	  uh,	  the	  
Law	  Society’s	  admission	  exam.	  	  
 
Quotation	  16	  	  
L21:	  48	   
LECTURER:	  Then	  you	  write	  the	  admissions	  exam	  and	  when	  you	  pass	  the	  admissions	  exam	  you	  
are	  admitted	  in	  court	  as	  an	  attorney.	  You	  can	  	  then	  practice	  for	  your	  own	  account,	  in	  other	  
words	  you	  can	  open	  your	  own	  business.	  You	  can	  practice	  for	  your	  own	  account,	  or	  you	  can	  join	  
a	  firm	  as	  a	  professional	  assistant	  or	  they	  also	  call	  them	  associates,	  or	  if	  you	  are	  very	  lucky,	  
perhaps	  get	  two	  or	  three	  of	  your	  friends	  and	  you	  can	  start	  your	  own	  firm	  and	  you	  will	  be	  a	  
director	  or	  partner	  of	  that	  firm.	  	  
 
Quotation	  17	  	  
L21:	  49	   
LECTURER:	  The	  work	  of	  an	  attorney	  is	  not	  glamorous.	  It	  is	  not	  glamourous	  work,	  it	  is	  hard,	  
boring,	  slogging	  work.	  It	  is	  administration	  for	  95	  per	  cent.	  You	  are	  not	  going	  to	  find	  in	  the	  
ordinary	  work	  of	  the	  attorney	  great	  intellectual	  challenges	  or	  great	  innovative,	  uh,	  law	  changing	  
challenges.	  If	  you	  are	  looking	  for	  that	  then	  there	  are	  other	  places	  where	  you	  can	  join	  the	  legal	  
profession	  but	  that	  is	  not	  what	  you’re	  going	  to	  do	  if	  you	  become	  an	  attorney.	  I’m	  not	  saying	  
that	  the	  attorney’s	  profession	  is	  all	  boredom	  …	  um,	  if	  you,	  if	  you	  join	  the	  attorney’s	  profession	  
and	  it	  is	  your	  specific	  niche,	  uh,	  patents	  or	  commercial	  law	  and	  that	  is	  what	  you	  want	  to	  do,	  
then	  you	  can	  become	  a	  leader	  in	  the	  field	  and	  you	  can	  (a)	  make	  lots	  of	  money	  and	  (b)	  you	  can	  
have	  a	  stimulating	  profession.	  Ordinary	  work	  for	  the	  attorney	  however,	  uh,	  divorces,	  estates,	  
trusts,	  transfer	  of	  property,	  uh,	  general	  attorney’s	  work	  it	  not,	  uh	  very	  challenging.	  Its	  not	  
intellectually	  very	  challenging.	  It	  is	  routine	  rather	  than	  intellectual	  effort.	  Perhaps	  that’s	  unfair.	  I	  
don’t	  know.	  If	  you’ve	  done	  your	  articles	  come	  and	  tell	  me	  whether	  you	  agree	  with	  me	  or	  not.	  	  
 
Quotation	  18	  	  
L21:	  50	   
LECTURER:	  The	  attorney’s	  profession	  is	  organized,	  uh,	  organized	  by	  an	  organization	  called	  the	  
Law	  Society	  of	  South	  Africa	  and	  they	  have	  representatives	  in	  each	  province	  and	  you	  will	  be	  
invited	  once	  you	  have	  been	  given	  articles,	  you	  will	  be	  invited	  to	  an	  interview	  with	  one	  of	  the	  
leading	  lights	  of	  the	  Law	  Society,	  uh,	  and	  you	  will	  have	  to	  convince	  him,	  or	  he	  will	  have	  to	  be	  
convinced	  that	  to	  join,	  to	  eventually	  join	  the	  profession.	  Um,	  in	  other	  words	  its	  	  a	  formal	  
interview,	  uh,	  where	  they	  will	  ask	  you	  ethical	  questions	  and	  they	  will	  ask	  you	  where	  you	  come	  
from,	  what	  kind	  of	  person	  you	  are	  just	  to	  vet	  that	  you	  are	  a	  fit	  and	  proper	  person,	  uh,	  to	  







Quotation	  19	  	  
L21:	  51	  -­‐	  2	   
051	   LECTURER:	  Why	  is	  this	  important?	  Ladies	  and	  gentlemen,	  the	  great	  prob	  …	  the	  great	  
temptation	  of	  the	  attorney’s	  profession	  is	  of	  course	  trusts	  money,	  trust	  money.	  Um,	  
attorneys	  act	  as	  custodians	  for	  huge	  transactions	  (breathes	  in	  loudly),	  for	  example,	  if	  
you	  are	  an	  attorney	  or	  a	  conveyancer	  and	  somebody	  wants	  to	  buy	  a	  huge	  building	  in	  the	  
north	  of	  Johannesburg,	  you	  attend	  to	  all	  the	  formalities	  and	  you	  are	  also	  the	  receiver	  of	  
the	  deposit	  of	  the	  buyer	  of	  this	  building.	  Now	  this	  building	  can	  be,	  uh,	  600,	  700	  million	  
rand	  and	  10	  per	  cent	  of	  that	  is	  then	  placed	  in	  your	  care.	  You	  have	  absolute	  control	  over	  
that	  money,	  uh,	  of	  course	  it	  is	  not	  your	  money,	  it	  must	  go	  into	  the	  trust	  account,	  but	  uh,	  
you	  as	  the	  partner	  or	  as	  the	  responsible	  person	  have	  got	  absolute	  one	  hundred	  per	  cent	  
control	  over	  that	  money.	  So	  the	  temptation	  to	  say	  ‘ag,	  I’m	  just	  going	  to	  borrow	  R30	  000	  
for	  the	  weekend,	  I’ve	  forgotten	  to	  draw	  money,	  I’ll	  put	  it	  back	  on	  Monday’	  is	  very	  great.	  
And	  if	  you	  go	  and	  look	  in	  the	  De	  Rebus	  which	  is	  uh	  the	  professional	  magazine	  for	  the	  uh,	  
professional	  journal	  for	  the	  attorneys,	  you	  will	  see	  there	  is	  a	  column,	  um	  of	  the	  
attorneys	  being	  struck	  from	  the	  roll	  and	  the	  reason,	  mostly,	  the	  reason	  given,	  mostly,	  
uh,	  is	  contravention	  of	  the	  trust	  or	  the	  trust	  monies	  Act	  or	  the	  Trust	  Act.	  Attorneys	  take,	  
I	  don’t	  know	  why	  but	  they	  can’t	  keep	  their	  hands	  off	  the	  trust	  money.	  	  
052	   Please	  [wry	  laugh]	  if	  I	  can	  give	  you	  some	  very	  good	  advice	  today,	  uh,	  make	  it	  impossible	  
in	  your	  firm	  for	  anybody	  to	  get	  to	  trust	  monies.	  And	  make	  it	  extremely	  difficult	  to	  
withdraw	  money	  from	  the	  trust	  account.	  Insist	  on	  at	  least	  two	  or	  three	  signatures	  plus	  
original,	  foundational	  documents.	  The	  original	  document,	  not	  copies	  or	  a	  fax	  copy	  or	  a	  
note	  ‘IOU’	  by	  partner	  [gestures	  ‘no’	  with	  his	  hand].	  A	  foundational	  document,	  you	  know	  
what	  I	  mean	  by	  a	  foundational	  document?	  The	  reason	  why	  that	  monies	  has	  to	  be	  
transferred,	  attached	  to	  two	  or	  three	  signatures	  of	  the	  partners	  plus	  the	  accountant.	  Its	  
its	  not	  a	  joke.	  It	  is	  a	  lot	  of	  money	  and	  attorneys	  cannot	  resist,	  uh,	  the	  temptation	  to	  take	  
some	  of	  that	  money.	  
 
Quotation	  20	  	  
L21:	  64	   
LECTURER:	  Ok,	  um,	  uh	  the	  other	  thing	  I	  must	  tell	  you	  ladies	  and	  gentlemen	  if	  you	  become	  an	  
attorney,	  you	  need	  a	  BSc	  degree	  in	  social	  sciences.	  	  
 
Quotation	  21	  
L21:	  71	   
[Attorney]	  [Legal	  secretary]	  	  
LECTURER:	  So	  please,	  don’t	  underestimate	  the	  office	  personnel	  in	  a	  legal	  office.	  You	  must,	  you	  
must,	  if	  you	  want	  to	  become	  an	  attorney,	  must	  be	  able	  to	  get	  on	  with	  the	  office	  manager	  and	  
the	  office	  personnel	  uh	  in	  the	  office.	  	  
 
Quotation	  22	  
L22:	  53	  	  




instance	  now,	  you	  know,	  um	  there’s	  a	  specific	  divorce	  that	  um,	  its	  your	  god	  daughter	  
that	  is	  getting	  divorced	  and	  you	  wanted	  to	  do	  the	  divorce,	  then	  the	  judge	  will	  allow	  it.	  If	  
it’s	  an	  uncontested	  divorce.	  If	  you	  know,	  if	  you’re	  a	  senior,	  uh,	  practitioner,	  the	  judge	  
will	  of	  course	  allow	  it	  uh	  because	  you	  know	  uh	  want	  to	  do	  it	  yourself.	  Uh,	  but	  usually,	  it	  
is	  better	  that	  the	  advocates	  do	  the	  court	  work	  and	  the	  attorney	  does,	  uh,	  the	  off-­‐the-­‐
street	  work,	  the	  preparation.	  Um,	  but	  it	  is	  possible	  now	  that	  the	  attorneys	  can	  appear	  in	  
the	  High	  Court.	  But	  you	  do	  need,	  you	  do	  need	  permission	  from	  the	  judge.	  	  
 
Quotation	  23	  
L22:	  92	   
[Attorney]	  [Judge]	  	  
LECTURER:	  You	  didn’t	  really	  take	  notice.	  OK.	  Um	  uh	  judge	  must	  be	  have	  an	  LLB.	  Must	  have	  a	  
good	  practice	  and	  they	  must	  be	  a	  senior	  uh	  advocate.	  Uh	  nowadays	  of	  course	  its	  no	  longer	  
compulsory	  that	  you	  must	  be	  a	  senior	  advocate.	  Uh	  uh	  attorneys	  have	  been	  appointed	  as	  
judges.	  Judge	  Kathy	  Saxwell	  Sax	  sax	  Sacks	  Sackswell	  is	  an	  attorney.	  She	  specialized	  in	  family	  
matters.	  And	  she’s	  now	  a	  judge	  here	  at	  the	  Witwatersrand	  Local	  Division.	  
 
Quotation	  24	  
L22:	  51	  -­‐	  2	   
[Advocate]	  [Attorney]	  	  
051	   STUDENT	  8:	  What	  are	  the	  incidences	  when	  attorneys	  appear	  in	  court,	  when	  …	  	  
052	   LECTURER:	  Um,	  it’s	  a	  new	  thing	  that	  has	  happened	  with	  the	  new	  Constitution	  and	  with	  
this	  whole	  thing	  of	  opening	  up	  the	  profession.	  Um	  if	  you	  ask	  me	  personally,	  I	  think	  it’s	  a,	  
it’s	  a,	  its	  wrong,	  its	  stupid,	  because	  the	  attorney’s	  profession	  has	  got	  certain	  things	  that	  
they	  must	  do	  and	  the	  advocates	  have	  got	  certain	  things	  that	  they	  must	  do	  and	  it	  is	  
stupid	  to	  mix	  the	  two.	  
 
Quotation	  25	  	  
L22:	  52	   
LECTURER:	  But	  sometimes	  you	  get	  a	  very	  good	  attorney.	  Like	  Dr	  Dale	  now,	  Professor	  Dale	  here	  
at	  Denys	  Reitz,	  he’s	  an	  honorary	  professor	  at	  Wits	  and	  he’s	  in	  mining	  law	  and	  he’s	  mostly	  the	  
the	  the	  worldwide	  expert	  on	  South	  African	  mining	  law	  So	  if	  there’s	  an	  application	  for	  the	  
prospecting	  of	  new	  mineral	  rights,	  then	  obviously	  you	  can	  appoint	  uh	  Dr	  Dale	  uh	  to	  appear	  in	  
the	  High	  Court.	  He’s	  the	  best	  there	  is.	  It’s	  a	  very	  specialized	  field,	  He	  knows	  absolutely	  
everything	  and	  he	  then,	  with	  the	  permission	  of	  the	  judge,	  can	  appear	  in	  the	  High	  Court.	  
(Breathes	  in	  deeply).	  This	  is	  …	  its	  an	  exception.	  You	  must	  apply,	  you	  must	  have	  extreme	  
expertise.	  You	  must	  be	  a	  leader	  in	  your	  field.	  	  
 
Quotation	  26	  	  
L22:	  54	  -­‐	  5	   
054	   STUDENT	  9:	  What	  …	  so	  when	  you	  join	  a	  big	  firm,	  it’s	  a	  firm	  of	  attorneys	  period	  …	  
055	   LECTURER:	  Yes	  	  
 
Quotation	  27	  	  




LECTURER:	  The	  litigation	  department	  prepares,	  does	  all	  the	  backroom	  work.	  The	  litigation	  
department,	  um	  is	  the	  fall-­‐back	  of	  the	  advocate.	  The	  litigation	  department	  -­‐	  well	  they	  do	  maj	  
court,	  maj	  court	  litigation	  obviously,	  that’s	  what	  they	  do	  and	  when	  it	  goes	  to	  the	  High	  Court	  you	  
do,	  um,	  all	  the	  backroom	  work,	  you	  get	  all	  the	  expert	  witnesses	  together,	  you	  get	  all	  the	  
statements	  together,	  you	  get	  the	  file	  together,	  because	  the	  advocate	  can’t	  do	  that.	  The	  
advocate	  is	  is	  is	  is	  office	  bound.	  You	  drive	  around,	  um	  and	  get	  the	  statements	  from	  witnesses,	  
you	  drive	  around	  and	  um	  uh	  do	  inspections	  in	  loco,	  and	  things	  like	  that.	  You	  do	  all	  the	  prep	  
[becomes	  tongue-­‐tied]	  preparatory	  work	  so	  that	  you	  can	  give	  the,	  uh,	  advocate	  a	  decent	  file	  
that	  he	  can	  work	  from.	  And	  that’s	  what	  	  the	  litigation	  department	  does.	  Not	  lucrative,	  not	  
lucrative.	  Um,	  even	  in,	  even	  in	  commercial	  litigation	  or	  insurance	  litigation	  where	  you’re	  talking	  
about	  millions	  of	  rand,	  not	  lucrative.	  Um,	  you	  know,	  uh	  it	  (sighs)	  what	  can	  I	  say,	  that’s	  a	  fact	  of	  
life.	  Rather	  do	  something	  more	  lucrative	  like	  trademarks	  or	  patents	  or	  the..	  uh,	  commercial	  
work	  straight-­‐forward	  commercial	  work,	  um	  uh	  mergers	  and	  acquisitions,	  management	  buy-­‐
outs,	  things	  like	  that.	  Very,	  very	  lucrative.	  	  
 
Quotation	  28	  	  
L22:	  60	  -­‐	  3	   
[Advocate]	  [Attorney]	  	  
060	  	   STUDENT	  1:	  Um,	  sorry	  Mr	  Serfontein,	  I	  was	  just	  wondering,	  I	  spoke	  to	  someone	  on	  the	  
weekend	  and	  they	  were	  telling	  me	  that	  …	  I	  remember	  you	  telling	  us	  the	  process	  that	  
once	  you	  got	  your	  LLB	  you	  do	  six	  months	  pupilage	  and	  then	  only	  you	  go	  on,	  um	  to	  
practice	  um	  	  
061	   LECTURER:	  Plus	  the	  exam.	  
062	   STUDENT	  1:	  Ja,	  plus	  the	  exam.	  Someone	  else	  was	  also	  telling	  me	  that	  its	  better	  to	  rather	  
do,	  uh,	  your	  articles	  first	  and,	  um,	  become	  qualified	  as	  an	  attorney	  and	  then	  only	  go	  …	  
063	   LECTURER:	  Mmmm,	  but	  I,	  we	  discussed	  that	  as	  well.	  Yes,	  I	  said,	  um,	  I	  said	  that	  you	  can,	  
if	  you	  finish	  your	  LLB,	  you	  can,	  technically,	  you	  can	  do	  that.	  You	  can	  go	  directly	  to	  the	  
bar.	  But	  I	  mean	  you’re	  a,	  you’re	  a	  fool	  because	  as	  I’ve	  just	  shown	  you	  by	  the	  the	  the	  
magazine,	  it	  all	  depends	  on	  your	  reputation.	  And	  what	  kind	  of	  reputation	  have	  you	  got?	  
Um,	  you	  know,	  you’re	  a	  beautiful	  girl	  from	  Scotland	  and	  that’s	  not	  going	  to	  help.	  It	  helps	  
with	  other	  things	  but	  its	  not	  going	  to	  help	  with	  the	  law.	  But,	  if	  you	  do	  your	  articles	  first	  
then	  at	  least	  you’re	  getting	  to	  know	  the	  attorneys.	  And	  you’re	  getting	  to	  know	  the	  
partners	  at	  that	  firm	  and	  other	  firms	  because	  every	  case	  that	  you	  do	  in	  your	  two	  years’	  
articles	  you	  have	  to	  work	  with	  other	  attorneys.	  And	  if	  you	  impress	  them,	  even	  in	  the	  
magistrates’	  court,	  you	  appear	  there	  and	  you	  make	  a	  name	  for	  yourself,	  far	  far	  better,	  
Not	  only	  do	  you	  do	  your	  articles,	  um,	  but	  also	  stay	  on	  a	  little	  while	  as	  a	  professional	  
assistant	  or	  associate,	  uh,	  its	  at	  a	  better	  salary	  and	  there	  you	  get	  more	  senior	  work.	  And	  
you	  can,	  you	  know,	  you	  can	  specialize	  especially	  if	  you	  go	  to	  a	  very	  large	  firm.	  Um,	  you	  
know.	  I	  would	  agree	  with	  that.	  Um.	  I	  would	  say	  nobody	  can	  go	  to	  the	  Bar	  before	  they’ve	  









Quotation	  29	  	  
L22:	  66	   
[Advocate]	  [Attorney]	  	  
LECTURER:	  OK.	  Those	  are	  the	  two,	  um,	  parts	  of	  the	  profession	  that	  I	  think	  most	  of	  you	  are	  going	  
to	  go	  into.	  Um,	  there	  ..	  those	  are	  the	  two	  private,	  uh,	  private	  parts	  of	  the	  profession.	  Um,	  and	  
in	  both	  these,	  um,	  uh,	  professions,	  you	  will	  make,	  you’ll	  make	  a	  living.	  Definitely.	  You’ll	  make	  a	  
good	  living.	  And	  the	  higher	  up	  you	  go	  in	  these	  professions	  the	  better	  your	  living	  is.	  	  
 
Quotation	  30	  	  
L22:	  68 
LECTURER:	  She	  with	  three	  other	  people	  started	  her	  own	  firm.	  And	  she,	  I	  think,	  I	  don’t	  know	  
exactly,	  but	  she	  works	  extremely	  hard	  um	  try	  not	  to	  work	  too	  hard,	  works	  extremely	  
hard	  and	  I	  think	  you	  know	  its	  now	  a	  bit	  personal	  but	  I	  think	  her	  salary	  is	  about	  3,	  3.5	  per	  
year.	  Um,	  so	  that	  is	  what	  you	  can	  achieve	  if	  you	  are	  in	  a	  commercial	  firm	  if	  you	  are	  top	  
of	  your	  class	  and	  if	  you	  work	  very	  hard	  within	  seven	  years	  after	  after	  qualifying	  at	  
university,	  you	  can	  achieve	  that	  kind	  of	  salary.	  But,	  it	  doesn’t	  come	  easy,	  its	  now,	  you	  




L22:	  137	   
LECTURER:	  No	  well	  some	  people	  thrive	  on	  that,	  some	  people	  live	  /	  like	  like	  [Isobel],	  I	  mean	  if	  
she	  doesn’t	  have	  an	  adrenalin	  rush	  every	  five	  minutes	  you	  know	  she	  gets	  bored.	  So	  some	  
people	  really	  like	  that,	  they	  thrive	  on	  that	  nervous	  tension	  and	  they	  are	  their	  best	  and	  sharpest	  
when	  they	  have	  …	  but	  you	  know	  you	  can’t	  its	  impossible	  to	  sustain	  it	  for	  weeks	  and	  weeks	  and	  
months	  and	  months	  and	  then	  you	  must	  take	  a	  break	  um	  you	  must	  look	  after	  yourself,	  you	  must	  
you	  know	  /	  it’s	  a	  very	  /	  it’s	  a	  high	  tension	  job.	  	  
 
Quotation	  32	  	  
L22:	  44	   
[Advocate]	  [Attorney]	  	  
LECTURER:	  A	  brief	  is	  a,	  um,	  is	  a	  document	  in	  blue	  that	  is	  folded	  like	  this,	  and	  we	  have	  discussed	  
this	  I’m	  sure.	  It	  comes	  from	  the	  formula	  of	  the	  praetor,	  It’s	  a	  document	  like	  this,	  its	  blue,	  its	  this	  
colour,	  slightly	  light,	  it’s	  a	  light	  blue	  like	  your	  jersey	  (gestures	  towards	  one	  of	  the	  students).	  It’s	  
a	  light	  blue	  and	  its	  got	  printed	  on	  such	  and	  such	  versus	  such	  and	  such,	  the	  attorneys	  and	  the	  
advocates	  and	  its	  tied	  together,	  inside	  there	  are,	  uh,	  papers	  or	  whatever	  and	  its	  tied	  together	  
with	  a	  pink	  ribbon.	  I	  don’t	  know	  why	  its	  pink.	  I	  don’t	  know	  if	  it	  must	  be	  a	  pink	  ribbon	  but	  its	  tied	  
together	  by	  a	  pink	  ribbon.	  And	  this	  is	  what	  the	  advocate	  takes	  to	  court	  with	  him	  and	  this	  is	  
called	  a	  brief.	  B-­‐r-­‐i-­‐e-­‐f	  it	  is	  his	  brief,	  his	  instruction	  from	  the	  attorney.	  It	  it’s	  the	  instruction	  that	  
the	  advocate	  receives	  from	  the	  attorney.	  	  
 
Quotation	  33	  	  
L22:	  41	   




LECTURER:	  OK,	  we	  were	  talking	  about	  the	  office	  personnel	  of	  an	  attorney’s	  office,	  um,	  and	  you	  
know	  to	  beware	  of	  the	  typists,	  Please	  beware,	  its	  very	  good	  advice	  one	  day	  you’re	  going	  to	  say	  I	  







APPENDIX	  4D:	  QUOTATIONS	  –	  ADVOCATE	  
N	  =	  54 
 
Quotation	  1	  
L1:	  52	   
LECTURER:	  No	  um	  uh	  its	  not	  necessarily	  because	  Cicero	  said	  that	  the	  higher	  power	  is	  your	  own	  
rationality.	  The	  recta	  ratio.	  He	  went	  a	  little	  further	  and	  he	  said	  ‘Ok	  that	  comes	  from	  nature’.	  And,	  you	  
know,	  I	  don’t	  know	  exactly	  what	  he	  means	  by	  nature,	  he’s	  also	  not	  a	  philosopher	  he’s	  more	  a	  orator	  so	  
he	  doesn’t	  write	  very	  well	  on	  these	  uh	  you	  know	  write	  like	  a	  philosopher.	  He	  he	  writes	  within	  a	  system	  
of	  rhetoric	  he’s	  trying	  to	  convince	  you	  so	  he	  doesn’t	  go	  into	  detail	  things	  that	  he	  can’t	  prove,	  you	  
know,	  he	  just	  he	  talks,	  like	  an	  advocate	  in	  a	  trial	  you	  know	  he’s	  not	  going	  to	  say	  ‘Oh	  excuse	  me	  judge	  
here’s	  a	  very	  good	  point	  against	  me	  if	  you	  don’t	  mind	  looking	  at	  this’	  -­‐	  it’s	  what	  they	  should	  do	  but	  
they	  don’t.	  	  
 
Quotation	  2	  
L5:	  42	  	  
LECTURER:	  You’re	  not	  sure	  what	  I’m	  asking.	  [student	  interjects]	  I’m	  asking,	  the	  debates	  on	  the	  second	  
reading,	  the	  debates	  about	  philosophy	  and	  policy,	  they	  are	  published	  in	  Hansard,	  [Student:	  yes].	  So	  say	  
for	  instance	  the	  Act	  is	  now	  passed,	  and	  it	  is	  now	  an	  Act	  of	  Parliament,	  and	  the	  Act	  comes	  before	  a	  
court	  of	  law,	  to	  interpret.	  Which	  happens.	  May	  you,	  as	  the	  advocate,	  use	  the	  debates	  of	  Hansard	  to	  
prove	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  legislature	  in	  the	  legislation.	  
 
Quotation	  3	  
L10:	  58	   
[Advocate]	  [Judge]	  	  
LECTURER:	  So	  what	  you	  do	  is	  you	  become	  an	  advocate,	  you	  if	  you’re	  a	  very	  good	  advocate	  they	  ask	  
you	  to	  become	  a	  uh	  acting	  judge,	  if	  they	  say	  that	  you	  can	  do	  the	  work	  then	  they	  invite	  you	  to	  become	  a	  
full-­‐time	  judge	  in	  the	  provincial	  division,	  or	  the	  local	  division,	  after	  years	  of	  service	  in	  the	  provincial	  
division	  or	  the	  local	  division,	  if	  you	  are	  deemed	  to	  be	  fit,	  they	  are	  invited	  as	  an	  acting	  judge	  to	  the	  
Supreme	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  or	  to	  the	  Constitutional	  Court.	  So	  it’s	  a	  hierarchy,	  its	  not	  the	  same	  judges	  and	  
they	  don’t	  exchange.	  You	  are	  promoted	  to	  to	  one.	  	  
 
Quotation	  4	  
L10:	  93	   
[Advocate]	  [Judge]	  	  
LECTURER:	  No	  um	  ….de-­‐uh	  …	  Look	  I	  have	  difficulty	  in	  following	  you,	  I	  don’t	  know	  exactly	  what	  you	  
mean	  but	  um	  judges	  in	  private	  law	  matters	  sit	  and	  they	  are	  confronted	  by	  both	  sides	  represented	  by	  
an	  advocate.	  The	  advocates	  make	  sure	  -­‐	  that’s	  their	  job	  -­‐	  they	  make	  sure	  that	  the	  judge	  is	  informed	  of	  
very	  single	  possible	  authority	  uh	  that	  their	  case,	  that	  their	  side	  of	  the	  case	  um	  uh	  that	  will	  support	  their	  




entire	  scope	  of	  authorities,	  presented	  by	  the	  two	  advocates.	  Of	  course	  not	  all	  advocates	  are	  the	  same.	  
And	  some	  advocates	  are	  more	  thorough	  than	  others.	  What	  then	  happens	  uh	  is	  the	  judge	  hears	  the	  
case,	  he	  gains	  all	  the	  authorities,	  he	  then	  retires	  and	  then	  um	  he	  does	  his	  own	  investigation.	  He	  does	  
his	  own	  sources	  he	  investigates	  the	  advocate’s	  sources,	  he	  does	  his	  own	  research,	  he	  comes	  to	  a	  
conclusion	  based	  on	  everything	  that	  was	  laid	  before	  him.	  	  
 
Quotation	  5	  
L10:	  99	   
LECTURER:	  L:	   	  No	  no	  no	  no	  what	  you’re	  conf	  -­‐	  what	  you’re	  confusing	  is	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  precedent	  
of	  the	  case	  itself	  and	  the	  cases	  that	  are	  quoted	  in	  reaching	  that	  authority.	  Um	  [clears	  throat]	  when	  a	  
case	  is	  brought	  to	  court	  um	  you	  appoint	  an	  advocate	  and	  it	  is	  the	  work	  of	  that	  advocate	  to	  promote	  
your	  case.	  So	  he	  will	  get	  all	  the	  precedents	  that	  is	  in	  favour	  of	  your	  case.	  And	  he	  will	  put	  that	  before	  
the	  judge.	  And	  he	  will	  try	  everything	  -­‐	  with	  his	  arguments,	  with	  your	  affidavits,	  with	  everything,	  he	  will	  
try	  to	  convince	  the	  judge	  to	  decide	  upon	  the	  cases	  that	  he	  has	  quoted	  to	  the	  judge.	  The	  opponent	  will	  
do	  exactly	  the	  same.	  And	  usually,	  if	  it	  is	  a	  moot	  point,	  if	  it	  is	  an	  open	  point	  in	  law	  then	  there	  will	  be	  
authority	  for	  both	  sides	  -­‐	  yes!	  Yes!	  That	  is	  very	  possible.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact	  that’s	  what	  happens	  every	  
day	  in	  court.	  Is	  trying	  to	  convince	  a	  judge	  to	  accept	  your	  authorities	  rather	  than	  your	  opponents’	  
authorities.	  And	  then?	  That’s	  why	  you	  have	  to	  use	  logic,	  that’s	  why	  you	  have	  to	  use	  uh	  rational	  
deduction.	  The	  judge	  then	  has	  all	  these	  authorities	  in	  front	  of	  him	  	  with	  various	  weights	  that	  he	  
attached	  to	  the	  authorities,	  depending	  on	  what	  they	  are,	  and	  then	  he	  does	  his	  own	  research	  and	  he	  
comes	  to	  a	  conclusion,	  which	  authorities	  to	  accept	  and	  which	  to	  reject	  because	  every	  case	  is	  different.	  
When	  I	  talk	  about	  a	  precedent,	  no	  two	  cases	  can	  be	  exactly	  the	  same.	  I	  mean,	  you	  can	  understand	  that	  
for	  yourself.	  The	  facts	  will	  -­‐	  every	  case	  will	  have	  different	  facts.	  So	  there	  will	  always	  be	  cases	  that	  you	  
can	  argue	  are	  for,	  and	  cases	  that	  you	  argue	  are	  against	  it.	  
 
Quotation	  6	  	  
L11:	  48	   
[Advocate]	  [Judge]	  	  
LECTURER:	  Uh	  etc	  etc	  you	  know	  how	  it	  works,	  the	  profession.	  In	  the	  past	  if	  you	  are	  a	  very	  good	  
advocate	  and	  they	  um	  the	  council	  the	  bar	  the	  minister	  and	  the	  judicial	  services	  council	  think	  you	  
should	  be	  promoted,	  you	  are	  invited	  to	  act	  as	  a	  judge.	  For	  a	  couple	  of	  weeks,	  or	  a	  couple	  of	  months.	  
And	  if	  you	  prove	  yourself,	  if	  you	  prove	  to	  be	  a	  good	  judge,	  if	  your	  judgments	  are	  sound	  then	  they	  invite	  
you	  to	  become	  a	  judge.	  Uh	  but	  you	  are	  an	  acting	  judge	  before	  you	  are	  a	  full	  judge.	  	  
 
Quotation	  7	  
L11:	  87	   
LECTURER:	  He	  will	  say	  ‘the	  advocate	  for	  the	  defence’	  or	  ‘	  the	  advocate	  for	  the	  respondent	  said	  the	  
following,	  I’m	  not	  accepting	  his	  version.	  I’m	  rejecting	  his	  authority.	  Advocate	  for	  the	  other	  side	  
forwarded	  these	  arguments	  and	  I	  find	  them	  acceptable.	  And	  for	  these	  reasons	  I’m	  going	  to	  follow	  that.	  
Um	  but	  that	  is	  very	  confusing,	  you	  know,	  If	  you	  don’t	  know	  what	  he’s	  doing,	  is	  this	  now	  part	  of	  the	  
judgment	  or	  what	  he’s	  doing.	  Um	  …	  uh…	  you	  know.	  The	  best	  is	  go	  to	  the	  order,	  go	  to	  the	  end	  where	  
you	  look	  for	  the	  ratio	  decidendi,	  the	  reasons	  for	  the	  decision,	  where	  he	  says,	  ‘OK	  everything	  








L12:	  14	   
LECTURER:	  If	  it	  is	  an	  application	  -­‐	  in	  other	  words	  its	  just	  one	  person	  involved.	  When	  is	  an	  application?	  If	  
you	  apply	  for	  voluntary	  liquidation,	  if	  you	  apply	  to	  be	  admitted	  as	  an	  advocate,	  if	  you	  apply	  to	  be	  
declared	  [gestures	  with	  hand]	  something,	  sane	  or	  insane.	  If	  you	  apply	  for	  for	  the	  court	  to	  make	  any	  de-­‐
uh	  declaratory	  statement.	  Then	  it	  is	  an	  application	  -­‐	  it	  is	  usually	  on	  a	  Tuesday	  morning,	  well	  in	  the	  
Transvaal	  its	  on	  a	  Tuesday	  morning,	  we	  call	  it	  the	  motion	  court,	  where	  all	  the	  simple	  applications	  are	  
heard.	  	  
 
Quotation	  9	  	  
L12:	  19	   
LECTURER:	  You	  get	  the	  Gregorowski	  law	  reports	  and	  that	  just	  means	  it	  is	  an	  advocate	  Gregorowski	  
who	  collected	  the	  law	  reports.	  You	  get	  the	  Munro	  set.	  You	  get	  um	  Roscoe,	  um	  you	  get	  um	  	  there	  are	  
many.	  There	  are	  many	  people	  who	  collected	  the	  uh	  the	  law	  reports.	  	  
 
Quotation	  10	  	  
L12:	  124	   
LECTURER:	  That	  they	  come	  from	  the	  from	  the	  -­‐	  Searle	  S-­‐e-­‐a-­‐r-­‐l-­‐e-­‐	  Searle.	  It’s	  a	  it’s	  a	  col/	  it’s	  a	  	  it	  was	  an	  




L12:	  186	   
LECTURER:	  You	  know	  we	  have/	  not	  all	  our	  case	  are	  even	  reported,	  as	  you	  know.	  Uh	  in	  those	  days,	  in	  
those	  days	  um	  and	  that’s	  what	  I	  wanted	  you	  to	  pick	  up,	  it	  that	  uh	  the	  the	  people	  who	  collected	  them,	  
these	  specific	  collections	  -­‐	  I	  will	  go	  fetch	  my	  law	  reports	  now	  so	  that	  I	  can	  show	  you	  -­‐	  um,	  these	  
people’s	  collections,	  it	  was	  in	  their	  discretion!	  Which	  cases	  to	  report.	  They	  decided,	  and	  they	  were	  
advocates.	  Practitioners	  of	  the	  court!	  And	  they	  could	  decide	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  year,	  OK	  I	  can	  put	  this	  
into	  my	  collection,	  I’m	  going	  to	  put	  that	  into	  my	  collection,	  and	  that’s	  how	  cases	  got	  reported.	  	  
 
Quotation	  12	  
L13:	  150	   
LECTURER:	  He	  didn’t	  have	  the	  authority	  to	  declare	  it	  invalid,	  but	  he	  said	  -­‐	  and	  it	  wasn’t	  argued	  by	  the	  
advocates	  -­‐	  but	  he	  just	  mentioned	  in	  passing	  
 
Quotation	  13	  
L14:	  11	  	  
[Advocate]	  [Judge]	  	  
LECTURER:	  Common	  law,	  England	  is	  the	  common	  wisdom	  of	  the	  judges	  and	  the	  the	  um	  uh	  advocates	  








LECTURER:	  I	  don’t	  know.	  No	  I	  don’t	  think	  so.	  I	  don’t	  think	  so	  no.	  No	  he	  was	  a	  he	  was	  a	  a	  um	  senior	  
counsel.	  And	  a	  bilio-­‐biblio-­‐bibliophile.	  Like	  like	  myself.	  He	  collected	  uh.	  He	  was	  an	  advocate	  and	  uh	  uh	  
you	  know	  he	  had	  a	  thriving	  practice	  [inaudible]	  but	  his	  his	  passion	  was	  books.	  Um	  and	  he	  collected	  
these	  old	  books	  and	  in	  his	  time	  you	  could	  still	  collect	  them	  you	  could	  still	  collect	  these	  books.	  	  
 
Quotation	  15	  
L14:	  110	   
LECTURER:	  And	  when	  Glenda,	  Glenda	  Fick	  and	  I	  went	  to	  to	  look	  at	  these	  books	  the	  first	  book,	  the	  first	  
thing	  that	  I	  saw	  -­‐	  he	  had	  a	  study	  about	  the	  size	  of	  this	  room	  -­‐	  and	  the	  first	  book,	  the	  first	  thing	  that	  I	  
saw	  when	  I	  walked	  in	  into	  the	  door,	  there	  was	  the	  full	  set	  of	  Cujacius.	  The	  full	  set,	  brand-­‐	  in	  pig-­‐skin.	  
Br-­‐	  not	  brand	  new	  but	  virtually	  untouched.	  The	  full	  set.	  So	  that’s	  $43	  000	  times	  42.	  Um	  and	  so	  he	  asked	  
-­‐	  his	  son	  is	  an	  engineer,	  this	  Suzman’s	  son	  is	  an	  engineer,	  and	  his	  mother	  stayed	  in	  the	  house	  and	  his	  
mother	  died	  and	  then	  and	  he’s	  of	  course	  emigrated,	  and	  they	  just	  want	  to	  get	  rid	  of	  the	  books	  and	  he	  
said	  ‘Are	  you	  interested	  in	  these	  things?’	  And	  I	  said	  ‘well,	  vaguely’	  [laughs]	  No	  no	  the	  thing	  is	  we	  
already	  have	  Cujacius,	  we	  have	  the	  full	  set	  of	  Cujacius	  in	  our	  old	  authorities	  room.	  So	  now	  we	  have	  
two.	  
 
Quotation	  16	  	  
L16:	  33	   
[Advocate]	  
LECTURER:	  Well,	  uh	  you	  know,	  it’s	  a	  difficult	  question.	  Its	  like,	  you	  know,	  it	  really	  is	  a	  difficult	  question.	  
Because	  if	  you	  are	  a	  the	  bar	  uh	  uh	  and	  when	  I	  say	  at	  the	  bar	  it	  means	  if	  you’re	  an	  advocate,	  you	  rely	  
one	  hundred	  percent	  on	  the	  um	  side-­‐bar,	  and	  those	  are	  the	  attorneys	  to	  send	  you	  briefs,	  to	  send	  you	  
um	  to	  send	  you	  work.	  So	  if	  you	  go	  directly	  from	  university	  to	  the	  bar	  you’re	  going	  to	  sit	  in	  an	  office	  
somewhere	  here	  in	  Johannesburg	  and	  wait	  for	  your	  telephone	  to	  ring	  and	  its	  never	  going	  to	  ring.	  
Because	  nobody	  knows	  about	  you.	  So	  in	  that	  sense	  it	  is	  much	  much	  better	  to	  go,	  do	  your	  articles,	  build	  
up	  your	  contacts	  as	  they	  say,	  during	  your	  articles	  you	  know	  get	  to	  know	  as	  many	  lawyers	  uh	  many	  
attorneys	  as	  possible	  um	  see	  that	  you	  know	  the	  attorneys	  in	  your	  firm	  uh	  very	  very	  well	  so	  that	  at	  least	  
they	  will	  brief	  you	  when	  you’re	  an	  advocate,	  and	  you	  must	  also	  be	  um	  you	  must	  have	  a	  very	  good	  
reputation.	  Now	  if	  you’re	  straight	  through	  your	  LLB	  by	  you	  know	  getting	  60	  or	  68%	  you	  know	  that’s	  not	  
good	  enough.	  You	  must	  get	  your	  LLM	  uh	  LLB	  cum	  laude.	  You	  must	  you	  must	  be	  distinguished.	  People	  
must	  talk	  about	  you.	  Um	  and	  then	  you	  know	  you	  must	  get	  a	  distinction	  in	  your	  in	  your	  admissions	  
exam	  for	  the	  bar	  or	  for	  the	  um	  uh	  attorneys’	  profession.	  Uh	  and	  people	  must	  you	  know	  there’s	  one	  
thing	  that	  a	  lawyer	  can’t	  resist	  and	  that	  is	  gossip.	  And	  the	  whole	  profession	  is	  built,	  in	  a	  positive	  and	  a	  
negative	  sense	  on	  gossip.	  Um	  its	  not	  negative	  gossip	  but	  people	  because	  its	  such	  a	  small	  profession	  
people	  immediately	  talk	  about	  your	  performance	  in	  court.	  	  
 
Quotation	  17	  	  
L16:	  31 
LECTURER:	  No	  if	  you	  want	  to	  become	  an	  advocate	  you	  only	  need	  to	  do	  six	  month’s	  pupilage.	  There’s	  a	  
difference	  between	  articles	  and	  pupilage.	  Pupillage	  you	  get	  a	  master	  at	  the	  at	  the	  uh	  uh	  a	  senior	  
advocate	  or	  an	  advocate	  that	  you	  have	  confidence	  in	  and	  you	  enter	  into	  a	  contract	  with	  him	  and	  you	  
go	  with	  him	  for	  six	  months	  just	  to	  so	  that	  he	  can	  show	  you	  the	  ropes.	  Um	  you’re	  not	  paid	  for	  that	  six	  




the	  bar,	  after	  you’ve	  written	  your	  bar	  exam,	  then	  you	  become	  an	  an	  admitted	  advocate.	  	  
 
Quotation	  18	  	  
L16:	  34	  	  
[Advocate]	  [Attorney]	  	  
LECTURER:	  Um	  to	  give	  you	  an	  example	  we	  had	  a	  colleague	  here	  who	  was	  a	  very	  good	  lecturer	  and	  he	  
was	  a	  student	  of	  mine	  he	  was	  a	  very	  good	  student	  but	  irritating	  student,	  he	  asked	  very	  piercing	  and	  um	  
tenacious	  questions,	  you	  know,	  he	  wouldn’t	  let	  go.	  You	  know	  if	  you	  didn’t	  answer	  the	  question	  he’d	  
come	  to	  you	  afterwards	  and	  say	  ‘look	  you	  didn’t	  answer	  the	  question,	  I	  want	  the	  answer’.	  Uh	  so	  he	  
was	  a	  difficult	  student	  but	  a	  very	  good	  student.	  And	  he	  became	  a	  lecturer	  here	  and	  he	  was	  a	  very	  good	  
lecturer	  and	  he	  wrote	  a	  book	  and	  decided	  to	  go	  to	  the	  bar.	  He	  wrote	  his	  exam,	  he	  passed	  his	  exam	  
with	  flying	  colours,	  and	  because	  um	  um	  my	  wife	  is	  an	  attorney,	  and	  I	  mix	  with	  lots	  of	  attorneys,	  uh	  
within	  three	  or	  four	  months	  everybody	  was	  talking	  about	  him.	  Uh	  as	  the	  new	  guy	  at	  the	  bar	  whose	  
brilliant.	  	  
 
Quotation	  19	  	  
L16:	  36	   
LECTURER:	  But	  that’s	  what	  I	  say,	  people	  are	  all	  talking	  about	  one	  another.	  And	  people	  are	  all	  talking	  
about	  whether	  you	  are	  good	  or	  not	  at	  the	  bar.	  So	  the	  attorneys	  know,	  when	  they’ve	  got	  a	  case,	  who	  to	  
brief.	  They	  know	  who	  are	  the	  bright	  stars.	  And	  if	  you’re	  one	  of	  those	  bright	  stars	  you’ll	  make	  it	  at	  the	  
bar.	  Whatever	  you	  do	  to	  get	  there.	  But	  you	  must	  be	  a	  bright	  star.	  Uh	  the	  bar’s	  not	  for	  mediocre	  
people.	  Um	  you	  know.	  I	  can	  say	  it	  because	  I’m	  not	  there.	  Um	  its	  not	  for	  you	  know	  you	  can	  go	  to	  the	  bar	  
and	  you	  can	  open	  your	  office	  and	  you	  can	  be	  admitted	  but	  you	  know	  the	  lights	  are	  going	  to	  be	  on	  but	  
nobody’s	  going	  to	  phone	  you.	  So	  it’s	  a	  very	  tough	  profession.	  But	  we’ll	  have	  a	  whole	  lecture	  on	  on	  the	  
legal	  profession	  and	  then	  you	  know	  I’ll	  answer	  some	  more	  questions.	  	  
 
Quotation	  20	  	  
L16:	  35	   
[Advocate]	  [Legal	  academic]	  	  
LECTURER:	  Also	  professor	  Cockerell	  who	  was	  also	  here,	  who	  decided	  he	  doesn’t	  want	  to	  stay	  in	  
academia,	  and	  he	  went	  to	  the	  bar.	  Now	  he	  already	  had	  a	  reputation,	  everybody	  knew	  him,	  he	  
published	  widely,	  he’s	  a	  confirmed,	  very	  established	  academic,	  and	  he	  then	  went	  to	  the	  bar.	  And	  
immediately	  he	  got	  enormous	  briefs,	  you	  know,	  um	  uh	  you	  know	  constitutional	  court	  cases	  and	  very	  
important	  cases.	  And	  he’s	  doing	  exceptionally	  well	  at	  the	  bar.	  	  
 
Quotation	  21	  
L18:	  73	  -­‐	  7	   
073	   LECTURER:	  A	  senior,	  a	  Queen’s	  Counsel	  or	  a	  King’s	  Counsel	  is	  um	  QC,	  is	  a	  title	  you	  obtain	  when	  
you	  become	  a	  very	  very	  senior	  advocate.	  	  
074	   STUDENT	  8:	  ‘K	  
075	   LECTURER:	  Or	  a	  very	  senior	  barrister.	  Um	  it	  means	  that	  um	  that	  the	  Minister	  of	  Justice	  or	  the	  
State	  President	  or	  the	  Queen	  then	  in	  England,	  considers	  you	  above	  the	  others.	  Uh	  the	  only	  
implication	  is	  that	  you	  get	  to	  wear	  now	  not	  only	  a	  cotton	  robe,	  but	  you	  can	  wear	  silk	  robe.	  Your	  
robes	  are	  now	  made	  of	  silk	  and	  the	  more	  important	  thing	  of	  course	  is	  that	  it	  is	  a	  prestige.	  Um	  




you	  charge	  no	  longer	  R3000	  an	  hour	  but	  	  
076	   STUDENT	  12:	  R20	  000	  
077	   LECTURER:	  R20	  000	  an	  hour.	  So	  that’s	  the	  main,	  that’s	  the	  main	  consideration.	  
 
Quotation	  22	  
L18:	  79	   
LECTURER:	  N-­‐	  I	  don’t	  think	  so	  ..	  it’s	  not	  …	  you	  know	  that’s	  something	  in	  the	  discretion	  of	  the	  Minister	  
of	  Justice.	  Um	  …	  uh	  …	  you	  know	  …	  uh	  senior	  advocates,	  senior	  advocates	  are	  a	  very	  rare	  breed.	  Um	  its	  
not	  a	  lot	  of	  them	  around.	  So,	  if	  you’ve	  been	  around	  for	  ten	  or	  fifteen	  years	  then	  your	  name	  will	  be	  sent	  
forward	  by	  the	  bar	  and	  the	  Minister	  will	  look	  at	  your	  at	  your	  practice	  and	  if	  you	  are	  a	  person	  of	  
substance	  and	  you’ve	  done	  uh	  important	  cases	  and	  you’ve	  got	  stature	  and	  you’ve	  got	  a	  very	  solid	  
practice,	  then	  he	  will	  make	  you	  Senior	  Counsel.	  I	  don’t	  think	  there’s	  a	  closed	  number.	  Um	  but	  its	  not,	  
its	  not	  something	  that	  is	  granted	  lightly.	  Its	  not	  something	  that	  you	  get	  in	  a	  lucky	  packet.	  	  
 
Quotation	  23	  
L18:	  82	  -­‐	  3	   
082	  	   STUDENT	  6:	  Excuse	  sir?	  This	  is	  just	  in	  passing,	  so	  if	  you	  look	  the	  these	  uh	  I	  just	  get	  sometimes	  
overwhelmed	  by	  the	  bills	  which	  they	  are	  charged,	  the	  Jacob	  Zuma	  and	  the	  McBride	  ..	  They	  run	  
into	  millions	  and	  millions	  of	  money.	  Within	  a	  short	  period	  of	  time.	  Can	  we	  assume	  that	  those	  
represented	  by	  something	  similar	  like	  a	  QC,	  a	  Senior	  Counsel,	  the	  advocates	  that	  represent	  
them	  in	  court,	  cos	  	  
083	   LECTURER:	  No	  I	  don’t.	  I	  don’t	  know	  about	  Mr	  McBride,	  uh	  I’m	  not	  following	  his	  case,	  but	  Zuma,	  
definitely.	  Um	  you	  know,	  obviously.	  Um	  it	  is	  a	  very,	  it’s	  a	  it’s	  a	  …	  it’s	  the	  most	  important	  case	  uh	  
criminal	  case	  in	  any	  case	  that’s	  serving	  before	  the	  courts	  at	  the	  moment.	  So,	  on	  both	  sides,	  
from	  the	  State	  and	  from	  his	  side.	  He	  will	  um,	  he	  will	  employ	  uh	  very	  very	  senior,	  very	  senior	  
advocates.	  He	  will	  employ	  the	  best	  he	  can	  get.	  And	  that	  will	  be,	  that	  will	  be	  senior	  advocates.	  
And	  that’s	  why	  the	  the	  …	  um	  that’s	  why	  the	  fees	  are	  exorbitant.	  Uh	  you	  know,	  they	  ..	  and	  the	  
cases	  are	  running	  for	  a	  very	  long	  time.	  So	  those	  people	  can’t	  take	  any	  other	  cases	  so	  they	  are	  
on	  a	  a	  um	  on	  a	  retainer	  by	  Zuma	  and	  probably	  McBride.	  But	  legal	  costs	  are	  something	  we	  can	  
talk	  about	  later	  if	  we	  have	  time.	  	  
 
Quotation	  24	  
L18:	  96	   




L20:	  24	   
LECTURER:	  Well	  …	  some	  people	  will	  not	  agree	  with	  that.	  But	  the	  idea	  is	  the	  very	  best	  senior	  advocates.	  
The	  very	  best	  of	  the	  practicing	  advocates	  are	  appointed	  as	  judges.	  	  
 
Quotation	  26	  
L21:	  44	   
[Advocate]	  [Attorney]	  




fascinates	  you,	  um,	  and,	  uh,	  let	  us	  start,	  uh,	  not	  at	  the	  top	  but,	  um	  at	  the	  part	  of	  the	  profession	  which	  
would	  probably	  be,	  uh,	  the	  part	  where	  you’re	  going	  to	  enter	  the	  profession.	  South	  Africa’s	  got	  a	  
divided	  bar,	  we’ve	  got	  a	  bar,	  um,	  where	  we	  have,	  um	  advocates,	  and	  I	  will	  come	  to	  the	  advocates	  just	  
now.	  And	  then	  we’ve	  got	  what	  we	  call	  a	  side-­‐bar,	  Uh,	  and	  in	  the	  side-­‐bar	  we	  have	  the	  attorneys.	  	  
 
Quotation	  27	  
L21:	  45	   
LECTURER:	  If	  you	  go,	  if	  you’re	  looking	  for	  legal	  advice	  you,	  what	  you	  most	  probably	  do	  is	  you	  look	  for	  
an	  attorney	  first.	  You	  cannot	  go	  to	  an	  advocate	  directly.	  The	  attorney	  must	  refer	  you	  to	  an	  advocate	  or	  
the	  attorney	  appoints	  an	  advocate	  on	  your	  behalf. 
 
Quotation	  28	  
L22:	  23	  	  
LECTURER:	  If	  she’s	  going	  to	  the	  bar,	  she’s	  now	  a	  candidate	  attorney,	  she’s	  working	  to	  qualify,	  she	  
qualifies	  at	  the	  end	  of	  this	  year.	  If	  she	  then	  stays	  on	  another	  year	  or	  so	  at	  Bowman	  Gilfillan,	  big	  firm,	  
lots	  of	  contacts,	  she	  then	  goes	  to	  the	  bar,	  everybody	  knows	  that	  she’s	  an	  authority	  on	  prescription.	  
And	  that	  -­‐	  that’s	  how	  you	  get	  people	  to	  phone	  you.	  That’s	  how	  you	  get	  people	  to	  phone	  you.	  That’s	  
how	  the	  legal	  profession	  works,	  ladies	  and	  gentlemen,	  that	  is	  unfortunately	  how	  it	  works. 
 
Quotation	  29	  	  
L22:	  42	  -­‐	  3	  	  
042	   LECTURER:	  OK,	  um,	  a	  legal	  advisor	  of	  a	  company.	  Now	  ladies	  and	  gentlemen	  this	  is	  something	  
completely	  different.	  It	  is	  somebody	  that	  has	  an	  LLB,	  a	  BA	  or	  preferably	  a	  B.ComLLB	  who	  does	  
not	  want	  to	  practice	  law.	  Is	  usually	  not	  the	  sharpest	  tool	  in	  the	  shed,	  um,	  people	  who	  become	  
legal	  advisors	  to	  a	  company	  are	  people	  who	  can’t	  practice.	  You	  know	  what	  they	  say	  about	  
academics,	  you	  know	  people	  who	  can	  do	  and	  people	  who	  can’t	  teach	  …	  but	  that’s	  not	  true,	  ah	  
well,	  I	  don’t	  think	  its	  true	  …	  
043	   Um	  but	  legal	  advisors,	  or	  what	  we	  call	  them	  a	  better	  word	  for	  them	  is	  in-­‐house	  counsel,	  it’s	  a	  
nicer	  word	  for	  it,	  in-­‐house	  counsel.	  That	  is	  an	  attorney	  or	  advocate	  that	  joins	  a	  huge	  firm	  like	  
Billiton	  or	  Anglo-­‐American	  or	  Old	  Mutual	  or	  Sanlam	  or	  whatever	  and	  they	  sit	  in	  a	  large	  office	  
and	  they	  are	  the	  first	  line	  of	  defence	  for	  that	  firm.	  In	  other	  words	  they	  are	  the	  in-­‐house	  lawyer	  
for	  that	  firm.	  And	  they	  don’t	  do	  anything.	  You	  get	  a	  problem	  if	  they	  can	  do	  it	  they,	  the	  the	  most	  
simple	  things	  they	  do	  themselves.	  But	  as	  soon	  as	  it	  gets	  complicated	  then	  they	  appoint	  an	  
outside	  lawyer	  or	  outside	  advocate	  to	  do	  the	  practical	  side,	  to	  do	  the	  practical	  side	  of	  it.	  They	  
do	  some	  of	  the	  work	  themselves,	  but	  very	  little	  only	  the,	  um,	  only	  the	  very	  menial,	  the	  very	  
basic	  things.	  Collections	  and	  bad	  debts	  and	  things	  like	  that.	  They	  do	  however,	  on	  a	  personal	  
note,	  they	  do	  however	  get	  a	  very	  large	  salary.	  Um,	  and	  they	  are	  privy	  to	  some	  very	  very	  
sensitive	  information.	  So,	  if	  you	  have	  friends	  becoming	  legal	  advisors	  to	  large	  firms,	  they	  are	  
very	  good	  to	  know.	  Uh,	  these	  are	  people	  who	  will	  brief	  you	  if	  you	  are	  going	  to	  become	  an	  
advocate.	  They	  will	  brief	  you	  and	  they	  will	  give	  you	  fat	  briefs.	  Do	  you	  know	  what	  the	  word	  brief	  








044	   A	  brief	  is	  a,	  um,	  is	  a	  document	  in	  blue	  that	  is	  folded	  like	  this,	  and	  we	  have	  discussed	  this	  I’m	  
sure.	  It	  comes	  from	  the	  formula	  of	  the	  praetor,	  It’s	  a	  document	  like	  this,	  its	  blue,	  its	  this	  colour,	  slightly	  
light,	  it’s	  a	  light	  blue	  like	  your	  jersey	  (gestures	  towards	  one	  of	  the	  students).	  It’s	  a	  light	  blue	  and	  its	  got	  
printed	  on	  such	  and	  such	  versus	  such	  and	  such,	  the	  attorneys	  and	  the	  advocates	  and	  its	  tied	  together,	  
inside	  there	  are,	  uh,	  papers	  or	  whatever	  and	  its	  tied	  together	  with	  a	  pink	  ribbon.	  I	  don’t	  know	  why	  its	  
pink.	  I	  don’t	  know	  if	  it	  must	  be	  a	  pink	  ribbon	  but	  its	  tied	  together	  by	  a	  pink	  ribbon.	  And	  this	  is	  what	  the	  
advocate	  takes	  to	  court	  with	  him	  and	  this	  is	  called	  a	  brief.	  B-­‐r-­‐i-­‐e-­‐f	  it	  is	  his	  brief,	  his	  instruction	  from	  the	  




LECTURER:	  So,	  if	  you’re	  an	  advocate	  this	  is	  what	  you	  take	  to	  court	  with	  you,	  this	  is	  your	  bread-­‐and-­‐
butter.	  This	  is	  what	  you	  make	  and	  this	  is	  what	  people,	  legal	  advisors	  in	  a	  company	  will	  send	  to	  you	  





LECTURER:	  OK,	  um,	  the	  second	  one,	  the	  second	  possibility	  is	  if,	  and	  we’ve	  spoken	  about	  this,	  is	  an	  
advocate.	  Advocate	  is	  more,	  uh,	  the	  work	  of	  an	  advocate	  is	  more	  intellectually	  stimulating.	  You	  work	  
on	  your	  own.	  You	  work	  on	  your	  own.	  You	  have	  your	  own	  office,	  you	  have	  your	  own	  secretary	  which	  
you	  appoint	  and	  you	  pay	  for.	  You’ve	  got	  your	  own	  law	  reports.	  You’ve	  got	  your	  own	  work,	  you’ve	  got	  
your	  own	  telephone,	  you’ve	  got	  your	  own	  dictaphone,	  you’ve	  got	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  anybody	  else.	  	  
There’s	  not	  somebody	  who	  will	  come	  and	  knock	  on	  your	  door	  and	  five	  o	  clock	  and	  say:	  ‘Why	  are	  you	  
still	  …	  ‘	  or	  ‘Why	  are	  you	  not	  here’	  or	  ‘Why	  are	  you	  still	  working’	  or	  ‘Have	  you	  finished	  this	  or	  that.	  You	  
work	  for	  yourself.	  You	  charge	  by	  the	  hour	  and	  what	  you	  do	  is	  you	  prepare	  everything	  for	  the	  court.	  You	  




LECTURER:	  Ladies	  and	  gentlemen,	  if	  you	  stand	  up	  in	  court,	  and	  you	  will	  feel	  that	  (shakes	  head)	  I	  hope	  
every	  one	  of	  you	  will	  at	  least	  once	  in	  your	  life	  have	  that	  feeling	  of	  appearing	  in	  a	  court.	  You	  are,	  and	  I	  
don’t	  care	  who	  you	  are,	  if,	  you	  can	  be	  Sydney	  Kentridge,	  if	  you	  appear	  in	  court	  you	  are	  scared.	  And	  if	  
you	  are	  not	  scared	  then	  you	  are	  not	  prepared.	  You	  are	  scared,	  uh	  uh	  ..	  appearing	  in	  a	  court	  is	  very	  very	  
intimidating.	  Um,	  so	  if	  you’re	  a	  good	  advocate	  you	  will	  see	  that	  all	  your	  papers	  are	  in	  order.	  What	  are	  
your	  papers?	  
 
Quotation	  34	  	  
L22:	  48	   
[Advocate]	  [Judge]	  	  
LECTURER:	  The	  papers	  are	  the	  things	  filed	  in	  the	  court	  file	  and	  served	  upon	  the	  other	  side	  that	  you	  are	  
going	  to	  base	  your	  case	  upon	  in	  the	  form	  of	  affidavits,	  expert	  witnesses,	  whatever,	  I	  don’t,	  I	  can’t	  go	  
into	  all	  those	  technical	  details.	  But	  it	  is	  a	  paper	  file	  that	  is	  opened	  for	  your	  case	  in	  the	  court	  and	  that	  




the	  judge	  will	  only	  keep	  you	  responsible.	  The	  judge	  will	  ask	  you,	  um,	  Mr	  [state’s	  student’s	  surname]	  
why	  is	  the	  file	  not	  properly	  paginated?	  And	  its	  no	  use	  saying,	  uh	  my	  lord	  I’m	  terribly	  sorry	  but	  that	  
must	  have	  been	  the	  clerk,	  the	  clerk	  of	  the	  attorney	  who	  did	  not	  attend	  to	  the	  pagination.	  You	  must	  see	  
to	  it	  that	  everything	  is	  in	  order.	  Up	  to	  such	  a	  small	  detail	  as	  pagination.	  You	  know	  what	  pagination	  is?	  	  
You	  have	  a	  file	  of	  ten	  thousand	  pages	  and	  every	  day	  a	  new	  document	  arrives	  to	  be	  put	  into	  that	  file.	  
Sometimes,	  the	  order	  changes.	  So	  before	  the	  document	  goes	  to	  the	  judge	  on	  the	  day	  of	  the	  trial,	  
somebody,	  usually	  the	  clerk	  of	  the,	  the	  candidate	  attorney	  of	  the	  attorney’s	  office,	  must	  go	  to	  the	  file	  
and	  see	  to	  it	  that	  it	  is	  paginated,	  in	  pen,	  in	  pen,	  you	  paginate	  it	  in	  pen	  because	  it	  changes.	  And	  its	  
paginated	  from	  page	  one	  to	  page	  ten	  thousand.	  Correctly.	  If	  it	  is	  not	  correct	  then	  the	  judge	  can	  throw	  
out	  your	  case.	  	  
 
Quotation	  35	  	  
L22:	  49	   
[Advocate]	  [Judge]	  	  
LECTURER:	  You	  must	  be	  able	  to	  see	  every	  single	  thing.	  If	  there’s	  a	  spelling	  error	  in	  your	  pleadings,	  oh	  
please.	  If	  there’s	  a	  grammatical	  error.	  If	  there’s	  a	  technical	  error,	  a	  legal	  error,	  if	  you’ve	  made	  an	  
aversion	  on	  a	  statement	  that	  is	  wrong	  technically,	  legally,	  your	  case	  is	  thrown	  out.	  The	  judge	  will	  give	  
you	  an	  opportunity.	  He’ll	  say,	  uh,	  please	  Mr	  [state’s	  student’s	  surname],	  address	  me	  on	  this	  novel	  
interpretation	  that	  you	  have	  in	  clause	  3.	  And	  then	  you	  will	  be	  able	  to	  address	  him	  but	  I	  mean	  if	  you,	  uh	  
uh,	  if	  he	  talks	  like	  that	  you	  know	  you’re	  stuffed.	  You	  can	  just	  as	  well,	  you	  know,	  pack	  up	  and	  say	  ‘I’m	  
sorry	  my	  lord,	  um	  uh,	  I’m	  relatively	  inexperienced	  in	  these	  matters	  and	  uh,	  it	  slipped	  in,	  I	  beg	  your	  
lordship’s	  indulgence	  to	  amend	  it.	  And	  your	  lordship	  will	  not	  give	  you	  an	  indulgence.	  He	  will	  say,	  well	  
the	  indulgence	  I	  will	  give	  you	  is	  that	  I	  will	  take	  the	  case	  off	  the	  roll	  for	  you	  completely	  and	  then	  you	  can	  
put	  it	  back	  again	  when	  its	  correct.	  And	  then	  you’ve	  wasted	  costs.	  You’ve	  wasted	  thousands	  of	  rand	  by	  
appearing	  and	  preparing	  to	  appear	  for	  that	  day	  for	  trial	  in	  court	  and	  its	  just	  thrown	  out	  because	  you’ve	  
made	  something	  wrong.	  You’ve	  referred	  to	  section	  2(1)	  instead	  of	  section	  1(2).	  	  Uh	  a.	  And	  the	  guy	  
sitting	  on	  the	  bench,	  the	  judge	  is	  a	  senior	  advocate	  of	  twenty-­‐five	  year’s	  standing.	  So,	  for	  twenty-­‐five	  
years	  he’s	  been	  looking	  through	  these	  pleadings.	  So	  he,	  it	  jumps	  out	  uh	  uh	  at	  him.	  As	  soon	  as	  he	  reads	  
the	  pleadings	  and	  you’ve	  made	  an	  error	  it	  jumps	  out.	  He’s	  an	  expert,	  he	  knows	  everything.	  	  
 
Quotation	  36	  	  
L22:	  49	   
LECTURER:	  It’s	  a	  small	  detail	  ladies	  and	  gentlemen,	  but	  God	  in	  the	  law,	  lives	  in	  the	  detail.	  (waves	  hand	  
as	  if	  saying	  ‘no’)	  If	  you	  don’t	  have	  an	  eye	  for	  detail	  if	  you’re	  a,	  if	  you’re	  a	  more	  of	  a	  forest	  type	  person	  
and	  you	  can’t	  see	  the	  detail,	  you	  can’t	  see	  the	  leaves	  for	  the	  forest	  (gestures	  ‘no’	  once	  again).	  Stay	  
away.	  Don’t	  even	  try	  to	  become	  an	  advocate.	  	  
 
Quotation	  37 
L22:	  50	   
LECTURER:	  So	  (clears	  throat)	  advocate	  is	  the	  person	  who	  appears	  in	  court.	  If	  you’re	  not	  a	  good	  public	  
speaker,	  well,	  I	  must	  say,	  I	  have	  seen	  some	  very	  poor	  public	  speakers	  being	  reasonably	  successful	  at	  
court,	  but	  it	  will	  help	  you	  know.	  Then	  go	  for	  elocution	  lessons,	  um,	  if	  you	  are	  shy	  and	  you	  don’t	  like	  
conflict,	  you	  don’t	  like	  uh,	  intellectual	  violence,	  don’t	  become	  an	  advocate.	  Please,	  its	  not	  ..	  it	  is	  a	  very	  




to	  the	  last	  thing	  you	  do	  and	  your	  hours	  are	  long.	  You	  work	  from	  4,	  5	  o	  clock	  in	  the	  morning	  to	  get	  
everything	  ready	  for	  court	  until	  12	  o	  clock	  the	  next	  evening.	  So	  you	  have	  three	  four	  hours	  every	  night	  
that	  you	  can	  sleep.	  If	  you	  want	  to	  have	  a	  family,	  then,	  you	  know,	  then	  try	  to	  get	  to	  sleep.	  (class	  laughs)	  
 
Quotation	  38	  	  
L22:	  51	  -­‐	  2	   
[Advocate]	  [Attorney]	  	  
051	   STUDENT	  8:	  What	  are	  the	  incidences	  when	  attorneys	  appear	  in	  court,	  when	  …	  	  
052	   Um,	  it’s	  a	  new	  thing	  that	  has	  happened	  with	  the	  new	  Constitution	  and	  with	  this	  whole	  thing	  of	  
opening	  up	  the	  profession.	  Um	  if	  you	  ask	  me	  personally,	  I	  think	  it’s	  a,	  it’s	  a,	  its	  wrong,	  its	  stupid,	  
because	  the	  attorney’s	  profession	  has	  got	  certain	  things	  that	  they	  must	  do	  and	  the	  advocates	  
have	  got	  certain	  things	  that	  they	  must	  do	  and	  it	  is	  stupid	  to	  mix	  the	  two.	  
 
Quotation	  39	  	  
L22:	  53	   
LECTURER:	  Uh,	  but	  usually,	  it	  is	  better	  that	  the	  advocates	  do	  the	  court	  work	  and	  the	  attorney	  does,	  uh,	  
the	  off-­‐the-­‐street	  work,	  the	  preparation.	  Um,	  but	  it	  is	  possible	  now	  that	  the	  attorneys	  can	  appear	  in	  
the	  High	  Court.	  	  
 
Quotation	  40 
L22:	  57	   
LECTURER:	  The	  litigation	  department	  prepares,	  does	  all	  the	  backroom	  work.	  The	  litigation	  department,	  
um	  is	  the	  fall-­‐back	  of	  the	  advocate.	  The	  litigation	  department	  -­‐	  well	  they	  do	  maj	  court,	  maj	  court	  
litigation	  obviously,	  that’s	  what	  they	  do	  and	  when	  it	  goes	  to	  the	  High	  Court	  you	  do,	  um,	  all	  the	  
backroom	  work,	  you	  get	  all	  the	  expert	  witnesses	  together,	  you	  get	  all	  the	  statements	  together,	  you	  get	  
the	  file	  together,	  because	  the	  advocate	  can’t	  do	  that.	  The	  advocate	  is	  is	  is	  is	  office	  bound.	  	  
 
Quotation	  41 
L22:	  58	   
LECTURER:	  OK,	  um	  [clears	  throat]	  advocates	  are	  specialist	  uh	  uh	  litigators.	  They	  are	  specialist,	  um,	  in	  
appearing	  in	  court.	  	  
 
Quotation	  42	  	  
L22:	  58	  -­‐	  9	   
058	   LECTURER:	  Um,	  uh,	  what	  must	  you	  have,	  what	  must	  you	  be	  to	  be	  a	  good	  um	  advocate?	  You	  
must	  have	  an	  enormous	  reputation,	  You	  must	  have	  a	  very	  good	  reputation.	  I	  told	  you	  about	  my	  
colleague	  who	  started	  here,	  well	  he	  was	  first	  my	  student.	  Extremely	  irritable,	  irritating	  student	  
because	  um,	  he	  was	  in	  my	  jurisprudence	  class	  and	  he	  um,	  he	  wouldn’t	  stop	  asking	  questions	  
until	  he	  had	  the	  answer.	  Um,	  which	  was	  irritating	  for	  me	  but,	  you	  know,	  he	  was	  a	  very	  good	  
student.	  He	  then	  came	  …	  he	  then	  tried	  to	  do	  his	  articles	  which	  he	  hated.	  He	  	  then	  came	  to	  Wits	  
and	  he	  lectured	  for	  two	  three	  years	  here	  and	  he’s	  gone	  to	  the	  Bar.	  And,	  I	  mean,	  within	  six	  
months,	  um	  everybody,	  every	  single	  person	  at	  the	  Bar	  was	  talking	  about	  him.	  Uh,	  because	  of	  
how	  brilliant	  he	  is	  and	  how	  perceptive	  he	  is	  and	  how	  tenacious	  he	  is.	  Um,	  he’s	  a,	  he’s	  a	  small	  
unopposing	  little	  man.	  He’s	  not	  a,	  you	  know,	  fiery	  lion	  or	  something.	  But,	  he	  chips	  at	  you	  until	  




gave	  th	  paper	  first	  thing	  in	  the	  morning,	  it	  was	  a	  day	  session,	  um	  and	  he	  was	  fascinated	  at	  the,	  
at	  my	  view,	  that	  I	  had	  on	  this,	  uh	  specific	  issue	  ..	  its	  complicated	  and	  I	  can’t	  even	  remember	  it.	  
But	  it	  was	  a	  novel	  view	  on	  extending	  unjustified	  enrichment.	  And	  he,	  as	  soon	  as	  	  the	  session	  
was	  over	  he	  came	  to	  me	  and,	  you	  know,	  he	  ..	  it	  was	  teatime	  I	  can	  remember	  and	  he	  was	  
standing	  here	  and	  he	  said:	  ‘Um	  you	  said	  this	  and	  this	  ..	  what	  exactly	  did	  you	  mean?’	  And	  he	  
went	  on	  and	  on	  and	  on	  ..	  throughout	  teatime,	  throughout	  uh	  the	  second	  session	  the	  the	  mid-­‐
morning	  session,	  throughout	  lunch	  time.	  And	  I	  said	  ‘Andrew,	  please,	  dear	  God,	  can	  I	  eat	  I	  mean,	  
I	  don’t	  want	  to	  be	  rude	  but,	  you	  know,	  can	  I	  just	  have	  a	  break?’	  And	  he	  said	  ‘Yes	  but	  uh	  um	  
what	  exactly	  did	  you	  mean,	  you	  can	  eat	  you	  can	  talk	  to	  me	  while	  you	  eat.	  And	  he	  stayed	  with	  
me	  until	  that	  afternoon	  that	  we,	  that	  the	  conference	  was	  over,	  he	  did	  not	  give	  up	  until	  he	  
understood	  exactly	  what	  was	  going	  on.	  And	  he	  didn’t	  uh,	  he	  didn’t	  accept	  uh	  my	  version	  of	  it	  at	  
all.	  First	  of	  all	  I	  had	  to	  explain	  it	  to	  him	  and	  then,	  you	  know,	  he	  started	  attacking	  me	  on	  why,	  
why	  it	  couldn’t	  be.	  	  
059	   So,	  um,	  that	  is	  the	  kind	  of	  person	  that	  you	  want,	  uh,	  as	  an	  advocate.	  	  
 
Quotation	  43	  
L22:	  59	   
LECTURER:	  Razor-­‐sharp,	  you	  must	  have,	  uh,	  a	  razor-­‐sharp	  intelligence.	  You	  must	  be	  very	  good	  
analytically.	  You	  must	  have	  an	  extremely	  well-­‐founded,	  um,	  and	  developed	  legal	  feeling.	  If	  you	  see	  
something	  you	  must	  know	  what	  is	  the	  law.	  Is	  it	  right?	  Is	  it	  not?	  You	  must	  have	  a	  encyclopaedic	  
knowledge	  of	  the	  law.	  Um,	  and	  then	  of	  course	  you	  must	  be	  able	  to	  present	  yourself.	  Must	  be	  able	  to	  
present	  yourself.	  	  
 
Quotation	  44	  	  
L22:	  59	   
LECTURER:	  Very	  hard	  work,	  um,	  very	  very	  tough	  profession.	  Always	  very	  lucrative,	  very	  well	  paid.	  
Wonderful	  profession,	  nobody’s	  your	  boss.	  Um,	  but	  if	  you	  don’t	  work	  you	  don’t	  get	  paid.	  If	  you	  go	  for	  
ten	  days	  to	  Athens	  then	  for	  ten	  days	  you	  don’t	  get	  paid.	  And,	  you	  know,	  you	  must	  pay	  the	  bills,	  you	  
know,	  you	  must	  pay	  your	  chambers,	  you	  must	  pay	  your	  secretary,	  lots	  of	  things	  that	  you	  must	  pay.	  Um,	  
so	  it	  is	  only	  for	  the	  very	  best,	  reserved	  for	  the	  very	  best	  lawyers.	  
 
Quotation	  45	  	  
L22:	  60	  -­‐	  3	   
[Advocate]	  [Attorney]	  	  
060	  	   STUDENT	  1:	  Um,	  sorry	  Mr	  Serfontein,	  I	  was	  just	  wondering,	  I	  spoke	  to	  someone	  on	  the	  
weekend	  and	  they	  were	  telling	  me	  that	  …	  I	  remember	  you	  telling	  us	  the	  process	  that	  once	  you	  
got	  your	  LLB	  you	  do	  six	  months	  pupilage	  and	  then	  only	  you	  go	  on,	  um	  to	  practice	  um	  	  
061	   LECTURER:	  Plus	  the	  exam.	  
062	   STUDENT	  1:	  Ja,	  plus	  the	  exam.	  Someone	  else	  was	  also	  telling	  me	  that	  its	  better	  to	  rather	  do,	  uh,	  
your	  articles	  first	  and,	  um,	  become	  qualified	  as	  an	  attorney	  and	  then	  only	  go	  …	  
063	   LECTURER:	  Mmmm,	  but	  I,	  we	  discussed	  that	  as	  well.	  Yes,	  I	  said,	  um,	  I	  said	  that	  you	  can,	  if	  you	  
finish	  your	  LLB,	  you	  can,	  technically,	  you	  can	  do	  that.	  You	  can	  go	  directly	  to	  the	  bar.	  But	  I	  mean	  
you’re	  a,	  you’re	  a	  fool	  because	  as	  I’ve	  just	  shown	  you	  by	  the	  the	  the	  magazine,	  it	  all	  depends	  on	  




girl	  from	  Scotland	  and	  that’s	  not	  going	  to	  help.	  It	  helps	  with	  other	  things	  but	  its	  not	  going	  to	  
help	  with	  the	  law.	  But,	  if	  you	  do	  your	  articles	  first	  then	  at	  least	  you’re	  getting	  to	  know	  the	  
attorneys.	  And	  you’re	  getting	  to	  know	  the	  partners	  at	  that	  firm	  and	  other	  firms	  because	  every	  
case	  that	  you	  do	  in	  your	  two	  years’	  articles	  you	  have	  to	  work	  with	  other	  attorneys.	  And	  if	  you	  
impress	  them,	  even	  in	  the	  magistrates’	  court,	  you	  appear	  there	  and	  you	  make	  a	  name	  for	  
yourself,	  far	  far	  better,	  Not	  only	  do	  you	  do	  your	  articles,	  um,	  but	  also	  stay	  on	  a	  little	  while	  as	  a	  
professional	  assistant	  or	  associate,	  uh,	  its	  at	  a	  better	  salary	  and	  there	  you	  get	  more	  senior	  
work.	  And	  you	  can,	  you	  know,	  you	  can	  specialize	  especially	  if	  you	  go	  to	  a	  very	  large	  firm.	  Um,	  
you	  know.	  I	  would	  agree	  with	  that.	  Um.	  I	  would	  say	  nobody	  can	  go	  to	  the	  Bar	  before	  they’ve	  
been	  to	  the	  side-­‐bar.	  But	  there’s	  no	  such	  rule.	  It’s	  a	  split	  bar	  so	  you	  can	  do	  what	  you	  want.	  	  
 
Quotation	  46	  	  
L22:	  63	   
LECTURER:	  But	  I	  can	  assure	  you	  there	  are	  people	  sitting	  here,	  um,	  in	  town	  or	  at	  um,	  Sandton,	  praying	  
for	  the	  telephone	  to	  ring.	  Uh,	  and	  they’re	  sitting	  there	  week	  after	  week,	  hopefully	  only	  week	  after	  
week	  and	  not	  month	  after	  month.	  Um,	  because,	  you	  know,	  I’ve	  heard	  of	  people	  sitting	  on	  the	  library	  
steps	  of	  the,	  of	  the	  chambers	  in	  Sandton,	  uh,	  trying	  to	  conduct	  a	  practice	  from	  the	  library	  steps.	  I	  
mean,	  can’t	  go	  into	  the	  library	  because	  the	  library	  is,	  is	  preserved	  for	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Bar.	  Sit	  on	  
the	  steps	  and	  trying	  to	  get	  your	  practice	  going.	  I	  mean	  that’s	  not	  [clears	  throat]	  that’s	  not,	  you	  know,	  
nobody’s	  going	  to	  employ	  an	  advocate	  on	  the	  library	  steps.	  	  
 
Quotation	  47 
L22:	  64	   
LECTURER:	  Um	  [clears	  throat],	  three	  things	  that	  you	  must	  have	  tech	  ..	  formally.	  LLB,	  six	  month’s	  
pupilage	  without	  payment,	  nobody	  pays	  you,	  you	  must	  have	  financial	  support	  to	  live	  for	  six	  months,	  
uh,	  without	  support	  uh	  to	  live	  for	  six	  months	  without	  a	  salary.	  Perhaps	  you	  might,	  you	  might	  think	  its	  
easy	  to	  do	  that	  as	  a	  student	  it	  is,	  you	  know,	  because	  you’ve	  got	  lots	  of	  support	  structures,	  but	  if	  you	  
are	  in	  a	  profession	  you	  must	  have	  a	  car,	  you	  must	  have	  a	  cellphone,	  you	  must	  have	  money	  to	  entertain	  
people,	  you	  must	  have	  money	  to	  go	  out,	  you	  must	  have	  money	  to	  buy	  books,	  you	  must	  have	  money	  to	  
buy,	  money	  to	  buy	  make-­‐up,	  you	  want	  to	  buy	  nice	  clothes	  …	  you	  can’t,	  you	  know,	  not	  be	  well-­‐dressed,	  
you’re	  an	  advocate,	  you	  must	  dress	  very	  very	  well	  you	  must	  impress	  the	  people.	  You	  can’t	  sit	  there	  
with	  uh	  a	  denim	  and	  slacks	  …	  it	  just	  doesn’t	  work.	  If	  you,	  if	  you	  if	  you’ve	  got	  a	  multi-­‐million	  contract	  
that	  is	  a	  bit	  shaky	  and	  you	  want	  to	  take	  it	  to	  court	  and	  you	  get	  to	  this	  guy	  and	  he	  looks	  like	  you	  look	  
now	  today	  …	  Not	  that,	  not	  that	  you	  don’t	  look	  beautiful	  but,	  um,	  you	  know,	  this	  is	  not,	  you	  know,	  he’s	  
going	  to	  say	  ‘uuuh,	  you	  know,	  please,	  this	  guy	  doesn’t	  know	  what	  he’s	  doing	  or	  this	  girl	  doesn’t	  know	  
what	  she’s	  doing.	  She’s	  in	  a	  pink	  Oxford	  tracksuit	  [gestures	  towards	  one	  of	  the	  students]	  please,	  you	  
know’.	  You	  must	  power	  dress:	  black,	  red,	  white;	  high	  heels,	  silk	  stockings,	  pencil-­‐striped	  skirt,	  jacket,	  
neat	  hair,	  and,	  you	  know,	  power,	  power,	  power.	  You	  mustn’t,	  you	  know,	  there’s	  no	  softness	  there.	  	  
 
Quotation	  48 
L22:	  65	   
LECTURER:	  Ok,	  um,	  and	  then	  the	  third	  thing	  you	  need	  is	  your	  bar	  exam.	  Bar	  exam	  -­‐	  difficult	  but	  not	  
impossible.	  Bar	  exam	  -­‐	  lots	  of	  work	  -­‐	  but	  you	  must	  know	  your	  Rules	  of	  Court.	  And	  your	  ethics.	  Ethics,	  




Rules	  of	  Court.	  You	  must	  know	  your	  etiquette,	  your	  Rules	  of	  Court	  and	  your	  ethics.	  What	  may	  and	  may	  




[Advocate]	  [Attorney]	  	  
LECTURER:	  OK.	  Those	  are	  the	  two,	  um,	  parts	  of	  the	  profession	  that	  I	  think	  most	  of	  you	  are	  going	  to	  go	  
into.	  Um,	  there	  ..	  those	  are	  the	  two	  private,	  uh,	  private	  parts	  of	  the	  profession.	  Um,	  and	  in	  both	  these,	  
um,	  uh,	  professions,	  you	  will	  make,	  you’ll	  make	  a	  living.	  Definitely.	  You’ll	  make	  a	  good	  living.	  And	  the	  
higher	  up	  you	  go	  in	  these	  professions	  the	  better	  your	  living	  is.	  	  
 
Quotation	  50 
L22:	  87	   




L22:	  87	   
LECTURER:	  People	  like	  George	  Bizos	  who	  is	  a	  well-­‐known	  advocate	  
 
Quotation	  52	  	  
L22:	  92	   
LECTURER:	  You	  didn’t	  really	  take	  notice.	  OK.	  Um	  uh	  judge	  must	  be	  have	  an	  LLB.	  Must	  have	  a	  good	  
practice	  and	  they	  must	  be	  a	  senior	  uh	  advocate.	  Uh	  nowadays	  of	  course	  its	  no	  longer	  compulsory	  that	  
you	  must	  be	  a	  senior	  advocate.	  
 
Quotation	  53	  	  
L22:	  100	  -­‐	  102	   
100	   LECTURER:	  Um	  the	  problem	  with	  becoming	  a	  senior	  advocate	  and	  then	  a	  judge	  is	  what?	  [some	  
murmurs	  from	  class]	  Hmm?	  
101	   STUDENT	  3:	  The	  salary.	  
102	   LECTURER:	  The	  salary.	  A	  judge	  gets	  about	  a,	  a	  junior,	  a	  newly	  appointed	  judge	  gets	  about	  seven	  
six	  hundred	  thousand	  a	  year.	  And	  a	  senior	  advocate,	  well	  as	  I	  said,	  gets	  from	  four	  to	  five	  up	  to	  
eight	  million	  in	  a	  year.	  
 
Quotation	  54	  	  
L22:	  134	  -­‐	  9	   
134	   STUDENT	  3:	  I	  don’t	  have	  a	  question	  but	  I	  just	  had	  a	  /	  I	  don’t	  have	  a	  question	  but	  when	  you	  were	  
saying,	  when	  you	  were	  talking	  about	  advocates	  being	  scared	  in	  court,	  I	  remember	  when	  I	  was	  in	  
standard	  nine,	  we	  had	  to	  do	  work	  experience	  and	  I	  went	  with	  a	  friend	  of	  mine,	  her	  dad	  works	  
for	  Bell,	  Dewar	  and	  Hall.	  
135	   LECTURER:	  Hmmm	  	  
136	   STUDENT	  3:	  And	  I	  went	  with	  Nigel	  and	  I	  spent	  a	  week	  with	  him.	  And	  he	  took	  me	  to	  a	  court	  in	  
Joburg	  Centre,	  I	  just	  remember	  it	  was	  close	  to	  the	  Brazilian	  Coffee	  Shop,	  and	  I	  sat	  in	  court	  that	  




in	  that	  room	  it	  was	  just	  too	  awful	  for	  words.	  	  
137	   LECTURER:	  No	  well	  some	  people	  thrive	  on	  that,	  some	  people	  live	  /	  like	  like	  [Isobel],	  I	  mean	  if	  
she	  doesn’t	  have	  an	  adrenalin	  rush	  every	  five	  minutes	  you	  know	  she	  gets	  bored.	  So	  some	  
people	  really	  like	  that,	  they	  thrive	  on	  that	  nervous	  tension	  and	  they	  are	  their	  best	  and	  sharpest	  
when	  they	  have	  …	  but	  you	  know	  you	  can’t	  its	  impossible	  to	  sustain	  it	  for	  weeks	  and	  weeks	  and	  
months	  and	  months	  and	  then	  you	  must	  take	  a	  break	  um	  you	  must	  look	  after	  yourself,	  you	  must	  
you	  know	  /	  it’s	  a	  very	  /	  it’s	  a	  high	  tension	  job.	  	  
138	   STUDENT	  3:	  I	  met	  a	  lovely	  /	  after	  the	  case	  and	  everything	  because	  we	  spent	  the	  whole	  day	  in	  
court,	  and	  Nigel	  was	  worried	  and	  said	  ‘Aren’t	  you	  tired,	  aren’t	  you	  hungry?’	  And	  I	  said	  ‘No	  no	  
I’m	  actually	  fine	  I’m	  enjoying	  this	  quite	  a	  bit,	  its	  different’	  and	  I	  met	  up	  with,	  well	  I	  met	  some	  of	  
his	  colleagues,	  there	  was	  a	  lovely	  tall	  blond	  lady	  -­‐	  I	  don’t	  recall	  her	  name	  -­‐	  lovely	  tall	  blond	  
woman	  and	  she	  was	  an	  advocate	  and	  she	  was	  wearing	  her	  robes	  and	  walking,	  you	  know	  we	  all	  
walked	  across	  the	  road	  and	  it	  was	  very	  romantic	  and	  everything	  we	  sat	  in	  the	  Brazilian	  [class	  
and	  lecturer	  laugh],	  we	  had	  lunch	  and	  she	  asked	  me	  all	  questions	  about	  school	  and	  then	  she	  
said	  ‘Oh	  you	  studied	  French	  at	  school!’,	  she	  started	  rattling	  off	  in	  French	  for	  like	  half	  an	  hour	  
and	  I	  just	  sat	  there	  with	  a	  mouth	  full	  of	  teeth.	  	  
139	   LECTURER:	  Ja	  that’s	  the	  stereotypical,	  that’s	  the	  stereotypical	  idea	  that	  I	  have	  of	  a	  of	  a	  female	  
advocate	  but	  I’m	  uh	  I	  shouldn’t	  talk	  to	  you	  about	  that	  but	  um	  tall,	  long,	  blond,	  um	  you	  know	  
multi-­‐faceted,	  multi-­‐functioning,	  multi-­‐tasking	  uh	  super	  elastowoman,	  you	  know	  three	  children	  








APPENDIX	  4E:	  QUOTATIONS	  –	  JUDGE	  




LECTURER:	  OK	  and	  that’s	  where	  um,	  that	  where	  the	  interesting	  thing	  starts,	  that’s	  where	  you	  have	  the	  




LECTURER:	  You	  can	  believe	  on	  a	  metaphysical	  level	  -­‐	  do	  you	  understand	  the	  word	  metaphysical	  -­‐	  it	  
means	  behind	  the	  physical,	  you	  can	  believe	  on	  a	  spiritual	  level,	  you	  can	  believe	  ‘this	  is	  how	  law	  works,	  
law	  is	  just	  a	  reflection	  of	  a	  higher	  law’	  and	  still	  be	  a	  judge	  and	  sit	  in	  judgment	  of	  others	  objectively.	  	  
 
Quotation	  3	   
L2:62	   
LECTURER:	  Well,	  you’re	  opening	  a	  whole	  can	  of	  worms	  now	  because	  um	  uh	  uh	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  
course	  we	  will	  do	  the	  difference	  between	  a	  review	  and	  an	  appeal	  and	  this	  is	  also	  in	  England,	  they’ve	  
got	  different	  rules	  than	  what	  we	  have	  in	  South	  Africa	  so	  I’m	  not	  quite	  sure	  how	  it	  works	  but	  certainly	  if	  
there	  is	  something	  fundamentally	  wrong	  in	  a	  case.	  If	  [there	  are]	  things	  which	  have	  not	  been	  taken	  into	  
consideration	  or	  if	  they	  think	  that	  the	  judge	  made	  a	  mistake	  then	  of	  course	  you	  can	  appeal,	  even	  if	  you	  




LECTURER:	  Um	  so	  the	  important	  thing	  that	  I	  want	  you	  to	  take	  from	  this	  case	  is	  uh	  what	  the	  judge	  said	  
um	  and	  I	  can’t	  get	  the	  quotation	  right	  now	  but	  um,	  one	  of	  the	  judges	  said	  ‘look,	  when	  we	  sit	  in	  
judgment	  on	  a	  matter	  like	  this	  you	  don’t	  bring	  along	  with	  you	  your	  own	  personal	  baggage.	  You	  don’t	  /	  
because	  this	  is	  abhorrent	  to	  everything	  you	  stand	  for	  /	  first	  of	  all	  you	  don’t	  agree	  as	  a	  judge,	  you	  don’t	  
agree	  that	  males	  should	  have	  intercourse	  with	  one	  another.	  That	  is	  something	  that	  is	  abhorrent	  to	  you.	  
That’s	  not	  strange,	  five	  years	  ago	  in	  this	  country	  it	  was	  against	  the	  law.	  That’s	  not	  strange	  at	  all.	  But	  
you	  don’t	  bring	  your	  personal	  subjective	  view	  to	  court.	  Secondly,	  you	  might	  find	  it	  from	  a	  Christian	  
point	  of	  view	  or	  from	  a	  decency	  point	  of	  view	  completely	  abhorrent	  that	  uh	  people	  have	  to	  hurt	  
themselves	  to	  …	  in	  order	  to	  get	  sexual	  gratification.	  That	  is	  not	  relevant.	  What	  you	  think	  of	  it	  while	  you	  
are	  uh	  busy	  with	  recreation	  with	  your	  family	  and	  your	  friends	  and	  uh	  socializing	  and	  your	  view	  in	  
society	  outside	  the	  courtroom	  is	  is	  one	  thing.	  What	  you	  must	  do	  when	  you	  sit	  in	  judgment	  on	  a	  matter	  








LECTURER:	  Now	  obviously,	  here	  you	  have	  a	  judge	  that	  has	  to	  interpret	  whether	  this	  man’s	  marriage	  is	  
uh	  uh	  valid	  or	  not.	  On	  the	  on	  	  the	  surface	  of	  it,	  purely,	  on	  the	  /	  without	  investigating	  it,	  what	  we	  call	  as	  
lawyers	  prima	  facie,	  on	  the	  first	  face	  of	  it,	  looking	  at	  it,	  this	  guy’s	  correct	  because	  it	  wasn’t	  in	  the	  
house.	  They	  were	  in	  the	  garden.	  They	  w	  ..	  got	  married	  in	  the	  garden.	  But	  the	  judge	  said	  ‘no,	  marriage	  is	  
a	  very	  very	  serious	  and	  a	  very	  solemn	  um	  contract	  between	  two	  people	  and	  uh	  it	  shouldn’t	  be	  handled	  
frivolously	  and	  meaning	  ‘in’	  the	  house	  also	  means	  in	  the	  garden.	  	  
 
Quotation	  6	  
L2:73	  -­‐	  5	   
073	   LECTURER:	  OK	  What	  do	  I	  ..	  What	  do	  I	  want	  to	  illustrate	  with	  this	  case?	  I	  want	  to	  illustrate	  to	  you	  
that	  legal	  certainty	  is	  very	  elusive.	  Legal	  certainty	  is	  very	  very	  important.	  Your	  society	  is	  based	  
on	  legal	  certainty.	  If	  you	  have	  a	  society	  where	  there’s	  no	  legal	  certainty;	  if	  you	  don’t	  know	  how	  
fast	  you	  must	  drive	  on	  the	  highway;	  if	  you	  don’t	  know	  uh	  at	  what	  age	  you	  can	  consent	  to	  
marriage	  or	  if	  you	  don’t	  know	  when	  you	  must	  start	  paying	  tax	  or	  ex/	  all	  these	  things	  …then	  you	  
live	  in	  chaos.	  Then	  you	  lived	  in	  an	  uncivilized	  an	  anarchic	  society.	  Now	  there	  is	  an	  argument	  to	  
say	  that	  that	  is	  not	  so	  bad	  but	  we	  won’t	  visit	  that	  now.	  What	  we’re	  trying	  to	  expl/	  establish	  
here	  is	  how	  important	  is	  legal	  certainty.	  In	  this	  case	  there	  was	  uncertainty	  in	  the	  language	  of	  
the	  statute,	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  word	  ‘in’,	  and	  the	  judge	  didn’t	  	  follow	  the	  letter	  of	  the	  law,	  
but	  he	  rather	  preferred	  to	  give	  a	  decision	  whereby	  certainty	  would	  be	  confirmed.	  Certainty	  
would	  be	  confirmed.	  Do	  you	  understand	  that?	  Hmmm	  …	  Any	  questions?	  	  
074	   STUDENT:	  Just	  say	  that	  again	  he	  didn’t	  follow	  the	  letter	  of	  the	  law	  …	  	  
075	   LECTURER:	  He	  didn’t	  follow	  the	  letter	  of	  the	  law	  because	  then	  ‘in’	  would	  mean	  ‘inside	  the	  
house’.	  Um,	  the	  ordinary	  Oxford	  English	  Dictionary	  if	  /	  and	  that’s	  what	  he	  used	  /	  means	  uh	  if	  
you	  look	  at	  the	  ordinary	  Oxford	  Dictionary	  in	  means	  …	  ‘In’	  is	  defined	  as	  follows:	  inclusion	  or	  
position	  within	  limits	  of	  space.’	  That	  is	  what	  the	  Oxford	  English	  Dictionary	  says	  about	  ‘in’.	  So	  if	  
you	  follow	  the	  Oxford	  English	  Dictionary	  the	  judge	  should	  have	  said	  ‘mmmm	  …	  sorry	  ..	  your	  
marriage	  is,	  is	  over.’	  But,	  it	  is	  a	  characteristic	  of	  law	  of	  good	  law,	  of	  a	  ordered	  society	  that	  we	  
strive	  towards	  certainty.	  So	  the	  judge	  looked	  beyond	  the	  dictionary	  meaning	  of	  the	  word	  ‘in’	  
and	  he	  extended	  it	  to	  mean	  also	  in	  an	  open	  space,	  outside	  the	  closed	  space.	  There’s	  very	  good	  
reason	  why	  the	  legislature	  used	  the	  word	  in	  because	  people	  get	  married	  within	  an	  enclosure.	  
The	  legislature	  said	  you	  must	  have	  open	  doors	  and	  when	  these	  people	  went	  through	  the	  open	  
doors	  and	  outside,	  the	  judge	  said,	  no	  that	  is	  also	  inclusive.	  	  
 
Quotation	  7	  
L2:80:293	  -­‐	  301	   
LECTURER:	  Um	  I’m	  not	  sure	  you	  understand	  this	  concept	  the	  uh	  concept	  is	  very	  important	  here.	  The	  
law	  will	  be	  interpreted	  to	  give	  um	  law	  will	  be	  interpreted	  to	  preserve	  something	  that	  people	  believe	  in.	  	  
I	  mean	  and	  that	  is	  that	  is	  what	  the	  judge	  based	  his	  decision	  on.	  The	  ma	  ..	  the	  contract	  of	  marriage	  is	  so	  
important	  that	  the	  judge	  said	  ‘I’m	  not	  going	  to	  be	  bound	  by	  what	  the	  dictionary	  says.	  I	  will	  ex	  …	  I	  will	  
use	  my	  discretion’	  -­‐	  we’ll	  get	  to	  discretion	  now.	  ‘I	  will	  use	  my	  discretion	  to	  to	  widen	  this	  concept	  of	  
“in”,	  just	  so	  that	  we	  have	  certainty.	  That	  we	  don’t	  have	  people	  thinking	  that	  if	  they	  just	  go	  over	  a	  






L2:80:304	  -­‐	  310	   
LECTURER:	  Only	  if	  you	  know	  if	  if	  if	  there	  was	  a	  blatant	  disregard	  of	  all	  the	  formalities	  will	  a	  judge	  uh	  
consider	  uh	  declaring	  the	  marriage	  null	  and	  void.	  Uh	  for	  instance	  if	  you	  marry	  somebody	  who	  is	  	  8	  
years	  old.	  That’s	  against	  the	  law,	  you	  can’t	  do	  that,	  not	  even	  with	  the	  permission	  of	  the	  Minister	  of	  the	  
Interior.	  The	  judge	  would	  have	  interpreted	  that	  as	  null	  and	  void	  because	  that	  that	  goes	  to	  the	  core	  of	  
the	  marriage,	  you	  can’t	  marry	  somebody	  whose	  eight	  years	  old,	  there	  can	  be	  no	  real	  consent	  from	  that	  
person.	  
 
Quotation	  9	  	  
L2:105	   
LECTURER:	  But,	  for	  legal	  certainty,	  what	  we	  do	  is	  we	  have	  the	  courts.	  So,	  what	  will	  happen	  is	  exactly	  
the	  same	  as	  this	  one.	  If	  you	  get	  married	  in	  a	  submarine,	  and	  then	  you	  subsequently	  want	  to	  declare	  it	  
ann	  …	  null	  and	  void	  um	  because	  it	  was	  not	  in	  a	  house	  then	  you	  have	  to	  go	  to	  court	  and	  the	  judge	  will	  
then	  decide	  whether	  he	  will	  interpret	  the	  legislation	  and	  he	  will	  decide	  whether	  it	  was	  valid	  or	  not.	  It	  is	  
the	  best	  way	  	  
 
Quotation	  10	  	  
L2:113	  -­‐	  119	   
113	   LECTURER:	  Look,	  a	  judge	  has	  got	  a	  discretion.	  A	  judge	  has	  got	  a	  discretion	  to	  interpret	  um	  uh	  
legislation	  and	  the	  judge	  will	  always	  in	  a	  case	  where	  he	  has	  to	  interpret	  something	  like	  this,	  will	  
always	  favour	  the	  interpretation	  that	  gives	  the	  greater	  legal	  certainty.	  And	  that’s	  not	  difficult	  to	  
establish.	  Um	  uh	  what	  you	  what	  you	  must	  establish	  is,	  if	  I	  interpret	  this	  [points	  to	  the	  word	  ‘in’	  
on	  the	  blackboard]	  as	  the	  dictionary	  says,	  and	  declare	  these	  people’s	  marriage	  null	  and	  void,	  
what	  will	  the	  result	  be?	  The	  result	  will	  be	  hundreds	  of	  people	  are	  now	  going	  to	  come	  to	  court	  
and	  say	  ‘Ja	  but	  we	  also	  got	  married	  in	  strange	  places	  and	  we	  are	  now	  also	  tired	  of	  our	  spouses	  
and	  we	  don’t	  want,	  we	  also	  want	  it	  null	  and	  void.	  You	  understand?	  That	  will	  lead	  to	  massive	  
uncertainty.	  Even	  people	  who	  don’t	  want	  to	  declare	  their	  marriage	  null	  and	  void	  may	  now	  think	  
‘Oh,	  but	  I	  also	  got	  married	  in	  a	  garden,	  is	  my	  marriage	  now	  valid?’	  [Makes	  a	  gesture	  that	  seems	  
to	  say	  ‘You	  see?]	  	  
114	   STUDENT	  1:	  So	  he’s	  just	  referred	  to	  what	  the	  majority	  of	  society	  would	  …	  find	  acceptable	  …or	  	  
115	   LECTURER:	  	  Uh	  no	  no	  it’s	  a	  it’s	  a	  you	  know	  I	  can’t	  its	  it’s	  a	  it’s	  a	  common	  sense	  thing	  Its	  more	  
than	  common	  sense	  it’s	  a	  …	  you	  know	  the	  judge	  doesn’t	  go	  out	  and	  have	  a	  census	  of	  society	  um	  
…	  
116	   STUDENT	  1:	  No	  that’s	  why	  I	  was	  just	  wondering	  ….	  
117	   LECTURER:	  Uh	  ow	  uh	  the	  judge	  the	  judge	  is	  the	  representative	  of	  us	  on	  the	  bench,	  of	  society	  on	  
the	  bench.	  And	  the	  judge	  must	  make	  the	  decision	  that	  will	  create	  the	  greatest	  amount	  of	  
certainty	  in	  society.	  In	  other	  words,	  uh	  huh	  uh	  uh	  uh	  you,	  if	  you	  judge	  a	  case,	  you	  are	  not,	  you	  
must	  avoid	  creating	  chaos.	  	  
118	   STUDENT	  1:	  It’s	  the	  opposite	  of	  certainty	  …	  
119	   LECTURER:	  Yes,	  so	  um	  if	  you	  do	  /	  but	  of	  course	  you	  can’t	  do	  this	  at	  all	  costs.	  If	  the	  
overwhelming	  legal	  argument	  is,	  to	  take	  a	  decision	  where	  you	  even	  make	  some	  uncertainty,	  








LECTURER:	  Where	  /	  in	  a	  society	  like	  South	  Africa	  you	  know	  that	  is	  very	  uh	  its	  its	  very	  almost	  flippant	  to	  
say	  that	  because	  um	  where	  the	  judges	  had	  to	  decide	  about	  um	  uum	  the	  gay	  marriages	  uh	  that	  would	  
cause	  enormous	  friction	  in	  society	  [coughs].	  But	  they	  had	  the	  Constitution	  to	  consider,	  and	  the	  
Constitution	  is	  an	  overwhelming	  authority.	  So	  you	  can’t	  go	  against	  the	  Constitution.	  So,	  they	  decided	  to	  
declare	  gay	  marriages	  valid,	  to	  declare	  it	  valid	  that	  people	  of	  the	  same	  sex	  can	  get	  married,	  create	  
some	  uncertainty,	  but	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  Constitution.	  OK,	  now	  everybody	  is	  nice	  and	  confused.	  
Any,	  any	  other	  questions?	  
 
Quotation	  12	  	  
L4:65	  -­‐	  8 
065	   LECTURER:	  No	  no	  no	  its	  not	  that	  good	  either	  [laughs].	  They	  have	  got	  /	  the	  President	  appoints	  a	  
kind	  of	  committee	  called	  the	  Judicial	  Services	  Committee.	  Uh	  and	  the	  Judicial	  Services	  
Committee	  consists	  of	  a	  wide	  spectrum	  of	  people	  involved	  in	  the	  legal	  world.	  And	  it’s	  a	  huge	  
panel	  consisting	  of	  the	  Minister	  of	  Justice,	  other	  law	  lords	  [laughs	  wryly]	  hmm	  other	  law	  lords,	  
other	  justices,	  the	  chief	  justice,	  ummm	  even	  a	  representative	  from	  the	  magistrates’	  
commission.	  Lots	  of	  people	  involved	  in	  in	  law.	  And	  then	  they	  interview	  all	  the	  possible	  
candidates,	  but	  where	  do	  they	  get	  the	  candidates	  from?	  [pulls	  face]	  
066	   STUDENT	  3:	  Aren’t	  they	  nominated	  by	  their	  peers?	  	  
067	   LECTURER:	  Yes,	  partly.	  But	  who	  compiles	  the	  list	  that	  goes	  to	  the	  Judicial	  Services	  Commission?	  
The	  President.	  The	  President	  gives	  the	  list	  to	  the	  Judicial	  Services	  Commission	  and	  say[s]	  ‘These	  
are	  the	  people	  I	  think	  you	  should	  interview’.	  Then	  they	  interview	  them.	  They	  interview	  the	  
people	  on	  the	  list.	  They	  can,	  strictly	  speaking,	  they	  can	  add,	  it	  is	  possible,	  but	  they	  never	  do.	  
And	  then	  they	  make	  a	  shortlist.	  And	  then	  they	  send	  the	  shortlist	  where?	  To	  the	  President	  and	  
the	  President	  appoints	  who	  he	  wants	  on	  the	  shortlist.	  He	  can	  also	  appoint	  everybody,	  which	  he	  
usually	  does.	  	  
068	   But	  if	  he,	  if	  he’s	  got	  a	  problem	  with	  somebody	  …	  with	  a	  political	  appointee,	  if	  there’s	  somebody	  
on	  that	  list	  that	  the	  Judicial	  Services	  Commission	  wants	  to	  uh	  appoint	  and	  he	  doesn’t	  want	  to	  
appoint,	  the	  person	  doesn’t	  get	  appointed.	  It	  has	  never	  happened.	  It	  has	  never	  happened,	  uh,	  
the	  only	  the	  only	  time	  that	  there	  was	  any	  kind	  of	  contro	  controversy	  and	  it’s	  a	  very	  slight	  
controversy,	  was	  when	  Justice	  Mohammed	  was	  appointed	  Chief	  Justice	  uh	  and	  its	  was	  that	  
strange	  time	  when	  South	  Africa	  was	  in	  transition	  so	  what	  you	  had	  was	  Justice	  Corbett,	  who	  was	  
the	  old	  chief	  justice,	  and	  who	  swore	  in	  minster	  Mandela	  as	  the	  first	  president,	  he	  retired,	  and	  of	  
course	  he	  had	  a	  deputy	  in	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  that	  was	  waiting	  in	  the	  wings	  to	  
become	  the	  chief	  justice,	  Hefer,	  who	  was	  who	  a-­‐a-­‐a-­‐	  white	  uh	  old	  judge	  from	  the	  old	  uh	  
dispensation.	  He	  wasn’t	  he	  wasn’t	  a	  bad	  judge,	  he	  was	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fact	  a	  very	  good	  judge	  but	  
he	  was	  a	  judge	  appointed	  by	  the	  previous	  government.	  And	  the	  President	  instructed	  the	  
Judicial	  Services	  Commission,	  or	  the	  President	  made	  it	  known	  to	  the	  Judicial	  Services	  
Commission	  that	  his	  candidate	  for	  the	  position	  of	  chief	  justice	  is	  not	  Hefer	  but	  Mohammed,	  
who	  was	  at	  the	  Constitutional	  Court.	  And	  then	  of	  course,	  you	  know,	  strangely	  enough,	  the	  




controversy	  that	  the	  President	  gave	  his	  impressions	  to	  the	  Judicial	  Services	  Commission.	  Strictly	  
speaking	  that	  that’s	  you	  can’t	  do	  that	  you	  know.	  If	  you	  say	  there	  must	  be	  watertight	  division,	  
then	  that	  shouldn’t	  be,	  that	  shouldn’t	  be.	  But	  we	  live	  in	  a	  broken	  reality,	  you	  know,	  it	  doesn’t	  
happen.	  Not	  even	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  
 
Quotation	  13	  
L5:	  64	   
064	   LECTURER:	  Oh	  um	  its	  very	  simple	  [moves	  around	  front	  row	  of	  chairs	  and	  leans	  against	  this	  row	  
in	  front	  of	  her	  as	  he	  responds	  to	  her	  question]	  In	  the	  uh	  past	  it	  was	  possible	  um	  to	  use	  force	  to	  
extract	  a	  confession	  out	  of	  a	  prisoner.	  There	  was	  a	  section	  in	  the	  Criminal	  Procedure	  Act,	  
section	  171	  …	  (d)	  …	  (4)	  that	  said	  if	  a	  prisoner	  does	  not	  want	  to	  co-­‐operate	  and	  there’s	  a	  
reasonable	  suspicion,	  then	  he	  may	  be	  forced	  to	  make	  a	  confession.	  And	  that	  confession	  will	  be	  
allowed	  in	  court	  subsequently.	  Now	  your	  legal	  feeling,	  such	  as	  it	  is	  at	  this	  moment,	  should	  
already	  tell	  you	  that	  there’s	  something	  wrong	  with	  that.	  Uh-­‐h-­‐h	  you	  can’t	  have	  (a)	  the	  right	  to	  
silence;	  uh	  (b)	  the	  presumption	  of	  innocence,	  (c)	  decent	  ordinary	  human	  rights	  of	  dignity.	  You	  
can’t	  have	  that	  and	  a	  Criminal	  Procedure	  Act	  that	  says	  you	  can	  be	  forced	  to	  make	  a	  confession,	  
the	  confession	  can	  be	  accepted	  against	  you	  and	  you	  can	  uh	  be	  tortured,	  your	  dignity	  can	  be	  um	  
uh	  affected.	  So	  that	  was	  one	  of	  the	  first	  things,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  State	  versus	  Zuma,	  that	  was	  one	  
of	  the	  first	  things	  that	  went	  to	  the	  Constitutional	  Court,	  to	  test	  whether	  the	  confession	  was	  
made	  by	  a	  prisoner	  can	  be	  accepted	  by	  a	  subsequent	  court.	  And	  the	  constitutional	  court,	  by	  the	  
mouth	  of	  the	  then	  Judge	  Kentridge,	  he	  was	  a	  judge	  for	  a	  very	  short	  time,	  he’s	  now	  in	  England,	  




LECTURER:	  Pius	  Langa,	  you	  should	  all	  know	  this	  ne?	  Who’s	  the	  deputy	  chief	  justice	  (sshhh	  sshhh)	  
Who’s	  the	  deputy	  chief	  justice,	  he’s	  on	  sabbatical	  at	  Wits	  now	  …	  he’s	  sitting	  here	  in	  Wits,	  he’s	  doing	  
sabbatical	  work,	  he’s	  also	  the	  chancellor	  of	  this	  university	  ….[Student:	  Edwin	  Cameron	  I	  think	  it	  is	  -­‐	  
other	  students	  murmur	  their	  disagreement	  or	  assent]	  Ooohh	  Edwin	  is	  the	  chairman	  of	  the	  council,	  who	  
is	  the	  chancellor	  [Student	  6:	  Chaskalson]	  No	  no	  Chaskalson	  is	  long	  retired,	  we	  long	  forget	  about	  
Chaskalson.	  Who	  is	  the	  chancellor	  of	  the	  university	  of	  the	  Witwatersrand?	  [Another	  student	  attempts	  
an	  answer	  but	  L	  already	  starts	  whistling	  incredulously]	  Ladies	  and	  gentlemen,	  I	  am	  going	  to	  kill	  myself	  
[class	  laughs]	  I	  give	  you	  a	  hundred	  bucks	  if	  you	  can	  tell	  me.	  [Student:	  Is	  it	  a	  contract?]	  [Class	  laughs]	  It’s	  
a	  verbal	  contract,	  ja	  [more	  students	  laugh]	  [One	  other	  student	  attempts	  to	  answer]	  Justice?	  What?	  
….Does	  anybody	  know?	  [slight	  pause]	  Have	  you	  ever	  heard	  of	  Justice	  Dikgang	  Moseneke?	  [cries	  of	  ‘oh’	  
from	  class	  and	  chatter]	  Oh	  yes	  of	  course	  Dikgang	  ja	  ja	  ja	  ja	  ja	  [imitates	  class]	  	  
 
Quotation	  15	  	  
L7:	  12:12)	  	  	  (Super)	  
Codes:	  [Judge]	  [Lawyer] 
LECTURER:	  The	  common	  law	  is	  the	  law	  created	  by	  the	  jurists.	  By	  the	  lawyers.	  In	  England	  it	  is	  the	  







[Judge]	  [Lawyer]	   
LECTURER:	  Thank	  you.	  Thank	  you.	  Very	  clever.	  Very	  very	  clever.	  When	  the	  courts,	  not	  the	  laws	  like	  Mr	  
…	  said,	  when	  the	  courts,	  the	  judges,	  when	  they	  sit,	  and	  they	  decide	  law	  cases,	  what	  do	  they	  use?	  They	  
use	  legislation	  and	  they	  use	  the	  common	  law.	  They	  use	  other	  cases.	  Why	  do	  they	  do	  this?	  They	  
develop	  our	  common	  law.	  The	  judges,	  since	  1910	  when	  we	  had	  uh	  a	  united	  uh	  appellate	  bench	  the	  




LECTURER:	  Uh	  these	  things	  are	  extremely	  theoretical	  and	  I	  can	  guarantee	  you,	  the	  judge,	  when	  the	  
judge	  sits	  in	  the	  court	  he	  does	  he	  does	  he	  or	  she	  doesn’t	  decide	  ‘OK	  I’m	  going	  to	  decide	  this	  
interpretation	  on	  this	  rule’.	  Its	  an	  ex	  post	  facto	  theoretical	  um	  construct	  in	  other	  words	  you	  look	  at	  all	  
the	  ways	  in	  which	  judges	  interpret	  uh	  rules,	  and	  then	  we	  formulate	  the	  theory.	  You	  understand?	  That’s	  
how	  all	  theories	  work.	  They	  don’t,	  its	  not	  watertight	  compartments	  neatly	  stacked	  that	  you	  can	  choose	  




LECTURER:	  Um	  um	  they	  they	  first	  draft	  the	  legislation.	  Then	  the	  legislation	  is	  passed	  and	  it	  becomes	  an	  
Act,	  and	  it	  becomes	  the	  law	  of	  the	  land.	  And	  then	  there’s	  a	  case,	  like	  this	  case,	  which	  asks	  for	  the	  
interpretation	  of	  the	  legislation.	  And	  then	  a	  completely	  different	  group	  of	  people,	  ie	  the	  judges,	  sit	  in	  




067	   LECTURER:	  Uh	  law	  is	  far	  more	  speculative.	  Um	  the	  the	  the	  theories	  that	  we	  have	  are	  theories	  
that	  are	  composed,	  not	  through	  empirical	  experimentation,	  like	  you	  would	  do	  in	  natural	  
science,	  but	  are	  theories	  that	  are	  composed,	  as	  I	  said	  in	  the	  beginning,	  ex	  post	  facto	  through	  
deduction.	  We	  see	  this	  is	  what	  the	  judges	  do.	  The	  judges	  when	  they	  sit,	  they	  don’t	  have	  in	  their	  
minds,	  the	  old	  judges	  especially,	  they	  didn’t	  have	  these	  theories.	  But	  through	  a	  hundred	  years	  
of	  jurisprudence,	  we	  saw	  that	  this	  is	  what	  the	  judges	  do.	  So	  we	  sit	  down	  and	  we	  extract	  from	  




[Advocate]	  [Judge]	  	  
LECTURER:	  So	  what	  you	  do	  is	  you	  become	  an	  advocate,	  you	  if	  you’re	  a	  very	  good	  advocate	  they	  ask	  
you	  to	  become	  a	  uh	  acting	  judge,	  if	  they	  see	  that	  you	  can	  do	  the	  work	  then	  they	  invite	  you	  to	  become	  a	  
full-­‐time	  judge	  in	  the	  provincial	  division,	  or	  the	  local	  division,	  after	  years	  of	  service	  in	  the	  provincial	  
division	  or	  the	  local	  division,	  if	  you	  are	  deemed	  to	  be	  fit,	  they	  are	  invited	  as	  an	  acting	  judge	  to	  the	  
Supreme	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  or	  to	  the	  Constitutional	  Court.	  So	  it’s	  a	  hierarchy,	  its	  not	  the	  same	  judges	  and	  
they	  don’t	  exchange.	  You	  are	  promoted	  to	  to	  one.	  	  
 
Quotation	  21	  




[Advocate]	  [Judge]	  	  
LECTURER:	  No	  um	  ….de-­‐uh	  …	  Look	  I	  have	  difficulty	  in	  following	  you,	  I	  don’t	  know	  exactly	  what	  you	  
mean	  but	  um	  judges	  in	  private	  law	  matters	  sit	  and	  they	  are	  confronted	  by	  both	  sides	  represented	  by	  
an	  advocate.	  The	  advocates	  make	  sure	  -­‐	  that’s	  their	  job	  -­‐	  they	  make	  sure	  that	  the	  judge	  is	  informed	  of	  
very	  single	  possible	  authority	  uh	  that	  their	  case,	  that	  their	  side	  of	  the	  case	  um	  uh	  that	  will	  support	  their	  
side	  of	  the	  case.	  So	  the	  judge,	  when	  he	  sits	  in	  the	  provincial	  division	  has	  got	  the	  advantage	  of	  the	  
entire	  scope	  of	  authorities,	  presented	  by	  the	  two	  advocates.	  Of	  course	  not	  all	  advocates	  are	  the	  same.	  
And	  some	  advocates	  are	  more	  thorough	  than	  others.	  What	  then	  happens	  uh	  is	  the	  judge	  hears	  the	  
case,	  he	  gains	  all	  the	  authorities,	  he	  then	  retires	  and	  then	  um	  he	  does	  his	  own	  investigation.	  He	  does	  
his	  own	  sources	  he	  investigates	  the	  advocate’s	  sources,	  he	  does	  his	  own	  research,	  he	  comes	  to	  a	  
conclusion	  based	  on	  everything	  that	  was	  laid	  before	  him.	  	  
 
Quotation	  22	  
L10:93:527	  -­‐	  533	   
LECTURER:	  So	  there’s	  virtually	  no	  chance	  that	  if	  there’s	  an	  authority	  on	  either	  for	  or	  against	  uh	  the	  
decision	  the	  judge	  wants	  to	  make	  that	  he	  won’t	  know	  of	  it.	  If	  he’s	  involved	  in	  that	  case	  he	  will	  know	  of	  
it,	  he	  will	  evaluate	  it	  and	  he	  will	  decide	  yes	  I’m	  going	  to	  use	  this	  authority	  or	  no	  I’m	  going	  to	  decide	  
against	  the	  authority.	  A	  judge	  can’t	  make	  his	  own	  authority.	  I	  think	  what	  you	  mean	  his	  own	  research.	  




LECTURER:	  And	  he	  will	  put	  that	  before	  the	  judge.	  And	  he	  will	  try	  everything	  -­‐	  with	  his	  arguments,	  with	  
your	  affidavits,	  with	  everything,	  he	  will	  try	  to	  convince	  the	  judge	  to	  decide	  upon	  the	  cases	  that	  he	  has	  
quoted	  to	  the	  judge.	  The	  opponent	  will	  do	  exactly	  the	  same.	  And	  usually,	  if	  it	  is	  a	  moot	  point,	  if	  it	  is	  an	  
open	  point	  in	  law	  then	  there	  will	  be	  authority	  for	  both	  sides	  -­‐	  yes!	  Yes!	  That	  is	  very	  possible.	  As	  a	  
matter	  of	  fact	  that’s	  what	  happens	  every	  day	  in	  court.	  Is	  trying	  to	  convince	  a	  judge	  to	  accept	  your	  
authorities	  rather	  than	  your	  opponents’	  authorities.	  And	  then?	  That’s	  why	  you	  have	  to	  use	  logic,	  that’s	  
why	  you	  have	  to	  use	  uh	  rational	  deduction.	  The	  judge	  then	  has	  all	  these	  authorities	  in	  front	  of	  him	  	  
with	  various	  weights	  that	  he	  attached	  to	  the	  authorities,	  depending	  on	  what	  they	  are,	  and	  then	  he	  
does	  his	  own	  research	  and	  he	  comes	  to	  a	  conclusion,	  which	  authorities	  to	  accept	  and	  which	  to	  reject	  
because	  every	  case	  is	  different.	  When	  I	  talk	  about	  a	  precedent,	  no	  two	  cases	  can	  be	  exactly	  the	  same.	  I	  
mean,	  you	  can	  understand	  that	  for	  yourself.	  The	  facts	  will	  -­‐	  every	  case	  will	  have	  different	  facts.	  So	  
there	  will	  always	  be	  cases	  that	  you	  can	  argue	  are	  for,	  and	  cases	  that	  you	  argue	  are	  against	  it.	  And	  it’s	  
the	  work	  of	  the	  judge	  to	  decide	  which	  of	  the	  cases	  to	  use	  to	  support	  his	  decision.	  And	  when	  he	  makes	  
a	  decision,	  and	  he	  reports	  that	  decision,	  that	  decision	  becomes	  authority	  for	  that	  specific	  point	  that	  




[Judge]	  [Magistrate]	  	  
LECTURER:	  Yes,	  in	  other	  words,	  the	  judges.	  [Student:	  Ja]	  Ja	  because	  you	  have	  magistrates	  in	  the	  lower	  







LECTURER:	  The	  word	  ‘precedent’	  is	  merely	  a	  technical	  word	  referring	  to	  a	  previous	  case	  taken	  as	  an	  
example	  for	  subsequent	  cases	  or	  as	  justification.	  In	  the	  le-­‐	  technical	  legal	  sense,	  the	  word	  pre-­‐	  





LECTURER:	  South	  Africa	  works	  on	  a	  system	  of	  a	  hierarchy	  of	  courts	  and	  of	  precedents.	  We	  work	  on	  a	  
system	  called	  stare	  decisis,	  in	  other	  words	  the	  lower	  courts	  are	  bound	  by	  the	  higher	  courts.	  So	  if	  you’ve	  
got	  a	  case	  that	  is	  exactly	  the	  same	  case	  as	  a	  case	  in	  the	  Transvaal,	  yes,	  and	  you	  are	  now	  say	  in	  Durban,	  
yes	  you’ve	  got	  the	  right	  to	  come	  to	  a	  different	  conclusion,	  and	  say	  for	  these	  reasons,	  very	  good	  reasons	  
must	  they	  be,	  I’m	  not	  following	  my	  brother	  in	  the	  Transvaal.	  Ok	  so	  that	  that	  you	  understand.	  When	  
you	  then	  have	  a	  new	  judge	  and	  a	  new	  case,	  and	  the	  facts	  are	  similar	  to	  both	  the	  previous	  case	  that	  
didn’t	  follow	  the	  Transvaal,	  and	  the	  Transvaal	  case	  um	  that	  was	  decided	  originally,	  the	  judge	  in	  the	  
Natal	  case,	  in	  the	  Durban	  case,	  will	  -­‐	  if	  he	  wants	  to	  follow	  the	  Transvaal	  case	  -­‐	  will	  very	  pertinently	  
state:	  ‘My	  brother	  in	  the	  Transvaal	  made	  this	  decision	  in	  1962,	  it	  was	  wrongly	  not	  followed	  by	  my	  
brother	  in	  1968	  but	  now	  in	  1992	  I	  am	  overruling	  him	  and	  I	  am	  following	  the	  Transvaal	  judgment.	  Uh	  he	  
wouldn’t	  say,	  he	  wouldn’t	  you	  know	  its	  unthinkable	  of	  making	  a	  whole	  judgment	  and	  not	  referring	  to	  
the	  Transvaal	  judgment.	  Because	  what	  you’re	  ultimately	  aiming	  at	  is	  that	  all	  the	  courts	  will	  agree	  with	  
all	  the	  legal	  points	  that	  may	  exist.	  And	  for	  that	  reason	  we	  also	  have	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Appeal.	  If	  
there’s	  a	  dispute	  between	  two	  courts	  and	  this	  dispute	  is	  really	  damaging	  to	  legal	  certainty,	  that	  case	  
then	  goes	  up	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Appeal,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  makes	  a	  precedent	  makes	  




LECTURER:	  No	  no	  its	  not	  like	  the	  praetor’s	  edict.	  Um	  if	  there’s	  a	  if	  there’s	  a	  if	  there’s	  a,	  if	  there’s	  a	  
precedent	  there’s	  a	  court	  case	  for	  instance	  in	  the	  um	  Cape	  Provincial	  Division	  and	  that	  judge	  made	  a	  
decision	  on	  a	  certain	  set	  of	  facts,	  and	  he	  came	  to	  a	  conclusion,	  and	  that	  is	  now	  the	  law	  in	  the	  Cape.	  
That	  case	  is	  what	  we	  call	  a	  precedent.	  It	  is	  used	  and	  it	  is	  followed	  by	  other	  judges	  in	  the	  Cape.	  If	  a	  judge	  
in	  the	  Transvaal	  wants	  to	  follow	  that	  precedent,	  he	  has	  to	  say	  so	  in	  his	  judgment.	  Say	  that	  he	  is	  
following	  that	  precedent	  for	  this	  and	  this	  reason	  and	  then	  that	  precedent	  becomes	  binding	  on	  the	  
Transvaal	  as	  well.	  Um	  the	  facts	  may	  change,	  but	  he	  may	  not	  -­‐	  obviously	  if	  he’s	  following	  the	  precedent	  




[Judge]	  [Magistrate]	   
LECTURER:	  Yes	  of	  course	  it	  happens	  every	  day!	  Yes	  of	  course,	  this	  is	  how	  law	  is	  made.	  You	  you	  go	  to	  uh	  
the	  magistrate’s	  court	  if	  you	  are	  within	  a	  certain	  uh	  uh	  a	  certain	  jurisdiction	  um	  s-­‐um	  R100	  000.	  If	  your	  
dispute	  is	  less	  than	  R100	  00	  or	  more	  than	  uh	  uh	  then	  you	  go	  to	  the	  magistrate’s	  court	  and	  the	  
magistrate’s	  court	  hears	  your	  case.	  If	  you’re	  not	  satisfied	  with	  the	  magistrate’s	  court,	  then	  you	  appeal	  




go	  to	  your	  local	  division.	  There	  the	  judge	  decides	  against	  the	  magistrate.	  But	  that	  is	  now	  a	  precedent.	  
The	  magistrate	  wasn’t	  a	  precedent.	  What	  the	  magistrate	  decided	  was	  just	  you	  know,	  binding	  between	  
the	  parties.	  Now	  in	  the	  Supr-­‐	  in	  the	  High	  Court	  when	  the	  judge	  gives	  a	  a	  decision	  that	  decision	  is	  a	  
precedent	  and	  it	  binds	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  Transvaal.	  Your	  opponent,	  who	  got	  satisfaction	  in	  his	  favour	  
from	  the	  magistrate	  is	  now	  unhappy.	  So	  what	  is	  he	  going	  to	  do?	  First	  he’s	  going	  to	  appeal	  to	  a	  full	  
bench.	  But	  that	  is	  now	  technical	  detail.	  He’s	  going	  to	  appeal	  from	  a	  single	  judge	  in	  the	  local	  division	  to	  
a	  full	  bench,	  either	  in	  the	  local	  division	  or	  the	  provincial	  division.	  If	  that	  if	  the	  full	  bench	  gives	  judgment	  
against	  you	  and	  for	  the	  guy	  that	  won	  in	  the	  magistrates’	  court	  then	  that	  is	  the	  precedent.	  Then	  the	  
whole	  of	  the	  Transvaal	  is	  bound	  by	  that	  precedent	  and	  the	  previous	  precedent	  of	  the	  single	  judge	  
disappears.	  Now	  of	  course	  what	  are	  you	  going	  to	  do?	  Now	  you	  are	  I	  mean	  you	  are	  I	  wanted	  to	  use	  a	  
bad	  word	  now	  but	  we’re	  now	  on	  camera	  you	  are	  not	  satisfied	  and	  you	  are	  going	  to,	  you	  want	  to	  
appeal.	  You	  appeal	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Appeal.	  Which	  is	  the	  highest	  court.	  And	  whatever	  the	  
Supreme	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  decides,	  that’s	  it.	  Unless	  it’s	  a	  constitutional	  case.	  That’s	  it.	  There’s	  nothing	  
higher.	  You	  can’t	  go	  to	  God	  or	  the	  Privy	  Council	  or	  you	  know	  George	  Bush	  or	  whoever	  you	  think	  is	  
powerful.	  That’s	  it.	  You	  stop	  at	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  and	  what	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  
says	  -­‐	  that’s	  law.	  Whoever	  and	  in	  whoever’s	  favour	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  has	  decided	  that	  is	  
law.	  And	  you	  will	  -­‐	  all	  the	  other	  things	  from	  the	  magistrates’	  court	  is	  worth	  nothing!	  It	  loses	  all	  its	  
value.	  What	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  says,	  that	  is	  where	  law	  is	  made.	  
 
Quotation	  29	  	  
L11:84 
084	   LECTURER:	  And	  unfortunately	  the	  only	  way	  to	  learn	  this	  is	  to	  expose	  you	  to	  the	  best	  brains	  in	  
the	  business.	  Um	  the	  court	  the	  judgments	  are	  written	  by	  you	  know	  the	  best	  advocates	  that	  
there	  were.	  The	  judges.	  And	  usually	  they	  are	  highly	  intelligent	  and	  very	  very	  good	  lawyers.	  And	  
they	  they	  talk	  in	  a	  language	  of	  their	  own	  they	  have	  arguments	  of	  their	  own	  and	  it	  is	  extremely	  
long-­‐winded.	  You	  can	  get	  confused.	  	  
 
Quotation	  30	  	  
L11:48	  	  
[Advocate]	  [Judge]	  	  
048	   LECTURER:	  Uh	  etc	  etc	  you	  know	  how	  it	  works,	  the	  profession.	  In	  the	  past	  if	  you	  are	  a	  very	  good	  
advocate	  and	  they	  um	  the	  council	  the	  bar	  the	  minister	  and	  the	  judicial	  services	  council	  think	  
you	  should	  be	  promoted,	  you	  are	  invited	  to	  act	  as	  a	  judge.	  For	  a	  couple	  of	  weeks,	  or	  a	  couple	  of	  
months.	  And	  if	  you	  prove	  yourself,	  if	  you	  prove	  to	  be	  a	  good	  judge,	  if	  your	  judgments	  are	  sound	  





LECTURER:	  And	  if	  you	  know	  your	  judges	  well	  then	  you	  will	  know	  that	  Judge	  King	  and	  Foxcroft	  and	  ol’	  
are	  both	  very	  well-­‐known	  as	  judges	  from	  the	  Cape	  uh	  Provincial	  Division.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fic/	  fact	  King	  at	  







047	   LECTURER:	  JP,	  Judge	  President.	  In	  other	  words	  he	  is	  the	  highest	  judge	  in	  the	  Cape	  Provincial	  
Division.	  He	  is	  the	  highest	  judge,	  he	  is	  the	  judge	  president	  of	  the	  Cape	  Provincial	  Division.	  
 
Quotation	  33	  
L11:67	  -­‐	  8 
067	   LECTURER:	  And	  then	  it	  gives	  you	  a	  verbatim	  judgment	  of	  the	  judge.	  You	  will	  see	  it	  is	  in	  a	  
narrative.	  The	  judge	  talks.	  Its	  not	  a	  uh	  uh	  it	  is	  a	  formal	  document	  of	  course,	  but	  it	  is	  in	  the	  form	  
of	  a	  judgment.	  The	  judge	  sits,	  it	  is	  something	  that	  he	  has	  prepared,	  and	  he’s	  reading	  it	  out	  to	  
the	  court.	  That	  is	  the	  judgment.	  	  
068	   Some	  of	  these	  judgments	  can	  become	  very	  tedious	  and	  become	  very	  long-­‐winded	  and	  you	  




LECTURER:	  Now	  in	  this	  case	  um	  the	  judgment	  was	  given	  by	  the	  Judge	  President,	  King,	  and	  his	  brother	  
Foxcroft,	  J	  concurred.	  In	  other	  words	  that	  means	  uh	  they	  discussed	  the	  matter	  and	  Foxcroft	  agreed	  




LECTURER:	  Yes,	  He	  concurs	  but	  for	  different	  reasons.	  And	  then	  he	  gives	  a	  separate	  judgment.	  Is	  that	  
important?	  Do	  they	  look	  at	  who’s	  the	  most	  senior	  or	  which	  judge	  has	  agreed	  with	  who?	  Huh?	  No.	  If	  he	  
concurred,	  if	  the	  judge	  concurred	  he	  agreed	  with	  him,	  then	  it	  is	  academic	  almost.	  He	  might	  differ	  on	  
the	  reasons	  that	  he	  came	  to	  the	  conclusion,	  but	  they	  concurred,	  they	  agreed.	  They,	  there’s	  no	  
difference	  between	  the	  two	  judges.	  This	  doesn’t	  always	  happen.	  In	  one	  of	  the	  uh	  great	  court	  cases	  in	  
my	  field,	  in	  unjustified	  enrichment,	  Nortje	  v	  Poole,	  um	  the	  judges	  were	  split	  three-­‐two.	  In	  the	  appellate	  
division.	  And	  it	  was	  whether	  we	  should	  have	  a	  general	  enrichment	  action	  or	  not,	  and	  three	  judges	  said	  
uh	  no,	  its	  not	  ready	  yet,	  and	  two	  judges,	  Roelf	  and	  Ogilve,	  Ogilvie	  Thopmson	  said	  you	  should	  have	  a	  
general	  enrichment	  action.	  And	  by	  just	  missing	  it	  with	  one	  judge,	  the	  South	  African	  legal	  science	  was	  




LECTURER:	  The	  judge	  will,	  when	  he	  starts	  giving	  his	  order,	  just	  before	  that,	  towards	  the	  end,	  he	  will	  say	  
these	  are	  the	  reasons	  why	  I	  decided	  like	  I	  decided.	  Um	  during	  his	  judgment	  he	  will	  play.	  He	  will	  say	  ‘the	  
advocate	  for	  the	  defence’	  or	  ‘	  the	  advocate	  for	  the	  respondent	  said	  the	  following,	  I’m	  not	  accepting	  his	  
version.	  I’m	  rejecting	  his	  authority.	  Advocate	  for	  the	  other	  side	  forwarded	  these	  arguments	  and	  I	  find	  
them	  acceptable.	  And	  for	  these	  reasons	  I’m	  going	  to	  follow	  that.	  Um	  but	  that	  is	  very	  confusing,	  you	  
know,	  If	  you	  don’t	  know	  what	  he’s	  doing,	  is	  this	  now	  part	  of	  the	  judgment	  or	  what	  he’s	  doing.	  Um	  …	  
uh…	  you	  know.	  The	  best	  is	  go	  to	  the	  order,	  go	  to	  the	  end	  where	  you	  look	  for	  the	  ratio	  decidendi,	  the	  








front	  of	  the	  law	  report	  you	  will	  see	  there’s	  a	  list	  of	  the	  judges,	  very	  short	  list	  of	  the	  judges.	  They	  were:	  
Frances	  William	  Reitz,	  chief	  justice.	  James	  uh	  Buchanan	  and	  Melliers	  de	  Villiers.	  Three	  three	  um	  judges	  
and	  um	  well	  they	  all	  have	  stories	  of	  course.	  Melliers	  de	  Villiers	  became	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  eventually.	  
And	  um	  uh	  Buchanan	  was	  one	  of	  the	  people	  who	  compiled	  these	  um	  cases.	  	  
 
Quotation	  38	  
L13:87	  -­‐	  94	   
087	   LECTURER:	  What	  are	  his	  initials?	  Ja	  look	  at	  his	  initials.	  
088	   STUDENT	  10:	  Oh	  Judge	  President	  
089	   LECTURER:	  He	  was	  the	  judge	  President.	  Yes	  and	  who	  sat	  with	  him?	  
090	   STUDENT	  10:	  [inaudible]	  
091	   LECTURER:	  Who?	  He	  was	  the	  Judge	  President,	  he	  gave	  the	  judgment	  and	  who	  sat	  with	  him?	  
092	   STUDENT:	  Jones	  and	  Murrans.	  
093	   LECTURER:	  Thank	  you.	  And	  what	  did	  they	  say?	  
094	   STUDENT:	  They	  concurred.	  	  
 
Quotation	  39	  	  
L13:117	   
LECTURER:	  Ratio	  decidendi	  is	  the	  reason	  for	  the	  judgment.	  Those	  are	  the	  specific	  reasons	  that	  the	  
judge	  provides	  why	  he’s	  come	  to	  the	  decision	  uh	  in	  the	  case.	  This	  has	  usually	  only	  got	  to	  do	  with	  law.	  
Very	  seldom,	  but	  its	  not	  impossible,	  very	  seldom	  will	  you	  find	  that	  the	  judge	  will	  base	  his	  reason	  for	  the	  
decision	  on	  fact.	  The	  way	  to	  differentiate	  between	  an	  obiter	  dictum	  and	  a	  ratio	  decidendi	  is	  to	  look	  for	  
something	  that	  is	  involved	  with	  law.	  Obiter	  dictum	  is	  those	  things	  that	  the	  judge	  will	  say	  that	  is	  not	  
binding,	  that	  is	  not	  binding	  but	  that	  he	  feels	  he	  cannot	  keep	  his	  mouth	  shut	  about.	  Just	  observations	  in	  
passing.	  [pauses	  to	  open	  textbook].	  	  
 
Quotation	  40	  	  
L13:121	  -­‐	  2 
121	   STUDENT	  3:	  The	  judge	  isn’t	  the	  one	  whose	  doing	  the	  interrogating	  on	  the	  person	  
122	   LECTURER:	  No	  …	  but	  the	  judge	  is	  the	  one	  evaluating	  the	  evidence.	  So	  the	  judge,	  if	  she	  said:	  ‘I	  
sat	  on	  the	  station	  bench.	  At	  quarter	  to	  four	  in	  the	  morning,	  after	  I’d	  been	  to	  a	  party.	  And	  I	  can’t	  
really	  remember	  because	  I	  had	  lots	  to	  drink.	  And	  then	  somebody	  with	  a	  dark	  brown	  jacket	  




LECTURER:	  OK	  she	  …	  she	  summarized	  it	  quite	  correctly.	  This	  is	  an	  old	  rule.	  It’s	  a	  rule	  that	  comes	  from	  
the	  Roman-­‐Dutch	  law.	  Uh	  it’s	  the	  old	  its	  very	  old	  pre-­‐constitutional	  conception	  of	  females	  that	  females	  
are	  emotional	  and	  they	  can’t	  that	  they	  they	  don’t	  know	  what’s	  going	  on	  in	  reality	  and	  more	  so	  when	  
they’ve	  been	  sexually	  violated.	  They	  lose	  touch	  with	  reality.	  And	  they	  fantasize	  and	  you	  can’t	  trust	  
them.	  [pulls	  face	  toward	  STUDENTS	  1	  and	  19]	  That’s	  the	  old	  concept	  of	  uh	  of	  females	  being	  raped.	  This	  
judge	  had	  the	  unenviable	  task	  of	  evaluating	  a	  rape	  victim’s	  uh	  evidence	  before	  the	  Constitution,	  uh.	  He	  
did	  so,	  he	  came	  to	  a	  conclusion	  that	  her	  evidence	  was	  fine	  but,	  and	  here’s	  the	  thing,	  he	  said	  obiter	  
dictum:	  ‘Listen,	  we	  live	  in	  a	  new	  era,	  I	  can’t	  take	  into	  consideration	  here	  now	  the	  Constitution	  that	  has	  




Constitution.	  So	  if	  I	  had	  been	  under	  the	  new	  Constitution	  I	  would	  not	  have	  used	  the	  cautionary	  rule.	  As	  
it	  is	  in	  this	  instance	  I	  didn’t	  use	  the	  cautionary	  rule	  because	  I	  believed	  what	  she	  said	  and	  I	  I	  didn’t	  use	  it	  
at	  all.	  She	  was	  a	  good	  witness	  and	  I	  accepted	  her	  word	  on	  the	  face	  of	  it	  it	  wasn’t	  necessary	  for	  me	  to	  
use	  it.	  That’s	  the	  ratio	  decidendi.	  In	  this	  case	  I	  didn’t	  use	  it	  but’	  and	  that’s	  the	  word	  you	  must	  look	  for	  ‘	  
but,	  I	  just	  want	  to	  say	  in	  passing,	  for	  instance	  if	  you	  don’t	  think	  I	  know	  it,	  that	  there	  is	  a	  Constitution	  
and	  that	  I	  agree	  with	  the	  Constitution	  and	  in	  future	  the	  cautionary	  rule	  will	  be	  abandoned.’	  That	  is	  
called	  obiter	  dictum.	  Do	  you	  understand?	  Its	  got	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  this	  case	  because	  the	  Constitution	  
is	  not	  has	  not	  been	  um	  promulgated	  yet.	  But	  the	  judge	  is	  just	  saying;	  ‘In	  future	  there	  won’t	  be	  this	  kind	  
of	  case.	  This	  question	  will	  not	  come	  before	  a	  court	  in	  future	  again.	  Because	  the	  cautionary	  rule	  will	  be	  




[Advocate]	  [Judge]	   
011	   LECTURER:	  Common	  law,	  England	  is	  the	  common	  wisdom	  of	  the	  judges	  and	  the	  the	  um	  uh	  
advocates	  that’s	  where	  the	  word	  comes	  from,	  so	  it’s	  a	  traditional	  law,	  it’s	  a	  tradition	  it’s	  the	  




005	   LECTURER:	  My	  rule	  of	  thumb	  with	  ratio	  decidendi	  is	  usually	  it	  has	  go	  t	  to	  do	  with	  law	  and	  not	  
fact.	  So	  on	  the	  first	  [inaudible]	  yes,	  if	  the	  if	  the	  judge	  is	  quoting	  another	  case,	  that	  is	  law.	  Um	  eh	  
you	  can’t	  ever	  have	  a	  rule	  of	  thumb,	  you	  must	  apply	  it	  uh	  to	  f-­‐find	  whether	  it	  is	  indeed	  the	  ratio	  
decidendi.	  So	  a-­‐a	  judge	  can	  indeed	  refer	  to	  another	  case	  only	  in	  passing.	  Uh	  especially	  if	  he	  
doesn’t	  apply	  that	  case	  in	  his	  judgment.	  Uh	  that	  is	  possible,	  so	  then	  its	  obiter	  dictum.	  If	  the	  
judge	  starts	  his	  decision,	  says	  ‘Oh	  there’s	  another	  case	  in	  Namibia	  and	  this	  is	  what	  the	  case	  said,	  
um	  I’m	  not	  going	  to	  follow	  that	  case,	  I’m	  not	  bound	  by	  that	  case	  because	  I’m	  not	  in	  the	  
Western	  Cape’	  or	  whatever	  ‘I’m	  not	  going	  to	  follow	  that	  case,	  I	  think	  that	  that	  case	  was	  um	  was	  
uh	  not	  correctly	  uh	  decided	  um	  and	  I	  would	  rather	  follow	  the	  following	  authorities.’	  Then	  
obviously	  that	  is	  not	  ratio	  decidendi.	  That	  is	  not	  the	  reasons	  for	  his	  decision,	  that	  is	  obiter	  
dictum.	  He’s	  just	  mentioning	  it	  in	  passing,	  mostly	  to	  show	  you	  that	  he	  knows	  about	  this	  case.	  
And	  that	  his	  judgment	  was	  based	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  considered	  that	  case,	  found	  it	  uh	  wanting	  
and	  he’s	  just	  mentioning	  it	  in	  passing.	  But,	  of	  course,	  nine	  out	  of	  ten	  times	  if	  a	  judge	  starts	  
analyzing	  a	  case	  then	  you	  can	  be	  certain	  that	  he	  is	  going	  to	  follow	  that	  case.	  Uh	  but	  you	  must	  
first	  see	  what	  is	  the	  question	  in	  the	  in	  the	  case	  what	  wh-­‐wh-­‐what	  was	  put	  before	  court,	  what	  
authorities	  did	  he	  use	  and	  what	  did	  he	  decide.	  And	  only	  then	  can	  you	  say,	  ok	  this	  is	  his	  decision.	  
The	  reasons	  for	  his	  decision	  are	  the	  following.	  And	  they	  are	  supported	  by	  the	  following	  uh	  
authorities.	  And	  that	  is	  his	  ratio	  decidendi.	  Ratio	  decidendi	  is	  just	  reasons	  for	  decision.	  Reasons	  




087	   LECTURER:	  This	  is	  only	  for	  highly	  specialized	  private	  law	  matters,	  its	  not	  for	  for	  contemporary	  




of	  our	  law	  that	  is	  open	  to	  that	  kind	  of	  research.	  Um	  um	  its	  not	  for	  the	  faint-­‐hearted,	  but	  it	  is	  
very	  rewarding	  if	  you	  do	  it.	  What	  you	  must	  know	  however	  is	  how	  to	  do	  it,	  vaguely.	  You	  must	  
know	  uh	  why	  we	  say	  what	  we	  mean	  when	  we	  say	  old	  authorities,	  and	  you	  must	  know	  that	  
some	  of	  those	  old	  authorities	  are	  still	  valid	  today.	  Obviously	  in	  the	  past	  twenty,	  thirty,	  forty	  
years	  lots	  of	  the-­‐	  huge	  pieces	  of	  Roman	  law	  -­‐	  like	  the	  senatusconsultum	  masoconaum	  and	  the	  
senatusconsultum	  omolierum	  -­‐	  those	  have	  been	  demolished,	  the	  actio	  doli	  has	  been	  
demolished	  in	  the	  case	  that	  you’re	  going	  to	  do,	  uh	  there	  are	  many,	  there	  are	  many	  pieces	  of	  
Roman	  law	  that	  has	  been	  taken	  out	  because	  they’ve	  just	  become	  uh	  anachronistic.	  Uh	  or	  not,	  




024	   LECTURER:	  Dankie.	  OK	  this	  is	  a	  case	  that	  you	  must	  go	  and	  read	  ladies	  and	  gentlemen.	  It	  is	  a	  case	  
by	  the	  wonderful	  and	  very	  eccentric	  and	  very	  learned	  uh	  judge	  of	  appeal	  Solomon.	  Um	  and	  you	  
must	  read	  the	  case	  -­‐	  its	  not	  a	  long	  case,	  its	  only	  four	  pages	  -­‐	  and	  you	  must	  read	  the	  case	  so	  as	  to	  
so	  as	  to	  understand	  his	  personality.	  Solomon	  was	  one	  of	  the	  of	  the	  bright	  lights	  of	  the	  1920	  the	  
1920	  appellate	  division.	  A	  brilliant,	  brilliant	  jurist.	  	  
 
Quotation	  46	  
L18:19	  -­‐	  21	   
019	   LECTURER:	  Courts	  and	  judges.	  So	  when	  there’s	  a	  new,	  when	  there’s	  a	  new	  dispensation,	  what	  
happens?	  What	  does	  a	  new	  dispensation	  do	  to	  the	  sitting	  judges,	  because	  a	  judge	  is	  not	  a	  -­‐	  
unlike	  in	  America	  and	  those	  funny	  places,	  but	  -­‐	  the	  court	  is	  not	  an	  elected	  institution.	  A	  court	  is	  
um	  uh	  a	  court	  is	  a	  meritocracy,	  it	  is	  something	  that	  is	  based	  on	  merit,	  its	  based	  on	  on	  um	  
professionalism,	  its	  not	  a	  political	  appointment,	  you’re	  not	  elected	  to	  be	  a	  judge	  or	  a	  
magistrate.	  So	  what	  is	  what	  do	  you	  think	  the	  new	  dispensation	  would	  do	  to	  the	  judges,	  or	  what	  
do	  you	  think	  they	  did	  [clears	  throat].	  	  
020	   STUDENT	  4:	  They	  would	  change	  their	  frame	  of	  reference,	  the	  way	  they	  …	  
021	   LECTURER:	  Now	  how	  do	  you	  do	  that?	  A	  sixty-­‐five-­‐year,	  middle-­‐aged	  old	  male?	  How	  do	  you	  
change	  his	  frame	  of	  reference?	  Its	  not	  just	  like,	  you	  know,	  chop	  off	  his	  head	  and	  give	  him	  




LECTURER:	  That	  takes	  time.	  That’s	  takes	  that’s	  only	  happening	  now.	  Ten	  years	  later.	  You	  don’t	  just	  
[clicks	  fingers]	  create	  250	  new	  judges.	  Ne?	  A	  judge	  takes	  a	  long	  time	  to	  train.	  Its	  not	  an	  its	  not	  an	  easy	  
its	  not	  an	  easy	  job.	  I	  don’t	  think/	  I	  think	  any	  one	  of	  you	  can	  jump	  into	  President	  Mbeki’s	  job	  um	  and	  run	  
it	  for	  a	  day	  or	  two.	  I	  don’t	  know	  for	  longer	  but	  for	  a	  day	  or	  two	  you’ll	  be	  able	  to	  do	  it.	  But	  I	  don’t	  think	  
anyone	  in	  this	  room	  except	  myself,	  I	  think,	  that	  can	  do	  a	  judge’s	  job.	  	  
 
Quotation	  48	  	  
L18:34	  
LECTURER:	  Um	  [coughs]	  the	  High	  Court	  was	  not	  a	  big	  problem	  because	  apparently	  there	  was	  an	  
understanding,	  there	  was	  a	  sunset	  clause	  in	  the	  interim	  constitution	  that	  sitting	  judges	  will	  be	  




judges	  were	  retrained,	  I	  don’t	  know	  how	  effective	  that	  was,	  its	  very	  difficult	  to	  train	  a	  judge.	  Believe	  
me.	  Um	  its	  not	  a	  its	  not	  the	  easiest	  thing	  to	  do.	  	  
Quotation	  49	  	  
L18:46	  	  
[Judge]	  [Magistrate]	  	  
Now	  appeal	  means	  you	  go	  to	  a	  higher	  court	  than	  the	  court	  where	  the	  case	  was	  heard	  in	  the	  first	  
instance.	  You	  go	  to	  a	  higher	  court	  if	  you	  are	  convinced	  that	  uh	  that	  something	  was	  done	  wrong	  in	  the	  
lower	  court	  uh	  and	  that	  the	  sentence	  uh	  that	  the	  magistrate	  court	  or	  judge	  came	  to	  uh	  was	  incorrect.	  
The	  appeal	  rests	  only	  on	  the	  four	  corners	  of	  the	  record	  of	  the	  case.	  There	  is	  no	  vive	  voce	  evidence	  to	  
be	  led	  in	  an	  appeal.	  You	  cannot,	  when	  you	  have	  an	  appeal,	  introduce	  new	  evidence.	  So,	  an	  appeal	  is	  a	  
second	  bite	  at	  the	  cherry.	  You’ve	  gone	  through	  the	  whole	  thing,	  the	  magistrate	  or	  judge	  has	  made	  an	  
error.	  According	  to	  you,	  something	  was	  done	  incorrectly.	  You	  want	  to	  take	  this	  to	  a	  higher	  authority	  uh	  
to	  rectify	  that	  in	  order	  that	  the	  sentence	  can	  be	  changed.	  	  
 
Quotation	  50	  	  
L18:53 
LECTURER:	  No	  I	  suggested	  when	  the	  when	  the	  um	  when	  the	  Constitution	  was	  being	  written	  I	  was	  at	  
um	  Justice	  College.	  I	  lectured	  at	  the	  um	  Justice	  College	  and	  we	  went	  all	  around	  the	  country	  to	  lecture	  
to	  all	  the	  magistrates	  and	  judges	  to	  introduce	  the	  new	  Constitution	  to	  them.	  And	  we	  also	  had	  
workshops	  with	  um	  all	  the	  stakeholders	  to	  determine	  how	  the	  new	  Constitution’s	  going	  to	  work	  
because	  we	  didn’t	  have	  any	  court	  cases	  or	  any	  precedents	  to	  go	  on.	  And	  then	  somebody	  asked	  the	  
same	  question.	  Where	  do	  you	  go	  from	  here?	  Where	  do	  you	  go	  from	  the	  Constitutional	  Court?	  Um	  and	  
um	  Arthur	  Chaskalson	  the	  judge,	  Chief	  Justice	  retired	  was	  in	  the	  audience	  and	  Dullah	  Omar	  was	  still	  




LECTURER:	  Mostly	  the	  High	  Court	  judges	  confirms	  the	  the	  judgment	  of	  the	  magistrate,	  but	  if	  it	  is	  an	  
over	  enthusiastic	  magistrate,	  uh	  um	  it	  can	  be	  sent	  uh	  back	  and	  the	  magistrate	  must	  then	  supply	  
reasons	  why	  he	  um	  sentenced	  the	  person	  to	  such	  uh	  to	  a	  higher	  sentence	  than	  is	  customary	  uh	  and	  if	  





LECTURER:	  But	  of	  course	  what	  I	  had	  forgotten,	  you	  know	  I	  was	  still	  a	  very	  junior	  magistrate,	  what	  I	  had	  
forgotten	  is	  it	  goes	  on	  automatic	  review	  to	  	  the	  judge	  of	  the	  Supreme	  ….	  Now	  the	  problem	  with	  the	  
system,	  is:	  The	  judge	  sits	  in	  his	  chambers,	  the	  judge	  is	  now	  a	  senior	  advocate	  who’s	  been	  elevated	  to	  a	  
judge.	  He	  sits	  in	  his	  chambers	  he’s	  high	  on	  on	  on	  human	  rights	  and	  things	  -­‐	  which	  is	  fine	  -­‐	  but	  he	  
doesn’t	  understand	  what	  a	  magistrate’s	  court	  looks	  like.	  He	  doesn’t	  understand	  seeing	  this	  woman	  
with	  four	  children	  and	  this	  man	  who	  refuses	  to	  pay	  the	  maintenance.	  He	  doesn’t	  you	  know	  they’ve	  







L18:98	  -­‐	  100	   
098	   LECTURER:	  Of	  course	  three	  months	  later	  on	  a	  Saturday	  evening,	  on	  a	  Saturday	  evening	  in	  Cape	  
Town,	  um	  I	  had	  a	  dinner	  party,	  I	  had	  lots	  of	  people	  there,	  at	  my	  dinner	  party,and	  it	  was	  about	  
se-­‐	  seven	  o	  clock.	  You	  know	  just	  after	  after	  the	  people	  have	  arrived	  and	  they’ve	  had	  their	  first	  
course,	  then	  there’s	  a	  phone	  call.	  Now,	  I’m	  irritated	  because	  you	  know	  -­‐	  the	  food	  is	  in	  the	  
kitchen,	  I	  must	  look	  after	  the	  food	  and	  I’ve	  got	  ten	  or	  twelve	  people	  to	  serve	  and	  I	  don’t	  want	  
phone	  calls	  now.	  Grab	  the	  phone:	  ‘Yes	  who’s	  this!’	  	  
099	   And	  a	  very	  civilized	  English	  voice	  on	  the	  other	  side:’	  Excuse	  me,	  but	  um	  may	  I	  please	  talk	  with	  
magistrate	  Serfontein?’	  [raised	  pitch]	  I	  said	  ‘Yes	  its	  him	  talking	  I’m	  not	  on	  duty	  this	  weekend	  
please	  who	  is	  this?’	  ‘Mr	  Serfontein	  this	  is	  Judge	  Foxcroft’.	  [starts	  laughing]	  ‘Do	  you	  remember	  
the	  case	  of	  State	  v	  Ngobe’	  or	  whatever.	  I	  said	  ‘No	  I	  don’t	  remember	  the	  case	  your	  honour	  or	  my	  
lord’	  or	  I	  don’t	  know	  what	  I	  called	  him	  or	  judge	  um	  and	  I	  said	  ‘uh-­‐h.	  ‘I	  have	  tonight	  issued	  an	  
urgent	  mandamus’	  or	  something	  ‘instructing	  Pollsmoor	  Prison	  to	  release	  this	  man	  and	  I	  would	  
like	  it	  if	  you	  could	  send	  me	  a	  full	  set	  of	  reasons	  why	  you	  for	  a	  first	  offender	  sentenced	  this	  man	  
to	  twelve	  months	  in	  prison.	  I’m	  forwarding	  the	  court	  record	  to	  you	  and	  if	  you	  could	  reply	  by	  
Monday	  afternoon	  latest	  I	  would	  appreciate	  it’.	  	  
100	   So	  of	  course	  I	  was	  in	  big	  big	  big	  trouble.	  Um	  and	  the	  man	  was	  released	  after	  three	  months	  and	  
the	  judge	  -­‐	  it	  was	  a	  reported	  case	  -­‐	  my	  name	  came	  in	  the	  law	  reports	  as	  the	  magistrate	  who	  




042	   LECTURER:	  No	  no	  two	  different	  people	  but	  they	  are	  related.	  So	  um	  you	  can	  go	  and	  read	  about	  
Oliver	  Schreiner.	  Um	  there	  are	  many	  articles	  in	  the	  law	  journal	  about	  him.	  Professor	  Kahn	  
wrote	  a	  beautiful	  obituary	  about	  him	  when	  he	  passed	  away.	  Um	  but	  he	  was	  indeed	  involved	  in	  
the	  Harris	  case	  and	  he	  was	  one	  of	  the	  few	  judges	  that	  stood	  up	  against	  the	  apartheid	  regime.	  
Uh	  he	  was	  a	  brilliant	  judge.	  Uh	  even	  his	  technical	  cases,	  on	  things	  like	  mining	  rights	  and	  um	  uh	  
administrative	  law,	  he	  was	  a	  true	  blue	  lawyer,	  you	  know,	  one	  of	  the	  …	  one	  of	  the	  greats.	  	  
 
Quotation	  55	  
L19:8	  -­‐	  10	   
008	   LECTURER:	  OK	  the	  first	  thing	  that	  we	  know	  about	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  is	  that	  it	  was	  
instituted	  by	  the	  um	  1994	  Constitution.	  It	  is	  a	  new	  court.	  Justices	  were	  appointed	  to	  that	  uh	  
court	  which	  um	  were	  charged	  with	  looking	  after	  the	  Bill	  of	  Rights	  and	  looking	  after	  the	  human	  
rights	  of	  South	  Africa.	  The	  courts,	  up	  to	  that	  point,	  as	  I	  said	  on	  Tuesday,	  the	  courts	  were	  not	  
wholly	  trusted	  by	  the	  new	  regime	  or	  by	  the	  new	  government	  because	  they	  were	  seen	  as	  co-­‐
operating	  with	  the	  apartheid	  government	  and	  they	  were	  not	  a	  hundred	  percent	  completely	  
trusted	  by	  the	  new	  government.	  	  
009	   So	  the	  one	  thing	  that	  the	  new	  government	  did,	  the	  most	  or	  the	  least	  revolutionary	  or	  the	  least	  
disruptive	  element	  that	  the	  new	  government	  put	  in	  place	  was	  the	  new	  Constitutional	  Court.	  
Um	  in	  other	  regimes	  in	  other	  um	  uh	  jurisdictions	  where	  there	  has	  been	  a	  transfer	  of	  power	  
from	  one	  group	  of	  people	  to	  another	  uh	  it	  happened	  on	  a	  much	  more	  revolutionary	  basis	  and	  
all	  the	  old	  judges	  were	  simply	  uh	  dismissed.	  Or	  they	  were	  simply,	  they	  were	  simply	  uh	  retired.	  




it	  strives	  to	  be	  a	  modern	  democracy,	  one	  of	  the	  major	  upheavals	  in	  Pakistan	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  
President	  dismissed	  the	  chief	  justice.	  	  
010	   Now	  this	  didn’t	  happen	  in	  South	  Africa.	  We	  had	  an	  evolutionary	  change.	  Um	  uh	  and	  the	  chief	  
justice	  of	  the	  previous	  regime,	  Justice	  Corbett	  was	  asked	  by	  President	  Mandela	  to	  officiate	  at	  
the	  swearing	  in	  ceremony	  of	  the	  new	  President.	  So	  the	  chief	  justice	  of	  the	  previous	  regime	  was	  
asked	  to	  swear	  in	  the	  new	  President	  of	  the	  new	  government.	  I’m	  making	  that	  point	  just	  to	  
illustrate	  to	  you	  that	  there	  wasn’t	  a	  clean	  sweep.	  The	  only	  clean	  sweep	  that	  there	  was,	  was	  that	  




014	   LECTURER:	  Um	  [fumbles	  over	  words]	  of	  course	  its	  true,	  because	  all	  courts	  are	  only	  sitting	  for	  
certain	  times	  of	  the	  year.	  Um	  and	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  has	  got	  um	  a	  specific	  diary	  or	  r-­‐
roster	  and	  they	  are	  in	  session	  for	  certain	  times	  and	  they	  are	  in	  recess	  for	  other	  times.	  So	  ub-­‐h	  
exactly	  the	  same	  with	  High	  Courts.	  The	  High	  Court	  doesn’t	  sit	  for	  the	  whole	  year,	  and	  the	  same	  
for	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Appeal.	  Um	  and	  that	  is	  to	  give	  the	  Justices	  times	  to	  do	  research.	  And	  
write	  the	  judgments.	  And	  um	  to	  come	  up	  to	  date	  with	  the	  most	  current	  law.	  To	  be	  a	  just-­‐	  to	  be	  
a	  uh	  um	  to	  be	  a	  justice	  in	  South	  Africa,	  to	  be	  a	  judge	  in	  South	  Africa	  is	  not	  easy.	  Um	  it’s	  a	  very	  
dynamic	  environment.	  So	  uh	  besides	  holiday	  they	  need	  time	  off	  from	  court	  work,	  so	  that	  they	  
can	  catch	  up	  with	  their	  research.	  
 
Quotation	  57	  	  
L19:32 
LECTURER:	  So	  the	  only	  challenge	  to	  the	  superiority	  of	  the	  Appellate	  Division	  the	  old	  apartheid	  
Appellate	  Division,	  though	  its	  unfair	  to	  call	  them	  the	  apartheid	  division	  of	  the	  Appellate	  Division,	  there	  
was	  some	  sterling	  judges	  in	  the	  Appellate	  Division	  uh	  especially	  white,	  of	  course	  white	  but	  English	  
liberal	  judges	  um	  uh	  also	  some	  Afrikaner	  professional	  judges	  that	  were	  above	  the	  apartheid	  nonsense	  
um	  uh	  but	  the	  new	  dispensation,	  the	  new	  government	  still	  saw	  the	  Appellate	  Division	  as	  a	  bit	  tainted	  





038	   LECTURER:	  Ja	  Oliver	  Schreiner	  [STUDENT	  3:	  …	  came	  from	  the	  Eastern	  Cape	  or	  Cradock].	  Oliver	  
Schreiner	  is	  the	  very	  very	  famous	  and	  very	  intelligent	  and	  wonderful	  judge	  that	  we’ve	  called	  our	  
law	  school,	  that	  we’ve	  named	  our	  law	  school	  after.	  So	  it’s	  the	  Oliver	  Schreiner	  School	  of	  Law.	  
And	  if	  you	  go	  into	  the	  library	  you	  will	  see	  pictures	  of	  Oliver	  Schreiner.	  And	  he	  is	  indeed	  related	  
to	  Olive	  Schreiner	  who	  wrote	  ‘Pictures	  of	  an	  African	  Farm’	  or	  whatever.	  Um	  who	  was	  a	  um	  
supporter	  of	  human	  rights	  even	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  And	  she	  was	  a	  




LECUTRER:	  The	  names	  and	  the	  geographical	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  High	  Courts	  are	  being	  considered	  or	  




Professor	  Hoexter	  who’s	  one	  of	  our	  leading	  academics	  at	  the	  Wits	  Law	  School.	  The	  Hoexter	  
Commission	  has	  designed	  a	  new	  structure	  for	  the	  whole	  of	  South	  Africa.	  
 
Quotation	  60	  	  
L19:67	   
LECTURER:	  The	  judges	  that	  sit	  in	  the	  local	  division	  are	  the	  exact	  same	  judges	  that	  sit	  in	  the	  provincial	  
division.	  They	  are	  interchangeable.	  It’s	  a	  roster.	  You	  sometimes	  sit	  in	  the	  provincial	  division,	  sometimes	  




LECTURER:	  Obviously	  not,	  you	  can’t	  uh	  what	  is	  the	  Latin?	  You	  can’t	  you	  can	  never	  be	  the	  judge	  in	  your	  
own	  case.	  Uh	  suo	  iudex	  non	  [inaudible]	  est	  -­‐	  you	  remember	  that	  Latin?	  No.	  You	  can	  never	  be/	  its	  like	  
um	  its	  like	  um	  audi	  alteram	  partem,	  the	  other	  side	  must	  always	  be	  heard?	  Its	  natural	  justice,	  you	  can	  
never	  be	  a	  judge	  in	  your	  own	  case.	  	  
 
Quotation	  62	  	  
L19:11 
LECTURER:	  Justice	  Albie	  Sachs,	  a	  fighter	  for	  human	  rights.	  Although	  he	  practiced	  for	  a	  very	  limited	  
matter,	  very	  limited	  matter	  in	  Mozambique,	  and	  the	  neighbouring	  countries,	  and	  he	  is	  a	  qualified	  
lawyer	  um	  he	  is	  he	  was	  appointed	  because	  of	  his	  role	  in	  the	  struggle,	  because	  of	  the	  sacrifices	  that	  he	  
has	  made	  and	  because	  of	  his	  passion	  for	  human	  rights.	  You	  can	  go	  through	  all	  the	  justices	  of	  the	  uh	  uh	  
Supreme	  uh	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Court,	  they	  were	  all	  appointed	  specifically	  for	  uh	  uh	  very	  specific	  




024	   LECTURER:	  The	  guardian	  of	  the	  guardian?	  There’s	  no	  custos	  custodius	  for	  the	  High	  Court.	  
Except	  of	  course	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  when	  it	  goes	  on	  review	  in	  the	  Constitutional	  Court.	  
But	  no	  no	  automatic	  review	  for	  the	  High	  Court.	  You	  must	  also	  remember,	  a	  district	  court	  
magistrate,	  and	  a	  regional	  court	  magistrate,	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent,	  is	  far	  removed	  from	  a	  judge.	  
Judges	  are	  appointed	  the	  best	  of	  the	  best.	  Well	  …	  some	  people	  will	  not	  agree	  with	  that.	  But	  the	  
idea	  is	  the	  very	  best	  senior	  advocates.	  The	  very	  best	  of	  the	  practicing	  advocates	  are	  appointed	  
as	  judges.	  So	  uh	  when	  you	  reach	  the	  stage	  where	  you	  are	  invited	  to	  become	  a	  judge,	  uh	  you	  




[Judge]	  [Magistrate]	  	  
LECUTRER:	  Having	  said	  that,	  and	  we’ll	  do	  this	  when	  we	  do	  the	  profession,	  please	  remember	  that	  it	  was	  
one	  of	  Dullah	  Omar’s	  objectives,	  the	  previous	  Minister	  of	  Justice,	  that	  the	  curriculum	  vitae,	  the	  cursus	  
honorum,	  the	  career	  path	  of	  a	  magistrate	  and	  a	  judge	  would	  eventually	  in	  South	  Africa	  become	  one.	  
You	  would	  start	  by	  being	  a	  junior	  prosecutor,	  senior	  prosecutor	  uh	  being	  elevated	  to	  the	  bench	  
becoming	  a	  magistrate,	  senior	  magistrate,	  regional	  court	  magistrate,	  senior	  court	  magistrate,	  regional	  








LECTURER:	  And	  a	  judge	  in	  the	  High	  Court,	  especially	  with	  some	  standing,	  a	  couple	  of	  year’s	  standing,	  




LECTURER:	  And	  went	  on	  review	  and	  was	  confirmed	  on	  review.	  By	  the	  way,	  if	  you	  think	  all	  my	  cases	  
were	  turned	  over	  [laughs,	  amid	  class	  laughter].	  It	  was	  confirmed	  by	  no	  lesser	  luminary	  than	  judge	  Eloff,	  
who	  was	  Judge	  President.	  It	  was	  confirmed	  on	  review.	  	  
 
Quotation	  67	  	  
L20:56	  -­‐	  7	   
056	   STUDENT	  3:	  Sir,	  I	  was	  under	  the	  conception	  that	  um	  if	  someone	  pleads	  guilty	  in	  court	  the	  
magistrate	  or	  judge	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  give	  a	  tiny	  bit	  less	  of	  a	  harsher	  sentence	  because	  of	  a	  …	  
057	   LECTURER:	  Yes,	  it	  could	  be,	  it	  could	  be.	  If	  you	  plead	  guilty,	  it	  save	  an	  enormous	  amount	  of	  time,	  
it	  saves	  an	  enormous	  amount	  of	  time,	  um	  and	  um	  you	  are	  helping	  the	  court.	  And	  it	  shows	  
remorse!	  You	  admit	  ‘Look,	  mea	  culpa,	  I’m	  guilty,	  I’m	  here,	  I’m	  throwing	  myself	  on	  your	  mercy.’	  
Then	  of	  course	  the	  court	  will	  take	  it	  into	  consideration.	  	  
 
Quotation	  68	  	  
L20:70	   
070	   LECTURER:	  Yes,	  of	  course,	  a	  court	  all	  courts	  except	  if	  the	  judge	  rules	  that	  it	  is	  in	  camera.	  In	  
camera	  means	  that	  because	  of	  the	  sensitivity	  of	  the	  case	  uh	  it	  shouldn’t	  be	  held	  in	  public.	  Those	  
cases	  are	  usually	  where	  children	  are	  involved.	  If	  the	  child	  has	  been	  molested	  then	  obviously	  you	  
don’t	  want	  the	  public	  to	  sit	  there	  and	  look	  at	  the	  poor	  child	  giving	  evidence.	  Um	  you	  know	  if	  its	  
high	  priority	  -­‐	  Zuma	  asked	  that	  his	  case	  be	  heard	  in	  camera	  and	  the	  judge	  said	  ‘No’.	  Um	  but	  
usually	  if	  its	  high	  profile	  or	  if	  its	  very	  sensitive.	  If	  it	  concerns	  national	  security	  as	  Zuma	  said	  it	  
did,	  national	  security	  on	  the	  weapons,	  whatever,	  then	  the	  judge	  can	  decide	  that	  the	  court	  will	  
be	  heard	  in	  camera.	  And	  that	  the	  court	  doors	  are	  closed	  and	  that	  there	  are	  notices	  that	  this	  
court	  is	  in	  camera.	  	  
 
Quotation	  69	  	  
L21:36 
The	  idea	  is	  that	  they	  would	  help	  to	  alleviate	  the	  pressure	  on	  the	  High	  Court.	  And	  unopposed	  divorces,	  
why	  do	  you	  need	  a	  High	  Court	  to	  listen	  to	  unopposed	  divorces.	  Have	  you	  ever	  heard	  an	  unopposed	  
divorce?	  I	  mean,	  three	  three	  minutes.	  Um	  if	  there’s	  an	  agreement,	  the	  judge	  says	  ‘Ok,	  the	  agreement	  is	  
now	  an	  order	  of	  the	  court	  and	  the	  parties	  are	  divorced.	  Thank	  you’	  Chup	  [makes	  as	  if	  he	  is	  slamming	  
down	  with	  a	  gavel].	  
 
Quotation	  70	  	  
L21:38	  -­‐	  9	   




justice	  is	  not	  something	  that	  uh	  you	  can	  use	  a	  sausage	  machine	  for.	  Its	  um	  you	  know,	  you	  must	  
consider	  the	  cases.	  It	  takes	  time.	  And	  then,	  you	  know,	  we’ve	  been	  through	  a	  transformation.	  
We’ve	  expected	  an	  enormous	  amount	  from	  our	  justice	  system.	  And	  its	  it’s	  the	  price	  that	  we	  
have	  to	  pay	  instead	  of	  having	  a	  complete	  breakdown	  and	  no	  courts	  and	  no	  and	  chop	  off	  the	  
heads	  of	  the	  old	  judges,	  that’s	  on	  the	  one	  hand.	  The	  price	  that	  you	  have	  to	  pay	  is	  you	  must	  
slowly	  but	  surely	  appoint	  new	  judges,	  the	  old	  judges	  must	  train	  the	  new	  judges	  and	  the	  new	  
judges	  must	  get	  used	  to	  the	  work.	  And	  that	  takes	  time,	  that	  you	  don’t	  /	  you	  know,	  a	  judge	  is	  
not	  made	  overnight.	  Um	  uh	  uh	  you	  know	  even	  a	  plumber,	  if	  you	  ask	  me	  now	  to	  become	  a	  
plumber	  it	  will	  take	  me,	  well,	  me	  specifically,	  about	  28	  years	  [laughter]	  but	  you	  know	  you	  can’t	  
send	  somebody	  in	  to	  do	  a	  complicated	  electrical	  job	  if	  he’s	  not	  trained	  electrician.	  Or	  even	  if	  
he’s	  a	  trained	  electrician	  if	  he	  hasn’t	  got	  experience.	  You	  know,	  it	  takes	  time,	  it	  really	  takes	  
time.	  Um	  and	  what	  we	  want	  from	  our	  judges	  is	  common	  sense.	  And,	  you	  know,	  the	  tree	  of	  
common	  sense	  is	  very	  high.	  You	  don’t,	  you	  don’t	  get	  to	  it	  very	  easily.	  	  
039	   So,	  um	  and	  there’s	  lots	  of	  work.	  You	  know,	  that’s	  the	  other	  thing	  that	  people	  forget	  about	  the	  
stupid	  electricity	  problem	  as	  well.	  Um	  you	  know,	  there’s	  a	  shortage	  of	  electricity,	  yes	  perhaps	  
because	  there	  wasn’t	  maintenance	  and	  because	  there	  wasn’t	  transformation	  and	  affirmative	  
action	  and	  all	  those	  arguments	  but	  the	  main	  reason	  why	  the	  electricity	  is	  in	  short	  supply	  is	  the	  
fact	  that	  South	  Africa’s	  economy	  is	  booming	  so	  much.	  That	  we	  need	  such	  an	  enormous	  amount	  
of	  electricity.	  Um,	  you	  know,	  the	  courts	  are	  full	  because	  there’s	  lots	  of	  commercial	  activity,	  
there’s	  lots	  of	  criminal	  activity,	  there’s	  lots	  of	  work,	  because	  it’s	  a	  society	  in	  transformation.	  
There	  is	  just	  an	  enormous	  amount	  of	  work.	  Couple	  that	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  we’re	  in	  
transformation	  situation	  then,	  you	  know,	  you	  have	  your	  answer.	  Um	  and	  its	  going	  to	  take	  a	  
generation	  to	  solve	  it.	  Not	  not	  not	  a	  decade.	  Its	  going	  to	  take	  a	  generation	  to	  solve	  it.	  	  
 
Quotation	  71	  	  
L22:48	  	  
[Judge]	  [Advocate] 
LECTURER:	  The	  papers	  are	  the	  things	  filed	  in	  the	  court	  file	  and	  served	  upon	  the	  other	  side	  that	  you	  are	  
going	  to	  base	  your	  case	  upon	  in	  the	  form	  of	  affidavits,	  expert	  witnesses,	  whatever,	  I	  don’t,	  I	  can’t	  go	  
into	  all	  those	  technical	  details.	  But	  it	  is	  a	  paper	  file	  that	  is	  opened	  for	  your	  case	  in	  the	  court	  and	  that	  
file	  goes	  to	  the	  judge,	  not	  to	  you,	  that	  file	  goes	  to	  the	  judge.	  If	  there’s	  anything	  wrong	  with	  that	  file,	  
the	  judge	  will	  only	  keep	  you	  responsible.	  The	  judge	  will	  ask	  you,	  um,	  Mr	  [state’s	  student’s	  surname]	  
why	  is	  the	  file	  not	  properly	  paginated?	  And	  its	  no	  use	  saying,	  uh	  my	  lord	  I’m	  terribly	  sorry	  but	  that	  
must	  have	  been	  the	  clerk,	  the	  clerk	  of	  the	  attorney	  who	  did	  not	  attend	  to	  the	  pagination.	  You	  must	  see	  
to	  it	  that	  everything	  is	  in	  order.	  Up	  to	  such	  a	  small	  detail	  as	  pagination.	  You	  know	  what	  pagination	  is?	  	  
You	  have	  a	  file	  of	  ten	  thousand	  pages	  and	  every	  day	  a	  new	  document	  arrives	  to	  be	  put	  into	  that	  file.	  
Sometimes,	  the	  order	  changes.	  So	  before	  the	  document	  goes	  to	  the	  judge	  on	  the	  day	  of	  the	  trial,	  
somebody,	  usually	  the	  clerk	  of	  the,	  the	  candidate	  attorney	  of	  the	  attorney’s	  office,	  must	  go	  to	  the	  file	  
and	  see	  to	  it	  that	  it	  is	  paginated,	  in	  pen,	  in	  pen,	  you	  paginate	  it	  in	  pen	  because	  it	  changes.	  And	  its	  
paginated	  from	  page	  one	  to	  page	  ten	  thousand.	  Correctly.	  If	  it	  is	  not	  correct	  then	  the	  judge	  can	  throw	  
out	  your	  case.	  	  
 






LECTURER:	  You	  must	  be	  able	  to	  see	  every	  single	  thing.	  If	  there’s	  a	  spelling	  error	  in	  your	  pleadings,	  oh	  
please.	  If	  there’s	  a	  grammatical	  error.	  If	  there’s	  a	  technical	  error,	  a	  legal	  error,	  if	  you’ve	  made	  an	  
aversion	  on	  a	  statement	  that	  is	  wrong	  technically,	  legally,	  your	  case	  is	  thrown	  out.	  The	  judge	  will	  give	  
you	  an	  opportunity.	  He’ll	  say,	  uh,	  please	  Mr	  [state’s	  student’s	  surname],	  address	  me	  on	  this	  novel	  
interpretation	  that	  you	  have	  in	  clause	  3.	  And	  then	  you	  will	  be	  able	  to	  address	  him	  but	  I	  mean	  if	  you,	  uh	  
uh,	  if	  he	  talks	  like	  that	  you	  know	  you’re	  stuffed.	  You	  can	  just	  as	  well,	  you	  know,	  pack	  up	  and	  say	  ‘I’m	  
sorry	  my	  lord,	  um	  uh,	  I’m	  relatively	  inexperienced	  in	  these	  matters	  and	  uh,	  it	  slipped	  in,	  I	  beg	  your	  
lordship’s	  indulgence	  to	  amend	  it.	  And	  your	  lordship	  will	  not	  give	  you	  an	  indulgence.	  He	  will	  say,	  well	  
the	  indulgence	  I	  will	  give	  you	  is	  that	  I	  will	  take	  the	  case	  off	  the	  roll	  for	  you	  completely	  and	  then	  you	  can	  
put	  it	  back	  again	  when	  its	  correct.	  And	  then	  you’ve	  wasted	  costs.	  You’ve	  wasted	  thousands	  of	  rand	  by	  
appearing	  and	  preparing	  to	  appear	  for	  that	  day	  for	  trial	  in	  court	  and	  its	  just	  thrown	  out	  because	  you’ve	  
made	  something	  wrong.	  You’ve	  referred	  to	  section	  2(1)	  instead	  of	  section	  1(2).	  	  Uh	  a.	  And	  the	  guy	  
sitting	  on	  the	  bench,	  the	  judge	  is	  a	  senior	  advocate	  of	  twenty-­‐five	  year’s	  standing.	  So,	  for	  twenty-­‐five	  
years	  he’s	  been	  looking	  through	  these	  pleadings.	  So	  he,	  it	  jumps	  out	  uh	  uh	  at	  him.	  As	  soon	  as	  he	  reads	  
the	  pleadings	  and	  you’ve	  made	  an	  error	  it	  jumps	  out.	  He’s	  an	  expert,	  he	  knows	  everything.	  	  
 
Quotation	  73	  	  
L22:	  52	  -­‐	  3	   
[Judge][Attorney]	   
052	   LECTURER:	  He	  knows	  absolutely	  everything	  and	  he	  then,	  with	  the	  permission	  of	  the	  judge,	  can	  
appear	  in	  the	  High	  Court.	  (Breathes	  in	  deeply).	  This	  is	  …	  its	  an	  exception.	  You	  must	  apply,	  you	  
must	  have	  extreme	  expertise.	  You	  must	  be	  a	  leader	  in	  your	  field.	  	  
053	   Or	  there	  must	  be	  some	  compelling	  reason	  why	  you	  must	  now	  appear.	  Say	  for	  instance	  now,	  you	  
know,	  um	  there’s	  a	  specific	  divorce	  that	  um,	  its	  your	  god	  daughter	  that	  is	  getting	  divorced	  and	  
you	  wanted	  to	  do	  the	  divorce,	  then	  the	  judge	  will	  allow	  it.	  If	  it’s	  an	  uncontested	  divorce.	  If	  you	  
know,	  if	  you’re	  a	  senior,	  uh,	  practitioner,	  the	  judge	  will	  of	  course	  allow	  it	  uh	  because	  you	  know	  
uh	  want	  to	  do	  it	  yourself.	  Uh,	  but	  usually,	  it	  is	  better	  that	  the	  advocates	  do	  the	  court	  work	  and	  
the	  attorney	  does,	  uh,	  the	  off-­‐the-­‐street	  work,	  the	  preparation.	  Um,	  but	  it	  is	  possible	  now	  that	  
the	  attorneys	  can	  appear	  in	  the	  High	  Court.	  But	  you	  do	  need,	  you	  do	  need	  permission	  from	  the	  
judge.	  	  
 
Quotation	  74	  	  
L22:86 
LECTURER:	  Because	  its	  not	  very	  taxing	  -­‐	  these	  people	  are	  only	  coming	  for	  the	  last	  part.	  OK	  of	  course	  
the	  most	  important	  civil	  service	  and	  they	  will	  kill	  if	  I	  say	  that	  they	  belong	  in	  the	  civil	  service	  but	  the	  
most	  important	  civil	  service	  job	  that	  there	  is	  is	  of	  course	  a	  judge.	  Um	  judge’s	  doesn’t	  belong	  in	  the	  civil	  
service	  but	  they	  get	  paid	  by	  the	  government,	  they	  get	  a	  car,	  they	  get	  a	  government	  car,	  um	  uh	  and	  um	  
just	  for	  you	  know	  for	  interest’s	  sake,	  its	  they’re	  certainly	  not	  private	  I	  mean	  they	  don’t	  earn	  their	  own	  
salaries,	  so	  its	  just	  to	  put	  them	  somewhere	  I	  put	  them	  under	  the	  civil	  service.	  	  
 






LECTURER:	  Judges	  ladies	  and	  gentlemen	  should	  be,	  they	  were	  always	  in	  the	  past,	  the	  best	  senior	  
advocates.	  Uh,	  are	  asked	  to	  act	  as	  judges	  and	  then	  they	  if	  they	  are	  good	  then	  they	  prove	  themselves	  
then	  they	  are	  asked	  by	  the	  Minister	  of	  Justice	  to	  consider	  becoming	  a	  judge.	  Their	  names	  are	  then	  sent	  
to	  the	  Judicial	  Services	  Commission.	  That	  is	  how	  a	  judge	  is	  appointed.	  You	  must	  know	  this.	  The,	  uh,	  
names	  are	  vetted	  by	  the	  State	  President,	  the	  State	  President	  sends,	  the	  State	  President	  gets	  them	  from	  
the	  Minister	  of	  Justice.	  The	  Minister	  of	  Justice	  gets	  it	  obviously	  from	  the	  Bar	  association.	  Um	  and	  those	  
people	  are	  then	  scrutinized	  uh	  albeit	  behind	  closed	  doors	  which	  I	  think	  is	  wrong.	  But	  they	  get	  they	  get	  
scrutinized	  by	  a	  panel	  which	  is	  called	  the	  Judicial	  Service	  Commission.	  Judicial	  Services	  Commission	  is	  
made	  up	  of	  the	  Minister	  of	  Justice	  and	  lots	  of	  other	  important	  people	  in	  the	  legal	  field.	  People	  like	  
George	  Bizos	  who	  is	  a	  well-­‐known	  advocate,	  um	  the	  Director-­‐General	  of	  Justice,	  Minister	  of	  Justice,	  
Deputy	  Minister	  of	  Justice,	  other	  judges,	  Chief	  Justice,	  Deputy	  Chief	  Justice,	  Judge	  Presidents.	  It’s	  a	  
very	  high-­‐powered,	  a	  very	  high-­‐powered	  panel	  that	  you	  appear	  before.	  And	  they	  ask	  you	  everything.	  
They	  ask	  you	  about	  your	  personal	  life,	  they	  ask	  you	  about	  your	  political	  views,	  they	  ask	  you	  about	  your	  
sexual	  orientation,	  they	  ask	  you	  about	  your	  health,	  they	  ask	  you	  everything.	  	  
 
Quotation	  76	  	  
L22:88	  -­‐	  90	   
088	   And	  this	  is	  where	  -­‐	  perhaps	  you	  will	  remember	  -­‐	  this	  is	  where	  it	  happened,	  that	  uh	  when	  Judge	  
Cameron	  was	  interviewed	  uh	  for	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Appeal,	  he	  was	  already	  a	  Judge	  but	  he	  
was	  interviewed	  for	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Appeal,	  uh	  he	  took	  the	  very	  bold	  step	  of	  saying	  -­‐	  they	  
didn’t	  ask	  him	  -­‐	  everybody	  knew	  that	  he	  was	  gay	  bit	  they	  didn’t	  ask	  him,	  they	  asked	  him	  about	  
um	  uh	  about	  his	  sexual	  orientation	  and	  of	  course	  he	  explained	  that	  to	  them	  and	  what	  he	  will	  do	  
and	  how	  he	  thinks	  that	  will	  add	  value	  to	  the	  job,	  and	  then	  on	  his	  own	  he	  said:	  ‘Look,	  before	  you	  
move	  on	  I	  think	  it	  is	  necessary	  for	  you	  to	  know	  that	  I	  am	  HIV-­‐positive	  and	  I	  have	  been	  for	  seven	  
years.	  I	  am	  on	  uh	  retroviral	  medicine,	  thank	  heavens	  I	  can	  afford	  it,	  and	  I	  am	  being	  looked	  after	  
by	  very	  high	  qualified	  medical	  people	  and	  it	  is	  under	  control	  and	  there’s	  no	  reason	  why	  I	  
shouldn’t	  be	  able	  to	  carry	  out	  my	  job	  as	  any	  other	  person	  if	  I	  am	  if	  I	  keep	  on	  using	  my	  
medication.’	  And	  of	  course	  that	  was	  that	  caused	  front	  frontpage	  highlights	  and	  everybody	  was	  
everybody	  was	  asking	  whether	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  do	  that	  and	  or	  was	  it	  very	  courageous	  to	  do	  
it.	  	  
089	   Well	  I	  don’t	  know	  you	  must	  maar	  decide	  for	  yourself.	  I	  know	  Edwin	  very	  well	  and	  he	  is	  a	  very	  
courageous	  person.	  Sometimes	  of	  course	  everybody’s	  got	  a	  got	  a	  political	  agenda	  and	  
sometimes	  he	  is	  very	  enthusiastic	  about	  HIV/Aids.	  And	  the	  new	  role	  that	  gay	  people	  have	  in	  the	  
community	  but	  perhaps,	  you	  know,	  it	  is	  necessary.	  Uh	  its	  something	  that	  you	  must	  decide	  for	  
yourself.	  But	  that’s	  where	  it	  came	  out.	  At	  the	  Judicial	  Services	  Commission.	  	  
090	   And	  they	  appointed	  him,	  despite	  his	  uh	  revelation	  before	  the	  committee,	  they	  appointed	  him	  
and	  as	  you	  know	  he’s	  still	  going	  strong.	  Ooh	  it	  was	  about	  ten	  years	  ago	  or	  how	  long	  was	  it	  ago?	  





092	   LECTURER:	  You	  didn’t	  really	  take	  notice.	  OK.	  Um	  uh	  judge	  must	  be	  have	  an	  LLB.	  Must	  have	  a	  




compulsory	  that	  you	  must	  be	  a	  senior	  advocate.	  Uh	  uh	  attorneys	  have	  been	  appointed	  as	  
judges.	  Judge	  Kathy	  Saxwell	  Sax	  sax	  Sacks	  Sackswell	  is	  an	  attorney.	  She	  specialized	  in	  family	  
matters.	  And	  she’s	  now	  a	  judge	  here	  at	  the	  Witwatersrand	  Local	  Division.	  
 
Quotation	  78	  	  
L22:93	  -­‐	  6	   
093	   STUDENT	  6:	  [inaudible]	  defeats	  the	  whole	  purpose	  of,	  I	  mean	  [inaudible]	  hierarchy.	  If	  you	  are	  
an	  attorney	  you	  become	  …	  	  
094	   LECTURER:	  Well,	  	  
095	   STUDENT	  6:	  [inadaudible]	  
096	   LECTURER:	  I	  think	  it	  makes	  the	  bench	  more	  representative.	  Um	  I	  think	  it	  makes	  the	  bench	  more	  
diverse.	  Its	  not	  just	  old	  middle-­‐aged	  white	  men	  that	  were	  successful	  advocates	  that	  can	  now	  
become	  judges.	  Um	  you	  know	  obviously	  you	  must	  have	  something	  to	  do	  with	  law.	  You	  can’t	  be	  
a	  teacher,	  a	  secondary	  school	  teacher	  and	  then	  all	  of	  a	  sudden	  become	  a	  judge.	  Um	  but	  if	  
you’re	  an	  academic,	  Judge	  Carole	  Lewis	  who	  was	  the	  Dean	  of	  this	  law	  school	  became	  a	  judge	  in	  
the	  Witwatersrand,	  and	  now	  she’s	  at	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Appeal.	  And,	  according	  to	  
everybody	  that	  I’ve	  spoken	  to,	  a	  brilliant	  judge.	  So,	  I	  think	  it	  brings	  more	  diversity	  to	  the	  bench.	  
It	  creates	  more	  attributes	  to	  the	  bench,	  she	  is	  more	  academic	  and	  her	  judgments	  are	  far	  better	  
theoretically-­‐founded	  than	  her	  colleagues,	  um	  I	  don’t	  know,	  I	  don’t	  think	  its	  I	  don’t	  think	  its	  um	  
its	  cast	  in	  stone	  that	  only	  senior	  advocates	  can	  become	  judges.	  I	  think	  you	  need,	  you	  need	  
something	  else	  ..	  magistrates	  have	  even	  become	  judges,	  as	  I	  told	  you.	  	  
 
Quotation	  79	  
L22:100	  -­‐	  102	   
100	   LECTURER:	  Um	  the	  problem	  with	  becoming	  a	  senior	  advocate	  and	  then	  a	  judge	  is	  what?	  [some	  
murmurs	  from	  class]	  Hmm?	  
101	   STUDENT	  3:	  The	  salary.	  
102	   LECTURER:	  The	  salary.	  A	  judge	  gets	  about	  a,	  a	  junior,	  a	  newly	  appointed	  judge	  gets	  about	  seven	  
six	  hundred	  thousand	  a	  year.	  And	  a	  senior	  advocate,	  well	  as	  I	  said,	  gets	  from	  four	  to	  five	  up	  to	  
eight	  million	  in	  a	  year.	  So	  that’s	  a	  big	  drop	  uh	  in	  salary.	  You	  must	  be	  very	  comfortable,	  uh	  and	  







APPENDIX	  4F:	  QUOTATIONS	  –	  PUBLIC	  PROSECUTOR	  
N	  =	  6 
 
Quotation	  1	  
L20:	  59	  –	  61	   
[Magistrate]	  [Prosecutor]	  	  
059 LECTURER:	  Never	  steal	  from	  your	  employer.	  If	  you	  steal	  from	  the	  hand	  that	  feeds	  you,	  you	  can,	  
I	  can	  remember	  when	  I	  was	  a	  prosecutor,	  one	  Friday,	  the	  sentences	  are	  always	  postponed	  to	  
the	  Friday	  so	  that	  you	  do	  all	  your	  sentencing	  on	  Friday,	  and	  I	  had	  an	  old	  battleaxe	  for	  a	  
magistrate.	  She’s	  now	  senior	  magistrate	  here	  in	  Johannesburg.	  But	  she	  was	  extremely	  strict.	  
And	  we	  had	  a	  case	  of	  a	  bookkeeper,	  a	  lady,	  single	  mother,	  wonderful	  wonderful	  civilized,	  first-­‐
class	  citizen.	  Worked	  thirty	  years	  for	  her	  employer,	  she	  stole	  ten	  thousand	  rands	  every	  month.	  
Every	  month	  for	  thirty	  years.	  And	  she	  stole	  it	  for	  her	  children,	  to	  put	  her	  children	  through	  
university	  and	  you	  know	  she	  had	  her	  psychiatrist	  and	  everybody	  there	  and	  everybody	  came	  to	  
give	  evidence.	  First	  offence.	  First	  offence.	  No	  criminal	  record.	  Wonderful,	  wonderful	  employer.	  
You	  know,	  the	  manager	  was	  there,	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  business	  was	  there.	  Said	  ‘never	  a	  better	  
person,	  we	  don’t	  want	  her	  to	  go	  to	  prison	  we	  just	  want,	  you	  know,	  basically,	  to	  remove	  her.	  We	  
want	  her	  to	  be	  found	  guilty	  and	  she	  must	  not	  come	  back.	  That’s	  what	  we	  will	  ask	  the	  court	  to	  
do.’	  And	  everybody,	  including	  myself,	  was	  expecting	  a,	  perhaps,	  house	  arrest,	  you	  know	  this	  
provisional	  supervision.	  But,	  you	  know,	  it	  was	  a	  first	  offence	  as	  a	  mother	  looking	  after	  her	  
children!	  Its,	  you	  know	  ..	  .	  	  
060	   And	  old	  Mrs	  Gradiz	  walked	  in	  there	  and	  I	  could	  see	  [indicates	  that	  the	  magistrate	  was	  
frowning],	  not	  in	  a	  good	  mood.	  And	  she	  sent	  her,	  she	  sent	  her	  to	  jail	  for	  a	  very,	  very	  long	  time.	  
And	  the	  woman,	  everybody	  in	  court	  broke	  down	  crying,	  you	  know,	  they	  were	  not	  prepared,	  
they	  didn’t,	  they	  didn’t	  expect	  it	  at	  all.	  And	  they	  said	  they	  will	  go	  for	  rehabilitation,	  they	  will	  go	  
for	  courses	  she	  said	  ‘yes,	  go	  do	  that	  in	  jail,	  there	  are	  lots	  of	  wonderful	  courses	  that	  you	  can	  do.	  
Go	  stand	  down	  …’	  I	  think	  it	  was	  something	  like	  twelve	  and	  a	  half	  years.	  Stand	  down.	  	  
061	   On	  a	  Friday	  morning	  you	  pack	  your	  bag	  and	  you	  go	  to	  magistrates’	  court	  and	  you	  think	  you’re	  
going	  to	  get	  a	  fine	  perhaps	  and	  a	  reprimand,	  and	  you	  get	  twelve	  and	  a	  half	  years.	  And	  it	  was	  
confirmed.	  So,	  if	  you	  steal	  from	  your	  employer,	  do	  anything,	  you	  know,	  steal	  from	  anybody	  but	  
don’t	  steal	  from	  your	  employer:	  a)	  because	  its	  so	  easy	  and	  b)	  because	  you	  never	  its	  so	  the	  
courts	  take	  an	  extremely	  dim	  view	  of	  it.	  And	  there’s	  no	  mercy.	  As	  far	  as	  ..	  drug	  dealing,	  credit	  




L20:	  45	  –	  49	   
045	   LECTURER:	  When	  I	  was	  a	  when	  I	  was	  a	  specialist	  prosecutor	  one	  of	  my	  glorious	  cases	  that	  I	  




fraud	  as	  a	  specialist	  uh	  uh	  court.	  So	  all	  the	  credit	  card	  fraud	  was	  brought	  to	  my	  court	  and	  you	  
know	  to	  to	  see	  to	  it	  that	  uniform	  sentences	  and	  harsh	  sentences	  and	  to	  prevent	  credit	  card	  
fraud	  uh	  was	  done	  they	  centralized	  all	  credit	  card	  fraud	  in	  my	  in	  my	  court.	  And	  credit	  card	  fraud	  
is	  not	  difficult	  to	  prove.	  You	  know,	  you	  have	  the	  real	  evidence	  there	  you	  have	  the	  credit	  card,	  
the	  slip,	  you	  have	  the	  bank	  statements,	  that’s	  not	  difficult	  its	  not	  a	  difficult	  case	  to	  prosecute,	  
but	  the	  credit	  card	  fraud	  is	  one	  of	  the	  fraud	  matters,	  and	  we’ll	  deal	  with	  that	  soon,	  the	  
magistrates’	  court’s	  jurisdiction	  is	  extended	  in	  certain	  circumstances,	  for	  drugs	  and	  drug	  
trafficking,	  credit	  card	  fraud,	  uh	  human	  trafficking,	  etc	  etc	  the	  district	  or	  as	  we	  call	  them	  the	  
specialist	  courts	  have	  increased	  jurisdiction.	  	  
046	   So,	  there	  was	  this	  guy	  and	  he	  had	  thirty	  offences	  of	  credit	  card	  fraud	  for	  American	  Express.	  He	  
stole	  an	  American	  Express	  card	  and	  he	  used	  it	  for	  on	  thirty	  individual	  times.	  We	  had	  all	  the	  
evidence	  there,	  and	  the	  prosecutor	  that	  forwarded	  the	  case	  to	  my	  court,	  um	  entered	  into	  a	  
plea	  bargain	  with	  the	  accused,	  saying:	  ‘If	  you	  plead	  guilty	  on	  one	  count,	  we’ll	  find	  you	  guilty	  on	  
one	  count	  and,	  you	  know,	  you’ll	  only	  be	  charged	  on	  one	  count.	  And,	  you	  know,	  that’s	  the	  end	  
of	  it.	  OK	  then	  you	  plead	  guilty,	  there’s	  no	  trial,	  thank	  you	  very	  much.	  But	  that	  was	  the	  previous	  
prosecutor.	  	  
047	   When	  it	  came	  to	  my	  court	  I	  said:	  ‘I	  am	  not	  going	  to	  accept	  this.’	  Because	  you	  can	  imagine,	  
American	  Express,	  if	  this	  guy’s	  only	  found	  guilty	  on	  one	  count	  they	  only,	  when	  they	  institute	  
civil	  action	  they’ve	  only	  got	  grounds	  for	  one	  offence.	  Its	  true,	  whether	  you’re	  found	  guilty	  for	  
one	  offence	  or	  thirty	  offences	  the	  criminality	  is	  the	  same.	  But	  the	  commercial	  implications	  
differed.	  So	  when	  the	  person,	  the	  accused	  came	  to	  my	  court,	  I	  said:	  ‘Look,	  you’re	  now	  in	  a	  new	  
court,	  a	  new	  prosecutor,	  the	  previous	  prosecutor	  said	  that	  you	  could	  plead	  guilty	  and	  we	  will	  
only	  sentence	  you	  on	  one	  count.	  That’s	  not	  going	  to	  happen.	  Um,	  you	  know.	  If	  you	  want	  to	  
plead	  guilty	  you’re	  welcome,	  but	  I’m	  going	  to	  charge	  you	  on	  all	  thirty	  counts.’	  So	  he	  asked:	  
‘Well,	  is	  that	  the	  same	  …	  as	  one	  count?’	  I	  said:	  ‘No	  its	  not	  the	  same,	  you	  know,	  you’re	  found	  
guilty	  thirty	  times,	  its	  not	  the	  same.’	  Like	  if	  you	  use	  this	  card	  thirty	  times,	  you’re	  going	  to	  be	  
penalized	  thirty	  times.	  And	  somehow	  he	  was	  tired	  or	  he	  just	  didn’t	  understood	  what	  I	  said	  and	  
he,	  I	  put	  the	  charge	  to	  him,	  all	  thirty	  counts,	  from	  a	  to	  z,	  all	  thirty	  counts,	  took	  half	  an	  hour	  to	  
read	  the	  charge	  sheet,	  and	  he	  said:	  ‘Ag	  ja’	  you	  know,	  just	  wanted	  to	  finish	  it	  and	  not	  plead	  
guilty,	  thinking	  he	  will	  pay	  a	  penalty,	  a	  fine.	  	  
048	   Which	  is,	  for	  the	  first	  offence,	  quite	  normal	  to	  pay	  for	  one	  credit	  card	  transgression,	  to	  pay	  a	  
fine,	  even	  if	  it’s	  a	  lot	  of	  money.	  	  But,	  you	  can,	  if	  you	  are	  a	  good	  prosecutor,	  ask	  	  the	  magistrate	  
to	  impose	  a	  fine,	  a	  jail	  sentence	  without	  the	  option	  of	  a	  fine.	  So	  he	  pleaded	  guilty	  on	  all	  thirty	  
charges,	  and	  I	  asked	  for	  the	  maximum	  sentence	  on	  all	  thirty	  charges.	  And	  the	  maximum	  
sentence	  is	  twelve	  months	  per	  charge,	  per	  count.	  So	  he	  went	  to	  jail	  for	  thirty	  years,	  without	  the	  
option	  of	  a	  fine.	  	  
049	   He’s	  still	  there	  today.	  He’s	  still	  in	  jail,	  unless	  he	  was	  released	  on	  one	  of	  these	  ridiculous	  
amnesties.	  Thirty	  years.	  This	  was	  about	  twenty	  years	  ago.	  So	  he’s	  still	  rotting	  away	  in	  jail	  
somewhere.	  So	  please	  be	  careful.	  I	  mean	  I	  was	  a	  small	  little	  prosecutor	  in	  a	  dirty	  dingy	  little	  
court	  and	  he	  went	  to	  jail	  for	  thirty	  years	  which	  is	  longer	  than	  life	  ...	  imprisonment,	  because	  life	  
imprisonment	  is	  twenty-­‐five	  years.	  
 
Quotation	  3	  




LECTURER:	  [Clears	  throat]	  OK.	  Other	  professions	  in	  the	  civil	  service	  where	  you	  will	  start	  is	  uh	  public	  
prosecutor.	  You’ll	  prosecute	  ordinary	  cases	  in	  the	  district	  court.	  Once	  you	  are	  au	  fait	  with	  that	  -­‐	  that’s	  
the	  best	  training	  you	  can	  get	  for	  court.	  Who	  asked	  about	  the	  articles,	  yes,	  that’s	  another	  thing,	  if	  you	  
don’t	  do	  the	  articles	  then	  go	  and	  join	  the	  Department	  of	  Justice	  for	  two	  years.	  Um	  you	  won’t	  build	  up	  
contacts,	  well	  perhaps,	  but	  you	  will	  know	  how	  to	  sit	  and	  stand	  in	  a	  court.	  That’s	  also	  excellent,	  
excellent	  experience	  because	  you	  do	  it	  not	  on	  your	  own	  account,	  you	  do	  it	  on	  the	  state’s	  account.	  So	  if	  
you	  want	  to	  become	  a	  good	  practitioner,	  if	  you	  want	  to	  know	  what	  to	  do	  in	  a	  court,	  become	  a	  public	  
prosecutor.	  I	  don’t	  know	  what	  they	  pay	  public	  prosecutors	  now,	  its	  not	  much,	  um	  ‘bout	  two	  hundred	  
thousand	  a	  year,	  to	  begin	  with,	  I	  think	  so,	  I’m	  not	  sure.	  	  
 
Quotation	  4	  
L22:	  104	   
LECTURER:	  And	  anycase	  if	  you	  become	  a	  senior	  public	  prosecutor,	  you	  prosecute	  specialized	  cases	  like	  
I	  told	  you	  about	  the	  credit	  card	  fraud,	  or	  uh	  environmental	  law	  or	  tax	  law,	  or	  um	  labour	  law,	  or	  -­‐	  there	  
are	  specialized	  courts	  for	  all	  these	  things	  in	  the	  magistrates’	  court.	  And	  you	  can	  become	  a	  public	  
prosecutor	  there.	  You	  can	  then	  become	  a	  senior	  public	  prosecutor	  um	  and	  if	  you’re	  a	  senior	  public	  
prosecutor,	  the	  director	  of	  public	  prosecutions	  invites	  you	  for	  a	  interview	  and	  if	  you	  pass	  the	  interview	  
then	  uh	  you	  become	  a	  state	  advocate.	  Now	  that’s	  excellent,	  excellent	  experience.	  Uh	  and	  everybody	  




L22:	  107	   
LECTURER:	  But	  if	  you	  do	  go,	  if	  you	  do	  become	  a	  public	  prosecutor,	  you	  know,	  that	  is	  where	  you	  want	  
to	  end	  up.	  To	  be	  a	  state	  advocate	  	  
 
Quotation	  6	  
L22:	  109	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  QUOTATIONS	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N	  =	  3 
 
Quotation	  1	  
L22:	  104	   
LECTURER:	  if	  you’re	  a	  senior	  public	  prosecutor,	  the	  director	  of	  public	  prosecutions	  invites	  you	  for	  a	  




L22:	  105	   
LECTURER:	  Uh	  state	  advocates	  does	  the	  work	  of	  an	  advocate	  but	  he	  only	  works	  for	  the	  State.	  So	  most	  
of	  the	  work	  is	  civil	  but	  there	  are	  also	  civil	  work.	  There’s	  also	  civil	  matters	  that	  the	  state	  advocate’s	  do.	  
And	  you	  have	  virtually	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  working	  conditions	  that	  an	  ordinary	  advocate	  has.	  You’ve	  got	  
your	  own	  office,	  your	  own	  set	  of	  law	  reports,	  but	  you	  work	  for	  the	  State,	  you	  work	  for	  the	  Director	  of	  
Public	  Prosecutions.	  	  
 
Quotation	  3	  
L22:	  107	   
LECTURER:	  But	  if	  you	  do	  go,	  if	  you	  do	  become	  a	  public	  prosecutor,	  you	  know,	  that	  is	  where	  you	  want	  
to	  end	  up.	  	  To	  be	  a	  state	  advocate	  and	  do	  work	  for	  the	  state	  because	  then	  you	  get	  High	  Court	  
experience	  at	  the	  State’s	  expense,	  you	  know.	  You	  know	  whether	  you	  lose	  or	  win	  its	  not	  really	  
important,	  you	  don’t	  want	  to	  make	  a	  lifelong	  career	  out	  of	  it,	  you	  only	  want	  to,	  you	  only	  want	  to	  get	  
experience.	  Unless	  you	  want	  to	  become	  a	  civil	  servant,	  that’s	  also	  possible,	  there	  are	  lots	  of	  things	  that	  







APPENDIX	  4H:	  QUOTATIONS	  –	  MAGISTRATE	  
N	  =	  26	  	  
 
Quotation	  1	  
L10:	  36	  	  
[Judge]	  [Magistrate]	  	  
LECTURER:	  Yes,	  in	  other	  words,	  the	  judges.	  [Student:	  Ja]	  Ja	  because	  you	  have	  magistrates	  in	  the	  lower	  
courts	  and	  judges	  in	  the	  higher	  courts.	  	  
 
Quotation	  2	  
L10:	  83	  	  
[Judge]	  [Magistrate]	  
LECTURER:	  Yes	  of	  course	  it	  happens	  every	  day!	  Yes	  of	  course,	  this	  is	  how	  law	  is	  made.	  You	  you	  go	  to	  uh	  
the	  magistrate’s	  court	  if	  you	  are	  within	  a	  certain	  uh	  uh	  a	  certain	  jurisdiction	  um	  s-­‐um	  R100	  000.	  If	  your	  
dispute	  is	  less	  than	  R100	  00	  or	  more	  than	  uh	  uh	  then	  you	  go	  to	  the	  magistrate’s	  court	  and	  the	  
magistrate’s	  court	  hears	  your	  case.	  If	  you’re	  not	  satisfied	  with	  the	  magistrate’s	  court,	  then	  you	  appeal	  
to	  the	  -­‐	  here	  in	  Johannesburg	  -­‐	  you	  appeal	  to	  the	  local	  division.	  You	  don’t	  appeal	  to	  the	  provincial	  -­‐	  you	  
go	  to	  your	  local	  division.	  There	  the	  judge	  decides	  against	  the	  magistrate.	  But	  that	  is	  now	  a	  precedent.	  
The	  magistrate	  wasn’t	  a	  precedent.	  What	  the	  magistrate	  decided	  was	  just	  you	  know,	  binding	  between	  
the	  parties.	  Now	  in	  the	  Supr-­‐	  in	  the	  High	  Court	  when	  the	  judge	  gives	  a	  a	  decision	  that	  decision	  is	  a	  
precedent	  and	  it	  binds	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  Transvaal.	  Your	  opponent,	  who	  got	  satisfaction	  in	  his	  favour	  
from	  the	  magistrate	  is	  now	  unhappy.	  So	  what	  is	  he	  going	  to	  do?	  First	  he’s	  going	  to	  appeal	  to	  a	  full	  
bench.	  But	  that	  is	  now	  technical	  detail.	  He’s	  going	  to	  appeal	  from	  a	  single	  judge	  in	  the	  local	  division	  to	  
a	  full	  bench,	  either	  in	  the	  local	  division	  or	  the	  provincial	  division.	  If	  that	  if	  the	  full	  bench	  gives	  judgment	  
against	  you	  and	  for	  the	  guy	  that	  won	  in	  the	  magistrates’	  court	  then	  that	  is	  the	  precedent.	  Then	  the	  
whole	  of	  the	  Transvaal	  is	  bound	  by	  that	  precedent	  and	  the	  previous	  precedent	  of	  the	  single	  judge	  
disappears.	  Now	  of	  course	  what	  are	  you	  going	  to	  do?	  Now	  you	  are	  I	  mean	  you	  are	  I	  wanted	  to	  use	  a	  
bad	  word	  now	  but	  we’re	  now	  on	  camera	  you	  are	  not	  satisfied	  and	  you	  are	  going	  to,	  you	  want	  to	  
appeal.	  You	  appeal	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Appeal.	  Which	  is	  the	  highest	  court.	  And	  whatever	  the	  
Supreme	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  decides,	  that’s	  it.	  Unless	  it’s	  a	  constitutional	  case.	  That’s	  it.	  There’s	  nothing	  
higher.	  You	  can’t	  go	  to	  God	  or	  the	  Privy	  Council	  or	  you	  know	  George	  Bush	  or	  whoever	  you	  think	  is	  
powerful.	  That’s	  it.	  You	  stop	  at	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  and	  what	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  
says	  -­‐	  that’s	  law.	  Whoever	  and	  in	  whoever’s	  favour	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  has	  decided	  that	  is	  
law.	  And	  you	  will	  -­‐	  all	  the	  other	  things	  from	  the	  magistrates’	  court	  is	  worth	  nothing!	  It	  loses	  all	  its	  
value.	  What	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  says,	  that	  is	  where	  law	  is	  made.	  
 
Quotation	  3	  	  





magistrates’	  court	  does	  not	  create	  precedent.	  Why?	  Well	  firstly	  because	  they	  haven’t	  got	  the	  
authority.	  And	  secondly,	  their	  decisions	  are	  not	  recorded.	  They	  don’t	  form	  part	  of	  the	  precedent	  
system.	  They	  cannot	  bind	  anybody	  with	  their	  decision.	  	  
 
Quotation	  4	  
L10:	  38	   
LECTURER:	  The	  magistrate’s	  court	  is	  b/	  like	  all	  other	  courts.	  Magistrate’s	  court	  is	  bound	  by	  the	  
precedents	  of	  the	  High	  Court,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  and	  the	  Constitutional	  Court.	  So,	  if	  a	  
magistrate	  sits	  in	  a	  court	  case,	  the	  magistrate	  the	  magistrate	  can’t	  just	  do	  what	  he	  wants	  to	  do.	  He	  is	  
bound	  by	  the	  South	  African	  law.	  Obviously.	  He	  practices	  South	  African	  law.	  So	  he	  is	  bound	  by	  South	  
African	  law.	  He	  is	  bound	  by	  the	  precedent	  of	  the	  High	  Court.	  So	  he	  can’t	  -­‐	  if	  there’s	  a	  decision	  in	  the	  
High	  Court,	  that	  says	  ‘we	  accept	  traffic	  photographs’	  you	  know	  these	  photo	  things	  that	  are	  now	  so	  
controversial,	  that’s	  the	  decision	  in	  the	  High	  Court,	  it	  is	  binding	  on	  everybody	  in	  the	  province.	  Its	  also	  
binding	  on	  the	  magistrate.	  The	  magistrate	  can’t	  say,	  ‘well	  the	  High	  Court	  they	  will	  accept	  the	  
photographs	  but	  here’s	  my	  court	  and	  I	  won’t	  accept	  it’.	  So	  he	  can’t	  say	  that.	  It	  is	  binding.	  But,	  the	  
decision	  of	  that	  magistrate,	  is	  not	  is	  not	  -­‐	  I	  wouldn’t	  say	  its	  not	  binding,	  its	  binding	  on	  the	  people	  who	  
are	  involved	  in	  the	  case	  -­‐	  but	  it	  has	  no	  precedent.	  Its	  not	  binding	  on	  other	  magistrates	  and	  its	  not	  
binding,	  obviously,	  on	  other	  courts.	  	  
 
Quotation	  5	  
L10:	  89	   
LECTURER:	  Usually	  if	  usually	  all	  criminal	  cases	  are	  heard	  by	  the	  magistrates’	  court	  first.	  And	  the	  
magistrate	  will	  decide	  (a)	  whether	  you’re	  going	  to	  be	  released	  on	  bail,	  or	  whether	  you’re	  going	  to	  be	  
kept	  in	  prison	  and	  he	  then	  makes	  an	  order.	  	  
 
Quotation	  6	  
L18:	  46	   
[Judge]	  [Magistrate]	  	  
LECTURER:	  Now	  appeal	  means	  you	  go	  to	  a	  higher	  court	  than	  the	  court	  where	  the	  case	  was	  heard	  in	  the	  
first	  instance.	  You	  go	  to	  a	  higher	  court	  if	  you	  are	  convinced	  that	  uh	  that	  something	  was	  done	  wrong	  in	  
the	  lower	  court	  uh	  and	  that	  the	  sentence	  uh	  that	  the	  magistrate	  court	  or	  judge	  came	  to	  uh	  was	  
incorrect.	  The	  appeal	  rests	  only	  on	  the	  four	  corners	  of	  the	  record	  of	  the	  case.	  There	  is	  no	  vive	  voce	  
evidence	  to	  be	  led	  in	  an	  appeal.	  You	  cannot,	  when	  you	  have	  an	  appeal,	  introduce	  new	  evidence.	  So,	  an	  
appeal	  is	  a	  second	  bite	  at	  the	  cherry.	  You’ve	  gone	  through	  the	  whole	  thing,	  the	  magistrate	  or	  judge	  has	  
made	  an	  error.	  According	  to	  you,	  something	  was	  done	  incorrectly.	  You	  want	  to	  take	  this	  to	  a	  higher	  
authority	  uh	  to	  rectify	  that	  in	  order	  that	  the	  sentence	  can	  be	  changed.	  	  
 
Quotation	  7	  
L18:	  84	   
LECTURER:	  A	  review	  takes	  place	  either	  um	  uh	  automatically,	  or	  through	  application.	  A	  review	  takes	  
place	  automatically	  from	  the	  magistrate’s	  court	  to	  the	  High	  Court	  if	  a	  magistrate	  of	  sev-­‐	  of	  less	  than	  
seven	  years	  seniority,	  if	  a	  magistrate	  is,	  has	  been	  a	  magistrate	  for	  less	  than	  seven	  years,	  And	  he	  
imposes	  a	  fine	  or	  prison	  sentence	  exceeding	  three	  months	  and	  I’m	  not	  sure,	  I’m	  not	  sure	  of	  the	  
amount	  of	  money.	  But	  three	  months	  or	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  thousands	  of	  rand	  in	  money,	  Then,	  




Supreme	  Court	  to	  see	  if	  the	  magistrate	  is	  not	  it	  not	  um	  imposing	  too	  harsh	  a	  sentence.	  That	  is	  only	  
magistrates	  that	  have	  been	  a	  magistrate	  for	  seven	  years	  or	  less.	  Magistrates	  that’s	  been	  um	  more	  
senior	  than	  seven	  years,	  if	  they	  impose	  a	  sentence	  of	  longer	  than	  six	  months,	  per	  count.	  Six	  months	  per	  
count	  then	  it	  goes	  on	  automatic	  review.	  Please	  remember	  there’s	  no,	  there’s	  no	  nothing	  you	  can	  do	  
about	  it,	  it	  must	  go	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  or	  uh	  to	  the	  High	  Court	  for	  review	  by	  a	  High	  Court	  judge.	  	  
 
Quotation	  8	  
L18:	  85	  -­‐	  101	   
085	   LECTURER:	  Um	  …	  the	  anecdote	  I	  can	  tell	  you	  about	  this	  matter	  is	  when	  I	  was	  a	  magistrate	  I	  had	  
to	  serve	  for	  a	  uh	  limited	  period	  of	  time	  thank	  heavens	  in	  the	  um	  matrimonial	  court	  um	  the	  so-­‐
called	  maintenance	  court	  where	  people	  don’t	  pay	  their	  maintenance.	  	  
086	   Now	  one	  thing	  that	  you	  can	  learn	  from	  this	  uh	  embarrassing	  episode	  uh	  is	  that	  you	  must	  never,	  
if	  you’re	  a	  lawyer,	  you	  must	  never	  do	  anything	  if	  you	  are	  um	  in	  a	  bad	  mood	  or	  if	  you	  are	  
emotionally	  uh	  unstable.	  If	  you	  if	  you’ve	  been,	  if	  you’ve	  lost	  your	  temper,	  don’t	  do	  anything.	  	  
087	   Uh	  this	  happened	  on	  a	  Friday	  afternoon.	  One	  Friday	  afternoon	  I	  was	  sitting	  in	  court	  and	  it	  was	  
late,	  and	  all	  my	  colleagues	  had	  already	  adjourned	  -­‐	  I	  was	  the	  most	  junior	  magistrate	  in	  the	  in	  
the	  court	  building.	  And	  all	  my	  colleagues	  had	  adjourned	  for	  the	  weekend.	  They’ve	  closed	  their	  
courts	  and	  they’ve	  gone	  -­‐	  you	  know	  they	  haven’t	  left	  the	  building	  but	  they’re	  sitting	  in	  their	  
offices	  and	  you	  know	  chatting	  and	  doing	  cross-­‐word	  puzzles	  and	  things	  like	  that.	  So	  I	  was	  the	  
only	  sitting	  magistrate.	  And	  this	  uh-­‐w	  case	  was	  a	  long	  outstanding	  case	  with	  a	  warrant	  and	  of	  
course	  somehow	  the	  police	  on	  a	  Friday	  afternoon	  -­‐	  you	  know	  don’t	  ask	  me	  how	  they	  manage	  to	  
do	  it	  on	  a	  Friday	  afternoon-­‐	  they	  caught	  this	  man	  and	  of	  course	  I	  was	  the	  only	  the	  only	  
magistrate	  sitting	  to	  hear	  the	  case	  and	  the	  case	  was	  an	  ordinary	  maintenance	  case.	  You	  know	  
what	  maintenance	  is?	  [inaudible]	  you	  have	  to	  pay	  for.	  	  
088	   And	  [coughs]	  it	  was	  late,	  it	  was	  already	  after	  five	  o	  clock	  and	  I	  went	  on	  record,	  you	  know	  you	  
have	  a	  tape	  machine,	  and	  I	  went	  on	  record	  saying	  ‘It	  is	  now	  five	  past	  five	  [struggles	  with	  
coughing],	  there	  are	  no	  courts	  available	  and	  I	  am	  reluctantly	  hearing	  this	  case	  because	  I’m	  the	  
only	  sitting	  court	  that	  can	  hear	  this	  case	  otherwise	  this	  man	  will	  stay	  in	  jail	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  for	  
the	  rest	  of	  the	  weekend,	  or	  another	  magistrate	  must	  come	  out	  after	  hours	  to	  hear	  a	  bail	  
application.	  And	  of	  course,	  you	  know,	  I	  was	  tired,	  I	  was	  irritated	  um	  uh	  I	  was	  cross	  with	  this	  
man,	  I	  was	  cross	  with	  my	  colleagues,	  cross	  with	  the	  world.	  	  
089	   And	  here	  he	  appears	  and	  he’s	  one	  of	  those	  typical	  um	  people	  who	  slips	  through	  the	  holes	  in	  the	  
system.	  He	  hasn’t	  paid	  maintenance,	  his	  wife	  was	  in	  court.	  He	  hasn’t	  paid	  maintenance	  for	  four	  
years.	  He	  has	  a	  a	  job,	  he	  has	  an	  income,	  of	  say	  three	  thousand	  rand	  a	  month.	  But	  he	  has	  a	  
girlfriend	  and	  he	  gives	  all	  his	  money	  to	  his	  girlfriend.	  He	  doesn’t/	  he’s	  left	  his	  wife,	  a	  wonderful	  
decent	  person,	  with	  four	  children,	  living	  without	  any	  income.	  	  
090	   So,	  you	  know	  [clears	  throat],	  we	  call	  we	  call	  the	  we	  call	  the	  wife	  and	  she	  gives	  evidence	  and	  um	  
I’m	  very	  um	  uh,	  I’ve	  got	  lots	  of	  empathy	  with	  her.	  Um	  and	  she’s	  really	  struggling.	  She	  is	  uh	  a	  
single	  mother	  she’s	  um	  uh	  uh	  domestic	  worker,	  she	  gets	  a	  pittance	  for	  an	  income.	  And	  she	  
must	  keep	  four	  children	  at	  school	  and	  this	  bugger	  is	  lounging	  around,	  he’s	  drinking	  out	  his	  
money	  and	  the	  rest	  he	  gives	  to	  his	  eighteen-­‐year-­‐old	  girlfriend.	  	  
091	   So	  then	  he	  of	  course	  gets	  into	  the	  um	  he	  gets	  was	  brought	  up	  from	  the	  cells	  um	  and	  um	  the	  
prosecutor	  starts	  asking	  questions,	  very	  inexperienced	  prosecutor	  so	  I	  lose	  my	  temper	  with	  the	  




do	  it.	  And	  I	  start	  cross-­‐examining	  him	  from	  the	  bench.	  And	  that	  is	  something	  you	  must	  never	  
do.	  But	  nevertheless	  I	  start	  cross-­‐examining	  him.	  And	  of	  course	  I	  am	  -­‐	  well,	  at	  that	  stage	  -­‐	  I	  was	  
an	  excellent	  cross-­‐examiner	  because	  I’ve	  just	  been	  a	  senior	  public	  prosecutor.	  So	  I	  knew	  all	  the	  
tricks	  of	  the	  trade.	  And	  within	  five	  minutes	  I’ve	  got	  him	  in	  a	  corner	  like	  a	  spider,	  I	  mean	  he	  is	  …	  
he	  couldn’t	  say	  a	  thing.	  And	  of	  course	  the	  more	  I	  ask	  him	  the	  more,	  you	  know	  you	  can	  hear	  on	  
the	  tape,	  ja	  I’m	  getting	  more	  and	  more	  irritated	  because	  he’s	  lying	  and	  he’s	  getting	  out	  he’s	  
trying	  to	  get	  out	  of	  his	  responsibilities.	  Um	  and	  you	  can	  you	  know	  I	  um	  I	  just	  let	  rip	  into	  him,	  
forgetting	  that	  I’m	  the	  magistrate	  and	  not	  the	  prosecutor.	  And	  then	  I	  started	  shouting	  at	  him.	  	  
092	   So,	  you	  know,	  long	  story	  short	  /	  and	  he’s	  attitude	  -­‐	  this	  …	  idiot	  [outburst	  of	  laughter	  from	  class]	  
his	  attitude	  to	  me	  is	  um	  ‘Well,	  you	  know,	  its	  my	  money	  I	  can	  do	  what	  I	  want.’	  Um	  and	  ‘I	  haven’t	  
paid	  my	  maintenance	  because	  I	  must	  look	  after	  my	  my	  girlfriend.’	  	  
093	   Now,	  you	  know,	  what	  do	  you	  do	  to	  a	  man	  like	  this?	  I	  said	  ‘But	  you	  can’t	  do	  what	  you	  want	  
there’s	  a	  court	  order.	  And,	  you	  know,	  this	  is	  the	  fabric	  of	  society,	  you	  don’t	  look	  after	  your	  
family,	  you	  know,	  your	  children	  are	  all	  going	  to	  become	  just	  like	  you!	  	  
094	   And	  then	  what	  where	  we	  going	  to	  be?	  In	  any	  case,	  it	  went	  on	  for	  an	  hour	  or	  two.	  For	  an	  hour	  or	  
an	  hour	  and	  a	  half.	  And	  um	  when	  I	  was	  finished	  with	  him	  of	  course	  um	  uh	  he	  also	  started	  
shouting	  he	  said	  he	  will	  do	  what	  he	  wants	  and	  I	  can’t	  do	  anything	  to	  him.	  And	  then	  of	  course,	  
you	  know	  [more	  laughter]	  …	  um	  I	  sent	  him	  to	  uh	  you	  know	  the	  first	  thing	  is,	  he	  was	  a	  first	  
offender.	  It’s	  the	  first	  time	  that	  he’s	  been	  before	  a	  court.	  So	  you	  never	  send	  a	  first	  offender	  to	  
jail.	  Obviously,	  you	  know,	  you	  never	  send	  a	  first	  offender	  to	  jail.	  So	  uh	  I	  gave	  him	  the	  maximum	  
[gestures	  with	  arm	  and	  elicits	  more	  laughter]	  sentence	  that	  I	  could	  which	  was	  one	  year.	  Twelve	  
months.	  I	  have	  him	  straight	  twelve	  months	  twelve	  thousand	  rand	  fine	  uh	  uh	  or	  twelve	  months.	  	  
095	   And	  of	  course	  he	  didn’t	  have	  the	  tw-­‐	  I	  knew	  he	  didn’t	  have	  the	  twelve	  thousand	  rands,	  it	  was	  St	  
Athlone’s	  and	  the	  people	  don’t	  have	  twelve	  thousand	  rand	  and	  he	  went	  to	  jail	  for	  twelve	  
months.	  Finish	  and	  klaar.	  	  
096	   But	  of	  course	  what	  I	  had	  forgotten,	  you	  know	  I	  was	  still	  a	  very	  junior	  magistrate,	  what	  I	  had	  
forgotten	  is	  it	  goes	  on	  automatic	  review	  to	  	  the	  judge	  of	  the	  Supreme	  ….	  Now	  the	  problem	  with	  
the	  system,	  is:	  The	  judge	  sits	  in	  his	  chambers,	  the	  judge	  is	  now	  a	  senior	  advocate	  who’s	  been	  
elevated	  to	  a	  judge.	  He	  sits	  in	  his	  chambers	  he’s	  high	  on	  on	  on	  human	  rights	  and	  things	  -­‐	  which	  
is	  fine	  -­‐	  but	  he	  doesn’t	  understand	  what	  a	  magistrate’s	  court	  looks	  like.	  He	  doesn’t	  understand	  
seeing	  this	  woman	  with	  four	  children	  and	  this	  man	  who	  refuses	  to	  pay	  the	  maintenance.	  He	  
doesn’t	  you	  know	  they’ve	  never	  seen	  that,	  its	  just	  not	  part	  of	  their	  frame	  of	  reference.	  They	  are	  
just	  concerned	  about	  procedural	  correctness.	  
097	   So	  about	  -­‐	  so	  this	  is	  the	  end,	  its	  Friday	  night	  you	  know	  I	  send	  him	  off	  to	  jail	  and	  I	  feel	  wonderful	  
you	  know	  I	  say	  ‘rot	  in	  hell	  I	  hope	  you	  never	  come	  out.’	  I	  just	  go,	  I	  just	  go	  off	  and	  well	  I	  forget	  
about	  him.	  	  
098	   Of	  course	  three	  months	  later	  on	  a	  Saturday	  evening,	  on	  a	  Saturday	  evening	  in	  Cape	  Town,	  um	  I	  
had	  a	  dinner	  party,	  I	  had	  lots	  of	  people	  there,	  at	  my	  dinner	  party,and	  it	  was	  about	  se-­‐	  seven	  o	  
clock.	  You	  know	  just	  after	  after	  the	  people	  have	  arrived	  and	  they’ve	  had	  their	  first	  course,	  then	  
there’s	  a	  phone	  call.	  Now,	  I’m	  irritated	  because	  you	  know	  -­‐	  the	  food	  is	  in	  the	  kitchen,	  I	  must	  
look	  after	  the	  food	  and	  I’ve	  got	  ten	  or	  twelve	  people	  to	  serve	  and	  I	  don’t	  want	  phone	  calls	  now.	  
Grab	  the	  phone:	  ‘Yes	  who’s	  this!’	  	  
099	   And	  a	  very	  civilized	  English	  voice	  on	  the	  other	  side:’	  Excuse	  me,	  but	  um	  may	  I	  please	  talk	  with	  




please	  who	  is	  this?’	  ‘Mr	  Serfontein	  this	  is	  Judge	  Foxcroft’.	  [starts	  laughing]	  ‘Do	  you	  remember	  
the	  case	  of	  State	  v	  Ngobe’	  or	  whatever.	  I	  said	  ‘No	  I	  don’t	  remember	  the	  case	  your	  honour	  or	  my	  
lord’	  or	  I	  don’t	  know	  what	  I	  called	  him	  or	  judge	  um	  and	  I	  said	  ‘uh-­‐h.	  ‘I	  have	  tonight	  issued	  an	  
urgent	  mandamus’	  or	  something	  ‘instructing	  Pollsmoor	  Prison	  to	  release	  this	  man	  and	  I	  would	  
like	  it	  I	  you	  could	  send	  me	  a	  full	  set	  of	  reasons	  why	  you	  for	  a	  first	  offender	  sentenced	  this	  man	  
to	  twelve	  months	  in	  prison.	  I’m	  forwarding	  the	  court	  record	  to	  you	  and	  if	  you	  could	  reply	  by	  
Monday	  afternoon	  latest	  I	  would	  appreciate	  it’.	  	  
100	   So	  of	  course	  I	  was	  in	  big	  big	  big	  trouble.	  Um	  and	  the	  man	  was	  released	  after	  three	  months	  and	  
the	  judge	  -­‐	  it	  was	  a	  reported	  case	  -­‐	  my	  name	  came	  in	  the	  law	  reports	  as	  the	  magistrate	  who	  
sent	  a	  first	  offender	  to	  twelve	  months	  in	  prison.	  
101	   So,	  um	  that	  is	  an	  automatic	  review.	  It	  goes	  to	  the	  judge	  to	  see	  that	  the	  young	  magistrates	  don’t	  
send	  people	  to	  twelve	  years	  imprisonment	  if	  they’re	  not,	  if	  they	  shouldn’t	  really	  be,	  go	  be	  
there.	  Uh	  but	  he	  stayed	  for	  three	  months	  and	  I	  still	  feel	  that	  that’s	  a	  good	  vindication	  of	  him.	  	  	  
 
Quotation	  9	  	  
L20:	  26	   
[Judge]	  [Magistrate]	  	  
LECTURER:	  Having	  said	  that,	  and	  we’ll	  do	  this	  when	  we	  do	  the	  profession,	  please	  remember	  that	  it	  was	  
one	  of	  Dullah	  Omar’s	  objectives,	  the	  previous	  Minister	  of	  Justice,	  that	  the	  curriculum	  vitae,	  the	  cursus	  
honorum,	  the	  career	  path	  of	  a	  magistrate	  and	  a	  judge	  would	  eventually	  in	  South	  Africa	  become	  one.	  
You	  would	  start	  by	  being	  a	  junior	  prosecutor,	  senior	  prosecutor	  uh	  being	  elevated	  to	  the	  bench	  
becoming	  a	  magistrate,	  senior	  magistrate,	  regional	  court	  magistrate,	  senior	  court	  magistrate,	  regional	  
court	  president	  and	  then	  be	  invited	  to	  become	  a	  judge	  in	  the	  High	  Court.	  He	  tried	  to	  bridge	  that	  gap.	  
 
Quotation	  10	  	  
L20:	  24	  
LECTURER:	  You	  must	  also	  remember,	  a	  district	  court	  magistrate,	  and	  a	  regional	  court	  magistrate,	  to	  a	  




LECTURER:	  While	  a	  magistrate,	  nja,	  is	  just	  trained	  here	  in	  Pretoria	  for	  six	  months	  and	  you	  know	  par	  de	  
par.	  Here	  they	  didn’t	  even	  have	  to	  have	  an	  LLB.	  Now	  they	  must	  have	  an	  LLB.	  But	  in	  the	  old	  days	  mje	  
just	  a	  public	  service	  diploma	  or	  you	  know	  walking	  past	  a	  few	  law	  books	  would	  have	  sufficed.	  Um,	  
nowadays	  its	  more	  formalized.	  But	  magistrates	  and	  judges	  are	  very	  very	  far	  removed.	  
 
Quotation	  12	  
L20:	  26	  -­‐	  29	   
026	   LECTURER:	  And	  some	  senior	  regional	  court	  magistrates	  on	  criminal	  matters	  have	  made	  it	  into	  
the	  High	  Court.	  	  
027	   As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  one	  of	  my	  colleagues,	  who	  is	  now	  a	  very	  controversial	  character	  Mr	  Andre	  
LeGransie,	  	  he	  was	  with	  me	  a	  magistrate	  in	  Cape	  Town.	  And	  he	  was	  very	  bright,	  very	  bright	  
young	  guy.	  He	  was	  really	  very	  very	  clever.	  And	  very	  fair,	  you	  know	  he	  was	  a	  -­‐	  I	  find	  it	  
embarrassing	  always	  to	  refer	  to	  this,	  but	  he	  was	  a	  man	  of	  colour.	  From	  the	  Cape.	  And	  he	  did	  his	  




concerned	  about	  human	  rights.	  You	  know,	  obviously.	  Um	  and	  so	  he	  was	  a	  magistrate.	  	  
028	   He	  became	  a	  regional	  court	  magistrate	  um	  and	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  year	  he	  was	  the	  
magistrate	  in	  the	  case	  with	  that	  other	  buffoon,	  that	  politician	  in	  the	  Western	  Cape	  that	  was	  
found	  not	  guilty	  on	  um	  corruption	  charges	  …	  with	  that	  development	  of	  that	  golf	  course	  …	  You	  
remember	  him	  …	  Pipi,	  	  its	  not	  Morkel,	  Pieter	  somebody,	  van	  der	  Westhuizen	  or	  you	  know	  was	  
an	  absolute	  buffoon,	  he	  was	  always,	  like	  Rajbansi	  in	  the	  apartheid	  years	  ‘The	  tiger	  is	  here	  
again’,	  you	  know,	  he	  was	  found	  guilty	  on	  every	  single	  thing	  uh	  charge	  of	  corruption	  uh	  who	  
always	  came	  back,	  you	  know,	  if	  you	  [inaudible]	  he’s	  on	  the	  voter’s	  roll	  again	  and	  he’s	  standing	  
for	  himself	  or	  he’s	  standing	  for	  a	  new	  party.	  Now	  he	  was	  like	  that	  what	  was	  his	  name?	  Can’t	  
you	  remember?	  In	  any	  case,	  he	  was	  the	  magistrate	  in	  that	  case	  and	  he	  found	  him	  not	  guilty	  
based	  on	  facts	  and	  the	  Scorpions	  were	  very	  upset	  and	  they	  asked	  him	  for	  reasons	  and	  he	  said	  
um	  his	  reasons	  are	  evident	  from	  his	  judgment	  and	  it	  was	  not	  a	  matter	  based	  on	  law	  it	  was	  
merely	  on	  facts	  of	  the	  case	  he	  found	  it	  um	  that	  there	  was	  enough	  grounds	  uh	  for	  doubt,	  it	  was	  
not	  proved	  beyond	  reasonable	  doubt	  that	  this	  Pieter	  van	  der	  Merwe	  or	  Pieter	  Vermeulen	  or	  I	  
don’t	  know	  what	  his	  name	  is	  …	  and	  he	  was	  found	  not	  guilty.	  	  
029	   Uh	  and	  he’s	  now	  in	  the	  High	  Court.	  Andre	  Legransie.	  And	  I	  think	  he	  will	  be	  you	  know	  an	  
excellent	  High	  Court	  judge.	  He’s	  got	  the	  gravitas	  and	  the	  knowledge	  and	  the	  professionalism	  to	  
become	  a	  High	  Court	  judge.	  OK	  so	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  become	  a	  magistrate,	  a	  High	  Court	  but	  the	  




LECTURER:	  We	  get	  to	  the	  difficult	  ones	  now,	  in	  the	  regional	  magistrates’	  court.	  Unfortunately,	  they	  are	  
very	  very	  important.	  Ninety-­‐eight	  percent	  ladies	  and	  gentlemen,	  you	  won’t	  believe	  this,	  ninety-­‐eight	  
percent	  [writes	  ‘98%’	  on	  board]	  of	  all	  legal	  work	  criminal	  and	  civil,	  is	  done	  in	  the	  magistrates’	  court.	  
Unbelievable,	  I	  couldn’t	  believe	  it	  but	  its	  true.	  Ninety-­‐eight	  percent	  of	  all	  legal	  work	  is	  done	  in	  the	  




LECTURER:	  The	  High	  Court	  is	  very	  very	  busy,	  although	  they	  only	  do	  two	  percent	  of	  the	  work,	  they’re	  
very	  very	  busy	  it’s	  a	  very	  formalized	  court,	  their	  court	  rolls	  are	  very	  full	  and	  you	  can’t	  bring	  somebody	  
off	  the	  street	  to	  the	  High	  Court.	  On	  a	  criminal	  case.	  Because	  it	  would	  just	  be	  chaos.	  So	  what	  happens?	  
In	  order	  not	  to	  let	  the	  people	  rot	  in	  jail,	  you	  bring	  them	  to	  the	  magistrates’	  court	  to	  what	  we	  call	  a	  
directional	  court,	  Court	  13	  in	  Johannesburg.	  And	  the	  magistrate,	  the	  regional	  court	  magistrate	  in	  
Johannesburg,	  has	  got	  a	  diary	  for	  the	  High	  Court,	  and	  they	  place	  the	  matter	  on	  the	  roll	  for	  the	  High	  
Court	  in	  the	  magistrates’	  court.	  Doesn’t	  mean	  that	  the	  magistrates’	  court	  has	  got	  authority	  to	  hear	  that	  
matter?	  They’ve	  only	  got	  authority	  to	  send	  it	  to	  the	  High	  Court.	  Why	  do	  they	  do	  this?	  The	  main	  reason	  
is	  so	  that	  the	  prisoners	  or	  the	  accused	  not	  remain	  in	  custody	  until	  the	  High	  Court	  can	  hear	  them	  in	  five	  
or	  eight	  or	  ten	  weeks	  or	  months	  time.	  So	  they	  appear	  in	  the	  magistrates’	  court	  a)	  to	  be	  directed	  to	  the	  
High	  Court;	  b)	  to	  consider	  whether	  they	  can	  get	  bail	  or	  not.	  	  
 
Quotation	  15	  




054	   LECTURER:	  No	  no	  no,	  it	  depends.	  If	  you	  become	  a	  magistrate	  and	  you’re	  so	  unlucky	  to	  get	  this	  
court	  that	  I	  talked	  to	  you	  about,	  the	  transitional	  court,	  the	  the	  directional	  court,	  uh	  that’s	  a	  
hideous	  court	  because	  its	  like	  a	  supermarket.	  You	  you	  get	  there	  at	  nine	  o	  clock	  in	  the	  morning	  
and	  you	  must	  take	  a	  decision	  every	  five	  minutes	  and	  all	  you	  get	  is	  the	  worst	  criminals	  in	  
Johannesburg	  appearing	  before	  you	  and	  all	  you	  must	  do	  is	  decide	  which	  court	  they	  must	  go	  to.	  
Um	  and	  because	  its	  such	  a	  horrible	  court	  if	  they	  put	  a	  magistrate	  there	  permanently	  he	  will	  go	  
mad,	  not	  that	  magistrates	  are	  not	  mad,	  I	  mean	  they	  are	  all	  mad	  [more	  laughter	  from	  class].	  But	  
if	  you	  put	  a	  person	  there	  permanently	  they	  will,	  I	  mean	  they	  will	  just	  resign	  after	  a	  week,	  I	  
mean,	  its	  like	  casualty	  …	  uh	  ward	  in	  Hillbrow.	   
055	   You	  know,	  you	  can	  do	  it	  for	  one	  day	  but	  they	  rotate	  that	  one,	  but	  if	  you’re	  a	  nice	  senior	  
magistrate,	  especially	  senior	  regional	  court	  magistrate,	  you	  pick	  and	  choose	  what	  cases	  you	  
want	  and	  then	  you’ve	  got	  court	  13,	  or	  court	  25.	  And	  your	  offices	  is	  attached	  to	  the	  court.	  You	  
walk	  out	  of	  your	  office	  into	  the	  court.	  Um	  and	  that’s	  your	  court.	  Its	  your	  court	  orderly,	  its	  your	  
interpreter,	  its	  your	  prosecutor,	  its	  uh	  …	  the	  whole	  organization	  is	  yours.	  You	  are	  the	  king,	  you	  
are	  the	  king	  of	  the	  of	  the	  dung	  heap.	  
 
Quotation	  16	  
L20:	  59	  -­‐	  61	   
059	   LECTURER:	  Never	  steal	  from	  your	  employer.	  If	  you	  steal	  from	  the	  hand	  that	  feeds	  you,	  you	  can,	  
I	  can	  remember	  when	  I	  was	  a	  prosecutor,	  one	  Friday,	  the	  sentences	  are	  always	  postponed	  to	  
the	  Friday	  so	  that	  you	  do	  all	  your	  sentencing	  on	  Friday,	  and	  I	  had	  an	  old	  battleaxe	  for	  a	  
magistrate.	  She’s	  now	  senior	  magistrate	  here	  in	  Johannesburg.	  But	  she	  was	  extremely	  strict.	  
And	  we	  had	  a	  case	  of	  a	  bookkeeper,	  a	  lady,	  single	  mother,	  wonderful	  wonderful	  civilized,	  first-­‐
class	  citizen.	  Worked	  thirty	  years	  for	  her	  employer,	  she	  stole	  ten	  thousand	  rands	  every	  month.	  
Every	  month	  for	  thirty	  years.	  And	  she	  stole	  it	  for	  her	  children,	  to	  put	  her	  children	  through	  
university	  and	  you	  know	  she	  had	  her	  psychiatrist	  and	  everybody	  there	  and	  everybody	  came	  to	  
give	  evidence.	  First	  offence.	  First	  offence.	  No	  criminal	  record.	  Wonderful,	  wonderful	  employer.	  
You	  know,	  the	  manager	  was	  there,	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  business	  was	  there.	  Said	  ‘never	  a	  better	  
person,	  we	  don’t	  want	  her	  to	  go	  to	  prison	  we	  just	  want,	  you	  know,	  basically,	  to	  remove	  her.	  We	  
want	  her	  to	  be	  found	  guilty	  and	  she	  must	  not	  come	  back.	  That’s	  what	  we	  will	  ask	  the	  court	  to	  
do.’	  And	  everybody,	  including	  myself,	  was	  expecting	  a,	  perhaps,	  house	  arrest,	  you	  know	  this	  
provisional	  supervision.	  But,	  you	  know,	  it	  was	  a	  first	  offence	  as	  a	  mother	  looking	  after	  her	  
children!	  Its,	  you	  know	  ..	  .	  	  
060	   And	  old	  Mrs	  Gradiz	  walked	  in	  there	  and	  I	  could	  see	  [indicates	  that	  the	  magistrate	  was	  
frowning],	  not	  in	  a	  good	  mood.	  And	  she	  sent	  her,	  she	  sent	  her	  to	  jail	  for	  a	  very,	  very	  long	  time.	  
And	  the	  woman,	  everybody	  in	  court	  broke	  down	  crying,	  you	  know,	  they	  were	  not	  prepared,	  
they	  didn’t,	  they	  didn’t	  expect	  it	  at	  all.	  And	  they	  said	  they	  will	  go	  for	  rehabilitation,	  they	  will	  go	  
for	  courses	  she	  said	  ‘yes,	  go	  do	  that	  in	  jail,	  there	  are	  lots	  of	  wonderful	  courses	  that	  you	  can	  do.	  
Go	  stand	  down	  …’	  I	  think	  it	  was	  something	  like	  twelve	  and	  a	  half	  years.	  Stand	  down.	  	  
061	   On	  a	  Friday	  morning	  you	  pack	  your	  bag	  and	  you	  go	  to	  magistrates’	  court	  and	  you	  think	  you’re	  
going	  to	  get	  a	  fine	  perhaps	  and	  a	  reprimand,	  and	  you	  get	  twelve	  and	  a	  half	  years.	  And	  it	  was	  
confirmed.	  So,	  if	  you	  steal	  from	  your	  employer,	  do	  anything,	  you	  know,	  steal	  from	  anybody	  but	  
don’t	  steal	  from	  your	  employer:	  a)	  because	  its	  so	  easy	  and	  b)	  because	  you	  never	  its	  so	  the	  




card	  fraud,	  things	  like	  that.	  Very	  little	  mercy.	  Even	  if	  you	  plead	  guilty,	  even	  if	  you	  plead	  guilty.	  
OK.	  	  
 
Quotation	  17	  	  
L20:	  65	   
LECTURER:	  Ladies	  and	  gentlemen	  this	  looks	  very	  innocuous,	  it	  looks	  very	  innocent,	  um	  and	  most,	  very	  
few	  magistrates,	  district	  court	  magistrates	  will	  go	  up	  to	  the	  three	  years	  and	  the	  sixty	  thousand	  rand	  but	  
if	  you	  get	  a	  serious	  matter,	  if	  you	  get	  a	  serious	  matter	  you	  can	  be	  hurt	  very	  very	  badly	  in	  the	  
magistrates’	  court.	  OK.	  
 
Quotation	  18	  	  
L21:	  9	  -­‐	  10	   
009	   LECTURER:	  OK,	  uh	  what	  I’ve	  forgotten	  to	  tell	  you	  and	  which	  was	  a	  major	  political	  problem	  in	  
the	  old	  dispensation,	  who	  is	  the,	  who	  is	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  regional	  magistrates’	  court?	  Do	  you	  
know?	  Who’s	  the	  chief	  in	  charge,	  chief	  bottlewasher	  in	  the	  regional	  court?	  In	  any	  regional	  
court?	  [pause]	  And	  in	  the	  magistrates’	  court?	  In	  the	  district	  court?	  Did	  I	  not	  do	  this	  with	  you?	  	  
010	   OK	  in	  the	  district	  court	  it’s	  the	  chief	  magistrate,	  the	  chief	  magistrate.	  Now	  the	  chief	  magistrate	  
is	  an	  enormously	  influential	  person.	  Uh	  he	  decides	  whether	  you	  can	  have	  um	  gatherings	  in	  his	  
city.	  He’s	  the	  person	  to	  decide	  where	  the	  court’s	  going	  to	  be,	  uh	  what	  court	  will	  listen	  to	  what	  
case,	  uh	  the	  organization	  of	  the	  court,	  the	  organization	  of	  the	  regional	  court	  even	  uh	  
enormously	  politically	  powerful	  person.	  Everything,	  whether	  there’s	  going	  to	  be	  a	  march,	  
whether	  he	  will	  give	  permission	  for	  a	  march	  to	  be	  held,	  um	  uh	  whether	  you	  can	  have	  /	  if	  you	  
have	  a	  huge	  pop	  concert	  you	  must	  get	  permission	  from	  the	  chief	  magistrate.	  So	  the	  chief	  
magistrate	  is	  a	  hugely	  influential	  political	  person.	  Uh	  its	  also	  a	  very	  high	  senior	  public	  uh	  um	  
service	  uh	  appointment.	  No	  longer	  because	  the	  magistrates	  now	  have	  their	  own	  act	  and	  they	  
see	  them	  as	  no	  longer	  being	  civil	  servants.	  But	  that’s	  more	  perceived	  than	  real.	  They	  are	  still	  
being	  paid	  	  by	  the	  civil	  service,	  they	  work	  in	  the	  civil	  service,	  their	  buildings,	  they’ve	  got	  their	  
own	  commission.	  But	  um	  they’re	  not	  completely	  independent.	  	  
 
Quotation	  19	  	  
L21:	  11 
LECTURER:	  The	  head	  of	  the	  regional	  court	  is	  the	  regional	  court	  president.	  The	  regional	  court	  president.	  
Now	  a	  regional	  court	  president	  is,	  in	  status,	  in	  protocol,	  is	  higher,	  he	  is	  more	  senior	  than	  a	  chief	  
magistrate,	  but	  the	  chief	  magistrate	  has	  got	  more	  political	  power	  than	  the	  regional	  court	  president.	  
The	  regional	  court	  president	  is	  only	  concerned	  with	  the	  organization	  of	  the	  regional	  court	  in	  his	  region.	  
He’s	  got	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  the	  district	  court,	  he’s	  got	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  political	  issues,	  he’s	  got	  
nothing	  to	  do	  with	  the	  outside	  world,	  he’s	  only	  a	  president	  for	  the	  regional	  court.	  	  
 
Quotation	  20	  	  
L21:	  12	   
LECTURER:	  Now,	  in	  the	  past,	  there	  were	  lots	  of	  very	  interesting	  clashes	  between	  regional	  court	  
presidents	  and	  chief	  magistrates,	  especially	  if	  they	  are	  of	  two	  different	  political	  persuasions.	  Then	  you	  






L21:	  14	   
LECTURER:	  Ordinary	  magistrates,	  with	  an	  LLB	  sit	  in	  the	  civil	  court.	  	  
 
Quotation	  22	  
L21:	  15	   
LECTURER:	  OK.	  This	  is	  being	  investigated.	  The	  idea	  is	  that	  it	  will	  be	  changed,	  that	  a	  senior	  civil	  court	  will	  
be	  introduced,	  where	  senior	  magistrates	  would	  sit.	  It	  would	  have	  a	  jurisdiction	  of	  R300	  /	  well,	  when	  I,	  
when	  I	  last	  heard	  they	  were	  considering	  a	  jurisdiction	  of	  R300	  0000.	  Jurisdiction	  of	  the	  amount,	  the	  
cases	  they	  could	  hear,	  R300	  000,	  but	  that	  may	  change	  to	  R500	  000,	  depending	  on	  when	  this	  court	  is	  




LECTURER:	  Just	  quickly	  let	  us	  run	  through	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  district	  court.	  Now	  the	  district	  court,	  
the	  district	  magistrates’	  court	  ladies	  and	  gentlemen,	  is	  the	  lowest	  court	  that	  you	  can	  get	  in	  the	  
hierarchy,	  um	  it	  doesn’t	  mean	  that	  its	  not	  important,	  it	  does	  virtually	  all	  the	  work.	  Between	  the	  
regional	  court	  and	  the	  district	  court	  it	  does	  virtually	  the	  lion’s	  share	  of	  the	  work.	  So	  the	  district	  court	  is	  
is	  very	  important,	  although	  it	  is	  um	  very	  neglected.	  
 
Quotation	  24	  
L21:	  17	   
LECTURER:	  You	  remember	  when	  we	  started	  this	  series	  of	  lectures	  on	  jurisdiction,	  I	  told	  you	  that	  the	  
magistrates’	  court	  was	  introduced,	  the	  new	  government	  was	  introduced	  and	  there	  was	  a,	  I	  wouldn’t	  
say	  an	  animosity	  but	  a	  mistrust	  between	  the	  magistrates’	  court	  and	  the	  new	  government.	  Because	  the	  
magistrates	  courts	  were	  those	  courts	  that	  sat	  in	  judgment	  on	  the	  pass	  laws,	  they	  were	  the	  primary	  
movers	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  apartheid,	  they	  were	  seen	  as	  civil	  servants	  and	  lackeys	  of	  the	  
apartheid	  government.	  This	  has	  now	  changed,	  we	  are	  fifteen	  years	  later	  into	  the	  new	  government	  and	  
uh	  the	  whole	  magistracy	  has	  changed	  and	  they	  are	  now,	  it	  seems	  as	  if	  they	  are	  now	  ready	  for	  
constitutional	  jurisdiction.	  	  
 
Quotation	  25	  
L22:	  63	   
LECTURER:	  And	  if	  you	  impress	  them,	  even	  in	  the	  magistrates’	  court,	  you	  appear	  there	  and	  you	  make	  a	  
name	  for	  yourself,	  far	  far	  better	  
 
Quotation	  26	  
L22:	  96	   








APPENDIX	  4I:	  QUOTATIONS	  –	  LEGAL	  ACADEMIC	  
N	  =	  20	   
Quotation	  1	  
L11:	  58	   
LECTURER:	  Um,	  so	  if	  you’re	  lucky	  you	  get	  the	  whole	  translation	  and	  the	  translation	  was	  done	  by	  an	  old	  
friend	  of	  mine,	  Dr	  van	  der	  Merwe,	  you	  might	  remember	  him,	  I	  wonder,	  I	  wonder	  whether	  he’s	  still	  
alive.	  He’s	  he	  was	  very	  old	  when	  I	  saw	  hi,	  last	  time.	  He	  was	  the	  uh	  author	  of	  Van	  der	  Merwe	  &	  
Rowland,	  Suid-­‐Afrikaanse	  Erfreg.	  And	  he	  was	  a	  professor	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Tukkies,	  and	  later	  on,	  
because	  he	  was	  very	  naughty,	  um	  uh	  he	  became	  the	  head	  of	  Justice	  College.	  He	  [looks	  at	  researcher	  
recording	  and	  then	  shrugs	  his	  shoulders]	  He	  fell	  in	  love	  with	  a	  professor	  at	  Unisa’s	  wife,	  I’m	  not	  going	  
to	  tell	  you	  who	  that	  professor	  is,	  you	  won’t	  even	  know	  her.	  But	  this	  we’re	  talking	  about	  in	  the	  early	  
40s,	  50s.	  So	  he	  was	  married	  and	  he	  was	  a	  he	  was	  a	  brilliant	  academic.	  He	  -­‐	  when	  I	  was	  at	  Justice	  
College,	  he	  would	  open	  his	  door,	  he	  had	  a	  huge	  office	  like	  this.	  And	  he	  opened	  his	  door	  in	  the	  corridor	  
to	  see	  when	  you	  arrived	  at	  the	  office.	  And	  then	  if	  you	  walked	  down	  the	  corridor,	  he	  would	  shout	  at	  
you.	  He	  was	  extremely	  eccentric.	  He	  would	  shout	  at	  you	  and	  give	  you	  a	  piece	  of	  Latin	  to	  translate,	  just	  
to	  [clicks	  fingers]	  to	  get	  your	  brain	  working	  for	  the	  morning,	  and	  um	  you	  know,	  very	  few	  people	  could	  
do	  it.	  Um	  but	  I’m	  very	  fond	  of	  Latin	  and	  I	  could	  translate	  some	  of	  it.	  But	  he	  would	  sit	  there	  from,	  he	  
was	  very	  nervous	  about	  the	  traffic	  in	  Pretoria,	  so	  he	  would	  drive	  in	  at	  five	  o	  clock	  in	  the	  morning	  
because	  he	  didn’t	  want	  to	  have	  to	  drive	  in	  traffic.	  And	  then	  he	  would	  translate	  Greek	  and	  Latin	  and	  
then	  if	  you	  came	  in	  he	  would	  call	  you	  to	  translate,	  if	  you	  could	  translate	  and	  what	  you	  thought	  of	  the	  
translation.	  But	  in	  any	  case,	  that	  is	  now	  way	  off	  the	  topic	  [class	  laughs]	  he	  fell	  in	  love	  with	  another	  
professor	  at	  Unisa’s	  wife,	  and	  he	  divorced	  his	  wife	  and	  he	  eventually	  married	  this	  uh	  lady.	  But	  of	  
course	  the	  professor	  at	  Unisa	  was	  of	  course	  extremely	  cross,	  that	  he’s	  now	  taking	  his	  wife	  away	  …	  
[laughs]	  you	  know.	  Its	  not	  the	  kind	  of	  thing	  that	  Afrikaners	  do,	  you	  know	  Boere	  are	  very,	  you	  know	  
they	  are	  very	  religious	  and	  …	  but	  Van	  der	  Merwe	  is	  not	  a	  is	  not	  like	  that.	  So	  he	  got	  a	  court	  order,	  the	  
professor	  at	  Unisa,	  got	  a	  court	  order	  to	  restrain	  Van	  der	  Merwe	  from	  coming	  close	  to	  his	  wife,	  or	  to	  his	  
house.	  And	  of	  course	  Van	  der	  Merwe	  ignored	  the	  court	  order	  and,	  you	  know,	  he	  carried	  on	  with	  his	  
affair.	  Um	  	  he	  was	  in	  love	  with	  this	  girl.	  And	  he	  you	  know	  [flicks	  hand]	  of	  course	  this	  other	  professor	  
was	  a	  real	  stick	  in	  the	  mud.	  So	  he	  had	  him	  arrested.	  And	  he	  was	  charged	  with	  contempt	  of	  court.	  And	  
then	  of	  course	  in	  those	  days,	  if	  you	  had	  a	  criminal	  charge,	  you	  couldn’t	  be	  a	  professor.	  Um	  he	  was	  a	  
professor,	  I	  think,	  at	  the	  age	  of	  24.	  At	  24	  he	  was	  a	  full	  professor	  and	  had	  already	  written	  his	  first	  or	  
second	  book.	  And	  then	  this	  thing	  happened	  and	  that	  ruined	  his	  whole	  career.	  Um	  and	  then	  the	  
nationalist	  government	  took	  him	  from	  the	  university	  -­‐	  because	  the	  university	  fired	  him	  -­‐	  because	  he	  
had	  a	  criminal	  conviction.	  And	  they	  made	  him	  head	  of	  Justice	  College,	  which	  was	  the	  university	  of	  the	  
department	  of	  justice,	  you	  know,	  the	  small	  little	  university	  within	  the	  department	  of	  justice	  that	  
trained	  judges	  and	  prosecutors	  and	  things	  like	  that.	  And	  there	  he	  translated	  all	  these	  things,	  he	  was	  
very	  very	  good	  with	  languages.	  And	  he	  translated	  all	  -­‐	  he	  and	  a	  couple	  of	  his	  colleagues	  -­‐	  the	  all	  the	  
Afrikaans	  um	  in	  beautiful	  English.	  I	  mean	  he’s	  Van	  der	  Merwe	  from	  the	  Free	  State,	  he’s	  not	  an	  








L14:	  100	   
LECTURER:	  But	  it	  won’t	  happen	  of	  course.	  Nobody	  will	  read	  it.	  Nobody	  reads	  journal	  articles.	  Thirty	  
percent	  of	  all	  journal	  articles	  are	  only	  read	  uh	  how	  what	  does	  that	  how	  does	  the	  statistics	  work?	  Um	  
the	  only	  people	  reading	  journal	  articles,	  learned	  journal	  articles,	  are	  the	  thirty	  percent	  of	  academics	  
who	  are	  involved	  in	  the	  publishing	  of	  those	  articles.	  You	  know,	  peer	  review	  and	  editors?	  They	  read	  it,	  
but	  uh	  other	  p-­‐	  he	  he	  seventy	  percent	  of	  the	  other	  academics	  never	  	  read	  it.	  So	  you	  know	  it’s	  a	  you	  
know	  it’s	  a	  its	  like	  a	  little	  mouse	  in	  one	  of	  these	  little	  wheels	  but	  nevertheless	  perhaps	  we	  can	  cause	  




LECTURER:	  Also	  professor	  Cockerell	  who	  was	  also	  here,	  who	  decided	  he	  doesn’t	  want	  to	  stay	  in	  
academia,	  and	  he	  went	  to	  the	  bar.	  Now	  he	  already	  had	  a	  reputation,	  everybody	  knew	  him,	  he	  
published	  widely,	  he’s	  a	  confirmed,	  very	  established	  academic,	  and	  he	  then	  went	  to	  the	  bar.	  And	  
immediately	  he	  got	  enormous	  briefs,	  you	  know,	  um	  uh	  you	  know	  constitutional	  court	  cases	  and	  very	  
important	  cases.	  And	  he’s	  doing	  exceptionally	  well	  at	  the	  bar.	  	  
 
Quotation	  4	  
L16:	  50:	  217-­‐220	   
LECTURER:	  there	  would	  be	  a	  series	  of	  articles	  or	  there	  would	  be	  uh	  textbooks	  by	  modern	  authors	  by	  
modern	  academics	  and	  then	  depending	  on	  whether	  the	  courts	  take	  that	  into	  consideration	  next	  time	  
when	  such	  a	  court,	  when	  such	  a	  matter	  comes	  to	  the	  court,	  the	  academics	  then	  have	  influence	  in	  




LECTURER:	  Professor	  John	  Dugard	  who	  was	  a	  professor	  at	  this	  university	  is	  an	  international,	  an	  
internationally-­‐renowned	  academic.	  He	  is	  not/	  his	  field	  is	  international	  law	  but	  he	  is	  an	  international	  
jurist.	  He	  is	  um	  the	  rapporteur	  for	  uh	  for	  the	  Palestinian	  question	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  um	  he	  was	  a	  
professor	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Leiden.	  And	  that	  is	  the	  kind	  of	  person	  that	  you	  can	  quote	  uh	  with	  
authority.	  And	  you	  can	  say	  that	  the	  court	  would	  follow	  him.	  If	  you	  quote	  John	  Dugard	  on	  an	  
international	  issue	  its	  more	  likely	  than	  not	  that	  the	  court	  will	  follow	  what	  John	  Dugard	  said.	  The	  court	  
is	  not	  bound	  to	  do	  this.	  It	  works	  very	  much	  the	  same	  way	  that	  the	  ius	  respondendi	  worked	  in	  the	  
Roman	  time.	  If	  you	  are	  a	  senior	  professor	  with	  an	  international	  reputation	  then	  the	  courts	  will	  follow	  
what	  you	  say.	  And	  if	  you	  are	  a	  junior	  academic,	  not	  impossible	  that	  the	  courts	  will	  listen	  to	  you,	  but	  it	  is	  
very	  unlikely	  that	  the	  courts	  will	  be	  swayed	  by	  an	  un-­‐	  unheard	  of	  or	  unknown	  academic.	  It	  is	  a	  
secondary	  source	  secondary	  source	  of	  law.	  Its	  not	  a	  primary	  source	  of	  law.	  
 
Quotation	  6	  
L16:	  53	  -­‐	  54	  	  




journal	  articles,	  these	  things	  that	  are	  prescribed	  to	  you	  -­‐	  even	  like	  professor	  John	  Dugard	  did	  -­‐	  
he	  was	  an	  academic	  member	  of	  the	  bar	  in	  order	  words	  he	  did	  his	  pupilage	  and	  was	  admitted	  to	  
the	  bar	  as	  an	  academic	  member,	  and	  he	  often	  appeared	  in	  the	  courts	  for	  um	  people	  who	  were	  
oppressed	  by	  the	  apartheid	  system.	  Who	  couldn’t	  afford	  counsel,	  and	  he	  often	  appeared	  as	  pro	  
amico	  	  for	  those	  people	  where	  it	  was	  where	  it	  was	  a	  groundbreaking	  and	  very	  important	  case.	  
That’s	  also	  one	  way	  that	  um	  you	  can	  present	  the	  court	  with	  your	  views.	  	  
054	   Unfortunately,	  professor	  Dugard	  during	  the	  apartheid	  era	  was	  not	  uh	  successful,	  he	  asked	  the	  
courts	  to	  look	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  legislation	  and	  very	  few	  of	  the	  judges	  then	  um	  
considered	  that	  being	  possible	  and	  they	  rather	  followed	  the	  very	  comfortable	  um	  uh	  dicta	  of	  
ius	  decere	  non	  facere	  -­‐	  our	  task	  is	  to	  uh	  speak	  the	  law,	  not	  to	  make	  the	  law.	  OK	  that	  brings	  in	  lot	  
of	  lot	  of	  philosophical	  questions	  but	  um	  that	  is	  that	  is	  what	  happened.	  	  
 
Quotation	  7	  
L16:	  54:	  267-­‐278	  	  
LECTURER:	  And	  then	  of	  course	  the	  final	  the	  final	  way	  in	  which	  you	  can	  make	  your	  views	  known	  is	  
through	  writing	  a	  textbook.	  If	  you	  are	  an	  authority	  on	  your	  field,	  if	  you’re	  an	  authority	  and	  you’ve	  been	  
a	  professor	  for	  a	  long	  time	  in	  your	  field,	  uh	  like	  Professor	  Hoexter	  whose	  just	  written	  a	  magnificent	  
book	  on	  administrative	  law,	  um	  uh	  and	  uh	  that	  book	  you	  know,	  not	  only	  reflects	  the	  law	  as	  it	  is	  at	  a	  
certain	  stage	  uh	  in	  life,	  end	  of	  2006	  I	  think,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  her	  view.	  Certain	  interpretations	  certain	  uh	  uh	  
innuendos	  and	  slants	  on	  the	  law	  is	  of	  course	  what	  she	  thinks	  how	  the	  law	  of	  uh	  uh	  administrative	  
justice	  should	  be.	  Because	  its	  her	  book.	  And	  she	  teaches	  from	  that	  book.	  She	  teaches	  to	  her	  students	  
and	  the	  book	  is	  quoted	  in	  court.	  It	  is	  a	  leading	  textbook	  on	  administrative	  law.	  And	  through	  that,	  
through	  process	  of	  osmosis,	  um	  her	  views	  become	  the	  views	  of	  the	  legal	  profession.	  OK	  those	  are	  the	  
big	  guys,	  you	  know,	  I’m	  not	  uh	  its	  not	  everybody	  whose	  a	  professor	  that	  that	  gets	  to	  that.	  Um	  OK.	  	  
 
Quotation	  8	  
L16:	  51	   
LECTURER:	  Now	  the	  value	  that	  we	  place	  on	  modern	  authors	  as	  you	  can	  imagine,	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  the	  
emphasis	  which	  we	  place	  on	  the	  primary	  sources	  of	  South	  African	  law.	  Modern	  authors	  are	  rated	  
according	  to	  their	  status.	  Now	  as	  I	  said	  earlier	  this	  this	  morning	  in	  in	  the	  legal	  profession	  reputation	  is	  
everything.	  In	  the	  legal	  profession	  your	  reputation	  is	  absolutely	  paramount.	  And	  whether	  you	  are	  going	  
to	  whether	  you	  are	  whether	  you	  are	  going	  to	  quoted	  by	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  or	  by	  the	  
Constitutional	  Court	  depends	  on	  your	  reputation.	  Um	  a	  a	  academic	  like	  Professor	  Iain	  Currie	  or	  
Professor	  Cora	  Hoexter	  who	  are,	  I	  don’t	  know	  if	  they’ve	  been	  rated	  but	  if	  they	  were	  to	  be	  rated	  they	  
would	  be	  A-­‐rated	  academics.	  They	  are	  excellent	  academics	  who’ve	  published	  standard	  works	  in	  both	  
their	  fields.	  So	  if	  you	  need	  to	  quote	  an	  academic	  on	  constitutional	  law	  then	  you	  would	  go	  to	  Iain	  Currie,	  
um,	  and	  if	  a	  judge	  quotes	  uh	  Professor	  Currie,	  every	  time	  a	  judge	  quotes	  him	  his	  reputation	  is	  
augmented.	  So	  obviously	  Professor	  Currie	  has	  got	  a	  far	  more	  persuasive	  influence	  on	  the	  courts	  than	  a	  
junior	  lecturer	  would	  have	  on	  the	  courts.	  If	  a	  junior	  lecturer	  would	  write	  an	  article	  the	  courts	  would	  
wouldn’t	  uh	  would	  not	  it	  could	  be	  an	  article	  that	  could	  be	  ground-­‐breaking,	  and	  it	  could	  be	  quoted,	  but	  
it	  is	  unlikely.	  Do	  you	  understand	  the	  principle	  how	  it	  works?	  	  
 
Quotation	  9	  




LECTURER:	  They	  have	  appointed	  academics	  to	  this	  court,	  Justice	  Kate	  O	  Regan	  was	  a	  professor	  at	  the	  
University	  of	  Cape	  Town	  and	  she	  was	  appointed	  as	  a	  Justice	  and	  now	  she	  is	  an	  acting	  Deputy	  Chief	  
Justice.	  Made	  an	  enormous	  impact	  on	  the	  constitutional	  jurisprudence	  and	  she	  was	  never	  an	  advocate	  
or	  a	  practicing	  member	  of	  a	  uh	  a	  bar	  in	  South	  Africa	  or	  anywhere	  else.	  She	  was	  an	  academic.	  She	  was	  
an	  academic	  and	  she	  was	  appointed	  as	  such.	  
 
Quotation	  10	  	  
L20:	  5:	  33-­‐38	  	   
LECTURER:	  My	  colleagues	  always	  complain	  that	  legal	  writing	  is	  difficult	  and	  you	  will	  now	  complain	  to	  
me	  that	  legal	  writing	  is	  so	  difficult	  because	  everything	  must	  be	  footnoted	  and	  authorized	  and	  you	  must	  
be	  very	  careful	  not	  to	  commit	  plagiarism	  and	  its	  really	  difficult	  not	  to,	  to	  write	  academically,	  legal	  
academic	  writing	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  difficult	  things	  to	  do.	  And	  the	  only	  thing	  more	  difficult	  than	  legal	  




LECTURER:	  No	  no,	  no	  no	  you	  can	  I	  mean	  /	  there’s	  an	  academic	  at	  UNISA	  called	  professor	  Wessel	  …	  
professor	  Wessels.	  Or	  is	  it	  professor	  Wessel	  something	  …	  I	  don’t	  know.	  He	  writes	  about	  the	  
architecture	  of	  judicial	  buildings.	  He	  writes,	  he	  compares	  the	  new	  constitutional	  court	  with	  the	  
Supreme	  Court,	  the	  High	  Court	  in	  Pretoria	  for	  example	  uh	  where	  one	  is	  open	  and	  reflective	  of	  human	  
rights	  and	  the	  other	  is	  a	  monumental	  building	  reflective	  of	  the	  State	  uh	  power	  at	  that	  state	  uh	  at	  that	  
stage	  uh	  when	  Paul	  Kruger	  and	  his	  government	  built	  the	  building.	  So	  if	  you’re	  interested	  in	  that	  you	  
can	  go	  and	  read,	  he’s	  written	  several	  articles	  on	  judicial	  buildings,	  as	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  society	  that	  we	  
are	  in.	  	  
 
Quotation	  12	  
L22:	  128:	  830-­‐836	   
And	  then	  finally	  ladies	  and	  gentlemen	  there’s	  of	  course	  the	  best	  profession	  of	  all.	  Yes.	  The	  best	  place	  to	  
be	  in	  the	  legal	  field	  is	  an	  academic.	  Legal	  academics,	  they	  teach	  at	  tertiary	  institutions,	  they	  train	  
lawyers,	  they	  write	  journal	  articles,	  and	  they	  they	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  change	  the	  law,	  if	  you	  are	  a	  legal	  
academic	  of	  very	  high	  standing,	  and	  people	  listen	  to	  you	  -­‐	  like	  John	  Dugard	  -­‐	  or	  Iain	  Currie	  or	  Cora	  




L22:	  836-­‐841	   
LECTURER:	  um	  it	  is	  sometimes	  a	  difficult	  profession	  because	  uh	  there’s	  lots	  of	  there’s	  lots	  of	  jealousy,	  
there’s	  lots	  of	  um	  competition,	  there’s	  not	  a	  lot	  -­‐	  in	  South	  Africa	  its	  not	  so	  bad	  but	  in	  a	  country	  like	  
Scotland	  or	  England	  where	  very	  little	  new	  develops	  you	  know	  its	  very	  difficult	  to	  think	  of	  anything	  
novel	  in	  a	  legal	  system	  that’s	  been	  going	  for	  centuries.	  So	  the	  competition	  is	  fierce	  
 
Quotation	  14	  
L22:	  841-­‐845	   
LECTURER:	  and	  um	  to	  make	  it	  more	  appetizing	  the	  conditions,	  the	  working	  conditions	  are	  very	  very	  




don’t	  have	  fixed	  office	  hours,	  you	  can	  work	  at	  home.	  Um	  you	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  go	  to	  
conferences,	  one	  international	  conference	  per	  year,	  two	  local	  conferences.	  
 
Quotation	  15	  
L22:	  845-­‐847	   
LECTURER:	  Unfortunately	  the	  bad	  part	  of	  an	  academic’s	  life	  is	  you	  must	  mark	  scripts,	  that	  is	  really	  the	  
bad	  part	  of	  it	  but	  …	  you	  know	  the	  first	  ten	  is	  fine	  but	  after	  that	  it	  does	  become	  very	  boring.	  
 
Quotation	  16	  
L22:	  847-­‐853	   
LECTURER:	  Um	  and	  uh	  you	  also	  get	  a	  title.	  If	  you	  are	  promoted	  you	  become	  an	  associate	  professor	  or	  
professor	  and	  people	  uh	  think	  very	  highly	  of	  you.	  There’s	  opportunity	  to	  get	  advanced	  degrees.	  
University	  stimulates	  further	  degrees,	  LLMs	  and	  LLDs,	  you	  can	  study	  for	  free.	  And	  you	  can	  obtain	  those	  
degrees	  at	  the	  university’s	  expense.	  Um	  there	  are	  many	  many	  grants	  many	  many	  opportunities	  to	  get	  
money	  for	  books	  and	  for	  study.	  	  
 
Quotation	  17	  	  
L22:	  853-­‐864	   
LECTURER:	  Uh	  it	  is	  not	  place	  you	  should	  go	  if	  you	  are	  very	  materialistic.	  Salaries	  are	  very	  humble	  -­‐	  well,	  
it	  depends,	  if	  you	  are	  a	  full	  senior	  professor	  or	  the	  Head	  of	  School	  which	  is	  now	  also	  not	  a	  pleasant	  job	  
because	  its	  all	  administrative	  -­‐	  but	  if	  you’re	  a	  full	  professor	  like	  Cora	  or	  Iain	  Currie,	  I’m	  sure	  that	  you	  
can	  survive	  on	  the	  on	  the	  salary.	  I	  don’t	  know	  what	  it	  is,	  I	  think	  …	  I	  don’t	  know	  what	  a	  full	  professor	  and	  
I	  think	  it	  is	  about	  forty	  or	  fifty	  thousand	  a	  month.	  Between	  forty	  and	  fifty	  thousand	  a	  month,	  um	  but	  I	  
stand	  to	  be	  corrected,	  please	  don’t	  quote	  me	  now	  you’ll	  get	  the	  labour	  unions	  on	  me	  or	  things,	  I	  don’t,	  
I	  really	  don’t	  know,	  it	  also	  differs	  from	  university	  to	  university	  but	  that’s	  about	  what	  they	  should	  get	  uh	  
about	  forty	  forty-­‐five	  fifty	  thousand	  rand	  a	  month.	  So	  you	  can	  make	  a	  pleasant	  living,	  you	  can’t	  have	  a	  
Porsche	  or	  you	  can’t	  have	  a	  vintage	  rolls	  Royce,	  unless	  of	  course	  you	  marry	  a	  very	  successful	  lawyer.	  	  
 
Quotation	  18	  	  
L22:	  129-­‐130	   
129	   STUDENT	  2:	  But	  if	  you	  publish	  books	  you	  get	  money	  for	  that	  …	  
130	   LECTURER:	  Yes,	  you	  do.	  If	  you	  publish	  books	  like	  Professor	  Skeen,	  you	  don’t	  know	  you	  don’t	  
remember	  Professor	  Skeen.	  Professor	  Skeen	  was	  the	  Dean	  of	  this	  Law	  Faculty	  and	  he	  was	  a	  
very	  dear	  old	  man.	  He	  was	  a	  great	  friend	  of	  mine,	  I	  was	  very	  fond	  of	  him.	  Uh	  and	  what	  he	  did	  is	  
he	  wrote	  a	  series	  of	  books	  on	  criminal,	  he	  did	  a	  uh	  he	  did	  a	  PhD	  or	  Masters	  degree	  in	  
criminology	  from	  Oxford	  [break	  in	  recording].	  
	  
Quotation	  19	  	  
L22:	  131	  
LECTURER:	  Because	  they	  could	  just	  as	  easily	  become	  practitioners	  and	  earn	  five	  times	  what	  the	  
academics	  earn.	  So	  to	  sugarcoat	  that	  there	  was	  a	  rule	  that	  if	  you	  become	  an	  academic	  you	  may	  use	  
twenty	  percent	  or	  your	  time,	  at	  university,	  for	  your	  practice.	  If	  you	  are	  a	  practitioning	  uh	  a	  practitioner,	  
either	  at	  the	  bar	  or	  at	  the	  side-­‐bar.	  You	  may	  use	  twenty	  percent	  of	  your	  time	  to	  attend	  to	  your	  
practice.	  And	  that’s	  what’s	  happening.	  But	  it’s	  a	  two-­‐	  is	  a	  double-­‐edged	  sword	  because	  if	  you	  allow	  




are	  better	  teachers.	  Because	  they	  can	  tell	  you	  what	  happened	  in	  court.	  Um	  you	  don’t	  want	  people	  
without	  any	  practical	  experience	  uh	  being	  academics	  ,you	  want	  a	  well-­‐rounded	  person	  being	  an	  
academic.	  So	  it	  is	  sometimes	  uncomfortable	  and	  you	  can’t	  tell	  the	  court	  that	  they	  must	  wait	  because	  
you’ve	  got	  a	  lecture,	  you	  know	  that’s	  unfortunately	  doesn’t	  work	  that	  way,	  so	  it	  is	  sometimes,	  it	  is	  a	  
problem	  but	  they	  must	  maar	  organize,	  make	  up	  lectures.	  	  
 
Quotation	  20	  	  
L22:	  132	  
LECTURER:	  But	  still,	  this	  is	  the	  best	  place	  and	  you	  don’t	  have	  to	  believe	  me.	  Being	  an	  academic	  at	  a	  
reputable	  university,	  with	  international	  standing	  like	  Wits	  is	  the	  best	  place	  in	  the	  legal	  profession	  to	  be.	  
Um	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  reasons.	  But	  you	  know	  you	  must	  be	  independently	  wealthy	  and	  you	  must	  be	  able	  to	  
support	  yourself	  you	  know	  its	  difficult	  to	  support	  yourself	  on	  the	  salary,	  and	  on	  writing	  books	  and	  
journals,	  but	  uh	  stimulation,	  for	  interaction	  with	  other	  people,	  for	  challenges,	  for	  	  intellectual	  
stimulation,	  intellectual	  ability	  uh	  uh	  being	  able	  to	  be	  uh	  on	  top	  of	  what	  is	  going	  on	  in	  your	  field,	  there	  










APPENDIX	  4J:	  QUOTATIONS	  –	  DIRECTOR	  OF	  PUBLIC	  PROSECUTIONS	  
N	  =	  5	   
 
Quotation	  1	  
L10:	  85	   
LECTURER:	  No	  no	  ja	  …	  what	  I’m	  talking	  about	  here	  is	  private	  law.	  Criminal	  law	  has	  got	  different	  
jurisdiction.	  Um	  uh	  it	  doesn’t	  matter.	  Um	  uh	  you	  are	  heard	  …	  its	  in	  the	  discretion	  of	  the	  director	  of	  
public	  prosecutions	  where	  you	  are	  being	  prosecuted.	  
 
Quotation	  2	  
L20:	  14:	  87-­‐91	  	  
In	  a	  criminal	  case,	  the	  jurisdiction	  is	  decided	  by	  the	  Director	  of	  Public	  Prosecutions	  based	  on	  the	  same	  
considerations:	  Where	  the	  accused	  lives,	  or	  where	  the	  crime	  took	  place.	  That	  is	  in	  the	  discretion	  of	  the	  
Director	  of	  Public	  Prosecutions	  but	  those	  are	  the	  general	  outlines.	  	  
 
Quotation	  3	  
L20:	  39	   
LECTURER:	  When	  the	  death	  penalty	  was	  a	  possibility	  you	  go	  to	  the	  High	  Court	  otherwise	  you	  go	  to	  the	  
magistrates’	  court.	  That	  is	  what	  it	  was	  in	  the	  old	  days.	  But	  that	  has	  fallen	  away.	  So	  they’ve	  instituted	  a	  
little	  character	  called	  the	  Director	  of	  Public	  Prosecutions.	  There’s	  a	  Director	  of	  Public	  Prosecutions	  in	  
each	  province	  and	  he’s	  represented	  by	  his	  public	  prosecutors	  in	  every	  court.	  	  
 
Quotation	  4	  
L20:	  40:	  243-­‐248	   
LECTURER:	  A	  delegation	  is	  a	  piece	  of	  paper	  signed	  by	  the	  Director	  of	  Public	  Prosecutions	  saying	  this	  
person	  can	  take	  decisions	  on	  my	  behalf.	  So	  the	  prosecutor	  in	  the	  court	  takes	  the	  decision	  where	  this	  
rape	  or	  where	  this	  murder	  should	  go	  to.	  If	  he	  or	  she	  thinks	  it	  should	  go	  to	  the	  regional	  court,	  it	  goes	  to	  
the	  regional	  court,	  whatever	  reason	  they	  advance	  or	  whatever	  instructions	  they	  get	  from	  the	  Director	  
of	  Public	  Prosecutions.	  	  
 
Quotation	  5	  
L22:	  106	   
LECTURER:	  And	  in	  my	  days	  it	  was	  a	  very	  very	  obnoxious	  character	  called	  Klaus	  [inaudible],	  who	  was	  a	  
Prussian	  military	  officer.	  And	  he	  invited	  me	  for	  an	  interview	  …	  and	  the	  moment	  I	  sat	  down,	  he	  had	  a	  
huge	  office	  and	  his	  whole	  office	  was	  full	  of	  military	  military	  uh	  memorabilia,	  little	  swords	  and	  pictures	  
of	  little	  men	  in	  uniform	  and	  rifles	  and	  things	  and	  I	  thought	  that	  this	  is	  hugely	  inappropriate	  for	  an	  
attorney-­‐general	  -­‐	  that	  is	  even	  what	  he	  was	  called	  at	  that	  stage.	  So	  I	  sat	  down	  and	  I	  looked	  around	  and	  
I	  was	  very	  uncomfortable.	  I	  was	  really	  extremely	  uncomfortable.	  Because	  its	  very	  important	  you	  know,	  




‘Why	  are	  you	  so	  nervous’	  he	  asks.	  And	  so	  fortunately,	  I	  had	  an	  answer	  ready.	  I	  said	  ‘People	  are	  like	  race	  
horses	  you	  know,	  the	  more	  intelligent	  you	  are	  the	  more	  nervous	  you	  are.’	  And	  so	  ‘that’s	  a	  slick	  answer,	  
I	  don’t	  like	  that.’	  And	  so	  he	  asked	  me	  three	  or	  four	  questions	  and	  um	  and	  I	  answered	  them,	  I	  think	  
correctly.	  One	  of	  the	  questions	  he	  asked	  me	  is	  ‘can	  you	  exhume	  a	  body	  if	  you’ve	  got	  new	  evidence?’	  
and	  I	  said,	  ‘Yes	  if	  you	  get	  the	  necessary	  certificate’	  and	  I	  told	  him	  what	  the	  requirements	  for	  getting	  the	  
certificate	  was,	  you	  can	  exhume	  a	  body,	  obviously	  you	  can	  exhume	  a	  body.	  Um	  and	  I	  can’t	  remember	  
what	  the	  other	  questions	  were	  but	  legal	  technical	  questions.	  And	  then	  he	  started	  asking	  me	  political	  
questions.	  At	  that	  stage	  he	  was	  prosecuting	  Winnie	  Mandela.	  Um	  and	  he	  started	  asking	  me	  questions	  
what	  I	  would	  do	  if	  I	  had	  been	  the	  attorney-­‐general.	  And	  I	  just	  refused	  to	  answer	  the	  questions,	  I	  said	  
‘sorry	  I	  consider	  those	  questions	  inappropriate	  and	  I	  don’t,	  I	  can’t	  answer	  them.	  And	  that’s	  a	  political	  
decision	  and	  I	  can’t	  answer	  them.	  Um	  I	  don’t	  want	  to	  seem	  unthankful	  or	  unpleasant	  but	  I	  really	  can’t	  
answer	  …’	  And	  then	  he	  stopped.	  Immediately.	  He	  said	  ‘thank	  you,	  yes	  go	  back	  to	  the	  magistrates’	  
court.’	  Uh	  so	  if	  you	  don’t	  get	  on	  with	  the	  character,	  if	  you	  don’t	  get	  on	  with	  the	  personality,	  of	  the	  
director	  of	  public	  prosecutions,	  then	  then	  its	  difficult.	  In	  the	  Cape,	  when	  I	  was	  a	  magistrate,	  there	  was	  -­‐	  
what	  was	  his	  name,	  Frank	  Kahn	  -­‐	  he	  was	  the	  director	  of	  public	  prosecutions.	  And	  we	  got	  on	  famously,	  
did	  some	  very	  interesting	  cases.	  Um	  and	  um	  we,	  you	  know,	  he	  wasn’t	  a	  pleasant	  guy,	  but	  he	  was	  









APPENDIX	  5A:	  EXTRACT	  ILLUSTRATING	  REPRESENTATIONAL,	  INTERACTIONAL	  AND	  
IDENTIFICATIONAL	  MEANINGS	  
Lecture	  2,	  paragraphs	  09	  –	  65.	  
009	   LECTURER:	  Now	  is	  there	  anybody	  who	  can	  start	  with	  Rex	  v	  Brown,	  is	  there	  anybody	  who	  
can	  give	  us	  the	  um	  facts	  in	  Rex	  v	  Brown.	  [Two	  students	  a	  male	  and	  a	  female	  raise	  their	  
hands,	  L	  addresses	  the	  male]	  Yes	  yes	  your	  name?	  
010	   STUDENT	  4:	  I	  can	  try	  this	  …	  	  
011	   LECTURER:	  Yes	  yes	  you	  must	  try.	  This	  is	  what	  to,	  why	  you	  ….	  Your	  name?	  
012	   STUDENT	  4:	  [States	  name]	  	  	  
013	   LECTURER:	  [Repeats	  name]	  …	  Ok	  [student	  name]	  can	  we	  hear	  what	  you	  have	  to	  say?	  
014	   STUDENT	  4:	  Um	  there	  was	  a	  group	  of	  sadomasochistic	  homosexuals	  …	  
015	   LECTURER:	  OK	  now	  you	  must	  explain	  what	  all	  those	  words	  mean	  to	  us,	  we	  don’t	  know	  
what	  that	  means.	  	  
016	   STUDENT	  4:	  All	  right	  ….	  
017	   LECTURER:	  What	  is	  a	  homosexual?	  	  
018	   STUDENT	  4:	  Um,	  homosexual	  is	  a	  man	  who	  has	  sexual	  interest	  in	  another	  man	  (said	  
with	  slightly	  mirthful	  expression).	  	  
019	   LECTURER:	  Can	  you	  have	  female	  homosexuals?	  
020	   STUDENT	  4:	  Course	  you	  can	  …	  oh	  well	  	  
021	   LECTURER:	  [Laughs	  together	  with	  whole	  class]	  A	  ha	  course	  you	  can	  ..	  its	  not	  so	  of	  
course.	  No,	  we	  call	  people	  who	  are	  interested	  in	  the	  same	  gender	  we	  call	  them,	  well	  the	  
popular	  name	  is	  gay	  but	  that	  also	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  bit	  problematic.	  But	  gay	  people,	  I’ve	  
heard	  people	  of	  this	  persuasion	  call	  them	  ‘queer’,	  the	  word	  ‘queer’	  is	  no	  longer	  
considered	  to	  be	  um	  offensive.	  Um	  queer	  legal	  theory	  is	  an	  acceptable	  word.	  But	  there	  
is	  this	  distinction.	  Homosexual	  is	  the	  word	  referring	  to	  men	  preferring	  to	  have	  sexual	  
intercourse	  with	  	  their	  uh	  own	  gender,	  men	  and	  men,	  and	  lesbian	  is	  where	  you	  have	  
female,	  um,	  variety.	  Ok?	  What	  is	  sadomasochist?	  
022	   STUDENT	  4:	  Um	  sadomasochism	  is	  like	  deriving	  pleasure	  from	  pain,	  as	  far	  as	  I	  
understand	  [looks	  to	  JL	  for	  approval]	  …	  
023	   LECTURER:	  Um	  hmmm	  its	  more	  complicated	  than	  that	  but	  lets	  go	  with	  that	  …	  
024	   STUDENT	  4:	  And	  this	  group	  of	  men	  willingly	  participated	  in	  the	  commission	  of	  acts	  of	  
violence	  against	  each	  other	  for	  like	  purposes	  of	  sexual	  pleasure.	  	  
025	   LECTURER:	  Umm	  Hmmm	  For	  how	  long?	  
026	   STUDENT	  4:	  Sorry?	  
027	   LECTURER:	  For	  how	  long?	  




029	   LECTURER:	  Yes	  for	  a	  long	  period.	  Its	  not	  something	  that	  they	  you	  know	  its	  not	  their	  first	  
try	  that	  they	  get	  to	  bed/together	  you	  know	  whatever	  they	  call	  themselves	  –	  the	  leather	  
fairies	  or	  whatever.	  They	  –	  it	  was	  for	  a	  very	  long	  time	  that	  they	  did	  this,	  once	  a	  month	  or	  
once	  a	  week	  its	  their	  social	  um	  social	  recreation.	  Uh	  huh?	  
030	   STUDENT	  4:	  And	  the	  passive	  partner,	  the	  victim	  in	  this	  case	  um	  consented	  to	  these	  acts	  
and	  also	  suffered	  no	  permanent	  injury.	  	  
031	   LECTURER:	  Mmm	  Hmmm	  	  
032	   STUDENT	  4:	  Also,	  these	  activities	  took	  place	  in	  private	  and	  were	  recorded	  on	  video	  tape.	  
Um	  The	  applicants	  were	  tried	  on	  charges	  of	  assault	  occasioned	  by	  actual	  bodily	  harm	  
and	  unlawful	  wounding.	  	  
033	   LECTURER:	  OK	  now	  [student	  name],	  you’ve	  made	  a	  huge	  leap	  now	  ne?	  Um,	  you’ve	  said	  
they’re	  doing	  this,	  um,	  they	  they’re	  doing	  all	  these	  things	  and	  then	  they	  were	  charged?	  
[Makes	  a	  questioning	  gesture]	  uh	  uh	  …	  there’s	  something	  in	  the	  middle…	  that’s	  missing.	  	  
034	   STUDENT	  4:	  Um,	  well	  obviously	  these	  activities	  were	  seen	  as	  /	  well	  obviously	  the	  
plaintiff	  or/	  
035	   LECTURER:	  Who’s	  the	  plaintiff?	  	  
036	   STUDENT	  4:	  The	  victim	  …?	  I	  don’t	  know,	  they	  didn’t	  say	  the	  victim’s	  name	  they	  just	  
referred	  to	  him	  as	  ‘Kay’	  
037	   LECTURER:	  No	  but	  the	  victim	  is	  not	  the	  plaintiff,	  he	  didn’t	  complain.	  
038	   STUDENT	  4:	  Was	  it	  the	  state	  that	  complained?	  [inaudible,	  lecturer	  starts	  laughing]	  What	  
I’m	  saying	  is	  whose	  the	  plaintiff,	  whose	  the	  defendant?	  
039	   LECTURER:	  By	  way,	  by	  way	  	  of	  speaking	  it	  was	  the	  state.	  It	  was	  a	  criminal	  case.	  Ok.	  I	  
think	  we’ve	  tortured	  you	  long	  enough	  ne	  and	  you	  don’t	  derive	  pleasure	  from	  this.	  What	  
about	  you?	  You	  wanted	  to	  say	  something?	  
040	   STUDENT	  3:	  Ah	  no	  I	  was	  just	  going	  to	  say	  we	  couldn’t	  really	  be	  sure	  who	  the	  plaintiff	  
was	  in	  this	  case.	  We	  knew	  there	  was	  …	  I	  kind	  of	  got	  a	  little	  bit	  confused,	  I	  knew	  that	  
basically	  it	  was	  the	  younger	  members	  of	  the	  group	  who	  were	  then	  brought	  into	  the	  
group	  under	  the	  age	  of	  21	  initially.	  	  
041	   LECTURER:	  Ja	  	  
042	   STUDENT	  3:	  But	  were	  now	  over	  21	  years	  old.	  And	  knew	  that	  they	  were	  the	  ones	  that	  
were	  ….	  
043	   LECTURER:	  Hurt	  
044	   STUDENT	  3:	  hurt	  
045	   LECTURER:	  No	  but	  um	  …	  	  
046	   STUDENT	  3:	  But	  I	  couldn’t	  understand	  who	  Rex	  was	  (confused	  smile).	  
047	   LECTURER:	  Who?	  Rex?	  
048	   STUDENT	  3:	  I	  couldn’t	  understand	  ,..	  It	  was	  Rex	  v	  Brown	  …	  
049	   LECTURER:	  [Laughs]	  ah	  ha	  you	  thought	  that	  Rex	  was	  one	  of	  these	  hairy	  old	  men	  that	  
[student	  carries	  on	  talking	  inaudibly].	  No	  Rex	  is	  the	  king	  my	  dear.	  Rex,	  that’s	  the	  Latin	  
for	  king.	  I’m	  sorry	  I	  should	  have	  told	  you.	  Uh	  its	  in	  England	  the	  case	  is	  in	  England	  so	  it	  is	  
the	  King	  versus	  Brown	  who	  was	  the	  perpe	  ..	  the	  main	  uh	  the	  main	  uh	  uh	  ring	  leader.	  But	  
I	  still	  wanted	  to	  know	  from	  the	  facts	  how	  did	  this	  case	  come	  to	  court?	  Yes?	  
050	   STUDENT	  14:	  Uh	  the	  police	  were	  investigating	  him	  for	  something	  else	  and	  they	  




051	   LECTURER:	  Um	  [looks	  quizzically	  at	  student]	  	  
052	   STUDENT	  14:	  [inaudible]	  
053	   LECTURER:	  No,	  I	  think	  that	  there	  were,	  there	  were	  complaints.	  The	  police	  were	  
investigating	  similar	  	  uh	  similar	  things	  and	  then	  there	  was	  a	  complaint	  by	  a	  neighbour	  of	  
noise	  from	  this	  from	  this	  uh	  from	  this	  house,	  And	  so	  the	  police	  there	  was	  a	  police	  raid	  
and	  that’s	  how	  they	  discovered	  it.	  Um	  …	  Yes?	  
054	   STUDENT	  4:	  How	  did	  the	  police	  come	  into	  possession	  of	  the	  tapes?	  
055	   LECTURER:	  No	  but	  they	  raided	  the	  house,	  they	  raided	  the	  house,	  that’s	  easy.	  That’s	  
what,	  that’s	  how	  I	  remember	  it,	  I	  could	  be	  wrong.	  Um	  uh	  but	  it	  was	  definitely	  a	  
neighbour	  complaining.	  	  
056	   OK,	  so	  the	  case	  is	  now	  before	  the	  court.	  What	  did	  the,	  what	  did	  the	  judge,	  what	  did	  say	  
or	  what	  did	  some	  of	  the	  judges	  say?	  [Student	  raises	  hand]	  Yes?	  	  
057	   STUDENT	  9:	  I	  wanted	  to	  ask	  you	  something	  because	  according	  to	  this	  it	  says	  in	  the	  trial	  
they	  were	  found	  guilty.	  Um.	  They	  pleaded	  guilty.	  	  
058	   LECTURER:	  Yes	  
059	   STUDENT	  9:	  Um	  the	  judge	  said	  that	  consent	  was	  not	  wasn’t	  a	  defence,	  wasn’t	  a	  decent	  
defence.	  Um	  and	  then	  and	  I	  wanted	  to	  ask	  you	  /can	  you	  /	  see	  /	  well	  this	  is	  what	  
happened	  /	  it	  seems	  strange	  that	  they	  pleaded	  guilty	  and	  then	  and	  then	  appealed	  that,	  
their	  conviction.	  Surely	  …	  are	  you	  entitled	  to	  appeal	  once	  you’ve	  pleaded	  guilty?	  
060	   LECTURER:	  Yes!	  No	  of	  course,	  it	  happens	  very	  often.	  No	  no	  no	  that’s	  quite	  /	  
061	   STUDENT	  9:	  It	  seems	  contradictory	  [continues	  inaudibly]	  	  
062	   LECTURER:	  Well,	  you’re	  opening	  a	  whole	  can	  of	  worms	  now	  because	  um	  uh	  uh	  towards	  
the	  end	  of	  the	  course	  we	  will	  do	  the	  difference	  between	  a	  review	  and	  an	  appeal	  and	  this	  
is	  also	  in	  England,	  they’ve	  got	  different	  rules	  than	  what	  we	  have	  in	  South	  Africa	  so	  I’m	  
not	  quite	  sure	  how	  it	  works	  but	  certainly	  if	  there	  is	  something	  fundamentally	  wrong	  in	  a	  
case.	  If	  [there	  are]	  things	  which	  have	  not	  been	  taken	  into	  consideration	  or	  if	  they	  think	  
that	  the	  judge	  made	  a	  mistake	  then	  of	  course	  you	  can	  appeal,	  even	  if	  you	  pleaded	  
guilty.	  And	  even	  after	  you	  pleaded	  guilty,	  you	  know,	  you	  had	  a	  change	  of	  heart	  you	  can	  
still	  appeal.	  It	  is	  a	  natural	  it	  flows	  naturally	  from	  a	  trial	  that	  you	  are	  entitled	  to	  an	  
appeal.	  Um	  so	  but	  don’t	  I	  forgot	  to	  tell	  you	  you	  know	  it’s	  a	  very	  long	  case	  and	  there	  are	  
many	  many	  things	  in	  the	  case	  and	  I	  didn’t	  want	  you	  to	  read	  the	  whole	  case	  I	  just	  wanted	  
you	  to	  read	  the	  [sneezes]	  sorry	  excuse	  me	  [sneezes	  again	  silently]	  	  
063	   Um	  so	  the	  important	  thing	  that	  I	  want	  you	  to	  take	  from	  this	  case	  is	  uh	  what	  the	  judge	  
said	  um	  and	  I	  can’t	  get	  the	  quotation	  right	  now	  but	  um,	  one	  of	  the	  judges	  said	  ‘look,	  
when	  we	  sit	  in	  judgment	  on	  a	  matter	  like	  this	  you	  don’t	  bring	  along	  with	  you	  your	  own	  
personal	  baggage.	  You	  don’t	  /	  because	  this	  is	  abhorrent	  to	  everything	  you	  stand	  for	  /	  
first	  of	  all	  you	  don’t	  agree	  as	  a	  judge,	  you	  don’t	  agree	  that	  males	  should	  have	  
intercourse	  with	  one	  another.	  That	  is	  something	  that	  is	  abhorrent	  to	  you.	  That’s	  not	  
strange,	  five	  years	  ago	  in	  this	  country	  it	  was	  against	  the	  law.	  That’s	  not	  strange	  at	  all.	  
But	  you	  don’t	  bring	  your	  personal	  subjective	  view	  to	  court.	  Secondly,	  you	  might	  find	  it	  
from	  a	  Christian	  point	  of	  view	  or	  from	  a	  decency	  point	  of	  view	  completely	  abhorrent	  
that	  uh	  people	  have	  to	  hurt	  themselves	  to	  …	  in	  order	  to	  get	  sexual	  gratification.	  That	  is	  
not	  relevant.	  What	  you	  think	  of	  it	  while	  you	  are	  uh	  busy	  with	  recreation	  with	  your	  family	  




one	  thing.	  What	  you	  must	  do	  when	  you	  sit	  in	  judgment	  on	  a	  matter	  like	  this	  is	  you	  must	  
look	  for	  the	  law.	  	  
064	   Now,	  granted,	  this	  was	  done	  in	  England,	  it	  was	  done	  in	  1993	  um	  it	  was	  not	  done	  in	  
South	  Africa	  where	  we	  have	  a	  beautiful,	  liberal	  Constitution	  and	  this	  case	  would	  have	  
been	  completely	  different	  in	  South	  Africa.	  But	  the	  point	  remains	  very	  clear.	  That	  when	  
you	  sit	  in	  judgment	  you	  do	  not	  bring	  your	  own	  ethics,	  your	  own	  religion,	  your	  own	  
morality	  to	  court.	  In	  this	  case	  they	  looked	  for	  the	  for	  what	  the	  law	  said.	  And	  the	  only	  
piece	  of	  legislation	  that	  they	  could	  get	  was	  the	  so-­‐called	  Offences	  against	  the	  Person	  Act	  
of	  1861.	  [licks	  lips]	  They	  then	  interpreted	  /	  what	  they	  did	  they	  interpreted	  this	  Act	  um	  
and	  they	  found	  in	  terms	  of	  this	  Act	  of	  1861	  what	  these	  men	  did	  was	  against	  the	  law.	  Um	  
you	  know	  and	  then	  you	  had	  many	  legal	  arguments	  as	  to	  whether	  you	  can	  have	  consent,	  
whether	  such	  an	  old	  law	  can	  still	  bind	  people	  etc	  etc	  but	  the	  fact	  is,	  the	  first	  station,	  the	  
first	  point	  of	  departure	  is	  you	  must	  apply	  the	  law	  as	  it	  is.	  That	  is	  the	  first	  rule	  of	  
positivism.	  Of	  course,	  uh	  in	  natural	  law	  its	  different.	  But	  the	  first	  rule	  of	  positivism,	  and	  
this	  is	  in	  England	  where	  positivism	  was	  uh	  uh	  discovered	  and	  it	  was	  the	  home	  of	  
positivism.	  And	  the	  rule	  that	  they	  have	  is	  that	  you	  look	  at	  the	  law	  as	  it	  is.	  Now	  …	  and	  this	  
brings	  us	  to	  /	  are	  there	  any	  questions	  about	  this	  case?	  Are	  there	  still	  things	  that	  people	  
don’t	  understand	  about	  this	  case?	  [No	  questions]	  	  
065	   It	  is	  a	  very	  good	  idea	  to	  go	  and	  read	  this	  case	  to	  see	  what	  your	  own	  feelings	  are.	  To	  see	  
how	  you	  react	  personally	  against	  this.	  And	  then	  to	  see	  what	  you	  feel	  uh	  what	  you	  feel	  
about	  the	  judgment.	  	  
